

# **Obligation of the Home Front: The Necessity of Cultural Awareness Training for Interventions in the New World Order**

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## **Obligation of the Home Front: The Necessity of Cultural Awareness Training for Interventions in the New World Order**

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Peacekeeping is an oft-used word by politicians, media, and even history textbooks to describe Canada's proud contribution to international peace and stability. Nevertheless, traditional peacekeeping has become a thing of the past since forces sent abroad are having to make and enforce peace rather than just keep it. Missions are also placing military personnel in the midst of very different cultures where language, religion, morals, and societal values are radically foreign to Canadians' Western experience. Canada's response to the attacks of September 2001, from increased border security to the War on Terrorism, has brought to the forefront the need of cultural sensitivity – whether in the area of racial profiling or while military forces intervene abroad.

Despite the increased profile of the need to be culturally sensitive as Western-based coalitions intervene in Islamic nations in the War on Terrorism, the recognition of this imperative is not an entirely new phenomenon for Canada's military. Canadian armed forces have learned the hard way that the culture and values of a host nation must be respected if Canadians' value for human rights and dignity are to be observed while this country's military representatives are serving abroad. In the wake of Operation Deliverance and the tragic beatings and deaths of Somali civilians at the hands of Canadian Airborne Regiment members in 1993, the resulting investigation and Commission of Inquiry identified that racism and lack of cultural empathy were at the root of these shocking occurrences. The Commission of Inquiry and its recommendations were a turning point for the Canadian Forces in its approach to training for peace support operations. After the very public soul-searching, clear guidelines were created concerning racism and racist behaviour, substantial changes were made to peace support

training, and cultural awareness training became an integral element. The Canadian Forces as an institution, and the members as individuals, clearly see and accept the obligation of being properly prepared for service abroad and interaction with those in need.

Canada began and formed its tradition of peacekeeping during the height of the Cold War. With this very present and very concrete threat, Canada's armed forces had a clear purpose in the eyes of the government, the Canadian public, and the military itself: the primary focus of the armed forces was to be ready for high intensity combat in case of aggression by members of the Warsaw Pact. Peacekeeping was not seen as a separate type of operation for which the Canadian military had to prepare. Instead, senior military leaders saw peacekeeping as an alternative use for pre-existing equipment and training. It was commonly held that general purpose combat training adequately prepared Canadian military personnel for peacekeeping missions. If need be, a little improvisation would satisfactorily meet any unforeseen challenges.<sup>1</sup> In the days of the traditional, classic peacekeeping mission, this combination of improvisation and combat training proved more or less adequate where peacekeepers were impartial monitors of already accepted cease-fires. Because the contingents were non-hostile, and because the parties involved consented to the presence of outside mediators, the peacekeepers were lightly armed. Missions were under the authority of the United Nations (UN), and the mission was not mandated to create conditions for peace.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, the very nature of peacekeeping has changed and grown increasingly complex.<sup>3</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, the global map has undergone some radical changes as decolonization, nationalism, self-determination, and internal conflict have exponentially grown.

### **Peace Support Roles and Tasks**

- Preventive Diplomacy:** diplomatic activity to preempt outbreak of fighting
- Preventive Deployment:** outside military presence requested to deter conflict
- Peacemaking:** mission to bring warring parties to agreement peacefully
- Peacekeeping:** observation or supervision of recognized truce or cease-fire
- Peace Enforcement:** restoration of order when no cease-fire compliance
- Peace Building:** post-conflict activities strengthening peace and avoiding relapse into conflict
- Observer Missions:** monitoring truce, accord, or agreement compliance
- Humanitarian Assistance Operations:** military assistance for humanitarian aid or disaster relief

Paul LaRose-Edwards, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers*, pp. 96-7.

Conflict between states has been replaced by ethnic and religious wars within state borders.

Historical animosities lead to territorial and resource disputes. Most post-Cold War conflicts have been characterized by prolonged, low-intensity warfare where the distinction between combatant and non-combatant is blurred, and where insurgents benefit from a state's weakness, poverty, and inability to quell rebellion and violence.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, operations to maintain peace in the world are decreasingly about monitoring and observing cease-fire agreements and borders. Increasingly, forces are being sent abroad to protect human rights and democratic values. Wealthy nations feel morally compelled to intervene when war brings humanitarian crises, refugees, genocides, displaced persons, war crimes, and starvation for the innocent.

When international forces intervene in these emergencies, they are faced with the task of not only helping those in immediate need but also with the necessity of creating peace so that a long-term solution to human suffering can solidly be put in place. Consequently, the new peacekeeper needs a balanced mix of combat skills, diplomatic savvy, and humane values. Humanitarian missions need military personnel who can empathize with the local population whom they are

trying to help; the new peacekeeper can not simply be emotionally detached from an enemy that may have to be killed. There cannot be a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘good’ versus ‘evil.’ Intervening in the name of democracy and for the purpose of defending human rights means that the nations and individuals involved in the peace mission must represent and carry out the very values they are trying to instill in the war-torn, impoverished, or undemocratic nations of the world. Anything less would be hypocritical and sheer imperialism.<sup>5</sup> From the changed nature of peacekeeping operations naturally follows the necessity for a suitably changed approach to peacekeeping training. Combat training is no longer enough. Peace support and mission-specific training is essential. Since military forces will be interacting more with the local population – either in providing humanitarian assistance or trying to establish peace and stability – these men and women need to be prepared for the new world they are about to encounter. Success in these kinds of missions will mean that pre-deployment training must provide peacekeepers with an understanding of the conflict, as well as the history, culture, social values, and religion of the those they will be helping. Humanitarian assistance requires empathy on the part of the peacekeepers. Defending human rights and democracy requires integrity and living by example on the part of the interveners.<sup>6</sup>

Unfortunately, both this requisite empathy and integrity was absent on the part of many Canadian Airborne Regiment members while deployed on Operation Deliverance, the 1993 mission to Somalia. This lack of understanding and empathy, the failure to represent with integrity Canadian values, a sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ and prevalent racism amongst the deployed personnel resulted in numerous tortures of Somali citizens, some of which proved fatal. Along the Horn of Africa lies the country of Somalia, a nation approximately the size of Alberta.

Agriculture (raising beef, sheep, and goats) is the country's main economic activity; less than ten percent of Somalia's gross national product comes from industrialization. Genealogy and clan membership are Somalis' basis for identification. Allegiance is to one's clan, which in turn provides security and physical welfare. Because of their belief in equal rights and egalitarianism (for males), clans do not have one leader. Instead, decisions are made through consensus by the entire clan. If agreements are not ratified by the clan, then the agreements are deemed illegitimate. Clan identification also comes into play if an individual has wronged (murdered, injured, insulted) a member of another clan. Compensation (usually camels) must be paid to the injured clan by the clan that was in the wrong. This sense of collective guilt also means that punishment of specific individuals (a Western form of justice) is interpreted as attempted humiliation of an entire clan.<sup>7</sup>

Somalia's history and geography was deeply imprinted upon by the colonial rule of Britain, France, and Italy. The borders set by these European powers were arbitrary and created artificial divisions amongst the nomadic clans that had previously moved about freely to find pasture and water for their herds. A sense of anti-colonialism remains today; consequently, foreigners are not automatically welcomed, and tolls are charged to outsiders wanting to pass through the various clans' zones of control. Independence was gained in 1960, but the ensuing years have not been peaceful. A border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia broke out in 1964. In 1969, Major-General Mahammed Siyaad Barre carried out a successful military coup. Somalia lost the 1977-78 border war with Ethiopia. A coup to depose Barre failed in 1988, but fighting continued into 1991, and the nation then descended into anarchy. As factions fought for political control, bandits and militias looted the country with impunity. In addition to the chaos

of war, drought ravaged the land, destroyed the farming industry, and left millions to starve. Even relief agencies bringing in food supplies found they could do little since up to fifty percent of their aid shipments were stolen by clan gangs.<sup>8</sup>

Helpless to successfully deliver the humanitarian aid in their charge, the Red Cross and various other non-governmental organizations pleaded for the UN's help. When Somali factions agreed to a cease-fire in February 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 751 (in April 1992) which authorized the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Under this Chapter VI operation, fifty unarmed peacekeepers would monitor the cease-fire and ensure the distribution of supplies by escorting the deliveries from Mogadishu to rural areas. In August, the UN expanded the mission's mandate and force to carry out humanitarian operations, to establish security for the relief supplies, to monitor the cease-fire, and to disarm the population. UNOSOM's expansion occurred without the consultation and approval of Somali factions; hence, the factions refused to accept the deployment; famine and starvation continued unabated; relief supplies remained insecure; and clan massacres and refugees' fleeing to neighbouring countries continued.<sup>9</sup>

Before the passing of Security Council Resolution 775 (on 28 August 1992), the Canadian government had agreed to participate in airlifting relief supplies to Somalia. Once the resolution was passed, the Canadian government committed to provide more troops. On 5 September 1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was selected as the unit for Operation Cordon, Canada's contribution to the Chapter VI mission to Somalia. Seven hundred fifty military personnel in total were committed; there would be a headquarters commando, three infantry commandos, an engineer squadron, and a service commando. The CAR would be

responsible for the area around Bossasso, and *HMCS Preserver* would provide communications, stores, evacuation, medical services, and fuel. An air detachment of Hercules transport planes, based in Nairobi, Kenya, would fly relief supplies to Somalia as well.<sup>10</sup> The CAR was chosen for this mission (Operation Cordon) because it had recently prepared for the UN mission for the referendum in the Western Sahara. Operation Python was to have included the tasks of “manning crossing points for refugees, monitoring and patrolling in support of UN military observers and civil police, providing security at UN sites and reception centres, and providing force reserves and basic mine clearing capabilities.” Between July and December 1991, the CAR trained for Operation Python, only to have the mission canceled before they were able to deploy. Because the CAR had been training for Operation Python, it was unable to attend a regimental exercise in Jamaica, and it also missed the opportunity to be deployed to Cyprus in spring 1992. Morale and discipline consequently fell. Canadian military leaders chose the CAR for the Somalia mission to take advantage of the previous training for a UN mission on the African continent and to boost the morale of the dejected regiment. The advance party would leave for Somalia on 13 December 1992; troops would begin deploying on 27 December.<sup>11</sup>

Come November 1992, the United States government agreed “to organize, command, and lead a multinational operation in Somalia if it were authorized to use force.” The Security Council agreed to this and passed Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992. The United States would lead the United Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia, and the mission would be a Charter VII operation, meaning that UNITAF was allowed to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.” When Canada was asked to provide forces for the new mission replacing UNOSOM, Canada agreed. The CAR was

sent seeing as it had just finished preparing for the Chapter VI Operation Cordon. With Resolution 794 on 3 December, the mission was changed to a Chapter VII mission merely days before the first CAR personnel were to begin leaving for the theatre of operations. Operation Deliverance would involve new rules of engagement and the more aggressive task of disarming Somali forces. Nevertheless, no changes were made to the CAR's preparation (which had focused on training to provide security for humanitarian aid distribution). With the new mission came a new force structure. A mortar platoon from the Royal Canadian Regiment's 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion and A Squadron from the Royal Canadian Dragoons were added to the original CAR battalion group that was to have been sent on Operation Cordon. Because of the cascading events of December 1992, the new eight hundred fifty man battle group never trained as a cohesive unit.<sup>12</sup> Despite these last minute changes and challenges, the Canadian Forces personnel were able to create a secure environment and carry out relief operations. The Canadians were remembered for their help in building tables, chairs, shelves, storage boxes, and a kitchen for an orphanage. Canadians provided volunteer medical assistance, helped rebuild a school, and trained a local police force.<sup>13</sup> Fellow allies in theatre did not fail to notice and commend the Canadians for their much appreciated contribution. The American President's Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, wrote to Canada's Minister of Defence, Kim Campbell, on 11 May 1993, calling the Canadian contribution "truly outstanding."

The Canadian unit was able to bring about the establishment of a regional council involving some fourteen sub-clans – who had absolutely refused to meet together, much less cooperate prior to the Canadian arrival.... Canada has every reason to be extremely pleased and proud of its military forces in Somalia. Certainly, the United States military and civilian authorities and Somalia people hold them in highest esteem.<sup>14</sup>

The commander of UNITAF, Lieutenant-General Johnson, also had words of high praise for the Canadians in Somalia. On 1 May 1993, he wrote to Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral

Anderson:

I must express my high praise for the performance of the Canadian forces under my command.... It should be no surprise that the Canadian Airborne Regiment worked most effectively with relief workers, in fact, delivered several thousand metric tons of relief supplies on behalf of the relief agencies.... The bottom line was that there was no mission the Canadians were not willing to handle.

Lieutenant-General Johnson goes on to recognize the school reconstruction with which the CAR was involved, noting that the opening of these schools ““was a most significant event and a testimony to the humanitarian focus of the Canadian troops. It has earned them enormous good will, and they have properly portrayed themselves as having come to Somalia for [a] noble purpose.””<sup>15</sup> In the eyes of the international community, Canada’s armed forces took its peace support missions seriously.

Unfortunately, it is not the school reconstruction, the orphanage building, nor the aid distribution that Canadians on the home front remember when the 1993 mission to Somalia is raised in conversation. Sadly, it is the shameful actions of a few CAR members that have given Canada’s participation in UNITAF a tarnished reputation, that lead to a Commission of Inquiry, and that eventually resulted in the disbanding of the CAR. Infiltration of the Canadian base at Belet Huen by looters became the CAR’s most persistent problem. Not only was food, water, weapons, ammunition, parachutes, radio antennas, and other necessary equipment being stolen on a regular basis, but the intruders also posed a security risk since they had opportunity to sabotage the base and kill the peacekeepers. Initially, Somalis who broke into the base were bound, imprisoned overnight, and then returned to their clans or the local police the next day. When this method proved to be no deterrent, frustrated Canadian soldiers turned to humiliation and abuse to make examples of the thieves. Children found breaking into the Canadian compound were tied, hooded, and made to sit in the sun with signs about their neck announcing

they were thieves. Other prisoners were subject to being bound, beaten, and having wet cloths drying and shrinking over their heads so as to cause pain and discomfort. Despite these increasingly brutal and humiliating tactics, the challenge of keeping the base secure from infiltrators remained unresolved.<sup>16</sup>

Attempts by the CAR to tighten perimeter security lead to actually setting bait to attract Somali looters so that they could be captured and taught an unforgettable lesson. In February 1993, Captain Sox lead an unauthorized operation against Somali roadblocks. Dressed in Somali robes, Sox drove a civilian vehicle with armed men from his platoon hiding in the back. The intent was to confront anyone who tried to stop the vehicle. Locals did stop Sox, and he held one of the Somalis at gunpoint; paratroopers then fired fifty to seventy rounds at the man as he fled to safety. No one was killed, but the incident report stated that only three rounds had been fired in the confrontation.<sup>17</sup> The next ambush had more fatal consequences. On 28 January 1992, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu had issued orders to use deadly force against any Somali who infiltrated the Canadian compound or who was seen to be running away with Canadian army property. Even after these orders, intruders were still stealing on a regular basis, taking items such as wood, water, food, jerry cans, among other items. The night of 3 March 1993 was no exception. The Engineers' officer commanding was greeted the next morning with reports that numerous break-ins had occurred yet again, but this time, a very important piece of equipment had gone missing: a fuel re-circulation pump for helicopters. Captain Rainville, leader of the CAR's Reconnaissance Platoon, volunteered to help with security around the Engineers' compound. His offer was quickly accepted, and the night of 4 March found Rainville and his men preparing to confront any would-be intruders. In order to carry out a "military deception

plan,” Rainville had ration boxes and jerry cans strategically placed in the compound where they were clearly “visible from a path used daily by the Somalis to go to the river to get water.” As hoped for, two Somali men came down the path, approached the wire perimeter, pointed in several directions around the base, and then moved toward the helicopter compound. Rainville called for the intruders to stop, and he ordered his men to “get them.” As the Somalis ran, the Canadians shot after them. Abdi Hamdare received multiple gunshot wounds. His companion, Ahmad Aruush died in the pursuit. After performing an autopsy on Mr Aruush, Dr Major Barry Armstrong came to the conclusion that the man had been ““shot in the back by a high velocity rifle, remained alive, and was dispatched a few minutes later by two or more high velocity rounds to the head and neck.””<sup>18</sup>

Even while the deadly incident was still being investigated, another fatal encounter occurred. The theft of equipment and supplies for almost three months was wearing the CAR members’ patience thin; hence, on the morning of 16 March 1993, the officer commanding of 2 Commando conducted a routine orders group session where he told his platoon commanders ““to capture and abuse the prisoners”” to teach them a lesson. In his own words, Major Seward stated, ““I don’t care if you abuse them, but I want those infiltrators captured.... Abuse them if you have to.”” Not all the platoon commanders felt comfortable with passing this order along to the troops. Nevertheless, some did, and two soldiers willfully carried it out. An unarmed sixteen year-old Shidane Arone was captured at 2045 hours on 16 March. Although he claimed to have been searching for a lost child, his guards chose to treat him as an infiltrating thief on whom they would carry out the abuse order given early that day. Over the course of the evening, Master-Corporal Matchee and Private Brown bound the prisoner, burned him with cigarettes, and beat

him severely. This treatment continued until midnight despite the fact that their guard duty shifts had ended. Matchee even had his picture taken, holding a loaded pistol to the head of the tortured prisoner. Although people had dropped into the bunker where the beatings were taken place, it was not until midnight that anyone began reporting the condition of the prisoner up the chain of command. Unfortunately, it was too late for Mr Arone; he died shortly thereafter.<sup>19</sup>

After the initial shock of the abusive behaviour of the CAR in Somalia, the story disappeared from the media, faded from the minds of Canadians, and played itself out only in the courts-martial of those involved in the shameful conduct in Somalia. That is, until November 1994, when the photos taken of Arone's murder were released to the media. Within days, Dr Armstrong publicly revealed that his military "superiors had ordered the destruction of evidence relating to the 4 March [1993] killing of Aruush and the wounding of Hamdare." The following day, 18 November, the federal government responded by calling for a Commission of Inquiry into the Somalia deployment, the disgraceful behaviour of the soldiers, and the alleged cover-up by military leaders. The shameful conduct of the CAR was once again brought to Canadians' attention on 15 January 1995 when the evening news aired segments of a video shot by CAR members while on the mission to Somalia. The video showed the soldiers' drinking excessively and making violent and racist utterances against the Somalis they were supposed to be helping. Three days later, a second video was released on the news, this one showing racist and degrading hazing rituals that had taken place in the CAR in August 1992. The only black member of the group had had KKK written on his back; he had been tied to a tree, doused white with flour, called racist terms, and made to crawl on his hands and knees like a dog while wearing a collar. While all the initiates had to endure the typical distasteful hazing rituals, only the black

paratrooper was subject to hazing that was clearly directed negatively at his race. The Canadian public then saw another videotape of CAR hazing rituals that had been performed in 1994. In the words of one study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry, “the content of these tapes was so shocking that it created a major scandal in Canada.” On 24 January 1995, Minister of National Defence David Collenette announced his decision that the disgraced CAR would be disbanded. Its final parade and laying up of colours took place on 5 March 1995.<sup>20</sup>

The Commission of Inquiry was established and given its Terms of Reference on 20 March 1995. In looking at the pre-deployment, in-theatre, and post-deployment periods, the Commission was tasked with determining the suitability of the CAR for a mission in Somalia, the appropriateness of the training provided, the values and attitudes held by all ranks toward lawful conduct of operations and professionalism, the role that cultural differences might have played in the mission, and how the military’s chain of command responded to the problems of the Somalia deployment. The problem of racism and cultural differences weighed heavily on the three commissioners’ minds as they undertook their investigation. On 3 August 1995, they issued a statement divulging how they would interpret the Terms of Reference, find the root of the problems, and make recommendations:

In order to properly assess the impact of cultural differences [sociological, anthropological, political, economic, intellectual, and human characteristics differentiating one culture from another] on the conduct of operations, the Commission has to look at the appropriateness of the training objectives and standards of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group with respect to the Somali culture and environment and the proper treatment of civilians and detainees, the adequacy of selection and screening of its officers and the state of discipline of its members with a view to determining the extent to which Somali and human rights values, and the need to protect and respect them, have been properly taught, understood, and respected in the context of peacekeeping mission in a fundamentally different cultural environment.<sup>21</sup>

The Commission began holding public hearings on 24 May 1995. In January 1997, the government suddenly decided that the hearings would wrap up by the end of March 1997. The

Commissioners fought the truncation of the inquiry because “the imposed time limitations precluded [them] from calling a number of important witnesses.” In a press release, the Commissioners explained why the deadline was detrimental to the findings of the final report:

The Inquiry was established in large measure to alleviate concerns that an imbalance had occurred in the official reaction to the events in Somalia. The feeling was that too much attention had been focused upon the activities of soldiers of lower rank and that not enough effort had gone into examining the role and responsibility of higher ranking officers, senior bureaucrats, and government officials. The deadline that is now being imposed on us makes it impossible for us to comprehensively address the question of the accountability of the upper ranks.

In response to a March 1997 Federal Court Trial Division decision “that the government’s actions were *ultra vires* and unlawful,” the Privy Council Office issued an order that a final report on the pre-deployment phase of the Somalia mission must be submitted by 30 June 1997. It was up to the commissioners’ discretion as to what else would be included in the report on the in-theatre and post-deployment phases.<sup>22</sup>

Despite the premature termination of the Commission’s public hearings, the commissioners had much to say about the CAR’s lack of leadership, discipline, and training. The investigation also unveiled the prevalent racism in the regiment and the obvious deficiencies in cultural awareness training. The Executive Summary of the five-volume report opened with criticism of rampant careerism, flawed supervision, inaction over indiscipline, and training preparations that fell short of requirements.<sup>23</sup> When it came to leadership and promotions, the Commission found that “individual career management goals were too often allowed to take precedence over operational needs in the appointments process. Bureaucratic and administrative imperatives were allowed to dilute the merit principle and override operational needs.”<sup>24</sup>

Leadership and the chain of command was compromised by the fact that CAR officers and non-commissioned officers mistrusted each other and by the fact that a group of NCOs had taken on

*de facto* leadership roles, thus affecting the authority that officers should have been exercising over the other ranks.<sup>25</sup> The commissioners severely criticized the CAR's lack of discipline. This was represented by acts such as setting an NCO's car on fire, the illegal possession and discharge of pyrotechnics, stolen ammunition, the persistent display of Confederate flags, and the negligent discharge of weapons (both personal and crew-served).<sup>26</sup>

The commissioners had much to say about the dismal quality of peacekeeping training which the CAR had (or actually had not) received. Because the CAR was Canada's UN standby unit, the commissioners expected that "the CAR should have at all times maintained a proficiency in both general purpose combat skills and generic peacekeeping skills (involving, for example, the nature of UN operations and the role of the peacekeeper, conflict resolution and negotiation, cross-cultural relations, restraint in application of force, and standard UN operations)." The commissioners were surprised to find that "the CAR received little or no ongoing generic peacekeeping training." The training plan for Operation Cordon needed to have included non-combat skills essential for successful peacekeeping: the nature of UN peacekeeping, the role of the peacekeeper, the law of armed conflict, arrest and detention procedures, use of force policies, mission-specific rules of engagement, conflict resolution and negotiation, inter-cultural relations and the culture, history, and politics of the environment, and stress management preparation.<sup>27</sup>

Even the CAR's combat training for Operation Cordon was found somewhat deficient. Exercise Stalwart Providence was held from 14 to 18 October 1992. In an effort to simulate a UN mission to Somalia and test the operational readiness of the CAR, the exercise was composed of a series of scenarios that included securing and establishing the base camp, convoys'

encountering mines, convoys' coming under fire, refugees' coming to the camp for medical attention, the disposing of corpses at the request of local officials, and the quelling a riot at a food distribution site. The Commission found the exercise itself to be "effective training," praising its realistic scenarios and the contact with non-combatants. Unfortunately, sub-units had not been able to complete their training by the time Exercise Stalwart Providence was held. The CAR's commanding officer was not present for the exercise since he was on a reconnaissance mission to Somalia at the same time (the dates for this mission had been set by the UN). Commissioners also identified the "lack of intelligence and current information on Somalia" as another serious deficiency of the exercise. When creating the Stalwart Providence, planners relied on information from CNN whereas in-depth intelligence on the conditions in Somalia was needed from National Defence Headquarters. According to the Commission's findings, "the exercise required a focus which more accurately reflected the threat, political, and cultural factors the CAR was liable to face in Somalia, and the opportunity for CAR members to practise the skills they would require to meet these challenges." The exercise revealed that more training was required for the safe operation of vehicles (the CAR was a light infantry battalion being given the role of a mounted unit). The exercise highlighted that there was a problem with the flow of information down the chain of command to the soldiers on the field. Those evaluating the exercise also found that 2 Commando was over-aggressive in its use of force: "open-fire/use of force policy is not clearly understood by all soldiers asked" was the conclusion of the after-action brief on the exercise. According to the Commission, the weeks remaining before deployment should have been spent on improving the passage of information, undergoing additional mounted vehicle training, learning the appropriate restraint in the use of

force and the rules of engagement, and providing training on the capture and holding of detainees. Nevertheless, the commissioners found that “these additional needs were not seriously or systematically addressed in the weeks prior to deployment.”<sup>28</sup>

The fact that the mission to Somalia was changed from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII operation had serious ramifications on the CAR’s deployment. Firstly, the new units the were augmenting the CAR did not receive the training provided for Operation Cordon. Secondly, the new force structure never received training as a cohesive whole. During the training period for Operation Deliverance (7 to 16 December 1992), the newly attached sub-units had to complete “fitness training, weapons training, individual preparations training, and speciality vehicle/equipment training.” Training for the new force structure focused on a fighting function to prepare the troops for the new task of disarming factions. No training was provided on the new mission-specific rules of engagement. The time to train for the new Chapter VII mission, and the new rules of engagement, were simply not available. In light of all the problems discovered, the Commissioners could not say that the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group was operationally ready:

If a unit is led by competent and accountable leaders who respect and adhere to the imperatives of the chain of command system; if the soldiers serving under these leaders are properly recruited and screened, cohesive, well-trained, and disciplined; if they have a clear understanding of adequately conceived and transmitted rules of engagement, then we can have confidence that this is a unit that is operationally ready for deployment. To our deep regret, we have come to negative conclusions about each of these elements and have found that the Canadian Airborne Regiment, in a fundamental sense, was not operationally ready fit its mission.<sup>29</sup>

Nevertheless, the last-minute changes to the mission, the lack of unit cohesiveness, and the training deficiencies identified did not mean that the mission was naturally going to devolve into the brutal beating and murder of Somali citizens. To explain this tragic turn of events, the

commissioners found racism to be prevalent in the CAR, a sense of frustration amongst CAR members over the apparent ingratitude of the local population, and a clear lack of cultural awareness training in the pre-deployment period. Before October 1993, the Canadian Forces had no policy to screen out active racists. According to the Deputy Minister of National Defence on 11 May 1993,

‘CF personnel may hold any political view, as long as their views are not in conflict with carrying out their duties.... Attendance at right wing extremist meetings is not illegal, and denying a citizen the right to attend such meetings would be contrary to Charter rights. What Canadian Forces members do on their own time is their own business, as long as it does not contradict the Canadian Forces Code of Service Discipline and/or Canadian law, or bring into question their reliability or loyalty.’

Consequently, one’s affiliation with a racist group was not grounds for release or restriction of assignments, postings, or deployment. Although it was Canadian Forces policy to tolerate affiliation with racist groups, the Department of National Defence grew concerned 1990-91 about the increasingly extremist and violent ideologies of these groups and consequently set up a special investigations unit to monitor what threat racists in the Canadian Forces posed to national security. It was the task of Project SIROS to track military membership in extremist groups: “by June 1992, some 40 CF members had been identified as having possible involvement in right-wing extremist and racist organizations.” Six of these men identified belonged to the CAR. According to Project SIROS, “the problem of active racists at Petawawa was ... centred in 2 Commando of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.” Two of these known racists were deployed to Somalia; it was later discovered that another five members of the CAR who were in Somalia had links to racist groups as well. This discovery included the names of Master-Corporal Matchee and Private Brown. During the pre-deployment period, racist symbols were openly displayed around CFB Petawawa, the CAR’s home base. Nazi swastikas, Ku Klux Klan flags, and

Confederate flags were not uncommon, as were racial epithets against blacks. The hazing video of August 1992 also clearly displayed racist behaviour being incorporated into CAR rituals.<sup>30</sup>

### **Returning Soldiers' Reflections on Somali Hostility to CAR Presence**

•“I had rocks thrown at me while I was out running.... Yep, I had rocks hurled at me. I was so angry once that I picked up a rock and threw it back. We all had rocks thrown at us when going downtown.”

•“They were calling us ... infidels. And the little kids, they had the old David and Goliath sling shots. And they were pretty good with them.”

•“Even the medics could get rocks thrown at them, and they wore a red cross on their arm, so the Somalis knew who they were, with all the International Red Cross organizations there. That just shows me the total disrespect for what we were there to do.”

Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia – A Socio-Cultural Inquiry*, p. 236.

Once deployed, mission frustration and culture shock only increased the CAR's cultural insensitivity to Somalis. Canadians arrived in Somalia believing their main role was to help feed the starving people. Their humanitarian attitudes were strained as they faced hostility, were physically attacked, and had their supplies and equipment continually stolen. Perceptions of a people in need were sadly replaced by views that Somalis were ungrateful thieves. The need to teach the locals a lesson grew with each act of hostility against the Canadians' presence. Testimony at the various courts-martial following the Somalia mission revealed the prevalent attitude that the theatre environment called for aggressive military action. According to peacekeeping training expert Colonel Kenward, “the forces deployed ... had to deal with some very difficult situations where they had a local population that was not always understanding of what was trying to be accomplished, were very demanding of the people on the ground, and sometimes displayed hostility.” Furthermore, Kenward described the theatre of operations as

being “the hardest physical environment that we have put Canadians into in UN operations.”

The defence lawyer for Private Brown also argued that the harsh physical conditions and the lack of law and order naturally frustrated the soldiers who tried desperately to defend themselves, restore base security, and create respect for the CAR’s authority and presence:

‘There was a general understanding amongst the troops that it was OK to rough up the prisoners a little bit for a deterrent purpose.... The troops were in a lawless country. There was no civil institutions, there was no civil authority. There was nothing that could be done to those looters who were captured. They could not be turned over to anybody who could effectively deal with them such as happens in most civilized countries. They could not call the police and have them arrested and expect that he ... would be taken to court and dealt with according to the law. At the same time, the soldiers were very vulnerable. They’re out in the field. They had no locks. They had valuable kit, and they were obviously particularly concerned about the security of their weapons.’<sup>31</sup>

Canadian soldiers’ growing sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ was not only rooted in the on-going conflict with hostile locals. Canadians also experienced shock at the differences between social cultures, differences that made the Somalis’ culture seem very alien and incomprehensible to the Canadian peacekeepers. Soldiers admitted to assuming that homosexuality was open and prevalent when they continually saw men walking in public holding hands. (They had not been informed that this was common practice amongst heterosexual men while discussing business with each other). Women seemed to do all the work while men were seen as simply lazy. Canadians expressed disgust over the abusive treatment of Somali women and the neglect of children. Canadians had also come to the conclusion that Somalis had little value for human life. After the mission to Somalia, soldiers reflected that they wished they had been warned about what to expect when they encountered the local culture. Misconceptions could have been avoided; disturbing differences could have at least been expected.<sup>32</sup>

### **Soldiers' Reflections on Somali People and Culture**

•“We would see the men in groups, talking and talking. Also they hold hands. When the guys saw that, well everyone thought ‘Everybody’s gay here! What’s going on?’”

•“There was quite a lot of homosexuality. That bothered a lot of people, to see two men walking hand in hand. We weren’t ready because no one told us. If only they had prepared us, to have an idea of how they live. They told us about military security, weapons, military organization, and the like, but nothing about the culture.”

•“What really frustrated me was that they had more time for their goats and camels and everything else they had than for human life.”

•“It’s frustrating to see. Women do everything over there. They get the water, cook, do everything, but they sleep outside. But the men, they sit around, don’t do anything all day long. They visit their friends and that’s about it. It’s so frustrating.”

•“I didn’t like the way they hit kids. I didn’t like the fact that the children slept outside the huts.”

•“Their women have no rights at all. They’re pack mules. You’d see a guy walking with his stick and two or three wives behind him with bundles of wood and stuff like that that’d break my back.”

Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia – A Socio-Cultural Inquiry*, pp. 232-4.

Non-commissioned members (NCMs) freely admitted that the pre-deployment cultural awareness training was very thin. When asked what information had been provided on the Somali country, people, and customs, one soldier responded that ““They brought us into a classroom, and one of the supervisors came in. They’d visited Somalia, and they came back with different studies saying that this is their culture, and this is what they eat, and what they drink, and this is how they live, this is what they believe in, and that’s about it.”” Another soldier reflected that ““there was an intense training that was given to us regarding all kinds of bugs that we could find there. There was no period, as such, given regarding racism. Because we were so in a hurry to do a mission.”” The NCMs did not feel that the training had been tailored specifically for what would be encountered on Operation Deliverance, nor did they see much

difference between regimental training and what was given as specialized mission-specific training. Non-combat training was negligible for NCMs; officers, on the other hand, did receive a number of briefings on Somali culture and politics.<sup>33</sup> Even the *Somalia Handbook*, a booklet distributed to all peacekeepers deployed to Somalia, failed to be a useful resource on Somali culture. In a mere two pages, Somalia's social culture, political situation, and economic conditions were summed up. On the other hand, nine pages were devoted to tips for operating in the terrain. The booklet finished with a series of ominous warnings about dealing with the locals:

'Unlike other UN missions, the different factions in Somalia have proven to be very unpredictable even day to day. Any locals with weapons must be considered as dangerous and potentially hostile on every encounter. Always remember, yesterday's allies can turn on non-vigilant groups if it is in their interest, and they can get away with it. This is an unfortunate aspect of trust-building in Somalia. Never let your guard down. Good luck.'<sup>34</sup>

Such indoctrination hardly prepared the CAR for a very different climate and culture, and it hardly set the stage for the peacekeepers to empathize with the people to whom they would be providing humanitarian assistance.

Despite having their public hearings cut short and despite an accelerated deadline being imposed upon them by the government, the three commissioners filed their report by the end of June 1997 with a total of 160 recommendations. These covered a vast array of subjects, suggesting changes in leadership, accountability, the chain of command, discipline, personnel selection and screening, training, rules of engagement, operational readiness, the military planning system, openness and disclosure, and military justice. In regards to personnel selection and screening, the commissioners wanted behavioural suitability and discipline to be criterion in selection for overseas deployments. Concerning racism, the commissioners called for "clear and

comprehensive guidelines to commanders at all levels regarding prohibited racist and extremist conduct. The guidelines should define and list examples of racist behaviour and symbolism and should include a list and description of extremist groups to which Canadian Forces members may not belong or lend their support.”<sup>35</sup> Recommendations stressed that the Canadian Force’s training philosophy must change and reflect the paramount importance of non-traditional, non-combat training for peace support missions. The commissioners did not feel that generic peacekeeping training should only be provided in the pre-deployment period; instead, it should become an integral part at all levels of training. This would provide more time in the pre-deployment period for mission-specific training. Recommendations also suggested that “training in the Law of Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, cross-cultural relations, and negotiation and conflict resolution be scenario-based and integrated into training exercises, in addition to classroom instruction or briefings, to permit the practice of skills and to provide a mechanism for confirming that instructions have been fully understood.” This pre-deployment training needed to include basic language training and a focus on local culture, history, and politics for the theatre of operations.<sup>36</sup> The Commission also called for the “development of specialist expertise within the Canadian Forces in training in the Law of Armed Conflict and the Rules of Engagement, and in inter-cultural and inter-group relations, negotiation and conflict resolution.” Institutionalizing this would ensure standardization and resources for the training of all Canadian Force members.<sup>37</sup>

The Department of National Defence (DND) was very receptive of the Commission’s report. Of the 160 recommendations made, the department accepted, in whole or in part, 132 of them. In the October 1997 *Report on the Recommendations of the Somalia Commission of*

*Inquiry*, the DND responded that all the recommendations concerning racism had already been implemented.<sup>38</sup> On 25 February 1994, the Canadian Forces issued a policy on racist conduct. CFAO 19-43 defines racism as “conduct that promotes, encourages, or constitutes discrimination on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, or religion, including participation in the activities of, or membership in, a group or organization that a CF member knows, or ought to know, promotes discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, or religion.” Examples of racist conduct in CFAO 19-43 include creating, distributing, and displaying racist literature; helping these groups financially; speaking publicly on behalf of racist organizations; and using derogatory racial terms. According to the February 1995 policy,

‘racist attitudes are totally incompatible with the military ethos and with effective military service, and any conduct that reflects such attitudes will not be tolerated. Racist conduct is therefore prohibited and will result in administrative action, disciplinary action, or both, and may include release. Any applicant for enrolment in the CF who is unable or unwilling to comply with the CF policy against racist conduct will not be enrolled.’<sup>39</sup>

The DND was open to the suggestions that generic peacekeeping training become integral to the Canadian Forces’ new training philosophy: “Individual and collective training programs are being restructured to incorporate considerable amounts of generic training for peace support operations, along with general purpose combat training. The following subjects have been incorporated: laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, human rights, legal responsibilities, cultural awareness, public affairs, and ethics.” The implementation of these changes were projected to be completed by June 1999.<sup>40</sup> In regards to institutionalizing peacekeeping training and developing resources and expertise, the department was pleased to report that a training package covering the subject areas of law of armed Conflict, Rules of engagement, inter-cultural

and inter-group relations, as well as negotiation and conflict resolution was also in the process of being created.<sup>41</sup>

The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), as noted in the report on recommendations, had opened in July 1996 to serve “as the centre of excellence for pre-deployment training for all peace support operations.” The PSTC provides pre-deployment training for individuals and advice and assistance for units training for peace support missions. All Canadian Forces members must receive the peace support training offered in the PSTC’s Basic Course. Formed contingents receive this training at their home locations (Edmonton, Petawawa, Gagetown, Valcartier) for the army or at Readiness Training Flights (located at Trenton, Comox, Cold Lake, Winnipeg, Bagotville, or Greenwood) for the air force. The seven-day course is conducted or supervised by PSTC staff or monitored by the PSTC when units run the course themselves. For Canadian Force members who are not part of a formed unit or contingent, they take the Basic Course at the PSTC in Kingston, Ontario. Ultimately, every Canadian Forces member deployed on peace support operations – whether officer or NCM – receives this peace support training. This training is repeated for every mission, unless the training took place within the previous year; then only mission-specific elements must be completed. The peace support training course offered through the PSTC covers the topics of peace support operations’ evolution, mine awareness, personnel survival skills, preventive medicine, negotiation and intervention techniques, foreign weapons and equipment recognition, media awareness, stress management, international force cooperation, the application of force, and the law of armed conflict. Mission specific topics include the rules of engagement, mission intelligence, mission terrain, and cultural awareness.<sup>42</sup>

The cultural awareness component of the seven-day Basic Course is devoted an entire day (0800 hours to 1700 hours, excluding lunch and breaks). In the opening session of the cultural awareness training day, students are introduced to the idea of different cultural values and how these differences can be found in concepts of leadership, time, family relations, responsibility, deadlines, gender, tempo, justice, and superior-subordinate relationships. Students are made aware of the fact that some forms of communication can be sources of conflict. Eye contact, for some cultures, can be interpreted as a challenge and a lack of respect for an individual. Smiles can have different meanings in different countries and for different genders. Hand gestures do not have universal meanings; hence, gestures commonly used for approval in Western culture can be seen as rude and insulting in Middle Eastern or African countries. After the general session demonstrating the many facets and challenges involved with the idea of culture, students then receive mission-specific cultural awareness briefings for the rest of the day. These interactive lectures are provided by facilitators who are indigenous to the country and culture about which they are teaching. Lectures cover historic events and personalities that shaped the country and culture, the religion, typical celebrations, family and daily lifestyles, ethics and social taboos, and even how international forces are perceived. Key phrases are also introduced and practised. Facilitators are open to any questions about their culture and freely discuss issues that are of concern to, and raised by, Canadian peacekeepers: cultural do's and don'ts; proper interaction with men and women, elders and children; successful means of communication; how not to offend and how to show respect; daily life for locals; customs and religious beliefs; the prevalence of extremist groups and the danger they may pose. Canadian military personnel come to these sessions with open minds and an eagerness to learn

about the various cultures and people they will be encountering. The facilitators augment their lectures with videos, music, and sample foods, and their frankness and enthusiasm leave the peacekeepers with a visible sense of excitement over their up-coming cultural exchange experience. Cultural awareness training at the PSTC has been provided for the past 6.5 years by the Ottawa-based language school *Interlangues* (which has been in existence since 1976 and now provides training in 72 languages). In addition to the cultural awareness lectures given at the PSTC, the facilitators provide cultural awareness training at bases across Canada, as well as language training at the Canadian Forces Language School. Although time does not permit field exercises for the Basic Course (practical exercises are scheduled in the eighteen-day Military Observers Course, also run at the PSTC), training at the bases has incorporated *Interlangues* facilitators in field exercises, role playing scenarios, and language training simulations. This involvement of the cultural and language experts can run from half a day up to three weeks, or more if so requested by the Canadian Forces.<sup>43</sup>

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) was established in 1995 to train and provide knowledge and skills to people and organizations involved in all aspects of peace operations.

### **Sample Courses Offered at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre**

- The Foundations of Peace Operations
- In the Service of Peace: Civilian Core Competencies in Peace Operations
- In the Service of Peace: Military Core Competencies in Peace Operations
- Civil-Military Cooperation: Tactical Operator's Course
- Creating Common Ground: Negotiation for Peace Operations
- The Humanitarian Challenge: Emergency Response in Peace Operations
- The Art of the Possible: Administration and Logistics in UN Peace Operations
- The Hard Road Home: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
- Free and Equal: Human Rights in Peace Operations
- From Reaction to Prevention: Early Warning-Early Response for Peacebuilding
- The Road to Peace: Conflict-Sensitive Programming in Fragile States

Civilians and military personnel from around the world come to attend the two-week long

courses offered. Courses cover topics such as an introduction to peace operations; negotiation skills; humanitarian responses to emergencies; logistics; civilian and military core competencies; civil-military cooperation; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration; human rights; and early warning responses. When created by the government, the PPC was not meant to provide peacekeeping training for CF personnel deployed abroad. This is the role of the PSTC where the focus is at the tactical level. The PPC looks at peace operations from an operational and strategic focus, and attendees tend to be senior diplomats and senior officials from government departments and agencies. Senior military officers do participate (in ninety percent of the seminars, military personnel can make up approximately one third of the student body), but this is in addition to their regular Canadian Forces peace support training.<sup>44</sup>

Undeniably, the international stage and the nature of peacekeeping has changed radically. The number of UN missions has been increasing since the end of the Cold War (“between 1991 and the end of 1996, 24 new peacekeeping missions were set-up – six more than the total established during the preceding 43 years”), and peacekeepers are being called upon to do more than monitor peace treaties and patrol disputed borders. Peacekeepers are increasingly sent to create peace, re-establish security, and provide humanitarian assistance to suffering populations.<sup>45</sup> This very close interaction with civilians means that the very different cultures of the peacekeepers and the locals will be coming into contact with each. Cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity will help to ensure that peacekeepers are prepared for the differences and conscious of their duty to treat the host culture and people with dignity and respect. This awareness and sensitivity was lacking in the CAR’s deployment during the 1993 Operation Deliverance – as identified in the Commission of Inquiry’s discovery of racists and deficient training, and as demonstrated in the beating and killing of Somalia civilians.

The positive outcome of the tragic events in Somalia and the very public examination of

the Canadian Forces has been the institutionalization of peace support training (which includes a serious consideration of cultural awareness). Just as the international situation and the nature of peace support operations is ever evolving, so too must the evaluation and conduct of peace support and cultural awareness training. Are peacekeepers' needs being met, or does more time and more interactive methods need to be dedicated to cultural awareness training? For the missions in which Canadians are participating, do peacekeepers need more than mere cultural awareness; do they need language expertise and cultural immersion before deployment? Do returning peacekeepers feel they were adequately prepared, or can they suggest additions to pre-deployment training curricula that will provide necessary knowledge for entering the theatre of operations? If each peacekeeper does not need to be a cultural expert, would the creation of some experts for each mission theatre be a useful allocation of time, money, and personnel resources? These questions must be asked on an on-going basis to ensure that training does not grow outdated and is meeting the needs of peacekeepers and the people they are assisting.

Although Canadians have no control over the changes that are taking place around the globe, although peacekeepers admittedly cannot be prepared for every contingency they might face while deployed, the country can control how its representatives are prepared to interact with local populations and their cultures. Ensuring that each peacekeeper has the mind-set of cultural sensitivity and ensuring that each peacekeeper is given more than adequate cultural awareness training is an obligation of the home front – an obligation to the reputation of Canada, an obligation to the integrity of the mission, an obligation to the effectiveness of each peacekeeper, and an obligation to those individuals and nations requiring international intervention and humanitarian assistance.

## Endnotes

1. J.R. Near, *Divining the Message: An Analysis of the MND and Somalia Commission Reports*, (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Research Paper, 1999), pp. 9-10; Paul LaRose-Edwards, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Service Canada, 1997), p. 1; Jean-Paul Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice in the Context of Peacekeeping: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Service Canada, 1997), p. 249; Berel Rodal, *The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective – Implications for the Military in a Free and Democratic Society: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Service Canada, 1997), pp. 69, 79.
2. Allen Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping – The Implications for Canada: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Service Canada, 1997), p. 21.
3. LaRose, *Non-Traditional Military Training*, pp. 96-7.
4. Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping*, pp. 93, 124.
5. Rodal, *The Somalia Experience*, p. 65; Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia – A Socio-Cultural Inquiry: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Service Canada, 1997), pp. 137-8.
6. Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping*, p. 112; *Dishonoured Legacy: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, Volume 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Service Canada, 1997), pp. 559-61.
7. M.R. Voith, *The Canadian Deployment to Somalia – A Strategic Failure*, (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Research Paper, 2002), pp. 5-8; Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, pp. 163-4; Sherene Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p. 136.
8. Voith, *The Canadian Deployment to Somalia*, pp. 6-14; Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights*, p. 136.
9. Troy Metz, *The Training of the Canadian Military and the Somalia Affair*, (Regina: University of Regina Master of Arts Thesis, 1997), pp. 73-4; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 236-9; Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping*, pp. 76-8.
10. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 240, 242, 250-1; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, p. 573.

11. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, pp. 569 (first quotation), 571-3.
12. Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping*, pp. 78 (first and second quotations), 79; Metz, *The Training of the Canadian Military*, p. 76; John English, *Lament for An Army: The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism*, (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998), p. 1; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, pp. 573, 608.
13. Voith, *The Canadian Deployment to Somalia*, pp. 39-40; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, p. 281.
14. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, p. 281.
15. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 281-2.
16. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 286, 293; David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996), pp. 233-4; Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights*, p. 5.
17. Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, pp. 235-6.
18. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 297, 298 (quotation), 300-2, 317; Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 236-7; Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights*, pp. 77-8, 82 (second quotation).
19. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 318-24; Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, p. 328; Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights*, pp. 93-9.
20. Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights*, pp. 121-2; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, p. 538; Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice*, p. 80 (quotation); Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, pp. 96-7; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, p. 350.
21. Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice*, pp. xvi, xvii (quotation); *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp; 350-1.
22. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 356-7.
23. *Dishonoured Legacy* Executive Summary, p. 1.
24. *Dishonoured Legacy* Executive Summary, p. 25.
25. *Dishonoured Legacy* Executive Summary, p. 23.
26. *Dishonoured Legacy* Executive Summary, pp. 20-2.
27. *Dishonoured Legacy* Executive Summary, p. 27.
28. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, pp. 601-7; first quotation p. 605, second quotation p. 607.
29. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, pp. 608, 609 (first quotation); *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 5, pp. 1464, 1465 (second quotation); *Dishonoured Legacy* Executive Summary, pp. 28, 30.

30. Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice*, p. 245 (first quotation), 251, 294; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 1, pp. 147, 246; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, pp. 536 (second and third quotations), 537.
31. Rodal, *The Somalia Experience*, p. 71; Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights*, pp. 94 (first quotation), 112 (second quotation), 137.
32. Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, pp. 232-5.
33. Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice*, pp. 108 (first quotation), 109 (second quotation), 110, 113-6; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, p. 619.
34. Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice*, pp. 117, 118 (quotation); Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, pp. 187-8.
35. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 5, p. 1476.
36. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 5, pp. 1477, 1479, 1480 (quotation).
37. *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 5, p. 1479.
38. *A Commitment to Change: Report on the Recommendations of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, October 1997), pp. 33-5.
39. Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice*, p. 214; *Dishonoured Legacy* Volume 2, pp. 539 (quotation), 540.
40. *A Commitment to Change*, p. 36.
41. *A Commitment to Change*, p. 42
42. *A Commitment to Change*, p. 42; PSTC website, <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/main.asp?Ing=Eng>; *Peace Support Operations – Basic Course Manual*, (Kingston: Peace Support Training Centre, March 2005), pp. 2, 4; personal correspondence with Captain Mike O’Connell (PSTC Acting Chief Standards Officer).
43. *Peace Support Operations – Basic Course Manual*, pp. 18-21; *Interlangues* website, <http://www.interlangues.ca.about.html>; personal correspondence with Captain Mike O’Connell (PSTC Acting Chief Standards Officer); personal correspondence with Anne Senior (*Interlangues* Cultural Awareness Facilitator Team Leader); classroom observations made while attending cultural awareness sessions held 13 December 2005 and 7 February 2006.
44. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre website; personal correspondence with Captain Mike O’Connell (PSTC Acting Chief Standards Officer); Brodeur, *Violence and Racial Prejudice*, p. 127.
45. DFAIT website, <http://www.defait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en.asp>.

## **Commission of Inquiry's Recommendations**

### On Racism

- 20.8 “The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and issue clear and comprehensive guidelines to commanders at all levels regarding prohibited racist and extremist conduct. The guidelines should define and list examples of racist behaviour and symbolism and should include a list and description of extremist groups to which Canadian Forces members may not belong or lend their support”
- 20.9 “The Canadian Forces continue to monitor racist group involvement and affiliation among Canadian Forces members”
- 20.10 “The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces clarify their position on the extent of their obligations under applicable privacy and human rights laws in screening applicants and members of the Canadian Forces for behavioural suitability, including racist group affiliation”
- 20.11 “The Department of National Defence and the Government of Canada review their security policies and practices to ensure that, within the limits of applicable privacy and human rights legislation, relevant information concerning involvement by Canadian Forces members or applicants with racist organizations and hate groups is shared efficiently and effectively among all responsible agencies, including the chain of command”
- 20.12 “The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces establish regular liaison with anti-racist groups to obtain assistance in the conduct of appropriate cultural sensitivity training and to assist supervisors and commanders in identifying signs of racism and involvement with hate groups”

### On Peacekeeping Training

- 21.1 “The Canadian Forces training philosophy be recast to recognize that a core of non-traditional military training designed specifically for peace support operations (and referred to as generic peacekeeping training) must be provided along with general purpose combat training to prepare Canadian Forces personnel adequately for all operational missions and tasks”
- 21.2 “Generic peacekeeping training become an integral part of all Canadian Forces training at both the individual (basic, operational, and leadership) and collective levels, with appropriate allocations of resources in terms of funding, people, and time”
- 21.4 “The Canadian Forces recognize, in doctrine and practice, that peace support operations require mental preparation and conditioning that differ from what is required for conventional warfare, and that the training of Canadian Forces members must provide for the early and continuous development of the values, attitudes, and orientation necessary to perform all operational missions, including peace support operations”

- 21.5 “The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the development of comprehensive training policies and programs for peace support operations make greater use of a broad range of sources, including peacekeeping training guidelines and policies developed by the UN and member states, and the training provided by police forces and international organizations”
  
- 21.6 “The Chief of the Defence Staff order that the mandates of all Canadian Forces institutions and programs involved in education and training be reviewed with a view to enhancing and formalizing peace support operations training objectives”
  
- 21.8 “The Chief of the Defence Staff oversee the development of specialist expertise within the Canadian Forces in training the law of armed conflict and the rules of engagement, and in inter-cultural and inter-group relations, negotiation and conflict resolution, and ensure continuing training in these skills for all members of the Canadian Forces”
  
- 21.12 “Contrary to the experience with the Somalia deployment, where general purpose combat training was emphasized, the Chief of the Defence Staff confirm in doctrine and policy that the pre-deployment period, from warning

*Dishonoured Legacy: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, Volume 5, pp. 1476-80.

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