

Peace through Security:
Making Negotiated Settlements Stick

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Comments are welcome.

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Abstract: This paper presents an empirical challenge to the commonly-accepted wisdom that negotiated settlements are the best way to end civil wars. There are two problems with negotiated settlements. First, negotiated settlements account for only one-fifth of all civil war outcomes, thus the bulk of wars and their endings remain largely understudied. Second, wars ended by negotiated settlements are much more likely to recur than those ended by outright military victory. The paper shows that military victories, especially those attained by rebels, are not only more stable, but may help better promote democratization. The paper argues that rebel victories are more stable because they employ mechanisms of both harm and benefit to all parties in reconstructing the state. Negotiated settlements by contrast tend to include only mutual benefit, leaving mutual harm mechanisms aside. The implication being that without the possibility of mutual harm, negotiated settlements fail. The paper offers ways to integrate harm mechanisms into these settlements and thereby make them as robust as military victories.

Introduction

Civil wars are the most common sort of large-scale organized violence, accounting for nine of ten conflicts, and 17–33 million deaths since 1940.¹ This essay offers an empirical assessment of the consequences and costs of all types of civil war termination. Although its primary focus is empirical, it also introduces an explanation for why enduring peace and positive postwar reconstruction tend to follow civil wars ended by a military victory more often than civil wars ended by negotiated settlements.

Given the apparent fragility of negotiated settlements, and the destructiveness that follows a war's re-ignition, there has been little written on the subject of what happens after civil wars end. Most scholarship and policy making to date has simply taken negotiated settlements as a necessary starting point and then focused on the difficulties of arranging settlements or on problems associated with bargaining under incomplete information or commitment problems.² A survey of the literature shows that ninety to ninety-five percent of the articles written in the last decade focused on negotiated settlements.³ These studies have sought to understand how to get the parties to the bargaining table to begin with,⁴ how to get them to sign onto the agreement⁵ and what factors make these agreements stick.⁶

¹ Estimates vary widely as some sources include civilian deaths resulting from drought and famine, while others include only military deaths. Based on my own dataset of all civil wars since 1940, the total number of deaths from civil war ranges from 14 million to 33.1 million. Appendix 1 provides a complete list.

² Commitment and asymmetric information problems are only two of three main obstacles to non-violent dispute resolution. The other is issue indivisibility. Issue indivisibility has only recently been taken up by international relations scholars. See for example, Toft, 2002 and 2003; and Goddard 2002. For applications of asymmetric information generally see, Fearon 1995 and commitment problems to civil war see Posen 1993, Fearon 1998, Walter 1997, 1999, and 2002.

³ Based on an assessment of articles published in seven leading international relations and comparative politics journals—*American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *International Organization*, *International Security*, *Security Studies*, and *World Politics*—from 1990 through 2000.

⁴ Zartman 1995 and Stedman 1997.

⁵ See Maynes 1993 and Walter 1995, 1997 and 2002.

⁶ Montville 1990, Sisk 1996, Paris 1997, Atlas and Licklider 1999, Hartzell 1999, Sambanis and Doyle 2000, Spears 2000, Hartzell et al 2001, Cousens and Kumar 2001, Bekoe 2002, Stedman, Rothschild and Cousens 2002, Downes, 2003.

There is no question that the topic of how to secure a negotiated settlement is an important one; and one worthy of a sustained research program. But we also need a sustained research program capable of explaining variation in war termination *outcomes*. Some civil wars end and stay ended while others re-ignite. Some civil wars are followed by healthy reconstruction and political liberalization, while others, even when they do not re-ignite, are followed by years of desultory destruction, corruption, mass abuse of citizenry and autocratic rule. What, if anything, explains the variation?

I argue that both negotiated settlements and military victories contain the key elements of a durable peace; but that neither type contains all the needed elements to achieve this important aim. In short, negotiated settlements have excelled at providing adversaries with positive incentives (benefit) to maintain cease-fires and work toward unity, but have proven weak at providing negative incentives (harm) beyond the vague collective good of “no more violence.” Military victories, by contrast, have excelled at providing negative incentives to potential adversaries following a civil war, but, with one striking exception—rebel victories—have tended to be lacking in the provision of positive incentives to former rebels. In short, I argue that for settlements to endure and facilitate liberal political institutions, they must contain the promise of harm and benefit or they will either collapse, or if they hold, they will result in increasing authoritarianism and grievances capable of producing war.

The remainder of this paper consists of three sections. In the next section I present an assessment of current explanations. The third section presents a set of descriptive statistics about the civil war outcomes in historical perspective, followed by two statistical tests on war recurrence and the duration of peace. In the section following I introduce a theoretical framework to explain why military victory, especially those attained by rebels, may be more stable and how the factors might be applied to negotiated settlements in an effort to make these latter types of settlements more robust. The fourth and final section discusses the implications of the findings.

Literature

The idea that how a civil war ends may determine long-term post-war outcomes is not new. Both Edward Luttwak and Richard Wagner have advanced the argument that allowing wars to “reach their natural conclusion” furthers the collective good of durable peace and effective postwar reconstruction.⁷

In “Give War a Chance,” Luttwak argues that “the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention”.⁸ But independent of a few problematic historical cases, Luttwak does not explain what he means by “transformative effects” or “exhaustion.”

Wagner argues that military victories should be more stable than negotiated settlements for balance of power reasons: with one side defeated, the loser’s capacity to re-ignite a war should be low. Although this is a sound hypothesis Wagner does not test it. In a later article, Licklider subjects what he calls the “Wagner hypothesis” to a statistical test. Licklider found that indeed military victories were far less likely to be followed by war re-ignition than negotiated settlements.⁹ Despite this important finding, no scholar has expanded on this work by measuring either the finding’s robustness or offering a general explanation.¹⁰ The title of the article—“The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993”—itself suggests why: it reduces military victories to an analytically unimportant role.

The subject of effective civil war termination—or lasting peace—is important for at least three reasons. First, and in terms of international relations theory, the “let it burn” argument forces us to confront how we as international relations scholars and foreign policy makers should best think about the costs and consequences of war. If we measure the collective good in terms of a lasting

⁷ Luttwak 1999 and Wagner 1993.

⁸ Luttwak 1999, p. 44.

⁹ Licklider tests the “Wagner Hypothesis” using a simple cross tabulation. The basic relationship that Wagner proposes was confirmed, but the underlying reasoning was not tested. Licklider 1993.

¹⁰ This hypothesis has also been advanced to explain interstate stability as well. See for example, Blainey 1988.

peace, a systematic and general reduction in the destructiveness of war, and robust postwar economic development, then all other things equal the let it burn argument must be taken seriously. If, by contrast, scholars and policy makers must consider the *justice* of a potential military, political, or economic intervention, then the let it burn argument calls attention to the impossibility of either non-intervention or axiomatic intervention as general policy prescriptions.

Second, and in terms of foreign policy, civil wars themselves are nasty in terms of the quantity and quality of destructiveness they cause. As a category of war, for example, internal wars have traditionally been less subject to regulation and limitation by treaties such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions than interstate wars. Until 1977—when additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 protecting “national liberation movements” came into force—this meant that incumbent governments were largely not limited in the amount or nature of force they could apply in efforts to defeat “rebels.”¹¹ To this nastiness should be added the tendency of many civil wars to escalate to interstate wars; either by spilling over from one state to others,¹² or by provoking or suffering external intervention, both interested and disinterested.¹³

Third and finally, a great deal of contemporary policy-making in the resolution of civil wars is dedicated to the advancement of democratic institutions and rehabilitation of the economy.¹⁴ The belief being that by giving former combatants a future voice in their political, economic, and social destiny, ballots can replace bullets and violence can be averted. This factor alone may explain the excessive focus on negotiated settlements, because by allowing all former combatants a say in the future configuration of the government they allow a democratic process to lead to

¹¹ See, in particular, Draper 1979.

¹² Although Saideman found that civil wars tended not to spillover into other states in terms of violence, civil wars nevertheless lead to a good deal of disruption through closure of transport routes or refugees flows to neighboring states (Saideman 1998). On spillover problems associated with civil wars see, Ryan 1990.

¹³ For one of the best treatments of the difficulties associated with international intervention see Betts 1994 and 1995. Also see Duner 1981 and 1983, Clemens 1993, Regan 1996 and 2000, O’Hanlon 1997, Hampson 1997, Gottlieb 1994, Heraclides 1990, and Lang 2001,

¹⁴ See for example Harris and Reilly 1998, Hartzell and Hoddie 2002 and Dubey 2002.

democratic institutions. But this plausible argument deserves empirical testing: how well do termination types correlate with long-term outcomes?

In sum, this essay seeks first, to supply a clearer understanding of the empirical reality of civil war termination outcomes; and second, to evaluate the most logical explanations for such correlations on the way toward building a general theory of civil war termination outcomes. Each of the potential war terminations—negotiated settlement, military victory, or stalemate/ceasefire—have their logical upsides and downsides. But, what is the empirical reality, how can this be explained, and what implications flow from the explanation(s)?

A statistical assessment of civil war termination

In this section I present two sorts of empirical evidence as a test of the “give war a chance” thesis. The independent variable is type of civil war outcome and the dependent variable is war recurrence and peace duration. The analysis presents a series of descriptive statistics about the character of civil war termination since 1940, correlations among key variables, and logit and hazard models. The logit model assesses whether war recurred and the factors associated with recurrence, while the hazard model examines the duration of the peace.¹⁵ This statistical section concludes with an analysis of levels of democracy/authoritarianism and economic growth following civil war in relation to termination types.

Before turning to the statistics, three terms require definition: (1) negotiated settlement; (2) ceasefire/stalemate; and (3) military victory.

By *negotiated settlement*, I mean an ideal-type war termination in which neither side admits defeat and combatants agree to end the violence and accept common terms on how a postwar state should be governed. A party external to the war may help to halt the violence and arrange a

¹⁵ While the logit analysis allows us to see whether the types of war outcomes are associated with the recurrence of war, hazard models (also called duration or event history models) allow us to determine the impact of independent variables on the probability that peace will fail at a given moment in time. Hazard models allow the retention and analysis of cases that have yet to fail (thus increasing the n and reducing the errors) and for not requiring us to specify beforehand the distribution of the time event (in this case, war recurrence.) For excellent discussions of hazard models, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997 and Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001.

settlement of conflict issues. The party may be another state, a regional or international organization such as the United Nations or Organization of African Unity, or a non-governmental organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. However, a third party is not required for an ending to be coded a negotiated settlement.

Ceasefire/stalemate is similar to negotiated settlements in that the parties agree to halt the violence. However, unlike negotiated settlements, *ceasefire/stalemates* do not involve agreement on the form of government that will be instituted or who will hold its offices. The agreement simply ends the violence.

By *military victory*, I mean an ideal-type war termination in which one side explicitly acknowledges defeat and surrenders. The surrender terms need not be unconditional, although the closer to that degree they approach, the closer to the ideal-type the victory will be.

The aim here is to learn whether there is a statistically significant relationship between civil war termination types and longer-term outcomes. However, before arriving at that series of tests, I present a number of other relevant empirical facts about civil wars and how they end. Data analyzed here were collected in a data set including all civil wars fought from 1940 to 2000. In order to be included in the data set a civil war had to meet six criteria:

1. The focus of the war was control over which group would govern the political unit.
2. There were at least two groups of organized combatants.
3. The state was one of the combatants.
4. There had to be at least 1000 battle deaths per year on average.
5. The ratio of total deaths had to be at least 95 percent to 5 percent, meaning the stronger side had to have suffered at least 5 percent of the casualties.
6. The war had to occur within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state or entity at the start of the war.

The first criterion centers on the notion of sovereignty and governance. In a civil war, the main objective of combatants boils down to the basic idea who will govern, with each side rejecting the legitimacy of the other (or others) to take control of the reins of government. The second indicates that there each side has to be organized and armed for the war. This criterion therefore

excludes spontaneous mob actions or riots, as in the Albanian pyramid crisis in 1997. The third criterion holds that the state has to be formally involved in the war. This criterion allows for the exclusion of communal conflicts, which involves warring ethnic groups. The fourth tries to capture the intensity of civil war as opposed to others types of violence such as riots, and smaller scale insurgencies. Adhering to this threshold requires the exclusion of such cases as Northern Ireland. The fifth captures the idea of a minimal capability of each side to conduct its military operation by inflicting casualties on the other side. This ratio criterion excludes massacres and genocides. The sixth and final criterion excludes wars between two sovereign states.¹⁶

The total number of wars that qualified for inclusion in the data set is 134. Of these, 117 ended at least five years prior to 2000, while 17 are still ongoing.¹⁷

Examining the number of wars that began in each decade, we find no real pattern of a decrease or increase in the number of wars. The average number of wars that started in each decade is about 22, with a high of 26 new wars in the 1970s to a low of 18 in the 1980s.

¹⁶ These six criteria are an amalgamation of criteria used by other scholars to define civil wars. For example, Licklider and Sambanis use a death threshold of one thousand total, as opposed to a yearly average. Furthermore, this data set includes wars that involved colonial struggles. Other data sets are inconsistent on this score (e.g. Licklider 1995, Sambanis and Doyle 2000, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Take, for example, the case of Russia and Chechnya, which is included in most data sets, but the war for Algerian independence is not. Licklider would probably argue that this war fails to meet part of his third criteria that “each side must have significant numbers of troops made up of local residents” (Licklider 1995, p. 682). The problem here is not with the criterion itself, but in its application across potential cases. In the case of Chechnya most of the fighting done by the Russian government side was federal troops sent down to Chechnya from Moscow. Local “Russians” did not fight in the war, rather they fell victim to the violence or fled. In Algeria, by contrast, French settlers engaged Algerians during the war for Algerian independence. Algeria better meets Licklider’s criterion than does Chechnya, yet it is excluded from his data set. To be consistent, wars that are commonly thought of as colonial wars are included in this data set. There are a total of 10 such wars included here. Furthermore other data sets use country years as their units of analysis (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, and Fearon and Laitin 2003). For a listing of the civil wars and summary statistics, see Appendix 1. The complete data set and codebook will be available online on the author’s website.

¹⁷ Five years is a standard period to delineate the final and stable end of a war, as it typically allows for at least one election cycle. (cf. Licklider 1995, Walter 1997, Hartzell, 1999).

Table 1: Frequency of Civil Wars started, 1940–2000

Decade	Number	Percent of all ¹⁸	Cumulative percentage
1940	21	16	16
1950	24	18	34
1960	23	17	51
1970	26	19	70
1980	18	13	83
1990	21	16	100
total	133	100	

If we examine the number of wars ended per decade we do see that the 1990s saw far more wars ending than in previous decades.

Table 2: Frequency of Civil Wars ended per decade, 1940-1990

Decade	Number	Percent of all	Cumulative Percentage
1940	13	11	11
1950	21	18	29
1960	14	12	41
1970	22	19	60
1980	9	8	68
1990	38	32	100
total	117	100	

Table 2 reveals that peace broke out in the 1990s, with the termination of 38 wars, or one-third of all wars that began during the entire period. Military victories ended most civil wars (81 wars or 60 percent), followed by negotiated settlements (24 wars or 18 percent) and then ceasefires/stalemates (12 wars or 9 percent). Military victories were more than three times more likely than negotiated settlements and six times more likely than ceasefires/stalemates. However, when civil war termination types are broken down by decade some interesting trends emerge; as indicated in Table 3 below:¹⁹

¹⁸ Because of rounding they do not add up to precisely 100 percent.

¹⁹ The 17 ongoing wars are excluded here.

Table 3: Type of termination by decade, 1940–2000

	decisive victory n/%	negotiated settlement n/%	ceasefire/ stalemate n/%	Total number of wars
1940	12/92	0/0	1/8	13
1950	18/86	2/10	1/5	21
1960	11/79	1/7	2/14	14
1970	16/73	5/23	1/5	22
1980	9/100	0/0	0/0	9
1990	15/39	16/42	7/18	38
total	81	24	12	117

Table 3 shows that how civil wars end has changed dramatically through the decades since 1940. Whereas military victory was the dominant mode of ending civil war for most of the period—ending between three-fourths to all of wars up to the 1980s—by the 1990s, military victory ended only four of ten. Moreover, while negotiated settlements ended only a handful of wars between 1940-1989, by the 1990s they surpassed military victories, ending 42 percent of all civil wars. Moreover, two-thirds of all negotiated settlements ended during the 1990s. Ceasefires/stalemates ended an additional fifth during the 1990s, but only a handful in the previous decades.

Data in Tables 2 and 3 raise two immediate questions. First, what was it about the 1990s that explains the increase in civil wars ending by negotiated settlement? Second, if ending civil wars by negotiated settlement is becoming the preferred policy, – as shown clearly in Table 3 – *should* it be?

There is no space here for a comprehensive explanation of the sudden break out of “peace” in the 1990s, however, the most likely explanation is two-fold.²⁰ First, the end of the Cold War

²⁰ A complete treatment can be found in author, “End of Victory? The Changing Nature of War Termination,” February 2005. Also see Page Fortna, “Where have all the Victories Gone?” paper

deprived the United States and Soviet Union of the incentive to provide cheap (or free) arms to combatants in proxy wars. Even for those combatants who wished to go on fighting, this performance would cause a lull while new sources of revenue to support further weapons acquisitions were arranged (e.g. Sierra Leone and Angola). Second, as the sole remaining superpower, the United States came under increasing pressure to take *moral* responsibility for ongoing civil wars, many of which it possessed the diplomatic, economic, or military capacity to halt outright. This pressure, which has continued, caused the United States (and some of its allies) to intervene to halt ongoing civil wars; especially those whose destructiveness threatened a U.S. national interest such as stability in Europe (e.g. the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s) or was calculated to be cheap and easy (e.g. Somalia in 1993).

Whether intervening to halt civil wars by negotiation is a good policy is at the center of inquiry here. There are a number of arguments for ending civil wars by negotiated settlement, but the most powerful is that a negotiated settlement would result in fewer deaths than a war ended by a decisive victory.²¹ The logic of this argument is that without a settlement the combatants would go on killing each other, perhaps even escalating the quality of violence along with the quantity. By negotiating an armistice and then settlement, negotiated settlements should therefore save lives.

If it is true that a war interrupted may save lives, it is equally true that combatants have strong incentives to avoid sharing power or other values with their adversaries, and in the absence of committed intervention by a third party, combatants are just as likely to use an armistice as an opportunity to recover and rearm in preparation for a future fight. In other words, negotiated settlements may have an increased likelihood of saving lives in the short term, but an equally increased likelihood of costing even more lives in the long run. By contrast, victories make re-arming by the losing side highly improbable. In addition, if combatants nearing defeat cannot

presented at the Annual International Studies Association Conference, March 1-5, 2005, Honolulu, Hawaii. Fortna attributes the change to improvements in peacekeeping in the 1990s.

²¹ Licklider 1995, p. 684.

assume that there will be a third party available to guarantee their security, they may give up sooner, thus sparing lives.²²

War Recurrence

As observed above, analysis of the data supports this particular critique of negotiated settlements.²³ Wars ended by military victory were nearly twice as likely to remain settled than those ended by negotiated settlement or a ceasefire/stalemate. Whereas only 12 percent (10 of 81) of wars ending in military victories recurred, 29.2 percent (7 of 24) of wars ending in negotiated settlements recurred and 33.3 percent (4 of 12) of wars that ended in ceasefires/stalemates recurred.²⁴ Put differently, wars ended by negotiated settlement are three times more likely to reignite than those ended by military victory. Embedded within this finding about the relative stability of military victories is the fact that victories achieved by rebels, as opposed to governments, are the most stable. In other words, it matters who wins. While 17.4 percent of wars (8 of 46) ending in a government victory recurred (still far less likely than negotiated settlements and ceasefires/stalemates), only 5.7 percent of wars (2 of 35) won by rebels recurred.²⁵

Somewhat paradoxically, negotiated settlements were as likely to break down as ceasefire/stalemates, and we expect ceasefires/stalemates to be the most precarious.

To get a fuller accounting of the relationship between civil war outcomes and the duration and quality of peace requires consideration of not only the key variables, but some control variables. In the literature on civil wars, there are some factors that seem to influence the likelihood of a

²² One might assume in such cases that the rebels are most likely to flee when they surrender, because traditionally (that is, especially prior to 1977), rebels have never enjoyed the full protections of International Humanitarian Law. Victorious incumbent governments have tended to deal extremely harshly with surviving rebels, who most often face exile and imprisonment at best, and torture and murder at worst.

²³ Doyle and Sambanis (2002) found a related, but contradictory finding: settlements enhanced peace-building between the combatants. This finding supports a different question which deals with the quality of peace rather than its absence or duration.

²⁴ This finding is statistically significant—Chi2 9.98 (3), $p > .01 < .05$; 3 of 8 (37.5%) cells with expected frequency less than 5.

²⁵ This finding is statistically significant—Chi2 12.03 (4), $p > .01 < .05$; 3 of 10 (30%) of cells with expected frequency less than five.

given type of civil war settlement and its duration. Five factors stand out and serve as control variables for this analysis. They are whether the war was (1) identity-based;²⁶ (2) a fight over territory;²⁷ (3) the death toll; (4) the duration; (5) and external intervention. The first two factors involve the quality of the war and the factors over which the combatants were fighting. Did the fight center on concerns of identity and cultural survival, and/or was territory the focus of the fight? As some research has indicated, identity and territory are often perceived as indivisible and therefore less amenable to negotiation.²⁸ If true, then we should find these negatively correlated with negotiated settlements. The remaining three factors look at the intensity of the fight. William Zartman (1995), for instance, argues that hurting stalemates should make the parties more willing to negotiate, thus, we should see high casualty counts and long wars associated with negotiated settlements. The last control variable is included because of the important question about whether outside parties *should* intervene. Does outside intervention make wars last longer or make a particular type of settlement more likely?

To better assess the relationship among these factors, I first estimated a model using logit. The first table below presents the results for the five types of war termination—military victory (MILVIC), negotiated settlement (NEGSET), stalemate/ceasefire (STALCEAS), military victory by government (MVGGOV), and military victory by rebels (MVREB) with civil war recurrence—“0” indicating no recurrence and “1” indicating recurrence—serving as the dependent variable, along with the five control variables. This table demonstrates both the effects of war termination types and the control variables on war recurrence. Given that the coefficients of a logit model are not directly interpretable as unit changes on the dependent variable (as they would be in a linear regression), I have included first differences. First differences demonstrate the effect of war

²⁶ A war was coded a “1” if the combatants did not share a common culture, ethnicity, religion, or language, as in former Yugoslavia with Bosnian Muslims fighting Orthodox Christian Serbs and Catholic Croats. It was coded “0” if the belligerents shared a common identity as in Afghanistan.

²⁷ A war was coded “1” if the fight was over control of territory, as in former Yugoslavia and “0” if the fight was for control of the government, as in Afghanistan.

²⁸ See Toft 2003. Also see Licklider 1995 and Kaufmann 1996 and 1997. Sambanis (2000) found that partition is more likely to follow ethnic/religious wars.

termination type on the probability of war recurrence, holding the control variables at their mean.

Table 4 reports the results:

Table 4: Logit Results of Civil War Termination Type on Recurrence

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	First Diffs
military victory	-1.07 (.485)	-	-	-	-	-.132
negotiated settlement	-	1.64 (.662)	-	-	-	+.259
stalemate/ceasefire	-	-	1.22 (.765)	-	-	+.210
military victory: government	-	-	-	-.176 (.503)	-	-.014
military victory: rebels	-	-	-	-	1.32 (.796)	-.108
identity	1.924 (.746)	2.032 (.785)	2.066 (.736)	2.074 (.756)	1.847 (.725)	-
territorial war	-.937 (.565)	-.704 (.601)	-1.225 (.612)	-.902 (.556)	-.949 (.556)	-
total deaths on average	-8.66e-08 (5.53e-07)	7.88e-08 (6.16e-07)	-1.01e-07 (5.38e-07)	-1.12e-07 (6.33e-07)	8.05e-08 (5.56e-07)	-
intervention 2	.338 (.486)	.309 (.511)	.350 (.496)	.452 (.474)	.486 (.479)	-
duration (years)	-.085 (.047)	-.096 (.039)	-.047 (.043)	-.060 (.0445)	-.064 (.045)	-
constant	-1.60 (.634)	-2.727 (.637)	-2.564 (.562)	-2.485 (.548)	-2.14 (.574)	-

N = 126 in all models
 p<0.1 in *italic*, p<0.05 in **bold**.
 Standard errors in parantheses. They are Huber/White robust standard errors.

Table 4 reveals that military victory reduces the likelihood of war recurrence by 13 percent, while negotiated settlements increase the likelihood of recurrence by 26 percent and both are statistically significant. I also controlled for decade by using dummy variables for the 1940s–1990s and found that my results were actually stronger. In other words, there is no pre-Cold War or post-Cold War effect on the likelihood of recurrence of war by termination type. Military victory doubles the dampening effect, meaning that regardless of time period, military victory decreases war recurrence by 24 percent. Negotiated settlements remain about the same, while stalemates/ceasefires increase war recurrence by 40 percent. Moreover, if we disaggregate which side won in the military victory, we find that military victory by rebels decreases the likelihood of

recurrence by 11 percent, while the effect of government military victories turns out not to be statistically significant at the 0.1 level.

The next table presents the same logit model but shows the relevant first differences for the other independent or control variables, in some cases combined with the first differences for the war termination-type variables. The dependent variable remains war recurrence.

Table 5: First differences of independent and control variables

	military victory	negotiated settlement	stalemate/ ceasefire	military victory: government	military victory: rebels
identity	+ .182	+ .191	+ .206	+ .208	+ .173
identity + war termination type	+ .078	+ .496	+ .460	+ .187	+ .045
-identity + war termination type	- .332	- .036	- .093	- .222	- .265
	military victory	negotiated settlement	stalemate/ ceasefire	military victory: government	military victory: rebels
territorial war	- .099	- .074	- .137	- .103	- .098
territorial war + war termination type	- .243	+ .149	+ .013	- .115	- .199
	military victory	negotiated settlement	stalemate/ ceasefire	military victory: government	military victory: rebels
duration (years) 1-5	- .047	- .056	- .026	- .033	- .034
duration (years) 1-10	- .090	- .106	- .051	- .064	- .066
duration (years) 1-20	- .137	- .159	- .080	- .101	- .104

Using the top-left square as an example, the results can be interpreted as follows: a shift from a non-identity-based conflict to an identity-based conflict in Model 1 (the regression containing “military victory”) leads to a 18.2 percent increase in the probability of war recurrence. Continuing with the same column, “identity+war termination type” (the independent variable) shows the effect on recurrence of a change from a non-identity to an identity-based war *plus* the

change from no military victory to a military victory is associated with a 7.8 percent increase in the likelihood of war recurrence (although this result is not significantly significant at the 0.1 level). Continuing down the column, “-identity+war termination type” looks at the change from an identity-based war to a non-identity-based war *plus* the change to a military victory is associated with a 33.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of war recurrence.

In terms of magnitude of impact, the most important results are as follows. The likelihood of war recurrence:

1. Decreases 33.2 percent given a military victory and a non-identity war.
2. Decreases 24.3 percent given a change to a military victory and a change to a territorial war.
3. Increases 49.6 percent given a negotiated settlement and an identity-based war.
4. Increases 46.0 percent given a stalemate/ceasefire and an identity-based war.

Finally, there is the general pattern of war duration on the likelihood of war recurrence. In the “military victory” and “negotiated settlement” cases the change between one and five years of duration is associated with a 5 percent decrease in the likelihood of war recurrence; one to ten years with around 10 percent and one to twenty years with around 15 percent.

These findings have interesting implications. For example, the first one tells us that – assuming war recurrence is a worse outcome than continued peace – military victory is a desirable outcome for ending non-identity and territorial wars as it reduces the chances of war recurring. Whereas, negotiated settlements and stalemates/ceasefires are not desirable outcomes to identity wars for the opposite reason, they increase the likelihood of war recurrence.

The logit analysis thus reveals a complex set of relationships. The bottom line is that it confirms the hypothesis that a negotiated settlement may be an undesirable outcome *if we seek to prevent war recurrence*. Military victories, on the other hand, appear to dampen the likelihood of war recurrence. Moreover, the results show that military victory by rebels has an even greater dampening effect on war recurrence than military victory by governments. These results are further confirmed below.

I now move to the hazard analysis, which shifts the dependent variable from war recurrence to the duration of peace. Table 6 shows the Cox proportionate hazard results. These should be interpreted with 1.00 as a baseline coefficient – that is, a coefficient of 1.00 means no effect on the hazard rate. The dependent variable is the combination of months from end of the first war to recurrence (although the coefficients need to be interpreted as effects on the hazard rate, that is, the likelihood of recurrence at a given time).

Table 5: Cox Proportionate Hazard Results for War Termination Type on Peace Duration

Variables	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5
military victory	.277* (.128)	-	-	-	-
negotiated settlement	-	2.941* (1.398)	-	-	-
stalemate/ceasefire	-	-	3.569** (2.441)	-	-
military victory: government	-	-	-	.640 (.282)	-
military victory: rebels	-	-	-	-	.298 (.233)
identity	8.055* (5.832)	7.829 (5.660)	9.982* (7.253)	10.062* (7.607)	7.345* (4.957)
territorial war	.358* (.169)	.467 (.256)	.229* .137	.333* (.160)	.354* .163
total deaths on average	1.000 (4.43e-07)	1.000 (5.24e-07)	1.000 (4.40e-07)	.999 (5.25e-07)	1.000 (4.74e-07)
intervention 2	.883 (.396)	1.086 (.463)	1.055 (.490)	1.178 (.533)	1.246 (.511)
duration (years)	.967 (.035)	.961 (.032)	.995 (.036)	.976 (.037)	.985 (.0363)
N=126. ** p<0.1, * p<0.05. Standard errors are Huber/White robust standard errors.					

Examining the top-left cell, military victory appears to reduce the hazard rate by 72.3%,²⁹ whereas (moving down-left diagonally) a negotiated settlement increases the hazard rate by nearly two hundred percent. Identity politics have a very large effect on the baseline hazard, increasing the hazard rate by several hundred percent. Territorial war, on the other hand, decreases this hazard rate by between fifty and seventy-five percent. What this means is that following an identity war, war recurrence is more likely to happen and more likely to happen sooner. Territorial wars tend to have a longer duration of peace. The model also reveals that intervention, the number of deaths, and the duration of the war do not appear to have a significant

²⁹ Note that to interpret coefficients in hazard models, you need to subtract 1 from the coefficient. This will then provide the proportionate change in the hazard rate. Thus, the figure 72.3 percent comes from $.277 - 1 \times 100 = -72.3$ percent.

effect on the hazard rate. They are simply impacting whether the wars recur sooner rather than later.

In terms of implications, this confirms that empirically, negotiated settlements are more precarious than military victories, reconfirming the results from the logit analysis and descriptive statistics above.

If war recurrence – with its attendant increase in deaths, sacrifices in opportunity costs, renewed destruction of infrastructure, and possible escalation – represents a high cost, then negotiated settlements appear to be more costly than simply allowing two parties to a civil war to fight until one side surrenders.

But there may be other costs or benefits associated with negotiated settlements and the Civil War Dataset allows for some important comparisons. What if, for example, despite the higher hazard rate of war *recurrence* following negotiated settlements, the postwar environment following a negotiated settlement promotes greater democratization and economic growth? In other words, what if we face a trade off between a greater probability of violence re-emerging, but the potential for stable, free government and prosperity? The next section reveals that unfortunately such a tradeoff is non-existent. Negotiated settlements do not generally lead to greater democratization (lesser authoritarianism) or economic growth.

The fate of postwar politics and economics

What impact, if any, might the type of war termination have on the nature of postwar political institutions? The data allows us to test to see whether there is in fact a relationship.

In order to track regime types by differences in war termination types, changes in the level of democratization were estimated based on the POLITY variable from the Polity IV data.³⁰ The POLITY variable ranges from –10 to 10; a score of –10 corresponds to the most severe of authoritarian regimes with no democratic qualities, while a score of 10 corresponds to the most

³⁰ Polity IV Project. 2000. Polity IV Dataset. [Computer file; version p4v2000] College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.

democratic regimes with no authoritarian qualities. In the Civil War Dataset, three variables capture the average POLITY score following each war's termination:

- POL5AV represents the average POLITY score during the interval one to five years after war termination;
- POL10AV represents the average POLITY score during the interval six to ten years after war termination; and so forth.

If data for a particular interval were incomplete because of an incomplete time horizon (e.g., only 19 years have passed since the end of the war), the average was calculated using the data that were available for that interval.

An additional set of variables was created to measure the difference between average POLITY five, ten, and twenty years after war termination and the POLITY one year prior to the outbreak of war (PREPOL1):

- POL5AVDIF is the difference between the average POLITY score during the interval ending five years after war termination (POL5AV) and POLITY one year before the war started (PREPOL1);
- POL10AVDIF is the difference between the average POLITY score during the interval ending ten years after war termination (POL10AV) and POLITY one year before the war started (PREPOL1); and so forth.

Before presenting the analysis it is important to report some statistics about the level of democratization or authoritarianism among the states that experience civil war.

Generally speaking, civil war begins in states that display few democratic qualities. An assessment of the average polity scores³¹ before and at the outset of war in fact indicates a good deal of authoritarianism. For example, five years prior to the start of civil war, the mean score for these states was -2.62 and a slight *decrease* in authoritarianism as war approached.³²

³¹ Changes in the level of democratization were estimated based on the POLITY variable from the Polity IV data. The POLITY variable ranges from -10 to 10 : a score of -10 corresponds to the most severe authoritarian regimes with no democratic qualities, while a score of 10 indicates to the most democratic regimes with no authoritarian qualities.

³² This chart indicates a shift towards less repression as the war approaches, although repression increases just slightly during the year the war breaks out. This decrease in authoritarianism might be revealing these states' efforts at placating a discontented society. However, this "loosening up" argument goes only so far. As the war approaches, we do see the level of authoritarianism increasing ever so slightly. Such a dynamic lends credence to the idea that "liberalization" of the system is precarious as it might put too much stress

Table 7: Mean polity scores for all states, five years before to year war started

<i>Mean polity score</i>	
Five years prior	-2.62
One year prior	-1.55
Year war started	-1.67

These average polity scores are significantly lower than those for all states in the international system. Between 1990 and 2000, the average polity score for all states, which were members of the United Nations, was 1.96, or nearly four points higher.³³ Thus civil wars tend to occur within authoritarian states.³⁴

Although the data show that civil wars tend to plague authoritarian states, we still need to determine whether certain types of civil war outcomes are associated with varying degrees of democratization. In other words, is it the case that we are more likely to see military victories in states with greater authoritarianism? Is there a systematic difference in polity scores across the different types of settlements at the start of the war? Table 8 presents a chart of the mean polity score five years before the war broke out, one year before and the year of the war.³⁵

Table 8: Polity scores by Termination Type Before and at the Start of the Civil War

<i>War termination type</i>	<i>Average polity score</i>		
	<i>Five years before</i>	<i>One year before</i>	<i>Year of war</i>
military victory	-3.86**	-3.30**	-3.31**
negotiated settlement	-2.63	-1.00	-1.81
ceasefire/stalemate	4.00	4.43**	4.43**

on the system, leading to more calls for even more liberalization. Should these calls not be met, frustration sets in, repression picks up, and violence ensues.

³³ Calculated by author. An interesting note is that comparison of the average rates through this ten-year period shows that average polity scores increased two points, from .76 in 1990, 2.29 in 1995 and 2.83 in 2000. Although these scores nevertheless indicate that democracy is not the norm (most scholars use a score of “6” as their cutoff to indicate a full-fledged democracy), increasing levels of democratization in the last decade at the global level do seem a trend.

³⁴ Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al. (2001) show that anocracy makes conditions ripe for insurgents. Authoritarianism does not allow insurgents to emerge, while democratic states seem to allow grievances to be handled without resort to violence. For related theses and evidence, see Snyder 2000 and Laitin 2004.

³⁵ The tables that follow present t-tests for the significance of difference in means across the categories. So, for example, the upper left cell answers the question whether the average polity score for cases of military victory is statistically different from those cases that did not end in military victory. See the appendix for the supporting data.

military victory gov	-3.77	-2.78	-2.14
military victory rebels	-3.96	-4.05**	-5.35**

Two-tailed t-test for significance of difference in means, **p <.05, * p < .10

Table 8 shows that whether a state signs a negotiated settlement is unrelated to its polity score. Statistically speaking, democracies and authoritarian states are equally likely to experience a negotiated settlement. This is not the case, however, with ceasefires/stalemates, which were associated with states that are more democratic.³⁶ The opposite is true for military victories: the mean polity score for cases of military victory was substantially different (i.e. more authoritarian) than those cases not ended by military victory. Note that when we disaggregate between government and rebel victories, we find that this result is driven largely by rebel victories. What this means is that wars ended by rebel victory occur within more authoritarian states.


These are important findings. However, they do not answer the question of whether the level of democratization increases or decreases within states following the termination of the war.³⁷ To answer the question whether democratization or authoritarianism increases with a particular outcome, we need to consider the average change in polity scores after the war terminated. Here we get some interesting findings.

Figure 1 illustrates the difference between average POLITY score at the war's start and the average change in POLITY scores five to thirty years after the war terminated.

³⁶ Because there are so few cases, we need to be careful with how we interpret the findings related to ceasefires/stalemates.

³⁷ Moreover, it does answer whether democratization effects civil war recurrence. I included this factor in an earlier model; it had no effect.

Figure 1:³⁸



As Figure 1 shows, negotiated settlements are associated with greater levels of authoritarianism the further away we move from the end of the war. Although there is an increase in democratization initially, as evidenced by an average increase in almost three points in the average polity score, this change is short-lived, eventually giving way to increasing levels of authoritarianism. After five years it becomes clear that authoritarianism becomes the trend, a trend that is statistically significant. Such a finding reinforces the findings presented above about war recurrence. Cases that are susceptible to a recurrence of war seem to sink precipitously into authoritarianism as governments crack down to avert another round of fighting.

³⁸ See Appendix for supporting data.

Ceasefires do not seem to have an impact on the level of autocracy or democracy. The level of repression a state had at the start of the war is a good indication of what it will have after the war. However, we need to be careful here given that there are so few cases (4-7) to run the tests against.

If we consider military victory and its relationship with levels of democratization or authoritarianism following civil war, the relationship is a bit more complicated. As the table shows, there is a *decrease* in authoritarianism immediately following the war. Whereas the mean polity score is -3.86 five years before the war, five years after the war, the mean is $-.49$ and remains fairly constant beyond five years. Although still well within the range of authoritarianism, this is a large change. This finding seems to suggest that the winners of the war may be trying to accommodate the losers by allowing some voice in the government and perhaps avoid future conflict and the recurrence of war (i.e. consistent with the findings above).

However, although the logic of this story seems sound, it does not hold when we disaggregate military victories into those won by governments and those won by rebels. As Figure 1 shows, when governments win, levels of repression remain relatively constant. This makes sense if we consider that the government, the *same* government having just suffered a civil war, is wary of opening up the political space. A bit of good news is that even with the government victory these data do not indicate that these governments are cracking down even more harshly than they had at the start of the war.

Rebel victories paint a more positive picture. Following rebel victory, democratization increases. Furthermore, if we consider the level of democratization a year before the war and five years after, we find a change from a polity score of -5.35 to 1.14 . Although still within the authoritarian range, the point change is dramatic enough to indicate that repression eases for a good portion of the citizenry. In fact states with rebel victories perform better on average than all of the types on the democratization front (and it is statistically significant at the 20-year and 30-year marks). Given this finding, the cliché image of a civil war—a corrupt and tyrannical

government opposed by freedom-loving rebels—may not be entirely unfounded. When the “repressive” government wins, it goes on creating reasons for legitimate grievances, either from survivors of the previous fight or an entirely new set of actors. When “good” rebels win, by contrast, reforms are dramatic and far reaching, resulting in fewer grievances on the part of survivors.

In sum, the relationship between polity scores and termination types provides further evidence that negotiated settlements may not be the best way to secure democracy following a civil war: negotiated settlements are associated with greater authoritarianism over time. This finding is not only striking in and of itself, but is important for at least four reasons. First, it suggests that more “democratic” processes do not necessarily lead to more democratic outcomes. Although we do see a dramatic increase in the average polity score five years after the termination of wars by negotiated settlements, this change does not last (and it is mirrored in the other types of settlements as well). In all likelihood what is being captured here is the effect of elections, mandated by the settlement itself, and giving rise to the increase in the polity coding. Years later, however, once the first round of elections have come to pass and third parties have left, it seems that repression starts to increase. This is consistent with the finding presented above that negotiated settlements are more apt to lead to a recurrence of the war. Generally speaking, political dynamics seem to move in a decidedly negative direction. Second, any general explanation of the relationship between war termination types and durable peace and robust reconstruction will have to content with this finding, especially if democracy promotion and inclusion are the reasons that negotiated settlements are sought. Third, although negotiated settlements are precarious both in terms of recurrence and authoritarianism, these findings suggest, if only tentatively given the few number of cases, that ceasefires may be a better, albeit not permanent solution. Fourth and finally, although military victories in general may not have a positive impact on postwar civil liberties and freedom, military victories by rebels are associated with significantly reduced levels of authoritarianism.

Postwar Economic Reconstruction

We have just found that negotiated settlements do not necessarily lead to greater democratization. The next question is whether it leads to prosperity. This question can be answered if we use gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for economic development. Following the end of a civil war, we can measure the impact that a given war termination type has on the speed and magnitude of postwar economic reconstruction. The figure below shows percent change in gross domestic product (GDP) 5, 10, 20, and 25 years after the wars terminated, with the year prior to the outbreak of war as the benchmark. That is, the percent change in GDP five years after war termination is the GDP at the five-year benchmark minus GDP from the year prior to the outbreak of war. Likewise, the percent change in GDP ten years after war termination is the GDP at the ten-year benchmark minus GDP from the year prior to the outbreak of war. The results are illustrated in Figure 2:

Figure 2:³⁹




Figure 2 shows that economic growth or decline is unrelated to the type of civil war settlement. Most of the states that suffered civil wars followed the same trajectory, with little divergence.⁴⁰ The most divergence is among states with wars ended with military victories by rebels. This cases suffered a decline in GDP immediately following the war. However, by 10 years out, they recovered and displayed the same level of economic performance.

In sum, this combination of statistical analyses reveals that the type of settlement does impact the prospects for peace, democratization, and prosperity. First of all negotiated settlements are much more likely to recur. Second, negotiated settlements are no more likely to lead to

³⁹ See Appendix for supporting data.

⁴⁰ GDP trends 20, 25, and 30 years after war termination may be driven by the few observations in these categories, particularly China.

democracy than other type of settlements. In fact, rebel victories seem a better avenue for this.

Third, economic growth trends seem to be uncorrelated with the type of termination.

Theory/Argument: Mutual benefit, mutual harm

We started this essay by examining the Wagner hypothesis, which stressed that balance of power best explains why military victories result in the most stable outcome in ending civil wars. The destruction argument constitutes an important and logically consistent explanation for why a military victory might result in a longer lasting peace and a more stable base for a postwar recovery. The logic reduces to a single hypothesis:

The more completely an adversary's capacity to fight in a civil war is destroyed, the less likely war will recur.

With one side defeated, the defeated side's capacity to reignite the war is substantially reduced and thus the likelihood of war recurring is lower. In other words, if a military campaign destroys the adversary's capacity to fight, then the question of postwar resistance to the winner's policies cannot logically matter. "Victory," in such a case, would effectively leave the state with a single actor.⁴¹

There are at least two problems with this argument. First, destruction of the enemy is as logically plausible as it is empirically *rare*. Consider that by "destroy," we mean actually destroy (kill); rather than forcing the adversary to flee the state or imprisoning survivors and their leaders. In either of the latter two cases the nucleus of a future resistance (and possible terrorism or civil war) would remain. The Great Lakes region of Africa, especially Burundi, Congo, and Rwanda, exemplify this pattern.

Although one can readily think of examples of the successful destruction of losers by winners—Rome's destruction of Carthage after the Second Punic War, for example—cases after the Industrial Revolution are few. Advances in communications and transportation technology have made it more difficult to isolate and destroy mobilized resistance to the state's authority. Even

⁴¹ Wagner (1993) makes this case.

absolute states, such as Stalin's Soviet Union, proved unable to eradicate Chechens or Crimean Tatars (both accused of collaboration with the Germans in WWII), who today largely inhabit their ancestral homelands even after having been murdered, imprisoned, and eventually deported *en masse* to the Soviet hinterlands.

By contrast, a negotiated settlement by definition implies that one side will not only survive, but remain organized enough to share power in a postwar government. In some conflicts, this very survival represents a defeat for one side or another. Survivors may attempt to gain outside support for a future fight, or perhaps even undertake a demographic strategy, birthing future fighters at such a rate that in a few decades they have a real chance to gain control of the state by either political or violent means.⁴² The hope is the demographic balance will shift in their favor.

A second problem with the destruction argument is that it cannot explain most of the findings presented above. Although destruction does seem to support the basic finding about the fragility of negotiated settlements, it cannot explain why stalemates/ceasefires are more stable than negotiated settlements. Stalemates/ceasefires result in situations where both sides remain organized as separate political and military entities, poised to take up the fight if it comes to that. In other words, neither side has been destroyed, yet we observe a degree of stability not predicted by the destruction argument. Furthermore, destruction cannot explain why *rebel* victories are not only more robust, but also lead to greater democratization down the road than government victories. In other words, the destruction argument is necessary but not sufficient to explain some of the most important and intriguing of the findings.

An alternative explanation incorporates elements of the destruction argument, but adds to it. Although less parsimonious, the addition of a few additional elements allows us to explain far more of the empirical record.

⁴² See Toft, 2002 on this in the case of Israel.

Framework of Benefit and Harm

Another argument for the desirability of military victory over negotiated settlement focuses on the enhanced ability of outright winners to shape and consolidate postwar political, economic, and social institutions. The logic of this argument is that strong institutions make for positive postwar outcomes. Strong institutions, in turn, imply relatively unified action and consolidated resources, leading to a more stable, and perhaps paradoxically, more democratic system of government.

This line of argumentation follows the classic writings of Moore, Huntington, and Rustow on state formation; each of whom argued to varying degrees that the type of transition a state faced influenced (if not determined) the character of its political institutions and stability.⁴³ For Moore and Huntington (more or less), political violence is the midwife of democracy. In Moore's view it is the "violent destruction of political institutions that permits a society to take a new course."⁴⁴ A quick, violent transition allows for the emergence of democratic political institutions. A gradual transition leads to highly bureaucratized, authoritarian regimes, something which Moore argued against, "the assumption that gradual and piecemeal reform has demonstrated its superiority over violent revolution as a way to advance human freedom is so persuasive that even to question such an assumption seems strange." Nevertheless, he does question the assumption, making the case that "revolutionary violence may contribute as much to peaceful reform to the establishment of a relatively free society and indeed was in England the prelude to a more peaceful transformation."⁴⁵

⁴³ Moore, 1966; Huntington, 1968; and Rustow, 1967.

⁴⁴ Moore, 1966, p. 149. For similar sentiments see Huntington 1968, pp. 123 and 156.

⁴⁵ Moore, 1966, p. 20.

The same logic might apply to civil wars, whereby a military victory allows for a rapid transition and thus a greater likelihood of democracy, while a negotiated settlement stalls a transition and thereby inhibits the formation of democratic institutions.⁴⁶

Following a decisive military victory, one side gains control of all the state's resources, and crucially, the ability to set the political and economic agenda.⁴⁷ While it is true that even a relatively centralized actor may make mistakes—say, bad economic decisions—it is also generally true that it will gain advantages in recovering from mistakes. Moreover, the fact that the winners gain control of the military and police gives them an advantage in preventing the emergence or re-emergence of organized violence and crime. According to Huntington, creating a legitimate public order, in which the government is capable of controlling the governed, is the government's first and most important function.⁴⁸

By contrast, negotiated settlements by their very design leave a state's offices divided, both in terms of physical infrastructure and human capital. Both sides will have some say in a postwar state's government, and may demand partial control of the police and military. Key territory, including international borders, may become porous transit points for arms, drugs, contraband, or recruits. Thus although the chief public good of non-violence may be gained by negotiated settlement at a lower cost in the short term than military victory, the consolidation of security argument implies that this good may come, paradoxically, at the expense of the public good of an

⁴⁶ Similar arguments have re-emerged in the democratic transitions literature of the late 1980s and 1990s. The later transition theorists rejected these arguments on the grounds that they were teleological, setting forth trajectories for states that could not be escaped or designed around. The more recent theorists argued instead that democratic institutions could be fashioned regardless of a state's historical experience. The basic difference between the old school and the new school seems to boil down to difference about the relative role of structure versus agency. The old school stressed structure, while the new school stressed agency. Not surprisingly, the pendulum is swinging somewhat in the direction of structure again in recognition of the many stalled and failed transitions, especially since the end of the Cold War. See Pzeworski, 1995, Linz and Stepan, 1996, Schmitter and O'Donnell, 1996.

⁴⁷ This argument follows Charles Tilly's about the monopolization of violence in state formation. See Tilly, 1975 and 1985.

⁴⁸ Huntington, 1968, chapter 1.

effective postwar administration, one premised on the state's ability to maintain order.⁴⁹ Moore's sentiment that "There is a tendency... to underestimate the importance of control over the instruments of violence"⁵⁰ aptly captures what seems to be happening with negotiated settlements.

An examination of the postwar negotiated settlements that have ended civil wars are illuminating in this regard. Establishing a solid representative set of institutions is the objective. Most include extensive provisions for establishing executives, legislatures, free and fair elections, judiciaries, and the demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR) of the armed forces. The emphasis is to make soldiers into citizens by giving them money and resources to reintegrate them back into society. However, the means and methods to refashion and re-institutionalize the military—security sector reform (SSR)—is given only secondary consideration, or, if provisions regarding the police and armed forces are written into the agreements, then their implementation is provided with anemic resources.

Although discussions of DDR are commonly found in academic and policy research, security sector reform (SSR) has received little consideration in academic research and has only recently become a policy priority among policy-makers.⁵¹ Although the concept of SSR emerged in the late 1990s, it was not until Afghanistan that policy-makers set up a fund explicitly for SSR, finally recognizing the "vicious circle of security and reconstruction/development,"⁵² in which lack of reconstruction and development progress intensifies security problems and security problems inhibit meaningful reconstruction and development. Iraq initially seemed to represent a step backwards, when the United States disbanded the armed forces, leaving Iraq in the throes of

⁴⁹ This is a classically "statist" way of framing the issue. "Peace" and "stability" have often been used by tyrants as rhetorical proxies for injustice and oppression. Again, this analysis will force us to consider the extent to which we may arrive at a general policy prescription regarding intervention in civil wars.

⁵⁰ Moore, 1978, p.82.

⁵¹ What little academic research exists on SSR is largely hooked into current policy practices. See for example Hendrickson 1999, Ball 2001, and Smith 2001.

⁵² The fund's name is LOFTA (Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan) and is administered by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. Interview with German Ambassador Michael Schmunk, Cambridge, MA, December 2005. Schmunk has been one of the principle German officials in charge of post-conflict operations in Afghanistan.

civil war. It still remains to be seen whether Iraqi forces can be reconstituted in time to avert full-scale civil war and allow for American and coalition forces to leave.

Lack of attention to SSR can have devastating consequences. Following negotiated settlements, for example, a military is left to fend for itself and what often follows is the reemergence of *multiple* sets of militaries/militias/rebellion organizations ready to do the bidding of any political leader that can provide (or has provided) resources to sustain their vision of how to win.

Colombia stands as a case in point.⁵³ The government's policy for decades gave priority to hurting the rebels—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—over military victory. The idea was similar to that encountered in a strategic bombing campaign: raise the costs of resistance until the adversary agrees to come to the negotiating table. But after a number of failed negotiated settlements over decades, the military became frustrated with government negotiations and what they perceived as a lack of funds necessary to defeat the rebels.⁵⁴ Militias splintered off and now the government faces a whole new series of rebel organizations in addition to FARC, each sustained by an illicit drug economy. Only now, with American help under Plan Colombia, has the Colombian government committed itself to defeating the rebels (all of them) in an effort to consolidate the state's control over its territory and institutions.

The logic of this argument reduces to a single hypothesis:

The more unified a postwar political administration is, the less likely war will recur.

Yet “monopoly over the use of force” does not seem to be enough. The ability of one side to harm the other does not explain all of the findings. Although it might explain why military victories and stalemates/ceasefires are more stable than negotiated settlements, it cannot explain why rebel victories are more stable and result in more democratic outcomes than government victories. To explain this we need to add another dimension: the idea of benefit.

⁵³ For background reading on the history and war Colombia see, Bushness, 1993, Ruiz, 2001, and Safford and Palacios, 2001.

⁵⁴ Aviles, 2001.

A key strength of negotiated settlements is their credible promise to provide mutual benefit as a reward for continued compliance. The collective goods of (1) no more violence and (2) the opportunity to participate in an electoral process and a government that promises to represent and protect their interests in some form, are important benefits. However, where negotiated settlements fall short is in the credible promise to provide mutual harm should one or both sides in a settlement fail to comply.⁵⁵

This is one of the reasons that much of the literature stresses the need for third parties.⁵⁶ What third parties threaten to do is “harm” both or either side if the provisions of mutual benefits as outlined by the settlement are undermined. Yet third parties are often engaged only in getting the parties to the bargaining table, or in the immediate implementation stage. Furthermore, third parties are rarely accorded the right to impose the terms of the settlement by use of force or refuse to do so. Finally, not every war attracts enough international interest that third parties are willing to become engaged and stay engaged, especially militarily. Thus, even strong promises of intervention to enforce compliance are often not credible. The bottom line is that while negotiated settlements do well on the benefit side, they do poorly on the harm side and are *therefore* not self-sustaining.

Military victories by governments seem to suffer the opposite problem. The military is left intact, as are the other branches of government. Thus, the government retains the capacity to repress or harm the population. And indeed, we see this. The polity score of the government victories remains about as authoritarian at the start of the war and well into the future. Yet, although these victories are more stable than negotiated settlements and stalemates/ceasefires, they are not as stable as rebel victories.

The reason is that when rebels win they are in a position to not only harm (or threaten to harm) their population, but to benefit them as well. By the fact of winning, a rebel military organization

⁵⁵ For an analysis of implementing negotiated settlements following three centralist civil wars, see Bekoe, 2002.

⁵⁶ Cf. Walter, 1996.

remains capable of containing moves against its government. However, because it is a *rebel* organization it has to appeal not only to a portion of its domestic audience for approval, but to an international community not predisposed to the overthrow of existing governments. This is also consistent with why we see a move toward the greatest level of democratization following rebel victories. Rebels need to buttress the legitimacy of their win: allowing greater liberalization of the political system is an effective means. Rebel victories thus provide both key factors of potential harm and benefit.

The logic of this argument is summarized in the figure below:

Figure 3: Provision of harm and/or benefit and Civil War Termination

Types

Provision of Benefit?	Provision of Harm?	
	No	Yes
No	Stalemate/ ceasefire	Government Victory
Yes	Negotiated Settlement	Rebel Victory

If we consider the upper left quadrant, we can see that stalemate/ceasefires precludes either party from harming or benefiting the other. They have pulled back from the frontlines and there is no agreement about the form of government. Each side goes about its business, and as we saw, a relative peace does ensue.⁵⁷ Across the diagonal are rebel victories, where the rebels provide both harm and benefit, managing to provide a stable postwar environment, with democratizing trends. This is not the case for negotiated settlements: no provision is provided that guarantees that the threat of harm will be carried through are formally established and put in place. Although third

⁵⁷ For a timely analysis of states and state-like entities that result from such ambiguous settlements, see King 2001.

parties can help initially, once they leave (typically after the first election cycle), repression and violence follow.

Implications

In sum, negotiated settlements may lead to a political system of mutual veto in which little is accomplished, grinding government to a halt to the point that one of the parties becomes so frustrated that it imposes repressive measures to gain control, but without a military that is well-trained or professionalized.

So, the key question is how to move negotiated settlements from the lower left quadrant to the lower right. The mutual benefit/mutual harm thesis focuses on the specific *nature* of harm mechanisms. In the past, and currently, most negotiated settlements have been strong on the prospect for providing and maintaining benefits to parties in the government, but weak on provisions capable of ensuring harm. In addition to not considering how the allocation of offices and position might contribute to a situation in which the parties might be able to harm each other, the restructuring and professionalization of the armed forces have, more often than not, been left out of the agreements altogether. An exception that might prove the rule is the peace agreement that ended the war in El Salvador. This agreement provided for extensive reform of the military and police, reforms that were carried through. El Salvador is considered a successful negotiated settlement, with little prospect for a return to war.⁵⁸

Every war ends uniquely, and even a decisive military victory is a kind of negotiated settlement. However, by reducing the complexity of civil war endings we can see there is a general pattern relating how wars end to the peace that follows.

Wagner's argument that decisive military victories have a positive utility is strongly, though not unconditionally, supported. Peace following a decisive military victory lasts longer and the prospects for postwar development are better than for negotiated settlements. By contrast,

⁵⁸ See Williams and Walter, 1997, Wood, 2000 and Call, 2002.

negotiated settlements seem to cause postwar governments to become less democratic over time: the further out in time you go, the less democratic postwar political regimes become.

Several important policy implications follow. First, axiomatically supporting negotiated settlements is not sound policy because they generally do not last, and because very often when civil wars reignite they escalate the violence in either quantity or quality. If we truly value stability, democracy and development, then this analysis implies we should consider *what it is* about military victories—and in particular, military victories by rebels—that lends itself to durable, and normatively superior outcomes. In this paper I have shown that the key is setting up provisions in the settlements that insure that the parties can gain both benefit from cooperation *and* suffer real harm in case of defection.

Appendix I

List of cases and key variables

	<i>state</i>	<i>startyr</i>	<i>endyr</i>	<i>warterm</i> ⁵⁹	<i>recur</i>	
1.	USSR I	1942	1950	0	0	0
2.	Greece	1944	1949	0	0	0
3.	USSR II	1944	1952	0	0	0
4.	China I	1945	1949	1	1	0
5.	Indonesia I	1945	1949	1	1	0
6.	Israel/Palest	1945	1949	0	0	0
7.	Bolivia I	1946	1946	1	1	0
8.	India Ia	1946	1949	3	3	1
9.	Iran I	1946	1946	0	0	0
10.	Philippines I	1946	1954	0	0	0
11.	Vietnam I	1946	1954	1	1	0
12.	Madagascar	1947	1948	0	0	0
13.	Paraguay	1947	1947	0	0	0
14.	Burma I	1948	1989	0	0	0
15.	Burma II	1948	2001	4	4	0
16.	Colombia I	1948	1958	2	2	0
17.	Costa Rica	1948	1948	1	1	0
18.	India II	1948	1948	0	0	0
19.	Malaysia	1948	1960	0	0	0
20.	South Korea	1948	1948	0	0	0
21.	Yemen North I	1948	1948	0	0	0
22.	China IIa	1950	1951	0	0	1
23.	Indonesia II	1950	1950	0	0	0
24.	Korea	1950	1953	3	3	0
25.	Bolivia II	1952	1952	1	1	0
26.	Egypt	1952	1952	1	1	0
27.	Kenya I	1952	1956	0	0	0
28.	Morocco I	1952	1956	1	1	0
29.	Tunisia	1952	1956	1	1	0
30.	Indonesia III	1953	1959	0	0	0
31.	Algeria I	1954	1962	1	1	0
32.	China IIb	1954	1959	0	0	0
33.	Guatemala I	1954	1954	1	1	0
34.	Argentina	1955	1955	1	1	0
35.	Cameroon	1955	1960	1	1	0
36.	Sudan Ia	1955	1972	2	2	1
37.	Cuba	1956	1959	1	1	0
38.	India IIIa	1956	1975	2	2	1
39.	Vietnam II	1957	1975	1	1	0
40.	Indonesia IV	1958	1961	0	0	0
41.	Iraq I	1958	1958	1	1	0
42.	Lebanon Ia	1958	1958	2	2	1
43.	Burma III	1959	2001	4	4	0
44.	Iraq II	1959	1959	0	0	0
45.	Laos	1959	1973	2	2	0
46.	Burma IV	1960	1994	0	0	0
47.	Guatemala II	1960	1996	2	2	0
48.	Zaire/Congo I	1960	1965	0	0	0
49.	Angola I	1961	1974	0	0	0

⁵⁹ A coding of “0” indicates military victory for government, “1” indicates military victory for rebels, “2” indicates negotiated settlement, “3” indicates stalemate/ceasefire, and “4” indicates ongoing.

50.	Ethiopia I	1961	1993	1	0
51.	Iraq IIIa	1961	1970	2	1
52.	Yemen North II	1962	1970	1	0
53.	Algeria II	1963	1963	0	0
54.	Cyprus Ia	1963	1964	3	1
55.	GuineaBissau I	1963	1974	1	0
56.	Rwanda Ia	1963	1964	0	1
57.	Colombia II	1964	2001	4	0
58.	Mozambique I	1964	1975	1	0
59.	Burundi Ia	1965	1965	0	1
60.	Chad	1965	1997	2	0
61.	Domin Republic	1965	1966	2	0
62.	India Ib	1965	1965	3	1
63.	Indonesia V	1965	1966	0	0
64.	China III	1966	1969	1	0
65.	Namibia	1966	1990	2	0
66.	Uganda I	1966	1966	0	0
67.	Nigeria I	1967	1970	0	0
68.	Philippines II	1969	2001	4	0
69.	Cambodia Ia	1970	1975	1	1
70.	Jordan	1970	1971	0	0
71.	Pakistan I	1971	1971	1	0
72.	Sri Lanka Ia	1971	1971	0	1
73.	Bangladesh	1972	1997	2	0
74.	Burundi Ib	1972	1972	0	1
75.	Philippines IIIa	1972	1996	2	1
76.	Zimbabwe	1972	1979	2	0
77.	Chile	1973	1973	1	0
78.	Pakistan II	1973	1977	0	0
79.	Cyprus Ib	1974	1974	3	0
80.	Iraq IIIb	1974	1975	0	1
81.	Angola IIa	1975	1994	2	1
82.	Ethiopia II	1975	1991	1	0
83.	Indonesia VI	1975	1999	2	0
84.	Lebanon Ib	1975	1990	0	0
85.	Morocco II	1975	1991	3	0
86.	Mozambique II	1976	1992	2	0
87.	Ethiopia III	1977	1978	0	0
88.	Afghanistan I	1978	2001	4	0
89.	Cambodia Ib	1978	1991	2	0
90.	Iran IIa	1978	1979	1	1
91.	Nicaragua	1978	1990	2	0
92.	El Salvador	1979	1992	2	0
93.	India IIIb	1979	1997	3	0
94.	Syria	1979	1982	0	0
95.	Iraq IIIc	1980	1991	1	0
96.	Nigeria II	1980	1984	0	0
97.	Peru	1980	1999	0	0
98.	Uganda II	1980	1986	1	0
99.	Iran IIb	1981	1982	0	0
100.	India IV	1982	1993	0	0
101.	South Africa	1983	1994	2	0
102.	Sri Lanka II	1983	2001	4	0
103.	Sudan Ib	1983	2001	4	0
104.	Turkey	1984	2001	4	0
105.	Yemen South	1986	1986	1	0
106.	Sri Lanka Ib	1987	1989	0	0
107.	Azerbaijan/USSR	1988	1994	3	0
108.	Burundi Ic	1988	1988	0	1
109.	India Ic	1988	2001	4	0
110.	Somalia	1988	2001	4	0
111.	Liberia	1989	1997	1	0
112.	Romania	1989	1989	1	0
113.	Georgia I	1990	1992	3	0

114.	Rwanda Ib	1990	1994	1	0
115.	Burundi Id	1991	1991	0	1
116.	Iraq IV	1991	1993	0	0
117.	Moldova	1991	1997	3	0
118.	Sierra Leone	1991	2001	4	0
119.	Yugoslavia I	1991	1995	2	0
120.	Algeria III	1992	2001	4	0
121.	Georgia II	1992	1993	3	0
122.	Tajikistan	1992	1997	2	0
123.	Yugoslavia II	1992	1995	2	0
124.	Brazzaville Ia	1993	1993	2	1
125.	Burundi Ie	1993	2001	4	0
126.	Russia Ia	1994	1996	3	1
127.	Yemen	1994	1994	0	0
128.	Zaire/Congo II	1996	2001	4	0
129.	Brazzaville Ib	1997	1997	1	0
130.	Angola IIb	1998	2001	4	0
131.	GuineaBissau II	1998	1999	1	0
132.	Yugoslavia III	1998	1999	1	0
133.	Russia Ib	1999	2001	4	0
134.	Philippines IIIb	2000	2001	4	0

Summary statistics of key variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
startyear	134	1969.179	16.46452	1942	2000
endyr	134	1977.41	18.67337	1946	2001
warterm	134	1.395522	1.371124	0	4
recur	134	.1567164	.3648973	0	1
category	134	.6343284	.4834252	0	1
polpre1	95	-1.547368	6.516376	-10	10
polpre5	91	-2.626374	6.558537	-10	10
polity0	97	-1.670103	6.602906	-10	10
polity5avdif	80	.5	6.41004	-15	14
polityav10~f	66	-.3181818	6.732605	-15	16
polity20av~f	51	-.8431373	5.558318	-15	16
polity30av~f	44	-1.386364	6.195332	-15	13
gdpstartyr	60	4.21e+10	8.22e+10	2.17e+08	4.13e+11
gdpdiffdur~r	60	.3333333	.8765624	-1	3
gdpdiffpost5	43	.255814	.7588532	-1	2
gdpdiffpo~10	29	.5517241	.6858887	-1	2
gdpdiffpo~15	20	1.1	.7880689	0	3
gdpdiffpo~20	17	1.705882	1.212678	0	5
gdpdiffpo~25	16	2.375	2.334524	-1	9

Appendix 2

Pre-war Polity score and Post-war Change in Polity Score by War Termination Type

	Average	Negset	Milvic	MV-Gov	MV-Reb	Stalceas
Polpre5	-2.63 (91/ 6.56)	-2.63 (16/ 5.82)	-3.86 (56/ 5.98)	-3.77 (31/ 6.26)	-3.96 (25/ 5.74)	4 (4/ 8.72)
Polpre1	-1.55 (95/ 6.52)	-1 (20/ 6.18)	-3.3 (54/ 6.05)	-2.78 (32/ 6.14)	-4.05 (22/ 5.98)	4.43 (7/ 6.24)
Polity 0	-1.67 (97/ 6.6)	-1.81 (21/ 6.57)	-3.31 (55/ 6.01)	-2.14 (35/ 6.4)	-5.35 (20/ 4.73)	4.43 (7/ 6.4)
Polity5avdif	0.5 (80/ 6.41)	2.95 (20/ 8.44)	-0.49 (53/ 5.73)	-1.65 (31/ 4.62)	1.14 (22/ 6.79)	1 (7/ 1.29)
Polity10avdif	-0.32 (66/ 6.73)	0.38 (13/ 10.52)	-0.69 (48/ 5.8)	-1.84 (31/ 5.01)	1.41 (17/ 6.67)	1.4 (5/ 1.52)
Polity20avdif	-0.84 (51/ 5.56)	-4.86 (7/ 7.01)	-0.32 (41/ 5.25)	-1.73 (26/ 4.27)	2.13 (15/ 6.01)	1.33 (3/ 2.08)
Polity30avdif	-1.39 (44/ 6.2)	-6.67 (6/ 7.61)	-0.71 (35/ 5.81)	-1.86 (22/ 5.63)	1.23 (13/ 5.81)	1.33 (3/ 2.08)

* No. of observations/ Std. Deviation given in parentheses

Baseline year of comparison for all post-war GDP is 1 year prior to outbreak of war.

Testing for differential Pre-war Polity Score and Post-war Change in Polity Score by War Termination Type

A) Negotiated Settlements (NS)

Variable	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that ended as NS	N (NS)	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that did not end as NS	N (non-NS)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Polpre5	-2.63	16	-2.63	75	-0.001	0.001
Polpre1	-1	20	-1.69	75	-0.44	0.44
Polity 0	-1.81	21	-1.63	76	0.11	0.11
<hr/>						
Polity5avdif	2.95	20	-0.32	60	-1.62	1.62
Polity10avdif	0.38	13	-0.49	53	-0.29	0.29
Polity20avdif	-4.86	7	-0.21	44	1.69	1.69*
Polity30avdif	-6.67	6	-0.55	38	1.89	1.89*

¹ Two-tailed t-Test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

B) Military Victory (MV)

Variable	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that ended as MV	N (MV)	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that did not end as MV	N (non-MV)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Polpre5	-3.86	56	-0.66	35	2.23	2.23**
Polpre1	-3.3	54	0.76	41	3.11	3.11**
Polity 0	-3.31	55	0.48	42	2.86	2.86**
Polity5avdif	-0.49	53	2.44	27	1.82	1.82*
Polity10avdif	-0.69	48	0.67	18	0.6	0.6
Polity20avdif	-0.32	41	-3	10	-1.21	1.21
Polity30avdif	-0.71	35	-4	9	-1.25	1.25

¹ Two-tailed t-Test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

C) Stalemate/ Ceasefire (SC)

Variable	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that ended as SC	N (SC)	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that did not end as SC	N (non-SC)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Polpre5	4	4	-2.93	87	-1.57	1.57
Polpre1	4.43	7	-2.02	88	-2.63	2.63**
Polity 0	4.43	7	-2.14	90	-2.62	2.62**
Polity5avdif	1	7	0.45	73	-0.59	0.59
Polity10avdif	1.4	5	-0.46	61	-1.66	1.66*
Polity20avdif	1.33	3	-0.98	48	-1.59	1.59
Polity30avdif	1.33	3	-1.59	41	-1.87	1.87*

¹ Two-tailed t-Test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

D) Military Victory by Government (MV-Gov)

Variable	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that ended as MV-Gov	N (MV-Gov)	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that did not end as MV-Gov	N (non-MV- Gov)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Polpre5	-3.77	31	-2.03	60	1.23	1.23
Polpre1	-2.78	32	-0.92	63	1.36	1.36
Polity 0	-2.14	35	-1.4	62	0.54	0.54
Polity5avdif	-1.65	31	1.86	49	2.69	2.69**
Polity10avdif	-1.84	31	1.03	35	1.8	1.8*
Polity20avdif	-1.73	26	0.08	25	1.16	1.16
Polity30avdif	-1.86	22	-0.91	22	0.51	0.51

¹ Two-tailed t-Test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

E) Military Victory by Rebels (MV-Reb)

Variable	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that ended as MV-Reb	N (MV-Reb)	Ave polity score/ change in polity score in all wars that did not end as MV-Reb	N (non-MV- Reb)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Polpre5	-3.96	25	-2.12	66	1.29	1.29
Polpre1	-4.04	22	-0.79	73	2.19	2.19**
Polity 0	-5.35	20	-0.71	77	3.55	3.55**
Polity5avdif	1.14	22	0.26	58	-0.53	0.53
Polity10avdif	1.41	17	-0.92	49	-1.24	1.24
Polity20avdif	2.13	15	-2.08	36	-2.4	2.4**
Polity30avdif	1.23	13	-2.48	31	-1.91	1.91*

¹ Two-tailed t-Test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

Percent change in GDP by War Termination Type

	Average	Negset	Milvic	MV-Gov	MV-Reb	Stalceas
Pre5diff	0.13 (53/ 0.18)	0.21 (11/ 0.16)	0.15 (23/ 0.15)	0.15 (14/ 0.16)	0.16 (9/ 0.15)	0.002 (7/ 0.24)
During	0.34 (60/ 0.85)	0.77 (12/ 1.23)	0.03 (28/ 0.27)	0.11 (18/ 0.24)	-0.13 (10/ 0.26)	0.18 (7/ 0.86)
Post5diff	0.34 (43/ 0.68)	0.57 (10/ 0.84)	0.27 (26/ 0.42)	0.42 (17/ 0.39)	-0.002 (9/ 0.35)	0.29 (7/ 1.16)
Post10diff	0.57 (29/ 0.69)	0.49 (5/ 0.51)	0.65 (20/ 0.66)	0.75 (15/ 0.64)	0.35 (5/ 0.68)	0.26 (4/ 1.07)
Post15diff	1.08 (20/ 0.81)	1.39 (2/ 0.5)	1.06 (17/ 0.86)	1.12 (12/ 0.76)	0.92 (5/ 1.16)	0.64 (1/ ..)
Post20diff	1.85 (17/ 1.12)	1.71 (2/ 0.49)	1.92 (14/ 1.21)	1.82 (10/ 0.86)	2.16 (4/ 2.01)	1.12 (1/ ..)
Post25diff	2.28 (16/ 2.34)	2.42 (1/ ..)	2.3 (14/ 2.52)	2.46 (8/ 1.41)	2.1 (6/ 3.69)	1.87 (1/ ..)
Post30diff	3.72 (12/ 3.74)	3.47 (1/ ..)	3.85 (10/ 4.12)	2.64 (7/ 2.46)	6.68 (3/ 6.39)	2.7 (1/ ..)

* No. of observations/ Std. Deviation given in parentheses

Baseline year of comparison for all post-war GDP is 1 year prior to outbreak of war.

Testing for differential GDP growth by war termination type

A) Negotiated Settlements (NS)

Variable	Ave % GDP change in all wars that ended as NS	N (NS)	Ave % GDP change in all wars that did not end as NS	N (non-NS)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Pre5diff	0.21	11	0.11	42	-1.73	1.73*
During war	0.77	12	0.23	48	-1.46	1.46
Post5diff	0.57	10	0.28	33	-1.02	1.02
Post10diff	0.49	5	0.59	24	0.35	0.35
Post15diff	1.39	2	1.04	18	-0.87	0.87
Post20diff	1.71	2	1.87	15	0.33	0.33
Post25diff	n/a because only 1 observation					
Post30diff						

¹ Two-tailed t-Test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

B) Military Victories (MV)

Variable	Ave % GDP change in all wars that ended as MV	N (MV)	Ave % GDP change in all wars that did not end as MV	N (non-MV)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Pre5diff	0.15	23	0.12	30	-0.72	0.72
During war	0.03	28	0.62	32	2.996	2.996**
Post5diff	0.27	26	0.46	17	0.75	0.75
Post10diff	0.65	20	0.39	9	-0.9	0.9
Post15diff	1.06	17	1.14	3	0.19	0.19
Post20diff	1.92	14	1.52	3	-0.94	0.94
Post25diff	2.3	14	2.15	2	-0.21	0.21
Post30diff	3.85	10	3.08	2	-0.57	0.57

¹ Two-tailed t-Test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

C) Stalemates/ Ceasefires (SC)

Variable	Ave % GDP change in all wars that ended as SC	N (SC)	Ave % GDP change in all wars that did not end as SC	N (non-SC)	t-stat ¹	t-stat
Pre5diff	0.002	7	0.15	46	1.59	1.59
During war	0.18	7	0.36	53	0.52	0.52
Post5diff	0.295	7	0.355	36	0.13	0.13
Post10diff	0.26	4	0.62	25	0.66	0.66
Post15diff	n/a because only 1 observation					
Post20diff						
Post25diff						
Post30diff						

¹ Two-tailed t-test for significance of difference in means

** Significant at 95% confidence level (alpha=0.05)

* Significant at 90% confidence level (alpha=0.10)

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