

**CSDS**



THE NORMAN PATERSON SCHOOL  
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

**CENTRE FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE STUDIES**

**AFTER THE FALL:  
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POST-INTERVENTION SECURITY**

CSDS Annual Conference  
9-10 March 2006  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

**CONFERENCE REPORT**

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**PART A  
CONFERENCE AGENDA**

**AFTER THE FALL:  
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POST-INTERVENTION SECURITY**

**Centre for Security and Defence Studies  
2006 Annual Conference**

9-10 March 2006  
Lord Elgin Hotel  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

As states increasingly accept an evolving norm of “conditional sovereignty,” the number of humanitarian and security interventions into weak and failed states will likely increase. While there is a fierce debate over the merits and challenges of nation-building and international democracy promotion, there is a growing consensus that when interventions do take place, the provision of basic security and social order is one of the most critical tasks. As the experiences currently in Iraq and Afghanistan, and recently in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and others, clearly reveal, the challenges to security provision are frequent, varied and complex. This conference will examine these challenges from a multidisciplinary perspective, bringing together scholars, students and practitioners to discuss the short-term security challenges that follow military interventions into foreign states.

Thursday, 9 March

18.30-19.15     Registration, Ontario Room

19.15-19.30     Welcome and Opening Remarks

**David Mendeloff**, Director, Centre for Security and Defence Studies

**Fen O. Hampson**, Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

19.30-20.30     Keynote Address

**“Nation Building from Germany to Iraq: An Evaluation of the U.S. and U.N. Records”**

**James Dobbins**

**Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C.**

20.30-21.30     Reception hosted by CSDS, Ontario Room

Friday, 10 March 2006

8.00-8.30 Registration and coffee, Ontario Room

8.30-10.00 **PANEL 1. POST-INTERVENTION SECURITY IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Chair:

**Fen O. Hampson**, Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Presenters:

**Major-General Andrew Leslie**, Director General Strategic Planning, Department of National Defence and former-Commander Task Force Kabul and Deputy Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan

**Roland Paris**, Director of Research, Conference Board of Canada and Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Colorado, Boulder

Discussant:

**Trevor Findlay**, Associate Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance

10.00-10.20 Coffee Break

10.20-11.50 **PANEL 2. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE TRANSITION TO POST-INTERVENTION AUTHORITY**

Chair:

**David Carment**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Presenters:

**David M. Edelstein**, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government, Georgetown University  
*"Establishing Security During and After Occupation: Lessons from History"*

**D. Kirk MacCleod**, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre  
*"Managing Security in Transition: Lessons from Kosovo"*

**Bob Martyn**, Queen's University  
*"Go Home! Security Challenges of Transitional Authorities"*

Discussant:

**Richard Gowan**, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

12.00-13.30 Lunch hosted by CSDS, Quebec Room

13.30-15.15 **PANEL 3. RESPONDING TO LOCAL POPULATIONS**

Chair:

**Grant Dawson**, Centre for Security and Defence Studies, NPSIA

Presenters:

**Ann Livingstone**, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and  
**Natalie Mychajlyszyn**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs  
*"The Do's and Don'ts of 3-D: A Critical Analysis"*

**Jeremy Lammi**, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary  
*"Managing the Population During an Insurgency"*

**Victoria Edwards**, Department of National Defence  
*"The Role of Post-Intervention Security in Peace and Relief Mission Negotiations"*

**Rachel Lea Heide**, Department of History, Carleton University  
*"Obligation of the Home Front: The Necessity of Cultural Awareness Training for Interventions in the New World Order"*

Discussant:

**Jean Daudelin**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

15.15-15.30 Coffee break

15.30-17.00 **PANEL 4. POST-INTERVENTION SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE**

Chair:

**Sarah Meharg**, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and Royal Military College of Canada

Presenters:

**Col. Kenneth Watkin**, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Canadian Forces  
*"The Application of Humanitarian Law in Complex Security Situations"*

**Mark A. Wolfgram**, Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University  
*"Men With Guns: Explaining the Failure to Improve Human Rights Conditions in Kosovo"*

**Robert A. Ventresca**, Department of History, King's University College, University of Western Ontario  
*"A Comparative History of Regime Change: Transitional Justice in Post-War Italy and Post-Saddam Iraq"*

Discussant:

**Chris Penny**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

17.00-17.30 Closing Remarks

**David Mendeloff**, Director, Centre for Security and Defence Studies

*\* The working language of the conference was English.*

The Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, is one of twelve national Centres of Expertise supported through the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) at the Department of National Defence. We gratefully acknowledge their support.

**PART B**  
**SESSION SUMMARIES**

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

**James Dobbins**  
**Director**  
**International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation**

**“Nation Building from Germany to Iraq:  
An Evaluation of the U.S. and U.N. Records”**

Mr. Dobbins began by noting that the U.S. intervention in Iraq was the sixth major nation building operation in less than a decade by the U.S. and the fifth intervention in a Muslim country. Dobbins himself was associated with all five interventions preceding Iraq. In 2002, he decided to analyze these experiences. He served as the lead author of a two-volume RAND study, *The U.S. Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (2003) and *The UN Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (2005).

Dobbins defined nation-building as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to prevent the re-ignition of conflict and assist the transition to democracy. This definition has three distinct components: 1) the use of armed force, 2) it takes place in a post-conflict environment, and 3) its objective is democratization. This definition of nation-building is analogous to the United Nations' concept of “peacebuilding.” The U.S. government calls these “stability operations.”

The American intervention in Germany demonstrated the feasibility of the concept of using armed force to compel a transition to democracy. However, it illustrated that this concept would not work under all circumstances. Germany was unique in that it was Western, surrounded by democracies and integrated in European institutions. Despite this, the German effort collapsed by 1948 and the Marshall Plan addressed that collapse.

The above characteristics did not apply to Japan but Japan's transformation was quicker and easier than Germany's. By 1947, all the reforms that General Douglas MacArthur had been asked to undertake were undertaken. There were two reasons for this quick transformation. First, the intervention in Japan was a unilateral effort versus the multilateral effort in Germany. Second, the underlying philosophy of intervention in Japan was different. In Japan there was always a fully-constituted Japanese government that was purely Japanese but took orders from the occupation authority. This meant that the society transformed from within. In Germany, from 1945 to 1949, there were no national institutions because they were dismantled and then rebuilt from scratch. This might indicate that the German transformation was more thorough since Germany is more reconciled with its neighbours who participated in its transformation. Also, the Germans accept the burden of history. Japan's neighbours do not accept its transformation and Japan does not accept the burden of its history to the same extent.

During the Cold War, the imperative for U.S. policy was stability and geopolitical balance with the Soviet Union. For forty years sources of conflict were frozen and stabilized. Germany, Europe, Cyprus, Korea, China and Palestine remained divided. This division was maintained by the U.S. and U.N. troops. Solving these divisions would advantage one side or the other. With the end of the Cold War, there was the option of doing more than freezing those conflicts. There was the potential to solve problems like Germany or Japan. The result was a higher level of international activism. This was coupled with an increase in failed states that had been held together by the U.S. or Soviet Union during the Cold War (such as Somalia, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia).

After the Cold War, the U.S. lost the incentive to hold these countries together and so let those states disintegrate. This meant there was an increased demand for nation-building as well as an increased supply (the increased capacity to get resolutions through the U.N. and the ability to do something). During the Cold War the U.S. intervened in a new country once every ten years. During the Clinton Administration the U.S. intervened once every two years, and during the Bush Administration, once every year (Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti). This frequency is reflected in U.N. operations: There were fifty five peacekeeping operations since 1945, of which forty one were since the end of the Cold War.

Dobbins then discussed a number of U.S. interventions in turn, beginning with Afghanistan. The Afghanistan operation, he said, involved a low-profile, small-footprint approach. It had less troops and less money and was the least resourced of the U.S. nation-building operations of the past sixty years. The lesson learned in Afghanistan was that a low input led to low output. However, the U.S. later modified its approach and more than doubled the number of troops in Afghanistan and quadrupled the amount of assistance. In order to justify this approach it must be stated that U.S. commitments matched its objective, which was to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a launch pad for global terrorism.

The Iraq operation, he said, had very ambitious objectives: Iraq was to become a democratic model for the Middle East. This was why the Iraq operation was more heavily resourced than Afghanistan. And yet, it was less resourced than Bosnia or Kosovo (four times less by proportion of population). The U.S. did not understand the dimensions of the challenge. The reason for this is “calculated ignorance,” which Dobbins defined as a wilful decision to exclude a body of relevant information from the planning and implementation process. This includes deciding to use as a model the occupations of Germany and Japan rather than the model of the 1990s. (The MacArthur analogy was used openly.) The White House did so because: Germany and Japan were big countries and so was Iraq; Germany and Japan were successes while Bosnia was not; and the successes in Germany and Japan had nothing to do with Bill Clinton (they could not possibly model their effort on operations mounted during the Clinton administration).

According to Dobbins there were a number of problems with this approach. For example, Iraq in 2003 looked more like Yugoslavia in 1995 than Germany/Japan in 1945. Germany and Japan were homogenous societies, first-world economies, they had been defeated in years of war, and had surrendered. By contrast, Iraq was and is not homogenous, is not a first world economy, and did not end through surrender.

The concept and terminology of occupation has also changed, he said. The world has changed a lot since the end of World War II. In 1945, there was no alternative to U.S. occupation of Germany and Japan. By the 1990s this had changed. In Bosnia, the U.S. contributed only twenty percent of the troops and money. Burden-sharing was a necessity. Moreover, the terminology of occupation was problematic. The U.S. association with it is benign, but the rest of the world associates occupation with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Therefore the term is controversial.

To cap it all off, the President’s decision to take responsibility for all the civil elements of occupation from the administrators that are familiar with them and hand them over to the

Department of Defense (three weeks before the mission was launched) created problems. The result was that inexperienced people who had not done the job of “administration” in over 50 years were now in charge of a country. It was an exercise in “heroic amateurism.”

Having discussed some U.S. operations, Dobbins then turned to the U.N. nation-building experience and record. He noted that the Belgian Congo in the 1960s was the U.N.’s first real experience with peacebuilding. The U.N. stayed out of these operations during the Cold War except for Cyprus. In 1990, the U.N. conducted a number of successful operations in places that had been the site of proxy wars. The U.N.’s role consisted of disarmament, demobilization and elections. These operations were conducted in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique. However, coping with disintegrated states that were held together by the Cold War required peace enforcement and large operations. Peace enforcement operations included East Timor, East Slavonia and Sierra Leone.

The RAND corporation’s study compares the success rate of the eight U.N. cases with the eight U.S. cases of intervention. The criteria for success included a) how peaceful the country is today and b) how democratic it is. RAND relied on Freedom House and the University of Maryland indicators for these criteria. The U.S. interventions had a fifty percent success rate (with Germany, Japan, Kosovo and Bosnia being successful, while Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq are not) while the U.N. interventions had a seven out of eight success rate for peace (the only unsuccessful intervention being in the Congo, which in fact was at peace for thirty years). U.N. interventions had a six out of eight success rate for democracy, with Cambodia and the Congo remaining undemocratic.

Why is the U.N. success rate higher than the U.S.? Dobbins argued that the selection of cases partly explains this. The U.S. cases were more difficult and involved forced entry; peace enforcement often came after a failed U.N. operation. In addition, the U.N. did a better job of institutionalizing its experiences and creating a cadre of professionals and doctrine of intervention.

The perception is that such missions are not very successful. This is because failures get much of the attention. However, according to the Canadian Human Security Report the world has become a safer place. There is nostalgia for the Cold War but the Cold War actually fed dozens of conflicts. Most of these conflicts have been stopped. In the 1990s there were sixty wars and now we are down to thirty. From the 1970s to the 1980s, there have been 200,000-300,000 conflict-related deaths. In the 1990s, that number fell to 120,000. Thus, it is worth investing in these post-conflict intervention capabilities.

The failures and setbacks in Iraq have a silver lining: recognition of the need to do the same things but better. There is a renewed interest in this field. However, if things go worse in Iraq there is the fear that there will be a “never again” phenomenon, similar to what happened after Vietnam.

During the question and answer session that followed, Dobbins was asked whether he would give the same assessment of U.S. interventions if he used a larger-time frame. The questioner noted that Haiti has been in trouble for 200 years. Dobbins replied that an intervention cannot ensure change at the roots. Interventions cannot address poverty for example, but they can ensure that a country does not relapse back into conflict. Relative tranquility today is better than a decade ago. Sometimes one has to pay the continuing price for stability. Even if there is conflict in the Balkans ten years from now the intervention was still worth it for that relative period of stability. Also, conflict has a negative effect on the economy of a country and its neighbours. No conflict and no assistance would still lead to a positive growth in a country. Therefore one can measure effectiveness using an economic framework: the cost of peacekeeping and assistance versus the benefits to the economy. Ninety percent of countries that come out of conflict with no intervention go back into conflict, but when there is a peacekeeping mission a country rarely goes



back into conflict. Peacekeeping is the most cost effective and only reliable form of post-conflict intervention.

Another audience member noted that his description of post-conflict intervention revolves around compulsion and the transition to democracy. But democracy needs cooperation, he said, and the difference between the U.S. and U.N. operations was that the U.N. has had moral authority. How does the extent of acceptance by the locals affect the success rate of the missions? Dobbins replied that all U.S. operations, except Kosovo and Iraq, were U.N.-mandated. One reason why the U.N. can get by with smaller operations is due to its soft-power attributes that the U.S. does not possess. The U.S. can only rely on hard power. Moreover, U.S. operations are peace enforcement operations. The conflicting parties did not invite intervention. U.N. moral authority is an important factor but the international community sometimes feels compelled to intervene in the absence of intervention. The U.N. does not do these kinds of operations and so the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Australia (in the case of East Timor) have to act. These interventions can be handed over to the U.N. after entry and if the operation is under 20,000 troops. The U.N. is the best alternative if there is no invasion and if less than 20,000 troops are required.

In his address, Dobbins stated that multilateral operations are more successful than unilateral ones (such as Iraq). A questioner asked him ask the counterfactual question: if intervention in Iraq were multilateral, would it have had a better outcome? Another questioner then asked whether there is anything that the U.N. or U.S. could do in fragile states, in particular in Africa? Dobbins answered that this is possible, but the scale would have precluded a U.N. operation. The main problems of intervention in Iraq were the failure to anticipate things that have precedents. About 400-500,000 troops are needed in Iraq and the U.S. could not find that except in a multilateral operation. A multilateral operation would contribute a) a greater number of troops and b) greater legitimacy. As for the second question, Dobbins noted interventions in fragile states, if properly resourced, are likely to succeed. However, Africa is not high enough on the international agenda for appropriate expenditure.

Another questioner asked Dobbins why the U.S. army did not anticipate counter-insurgency in Iraq. Dobbins said there were two reasons. First, it was not something that the army had faced in a long time. In Afghanistan and Bosnia there were spoilers present, but no one was actively resisting the U.S. intervention so ultimately the U.S. army was not expecting counter-insurgency. Second, the U.S. army had abandoned counter-insurgency doctrines and had no counter-insurgency training. Now it is opening schools in counter-insurgency and training in cultural sensitivity and appealing to hearts and minds of the people. Also, counter-insurgencies are won by locals and there has been an effort towards "Iraqization" in Iraq. The army is beginning to re-learn the lessons.

**PANEL 1**  
**POST-INTERVENTION SECURITY IN COMPARATIVE**  
**AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Chair: **Fen O. Hampson**, Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Presenters: **Major-General Andrew Leslie**, Director General Strategic Planning, Department of National Defence and former-Commander Task Force Kabul and Deputy Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan

**Roland Paris**, Director of Research, Conference Board of Canada and Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Colorado, Boulder

Discussant: **Trevor Findlay**, Associate Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance

Major-General Andrew Leslie opened the session with a caveat: his comments would reflect his experiences as a former peace operations commander, rather than the theoretical debate that surrounds post-conflict interventions. Leslie sees the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia as extremely important to the evolution of multinational operations. The confusion and complications that plagued the U.N. operation led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to assume control of peace operations in the Balkans. Once NATO took over, Leslie observed, the efficiency and success of the peacekeeping operation radically improved. In his opinion, NATO's involvement showed the belligerents that the international community was finally serious about ending the violence in the region.

As seen in the Brahimi Report (August, 2000), Leslie argued that the lesson learned from the Balkans is clear: the U.N. does not automatically have the capacity to conduct robust peace operations. When a mission calls for strong military forces to enforce a mandate or provide security in hostile environment, a coalition of states, mostly Western NATO members, must be called upon. More importantly, Leslie noted, wealthy Western states have a moral obligation to bring peace and stability to war torn regions of the world, and to protect the innocent who are victimized by civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and state failure.

For Leslie, Afghanistan is an example of how the West is implementing the lessons of the Balkans and fulfilling their moral obligation to help the less fortunate. Canada's role in Afghanistan is a supporting one. Canadians are not conquerors and their ambitions are not imperial. The Afghan government of Hamid Karzai has asked for Western support. Without it, Afghanistan would relapse into anarchy, the opium trade and oppression of women would continue unchecked, and Afghan territory would again provide terrorists with a safe haven. Leslie warned, however, that the West must be willing to compromise when attempting to bring peace and stability to countries such as Afghanistan. First and foremost, the West must abandon the ideal of neutrality. Forces of moderation and stability must be supported, while extremist

elements must be opposed. Intervening forces must also negotiate with unpleasant elements, including warlords and drug producers. Confronting these dangerous elements directly is likely to engender greater instability and perhaps hand extremists new allies. While the long-term objective should be to marginalize and weaken warlords and drug producers, they must be engaged in the short-term.

A second lesson Leslie addressed was the need to advance a “whole of government approach” to post-conflict interventions. In the past, the defence department, diplomatic service, and aid agencies rarely communicated and their international efforts were poorly coordinated, even when they operated in the same region or theatre. As articulated in the *International Policy Statement* (April, 2005) released under Prime Minister Paul Martin, the Canadian government is committed to a “joined-up” approach. Steps have been taken to foster cooperation among Canada’s internationally-focused agencies and departments. Although there is certainly room for improvement, relations between the Department of National Defence (DND), Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) are becoming stronger.

Leslie ended his talk with a call for more investment in peacebuilding resources. He also reminded the audience that Canadians may not be militaristic, but they are at times required to wage war for just causes. Afghanistan and other peacebuilding operations count among these just causes.

**D**r. Roland Paris argued that a distinction must be made among peacebuilding interventions. Post-conflict interventions are those operations that occur after local belligerents have agreed to a ceasefire or settlement. The role of interveners in these cases is to provide an impartial monitoring of a peace accord’s implementation, which typically includes disarmament, demobilization and governance reform. Post-conflict interventions also tend to have the consent of belligerents. U.N. operations in East Timor, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are examples of this type of peacebuilding mission.

Post-invasion operations are a second type of peacebuilding operation. In these cases, the interveners have conquered and are occupying the state or region in question. In addition, forces deployed to these types of peacebuilding operations are typically supporting a government they brought to power. As a result, the objectives of these peacebuilders is to secure a government favourable to their interests and values, rather than acting as impartial arbitrators. We need to be clear about what type of intervention we are talking about. Afghanistan and Iraq count among the latter type of peacebuilding operation.

In Paris’s estimation, post-conflict interventions face fewer obstacles and have had more success than post-invasion operations. Of the twelve post-conflict peacebuilding missions launched by the U.N. since the end of the Cold War, for instance, only three have relapsed into violence. A number of factors account for this. Forces attempting to build a stable peace after conquest are more likely to be viewed as occupiers by local inhabitants. As a result, resistance to the interveners tends to be higher in post-invasion missions. Indeed, post-invasion peacebuilding operations tend to exhibit characteristics akin to counterinsurgency instead of peace support or classical peacekeeping. Paris argued that the distinction between post-invasion and post-conflict peacebuilding operations is critical since the unique challenges of the former tend to obscure the successes and lessons learned of the latter.

Among the lessons learned from previous post-conflict peacebuilding operations are the need to field robust military and police forces, and to disarm and demobilize belligerents quickly. Like Leslie, Paris noted that past missions show that the U.N. is ill-suited to manage operations involving forceful interventions. The U.N.’s bureaucratic structure complicates the effective and consistent application of force on peacebuilding operations. Consequently, he supports the U.N.’s tendency to outsource force-reliant missions to regional organizations and major states, such as NATO and the United Kingdom.

Next, Paris questioned whether a cessation of violence should be used as a test of a peacebuilding operation's success. A better gauge of a mission's accomplishments, he suggested, was the implementation of lasting political, institutional, and socio-economic reforms. Absent such reforms, war-torn societies are unlikely to achieve a self-sustaining and stable peace. Peacebuilders must therefore look beyond security. They should devote equal, if not more, time and effort to improving governance and economic development.

Paris was especially critical of using elections as a benchmark of peacebuilding success. Premature elections can reinforce existing tensions, exacerbate hatreds among ethnic groups, slow economic development, and legitimize oppressive dictatorships. For elections to have a positive effect, they must be buttressed by respect for the rule of law and other norms of good governance. Inevitably, instilling norms of good governance and the rule of law takes time. When states intervene in post-conflict situations, therefore, they should anticipate a long-term commitment.

Discussant Dr. Trevor Findlay responded to Leslie and Dr. Paris by questioning the degree of ownership involved in peacebuilding operations. Specifically, Findlay observed that like national governments who must weigh the cost of alleviating poverty and discontent within their own borders, interveners must examine the extent to which they are prepared to assume responsibility for the well-being of fragile states. Stated differently, just as national governments must decide to what extent they should act as 'nanny states', interveners must critically evaluate their ability to assume the stewardship of fragile regions and societies.

To Findlay, the ownership issue springs from a larger normative concern – namely, what exactly is a normal society? Since Western societies are far from perfect, it is pertinent to ask what should be considered an acceptable level of normality in post-conflict states. Unless this receives the attention it deserves, interveners will be unable to know when it an appropriate time to end a peacebuilding operation has arrived.

He praised Paris' distinction between post-invasion and post-conflict peacebuilding. Findlay said this differentiation was key to understanding the complexities interveners face when attempting to foster a stable peace in fragile states. Findlay also expressed support for Paris's views on premature elections, the role of robust military forces and police forces, the necessity of a holistic and coordinated approach to peacebuilding, and the long-term commitment required for effective peacebuilding.

Lastly, Findlay was critical of the Canadian government's hesitancy in linking the rebuilding of Afghanistan with Canada's national interests. Drawing on the Australian example, Findlay argued that interveners should not let diffidence dissuade them from admitting that peacebuilding operations serve both humanitarian and self-interested ends.

During the question period that followed, the panelists were asked to comment on the utility of deploying small numbers of U.N. peace forces to regions of the world where conflict has yet to erupt. Leslie replied that prevention is key and that small deployments can be effective in forestalling violence. Paris argued that smaller, preventive deployments can be useful, depending on the context. His larger concern was that small deployments should not be the norm for post-conflict interventions.

Another audience member questioned the wisdom of working with warlords and asked Paris why he did not count Kosovo as a post-invasion operation. Leslie answered that, when dealing with warlords and other dangerous elements, the choice is between compromise and forceful confrontation. Since peacebuilders are seeking to improve security in a hostile environment, escalating tensions by using force against warlords is often risky and counterproductive, given that a threatened warlord can easily drag a fragile society back into violence and conflict. Paris responded that, in the case of Kosovo, the NATO intervention was

supported by ninety-percent of the Kosovo Albanians and that the scale of the invasion was small compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.

The panelists were asked to consider what could be done to improve coordination and relations among national and international stakeholders, and the NGO community and intervening militaries. Leslie said that coordination among national stakeholders is improving. He further observed that, in spite of their unquestionable courage and ideals, NGOs must abandon their aversion to working with intervening militaries. NGOs need security and only military forces can protect them in hostile environments. Paris noted that the Canadian government was already working towards more coordinated approaches to peacebuilding, and he agreed that links between government and NGOs must be improved.

**PANEL 2**  
**SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE TRANSITION**  
**TO POST-INTERVENTION AUTHORITY**

Chair: **David Carment**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Presenters: **David M. Edelstein**, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government, Georgetown University

*“Establishing Security During and After Occupation: Lessons from History”*

**D. Kirk MacCleod**, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre

*“Managing Security in Transition: Lessons from Kosovo”*

**Bob Martyn**, Queen's University

*“Go Home! Security Challenges of Transitional Authorities”*

Discussant: **Richard Gowan**, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

**D**r. David Edelstein began the panel by noting that his paper outlined an on-going research project. This project will present a history of military occupation and theory of success and failure of military occupations. He has identified twenty-five occupations over the course of history: only seven have been successful, and six of those seven took place in the immediate post-World War II period. He defines “success” as achieving those goals set out by the occupying power.

Occupation takes time and resources to succeed, he said, because it involves rebuilding societies and re-establishing stability. The most important impediments to success are the nationalist feelings of targeted populations and the impatience of the occupying power. Successful occupying powers will overcome these challenges, achieve their goals, and withdraw following establishment of a stable government; failure will require either an early withdrawal or extending the occupation.

East Timor and Kosovo are the closest the U.N. has come to seizing sovereignty and administering a territory. East Timor was a success, Kosovo remains a “question mark.” In the case of Kosovo, the troops cannot leave due to a fear of a resumption of fighting. The U.N.’s presence has been met with hostility by the population. In East Timor, the rampaging Indonesian militia caused the U.N. and Australians to intervene, to expel the militias and rebuild. Although it was a success, the legitimacy effect of the U.N. should not be overstated; nations want to govern themselves.

As for Iraq and Afghanistan, Edelstein expressed scepticism about final outcome. No external threats are present, but internal threats exist. Why is Afghanistan marginally more successful than Iraq? There has been no attempt to occupy the whole country other than the capital, hence foreigners are not as visible; there is a weak central government and warlords still govern at local levels (which translates into less resistance to the occupation, but more risk to

long-term stability). The Iraqis, by contrast, are impatient with the U.S. presence, and the U.S. people are becoming impatient with the dedication of resources to Iraq.

Lastly, the issue of the nationalism needs to be managed. Despite this often thorny issue, occupation sometimes has to be done (for example in the cases of Germany and Japan post-World War II). Yet the question remains: should we do this at all and under what conditions?

Kirk MacLeod opened his talk by relating a popular joke about the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK): “What is the difference between UNMIK and the Albanian mafia?” The answer: “The mafia is organized!” He admitted it is true that there are real organizational stumbling blocks in the way of the U.N. in Kosovo. MacLeod focused on how the U.N. could make itself more integrated and how the military, police and aid components of a mission could work better together.

Dedicated human resources are an important part of any successful intervention. The right people need to be sent; there is always a pressing need for talented people. Finding and keeping specialists to ensure continuity is a constant challenge. Currently, the best people are sent first, and as the mission continues, whoever is available then gets sent. One result of this is that civil-military relations are not conducted effectively. The worse case was the police – effective trainers for the Kosovar police, intelligence, canine units, etc., are needed, and instead beat cops are being sent. In addition, the six-month rotation cycle is out of sync with the reality on the ground – there is the challenge of getting up to speed, which takes about 2 months, then 2 months of working, and then 2 months preparing to go home (this is the 2-2-2 rule). This is inefficient and makes human resources volatile.

Capacity building, he said, also requires co-ordination both within the international community and between expatriates and local population. Some Kosovars, for example, saw that the international community did not have its act together and they took advantage of this. The shortage of specialized personnel compounded this problem. The mission was unable to hand over tasks and responsibilities to the locals in a timely fashion.

The local leadership is another important yet controversial problem. This is because some are former combatants and may be war criminals. Embracing or rejecting such people each carries risks. There is the potential for conflict between the international community’s security interests and its values and norms. What happens, for example, when a person indicted for war crimes is helping to rebuild the country? What would serve Kosovo better?

MacLeod also discussed the problem of competing national interests. In the case of Kosovo, Germany has wanted to address the problem of organized crime because it was concerned about the Albanian mafia that was operating in Germany. The U.S., by contrast, was focused on counter-terrorism. These differences can cause problems on the ground.

The third presenter, Dr. Bob Martyn, argued that terrorism will not be defeated through combat operations alone. This is evident from the number of failed states serving as breeding grounds for exporting terrorism and insurgency.

Drawing on various studies, Martyn outlined some features of modern conflict. First, he asserted that the dominant characteristic of insurgency, namely its protracted nature and ambiguity, effectively precludes fixed time-limited approaches. Thus there is a need to reorient strategic thinking. Second, terrorism is a dominant feature of current conflict and has long historical antecedents. He identified contemporary religious terrorism, including al-Qaeda, as the fourth wave in the history of terrorism dating from the late-nineteenth century. Martyn argued that based on existing patterns, current conflict conditions should exist at least for a generation.

Martyn identified some recurring security problems in post-combat environments that can be fit into three overarching economic, social, and political categories. The economic ones include the rise of black market activities, and the requirement to provide or assist in the provision of the basic resources of survival. Some of the social problems are incidents of post-

conflict retribution by previously-oppressed groups against the overthrown regime, and the need for extensive external provision of humanitarian aid and infrastructure reconstruction. The problems with political implications are security vacuums; the seeds of discontent caused by failure to re-integrate demobilized military / security forces; and the heartache caused to “friendly players” by the visible and open use of foreign troops to provide humanitarian, governmental and reconstruction assistance.

The transition from military to civilian authorities can be difficult in post-conflict situations. For example, the U.N.-mandated requirement for the immediate withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo created a security vacuum that was immediately filled by the UCK (a.k.a. Kosovo Liberation Army). The KLA established themselves in positions of authority, from which they had to be removed. Failing to re-integrate demobilized military and security forces produced several thousand disenfranchised young men and women. This created another dangerous situation. One partially successful remedy was the creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps. It had support roles, such as de-mining and humanitarian aid distribution, but no direct military or police roles. Tying demobilization to job opportunities was successful.

Some elements of Kosovo’s society demanded retribution against the former regime. Although the Kosovo Force had entered Kosovo to protect Albanians from Serb oppression, in a bizarre twist the troops spent most of their time protecting the minority Serbs from Albanians. In cases such as this, where some groups demand retribution against others, international forces will have to be on hand to provide security.

The presence of military and aid workers in the post-conflict zone also caused a few problems for the military, and vice versa. The Canadian Forces, among other militaries, have been doing this work for decades, but misunderstandings still occur. One reason for this is civilians are outside the military chain of command. Therefore, they sometimes cannot be provided with the information that would help them work with military. Another source of military / NGO tension in Kosovo related to the administrative vacuum following the removal of the former regime. In such cases, international actors must make decisions for the local community and provide basic municipal services. The military often does this work because they can and someone must. Often soldiers can accomplish these tasks the most quickly, while providing the security required. But NGOs can become unhappy if they believe that the troops are taking jobs, such as aid distribution, away from NGOs. This is understandable, Martyn said, but what is best for the local population should be the guiding principle and first priority.

Finally, Martyn turned to the question of sustaining the military presence. One of the keys to successful post-combat security is having sufficient military strength to ensure stability, having enough “boots on the ground” to make a footprint. Yet, the presence of foreign troops can be a problem. It appears that you must have a large footprint initially, enough to win the battle, while bearing in mind that large forces can make subsequent operations more difficult. It may become necessary to make the footprint smaller so that the troops on the ground do not become a lightning rod for resentment and conflict. Strategic leadership, and the transitional team, must carefully manage the shift from force-based physical security to psychological security that springs from stable government and economic growth.

The key is not for the Canadian military to get better at stability operations (though there is room for improvement), but for the other elements of the ‘3-D’ (Diplomacy and Development) troika to increase their deployment capabilities. War-fighting and the subsequent security environment cannot be treated separately. Canadian elements, including those of defence, diplomatic, developmental nature, are not optimized for this security environment. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at post-conflict support as its weakest link. This is particularly crucial now, when our military is at war, but our nation is not.

The insurgent nature of post-conflict security environment challenges our traditional approach to thinking about the Canadian Forces and conflict. Because the dominant characteristics of insurgency preclude our time-tested approaches, we need to reorient our



strategic thinking to deal with the identified challenges in social, political, and economic realms. There is a need to use the lessons of peace operations and apply them to the current security environment.

Discussant Richard Gowan turned first to Edelstein's paper. He said Edelstein's concerns are shared by the U.N. There is concern at the U.N. regarding occupation in post-conflict situations and doubt about the legitimacy it can provide. Gowan added that more emphasis could have been placed on how societies under occupation can also threaten neighbouring countries. For example, Kosovo Albanians radicals threatened Macedonia in 2001. Threats can come from without and within.

Gowan noted in regards to MacLeod's paper that the U.N. is bad with politics and power relationships. Politics at the local level often defines what happens. Local politicians think in terms of winning and losing and what is best for them and their communities; they do not always share the international community's level of concern for the achievement of a fully-functioning democracy. Another problem is the lack of political intelligence. Sometimes the manipulation of information is as important to success as compromise. Often the need is for "political stories that lead to peace," and not just programs.

Gowan made several points touching on Martyn's paper. One was the need to address human trafficking by international peacekeepers. He added that although the international community moved from a light footprint to a heavy one in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and East Timor, these missions were now concluded or concluding. By contrast, while the international community has authorized ambitious new mandates for operations such as the UN's mission to southern Sudan, it has proved difficult to find sufficient military and civilian resources for these. The result is a "withered footprint", by which personnel on the ground lack the capacity to fulfil their intended mandate and strategies.

During the questions and answer session, the panellists were asked about solutions to staffing problems in peace operations organizations, and about ensuring the presence of more competent staff working efficiently. MacLeod observed that the question was complex. He said that the U.N. acknowledges the problem at its highest levels, but the main issue are the operations themselves. There is a need to get rid of those entrenched in the old system. Six month contracts were introduced so that organizations can vet employees, but good employees are not rewarded under the current system with longer commitments, only given another 6 month contract.

Another audience member was curious about light footprints vs. heavy footprints. In Kosovo and East Timor there was a heavy footprint. But why, she asked, was the heavy footprint a success in East Timor and not Kosovo? Gowan replied that it was because East Timor's final status was decided from the start, Kosovo's was not. The political framework to determine the balance of power still has not yet been set (because of the Albanian factions). Edelstein agreed that the root problem is the nationalism of the populations. This must be settled before determination of final status, which is what the population is most interested in. MacLeod added that Kosovo is not ready for independence (it could not self-govern or operate a self-sustaining economy). In addition, East Timor is on an island, but for Kosovo there are regional concerns. Martyn said another factor is that the west does not care about Kosovo anymore.

### PANEL 3 RESPONDING TO LOCAL POPULATIONS

Chair: **Grant Dawson**, Centre for Security and Defence Studies, NPSIA

Presenters: **Ann Livingstone**, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and  
**Natalie Mychajlyszyn**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs  
*“The Do's and Don'ts of 3-D: A Critical Analysis”*

**Jeremy Lammi**, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary  
*“Managing the Population During an Insurgency”*

**Victoria Edwards**, Department of National Defence  
*“The Role of Post-Intervention Security in Peace and Relief Mission Negotiations”*

**Rachel Lea Heide**, Department of History, Carleton University  
*“Obligation of the Home Front: The Necessity of Cultural Awareness Training for Interventions in the New World Order”*

Discussant: **Jean Daudelin**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

**D**rs. Ann Livingstone and Natalie Mychajlyszyn opened the third panel with an overview and some examples of the concept of 3-D or “whole of government” approach and the do’s and don’ts of applying the concept in practice.

Livingstone began by discussing how the 3-D concept came into being to help governments respond to the “multi-dimensional complexity of conflict.” In Canada, this resulted in integrated planning and increased coordination between FAC, DND and CIDA. She said that the 3-D concept must not remain a western construct. Donors must pay close attention to the local needs as identified by recipients. The “whole of government” approach, she argued, will be unsuccessful unless local realities are taken into account.

She then turned to the lessons of 3-D, outlining three “Dos” and three “Don’ts” for governmental implementation of such a policy. The “Dos” are:

1. Appropriate structures and processes are required in order to properly implement any 3-D policy. This requires a commitment to the whole of government process. Otherwise the government runs the risk of returning to departmental stovepipes.
2. The government must identify all the various parts that are required for “whole of government.” This entails moving beyond a strict understanding of 3-D and incorporating areas such as justice.
3. Proper communication and coordination of the ground application of 3-D is necessary, as there are a variety of potential partners in local areas.

The “Don’ts” are:

1. Do not expect a 3-D policy to act as panacea for lack of integration. Departments have a tendency to fixate on their own *raison d'être*; the government should try to avoid disconnects, but realize that they will occur.
2. Do not ignore regional and subregional groups; capacity building is a critical factor in preventing a return to conflict.
3. Do not allow scepticism to prohibit communication between the components.

Dr. Mychajlyszyn then discussed the need for critical analysis of the 3-D concept, using as examples Canada's experiences in Haiti and Afghanistan. She noted that the Canadian government has moved forward in the 3-D policy, which has been evolving since 1996. Canadian policy now understands security from a more comprehensive point of view, one that takes several forms, including human security, the Disaster Assistance Response Team, prevention, and CIDA's recognition of a conflict cycle. This gradual movement towards 3-D, due in part to lessons from Zaire (a negative experience) and the Balkans (positive), culminated in the international policy statement.

Responding to earlier panels, Mychajlyszyn also cautioned against an overly critical assessment of the infrequency of inter-departmental meetings; she pointed out that criticism must be fair to the initiatives that have taken place. Individuals do meet to discuss matters of common interest. More is needed, but there is movement in the right direction. She referred to the increased involvement of non-traditional departments as a sign we are progressing toward a true whole of government approach.

She noted that in the context of a new government it is difficult to predict the future of the 3-D policy but suggested that the Conservatives may re-label the policy without substantially changing it. Mychajlyszyn pointed to Canada's response to Afghanistan as an example of how effective 3-D can be.

Mychajlyszyn then discussed some additional "Don'ts" for Canada's 3-D policy. She emphasized that the successful application of 3-D in Afghanistan should not be generalized back to Canada's overall 3-D policy. Despite the high-profile nature of 3-D and the successful integration in Afghanistan, there is still concern. For one thing, NGOs in the field are uncertain about Canada's activities and are reluctant to associate with our Provincial Reconstruction Team. For another, despite the cohesion of 3-D in Afghanistan, when looking back at the policy decision making process in Canada, it is clear that more is needed to institutionalize 3-D as policy.

This was particularly evident when Canada deployed to Haiti. When one looks at that mission, it creates doubt about whether Canada really has a "whole of government" response. Thus, one cannot generalize because stove-piping still exists in Ottawa. Territoriality and conflict over federal resources speaks to the absence of a new institution to frame the "whole of government" approach.

This led directly to Mychajlyszyn's second "Don't," which is never leave 3-D un-interrogated. There is still much that is unknown about the concept; the expert knowledge available at the conference is not easily accessible to other analysts. The academic analysis of 3-D has only begun. Mychajlyszyn noted that she and Dr. Livingstone were about to initiate a joint research project involving NPSIA and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre that would more fully examine the 3-D approach.

Jeremy Lammi's presentation focused on counter-insurgencies and the role of governments in addressing rebellions. He began with a discussion of Karl von Clausewitz's seminal work *On War* (1832). Clausewitz, Lammi said, dealt with guerrilla campaigns from the perspective of the insurgents, but he also touched on counter-insurgency policy in the sense of deploying troops to troubled spots and essentially annihilating those areas.

Lammi then presented an overview of the procedures that governments have adopted in the past to deal with troublesome populations. They have largely relied upon terror and violence (such as the Romans in Spain, U.S. in Vietnam and, most recently, the U.S. in Falluja). Such strategies lead to bad policies. In most insurgencies, Lammi pointed out, only about 1% to 2% of the population participates in the uprising, another small percentage actively supports it, and a few more are neutral. Most of the population remains loyal to the government. But when government adopts a militaristic approach to quell the rebellion, the population can be militarized and radicalized, causing more people to support and even join the insurgency – the opposite of the intended effect.

Lammi then discussed the “hearts and minds” approach. The idea here is that to defeat an insurgency, the government needs the respect of the people. Lammi highlighted the fact that by virtue of its legitimacy the government has important advantages over insurgents; without it, the insurgencies would take over. The question then is how to build legitimacy in the context of an insurgency. Respect for the rule of law is key. The government must act in accordance with the law, through fair, just and open trials.

Ireland is a case in point. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) built up legitimacy by protecting Catholics in Northern Ireland, but lost it over the past few years when innocents were killed because of their actions. The resulting backlash helped push the IRA toward a ceasefire. Lammi argued that when government actions are at the same level as insurgents, the population will struggle to decide whom to support. Since the insurgents are able to tap into underlying grievances, the population will increasingly turn to supporting the insurgents.

Lammi then related this discussion to Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, he maintained, it is necessary to create security before anything else. This in turn needs to be done carefully; for instance, 500 pound bombs should not be dropped on the population. The context in Iraq is somewhat different, as it may not be insurgency but a civil war. The U.S. should thus follow three rules for dealing with a civil war:

1. Don't engage in the civil war;
2. If you must engage, support only one side; and
3. Ensure that your side wins.

He concluded with two further points. Warlords must be disarmed or else they will sap legitimacy from the central government. This must be done carefully and cautiously. Second, governments must create “buy-in” for the populations. In essence, the people need not love the government, but they must respect it.

Victoria Edwards discussed the theory and practice of post integration security and its relationship to negotiations in post-conflict areas. Peace and relief mission negotiations are often thought of as those between highly visible and use professional negotiators and extensive support staff, including highly-trained professional interpreters, far from the conflict. Field negotiations, however, between military members, aid organizations and civilians in the context of contemporary peace and relief missions (in dangerous, ever changing conditions), using locally-engaged language assistants constitute another level of negotiation and another level of risk. Post integration security is necessary to facilitate the peace and relief assistance.

Negotiation is a practical mechanism used in peace and relief missions to help contain armed conflicts and settle them by peaceful means. Negotiation is the process wherein two or more people communicate with the aim of reaching an agreement. We negotiate, because voluntary cooperation of the local parties is more likely to lead to a sustainable peace. In contrast, if force is used to suppress violent conflict, it will remain under control only for as long as that force continues to be applied. A negotiator can assist parties to change their behaviour and bring about a positive peace (a state that involves more than just the absence of violence, justice and rule of

law). The negotiation environment at the field level is often more complex than at the political level due to the highly tense circumstances. The negotiator typically engages with parties from another culture, often in situations where people may feel threatened, irritable and frustrated. Messages may be mis-communicated through simple mispronunciation.

Edwards noted that every culture has its own communications practices, customs and protocol. She pointed out that the introductory phase of the negotiation provides an opportunity to gather information about the specific problem; consider and clarify assumptions; and agree on a process, purpose and direction. During the substantive negotiations, it is important to clarify and prioritize interests vice positions; deal with problem and people-related issues; clarify unspoken interests or outcomes; and agree to the text and agree to a draft accord. During the closing session, the parties record the formal agreement. Regardless of whether the negotiations are ad hoc or planned, the negotiation, always takes place amongst a small group of representatives of the parties. As the agreements need to be implemented by a much larger group, the follow-up and information sharing with these wider constituencies are very important. She suggested that to respond more effectively and increase their credibility, negotiators should avoid cultural and protocol mistakes. She noted that the principle factors that will influence successful negotiations are the parties' knowledge of: their own mandate and orders; the other parties' interest and the cultural context (the history, culture, values, traditions, and conflict).

Languages can be crucial for negotiations, particularly for human rights missions. For instance, the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), a human rights operation, made every effort to use the local language as a co-working language of the mission. But due to the multi-national nature of missions, some staff will not be able to communicate effectively in the local language. The solution is to hire local language assistants; members of ethnic minorities can be included to help minimize the potential for dangerous misunderstandings. When selecting a translator, Edwards emphasized that the key to success is in high proficiency standards. In terms of prejudice, she conceded that it is often difficult to find unbiased people. However, the assistant must at least act unbiased, and it is crucial that the assistant be able to respect the confidentiality of the negotiations.

Edwards also drew attention to the fact that negotiators must remember that the assistant will not leave when the intervention does; as such, negotiators should ensure that they do not disclose sensitive information in hearing range of the assistant. The presentation concluded with the observation that negotiation can be awkward and erroneous; interpreters and language assistants provide a bridge between negotiators and local parties.

The final presenter on the panel was Rachel Lea Heide. She discussed the role of cultural awareness in Canadian peacekeeper training and argued that, after the Canadian Airborne Regiment's experience in Somalia in 1993, it became imperative to make this training an integral element of peace support training. Heide pointed out that traditional peacekeeping has become a thing of the past; soldiers are instead being asked to make and enforce a peace rather than just keep a peace. Peacekeepers are often placed in foreign cultures, expected to interact with the local population in close quarters, and as a result require cultural sensitivity. Canada learned the hard way that cultural sensitivities are important. After the Somalia experience, racism guidelines were developed and incorporated into pre-deployment training to foster cultural sensitivity.

Heide explained how Canada's peacekeeping experience developed during the Cold War. Peacekeeping was not viewed as a separate type of operations for which the military had to prepare; instead, it was treated as an alternative use for equipment that had already been acquired for combat roles. Post-Cold War peace operations have been more serious and intensive than the traditional cease-fire monitoring done by early peacekeepers. Recent peace support operations have involved low-intensity warfare, and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has often been blurred. The Canadian Forces are deploying to protect human rights, stop genocide, and establish peace and security. Such humanitarian missions require personnel that

can empathize with the local population; there cannot be a sense of “us versus them” or “good versus evil.” Consequently, training must also evolve; pure combat training is no longer acceptable for peacekeepers. Peacekeepers need a better sense of culture, religion, history, and other important aspects of the local population. This was lacking in the deployment to Somalia; some members of the Canadian contingent displayed racist attitudes, and this resulted in tortures and killings.

Canada contributed the Canadian Airborne Regiment to Somalia because it had prepared for a recently cancelled U.N. mission to the Western Sahara. Canada decided to send the Airborne Regiment to Somalia to take advantage of its training. However, the Security Council changed the mission to a Chapter Seven mandate, and there was not sufficient time to allow the Airborne Regiment to retrain and adjust from its intended Chapter Six mission. Heide acknowledged that the Canadian Forces was able to create a secure environment and carry out its humanitarian activities successfully. Unfortunately, it was the actions of a few individuals that led to an inquiry and the eventual disbanding of the unit. While in Somalia, infiltration of the main base was a persistent problem; the initial response of Airborne members was to bind and hold infiltrators overnight before returning them to their home villages. When this proved ineffective, some soldiers turned to humiliation to deter locals from infiltrating. This resulted in physical beatings and, ultimately, killings of locals.

Images in the media, including videos of hazing rituals, brought about a Commission of Inquiry. The Somalia Inquiry found that the Canadian Airborne Regiment suffered from rampant careerism, flawed supervision, prevalent racism, inadequate training, and deficiencies in cultural training. The unit was not adequately prepared for conflict in a peace support mission. For instance, the commander was absent during the operational readiness exercise; some units had not finished their training, and others fell short in a variety of exercises. Nevertheless, this did not guarantee the devolution of discipline and the occurrence of beatings and killings.

Heide explained that a sense of frustration, the lack of training, and active racism brought about the resulting violence. Canadians arrived in Somalia believing their role was to “feed the starving;” thus, when Somalis began infiltrating the camp, the view arose that Somalis were ungrateful thieves. The Canadians were also shocked by the differences in culture; they had not been adequately warned about what to expect. Even their Somalia handbook was unhelpful; it devoted only two pages to explain the local situation. The Inquiry’s resulting recommendations included such things as behavioural suitability tests and personal history checks when selecting troops for overseas deployment; that the Canadian Forces training philosophy be changed to reflect non-combat training; and that the Canadian Forces introduce and implement a policy on racism. DND accepted in whole or part 132 of the 161 recommendations, including the need for a racism policy and the need to make peacekeeping training integral to all levels of training.

The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) was created in 1996 to provide pre-deployment training assistance to units and individuals. All those being deployed overseas must receive the basic course given by the PSTC. In this seven day course, there is an entire day on cultural awareness briefings. Additionally, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre provides training for civilian and military personnel. Heide concluded her presentation by highlighting that peacekeeping is changing and evolving; cultural awareness and sensitivity is necessary for effective peacekeeping. The positive outcome of the Somalia Inquiry was the institutionalization of peace support training, which includes a serious look at cultural awareness.

**D**iscussant Dr. Jean Daudelin spoke about the need to draw distinctions between post-intervention peacebuilding activities and post-conquest counterinsurgencies. The size and nature of the 3-Ds, particularly in post-conquest situations, are important. In these cases, the development D is subordinated to the defence D. Concurrent development initiatives cannot have much hope. Conversely, in a post-intervention context, the defence D becomes an instrument of development D.

Heide's piece, he said, provided a compelling case that cultural training needs to be performed. He brought up the role of political intelligence; in Somalia, the Canadian Forces did not know what the political situation was outside the walls of their compound. The failed states game (of which they knew so little) did not have clearly established rules. Post-intervention in failed states, Daudelin pointed out, is different from interventions in relatively stable states.

Daudelin discussed how the 3-Ds change according to whether the situation is a failed / not failed state, and whether it is post-intervention / post-conquest operation. There is often talk about insufficient resources, but what is rarely mentioned is the potentially negative impact of heavy footprints. What is the resource threshold? The local population may respond to incentives provided by the international community, but too much money or too many soldiers providing security will weaken the incentives of local leaders to develop their own self-sustaining capacities. Further, the better the soldiers, the less incentive local officials have to master the security situation themselves. He concluded by noting that a "whole of government" approach is usually discussed in the context of intervener stakeholders, not the recipients, and that the latter need to be more fully engaged in the future.

**PANEL 4**  
**POST-INTERVENTION SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE**

Chair: **Sarah Meharg**, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and Royal Military College of Canada

Presenters: **Col. Kenneth Watkin**, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Canadian Forces  
*“The Application of Humanitarian Law in Complex Security Situations”*

**Mark A. Wolfgram**, Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University  
*“Men With Guns: Explaining the Failure to Improve Human Rights Conditions in Kosovo”*

**Robert A. Ventresca**, Department of History, King’s University College,  
 University of Western Ontario  
*“A Comparative History of Regime Change: Transitional Justice in Post-War Italy and Post-Saddam Iraq”*

Discussant: **Chris Penny**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Col. Kenneth Watkin’s presentation focused on the interface between humanitarian law and human rights in contemporary armed conflict. He was interested in the increasing influence that human rights law is having on humanitarian law, most specifically regarding accountability processes.

He began by describing human rights and humanitarian law and carefully differentiated between them. International humanitarian law (IHL) is designed primarily to govern armed conflicts and protect civilians and other non-combatants. IHL requires that combat-related harm to civilians and civilian facilities be minimized. However, if conducted in accordance with the law, civilians and civilian property caught in the cross-fire may become collateral damage, and in this case, the perpetrators are not tried (because of “combatant immunity”).

Human rights law (HR), for its part, is governed by the rule of law and is based on the strict control of force. As such, HR tries to avoid the use of force altogether, focusing instead on the capture of perpetrators, and requires that any risks to civilians be avoided. Where force is used, HR requires an investigation, often rendering the process extremely arduous. Nevertheless, Watkin did note that HR recognizes circumstances in which people may be killed. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, for example, permits the use of force in self-defence or to quell riots or insurrections (see Article 2 of the Convention).

Following from this discussion, he argued that the interface between humanitarian and human rights law raises a question with regards to the principle of proportionality, or “double effect.” That is to say, while an operation may be legitimate and carried out with good intentions, the same operation may have terrible secondary effects on the ground. Part of the problem, as Watkin raised, is the fact that IHL does not benefit from the same history of a “wholesome



accountability process” as HR. There are no obligations to capture perpetrators under IHL. Under a law enforcement paradigm, however, the capture of individuals is the default method.

This is of greater concern today, he said, because of the evolving nature of conflict. As identified in the 2005 *Human Security Report*, 95% of contemporary conflicts occur within states, effectively confusing the roles of both IHR and HR. This means that if states want to operate under a HR paradigm, in which the capture of individuals is common practice, such states must be able to account for their use of violence.

Watkin concluded by reaffirming the importance of an accountability process in humanitarian law. He believes that the HR accountability process is slowly filling this void. The extent to which this can be done, however, is a question for future debate.

**D**r. Mark Wolfgram observed that, as interveners, we impose high standards of success on post-conflict situations. While such standards may not in themselves endanger success, he argued that the situation in Kosovo today is a direct result of the strategy adopted by intervening nations in 1999. The desire to achieve stability in Kosovo was met with a strategy of accommodation of former leaders – the “men with guns” – rather than a determination to transform the situation on the ground.

In his opinion, there was a lack of will to transform the ground reality when the conflict ended. The failure to improve the human rights situation for the Serbian minority in Kosovo resulted from NATO’s dependent relationship on the KLA. As Wolfgram argued, by choosing to accommodate and work with the KLA, NATO could not act to change the reality on the ground and this, in turn, greatly reduced the chances for sustainable peace.

Wolfgram turned to the current human rights situation in Kosovo. He referred to the 5<sup>th</sup> Annual Report of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo that mentioned persistent insecurity among Serbian Kosovars. The observance of basic human rights was well below the international norm. He also alluded to an Organization of Security and Co-Operation in Europe report that claimed the justice system has not sent clear signals to the population. Though convictions have been made, punishments have been inadequate. He asked why the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s jurisdiction had not been extended to post-1999 Kosovo.

Another problem is that the process of disarmament in Kosovo is non-existent. This means the “men with guns” are the norm not the exception. One of these was former President M. Ramush Haradinaj, who resigned as Prime Minister when he was indicted in March 2005 to face a U.N. war crimes tribunal. Discussions are underway for another former KLA leader, M. Agim Ceku, to become Kosovo’s next Prime Minister.

Wolfgram stressed in his conclusion the need to rethink how we evaluate success and failure in interventions and how we define these operations. The interveners’ willingness to work with “men with guns” played a determining role in making Kosovo what it is today. While he acknowledges that the reality on the ground may dictate a strategy of accommodation of “men with guns,” such a strategy may also reveal a lack of willingness to change the reality on the ground and passive acceptance of the situation at hand.

**R**obert A. Ventresca, a historian who specializes in contemporary Italian and European history, began his presentation by addressing a very important question that is often overlooked by political scientists and international relations scholars: how should historical cases be studied or applied? He said one must avoid the “checklist approach,” in which events are compared based on a set of criteria. In his opinion, the goal should be gaining perspective: history helps to challenge assumptions and presumptions.

Study of post-war Italy, he added, can challenge some assumptions of how we perceive the situation in post-war Iraq. Looking more closely at the question of transitional justice, he asked, “What do you do with leaders of authoritarian regimes?” There are analogies between the Iraq trials and Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which are often looked upon as synonymous with

justice. But it is questionable whether the precedent set in Nuremberg and Tokyo fits the pattern that we see today. Ventresca identified three pressing challenges facing Iraq: what is to be done with the former leaders? What hope is there for a legal process? How are new institutions to hold the former leaders accountable?

He said the process of transitional justice in post-war Italy is instructive. First, there was the “summary and selective justice of the leadership”: former dictator Benito Mussolini was executed. Second, political functionaries were given amnesty. Third, the Italian government after 1945 agreed to a formal investigation. To spare the Italians this embarrassment, however, the Allies decided not to impose a Nuremberg-style trial, hoping this would help Italy get back on its feet faster. Ventresca argued that because of this process of transitional justice, some historians argue that there is a “gap in the collective memory” of Italians. Some argue that Italy’s failure to come to terms with its fascist past is the cause of its current political situation.

Ventresca then turned to the writings of Antonio Casese, who was the first president of the U.N. Special Tribunal on Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia. Casese argued that the use of international tribunals is the best way to deal with political elites who commit war crimes and he saw several advantages to tribunals. International courts and trials can safeguard justice and provide a detailed historical account and inventory of an event.

How might all this relate to Iraq? In Ventresca’s opinion, transitional authorities must strike a balance between upholding human rights principles and being careful not to generate further divisions among the population. The nature of Italy’s fascist movement and the country’s involvement in World War II made its transition to democracy very contentious. The collapse of the regime was also important because it created ambiguity in transitional processes. The process in Iraq is still uncertain. As in the case of Italy, “we are left with more questions than answers.” It is not yet clear how Iraq will address what one scholar (Italian historian Giuseppe DiPalma) has described as the “twin problem of authoritarian legacy and democratic reconstruction.”

**D**iscussant Chris Penny noted that justice in post-conflict societies is a recurring theme in all presentations. Not only must justice be created, he said, it must be seen to exist by the post-conflict population. The absence of the appearance of justice may have its own negative implications.

Penny said the papers clearly examined the challenges associated with achieving justice in post-conflict societies and the difficulties of balancing justice with stability. Ventresca, for example, suggested that justice may be a key factor in achieving long-term stability. Wolfgram demonstrated that the failure to establish justice in Kosovo led to human rights abuses by all parties. In Kosovo, Penny observed, the appearance of injustice may have had significant implications for the rule of law and for how NATO is perceived.

He said the papers showed that the law is difficult to decipher. While he agreed that the law is extremely difficult to interpret, application can be even more complicated. While the law provides standards, it does not provide all the answers. Justice, in his view, must be more than just conforming to the law. The papers demonstrated how hard it is to balance security and justice, both during a conflict and in its aftermath.

Penny concluded with some questions for the panelists. What does justice mean? No matter how law is defined, is it a relative concept? Must the concept of justice be tempered with maintenance of stability? When talking about stability and justice: Stability compared to what? Justice compared to what?

**T**he panelists addressed Penny’s questions during the question and answer session. Watkin replied justice was in fact a relative concept, and that it must be tempered with maintenance of stability. At some point, theory must become context driven, and compromises are sometimes necessary. Wolfgram suggested that politics and justice are intertwined, and as a result, we should strive to depoliticize tribunals. Ventresca noted that Mussolini was executed for the sake of

justice, which was both symbolic and pragmatic. It was important for Italians to administer justice themselves, but also very practical to get rid of Mussolini instead of bringing him to trial.

A member of the audience referred to the complexity of rules of engagement, and the separate rules that exist for the police and the military. He asked Watkin which force has the lead and how such decisions are taken. He asked Wolfgram whether the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's decision to indict Kosovo's President was in the best interest of Kosovo.

Watkin replied that in complex situations, there is a bias for applying IHL. There is no easy answer in terms of the approach needed. Wolfgram said that the decision was in the best interests of Kosovo. He said we must look at our ultimate goals. At what point should we accommodate? At what point have we locked ourselves into a pattern and are dependent on the reality? Wolfgram said he believes that we have fallen into a pattern of "working with" and of "accommodating" the President. He asked: "When do we become too dependent upon him?" It is necessary to pick and choose whom we want to work with.

## PART C ABOUT THE CENTRE FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE STUDIES (CSDS)

### OVERVIEW AND MISSION

The Centre for Security and Defence Studies (CSDS) at Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) is one of twelve national Centres of Expertise supported through the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) at the Department of National Defence. The Centre's aim is to increase awareness and enrich understanding of international and Canadian security, foreign and defence policy issues. Its primary mission is to promote knowledge of, and innovative solutions to, Canadian and global security challenges through a program of interdisciplinary undergraduate- and graduate-level teaching and development of young scholars, research, and outreach to the academic and policy communities and general public. To fulfill its mandate, CSDS engages in three main activities:

**Education.** CSDS promotes interdisciplinary graduate and undergraduate education at NPSIA and other Carleton departments in the fields of conflict analysis, international conflict management and resolution, defence and security studies, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, intelligence studies, and Canadian foreign policy. CSDS provides support for security and defence-related course instruction, course design, teaching innovation, student thesis supervision, and student research and conference travel.

**Research.** CSDS provides support for advanced interdisciplinary research and publication on security and defence-related issues by NPSIA and Carleton faculty, graduate students and outside specialists. This includes a post-doctoral fellows program; a visiting senior research fellows program; pre-doctoral fellows program; graduate research assistantships; conference participation support for Centre Associates; support for the NPSIA Resource Centre, which affords access to specialised publications that meet the research and teaching requirements of our students and faculty; and the Working Paper Series, which provides a publishing venue for Centre Associates, students and the broader NPSIA and Carleton community.

**Outreach.** CSDS undertakes outreach activities targeting the Carleton University and broader Ottawa-area security and defence community, including Government of Canada departments and agencies, the Ottawa-based foreign diplomatic corps, Ottawa-area high schools and colleges, national and international professional and scholarly associations, non-governmental organisations, and the general public. Activities include public lectures and seminars, academic and policy conferences, specialised workshops, publications, and interviews with electronic and print media on security and defence-related issues.

### CENTRE ASSOCIATES AND RESEARCH EXPERTISE

The Centre's core faculty are drawn primarily from Carleton's School of International Affairs (NPSIA), as well as the Departments of Political Science and History, the School of Journalism and Communication, and the Sprott School of Business. Building on NPSIA's tradition of interdisciplinarity, the Centre's faculty provide broad-based competency in security

and defence issues. The Centre's faculty consists of political scientists, sociologists, economists, legal scholars, historians, journalists and operations researchers, representing a wide range of academic traditions, intellectual perspectives, and professional experience.

The Centre's research expertise falls into five broad categories: Regional Security, North American Defence and Security, Causes and Prevention of War and Violent Conflict, Management of Violent Conflict, and Emerging Security Issues. Within these categories, the research of CSDS Faculty and Research Associates addresses: Canada-US defence and security relations; US and Canadian intelligence and security; transatlantic security; US security policy; causes and prevention of civil wars and insurgencies; ethnic, nationalist and identity conflict; conflict forecasting, risk analysis and prevention; the laws of war; peacekeeping and peace support operations; post-conflict peacebuilding; modeling of warfighting; civil-military relations; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); terrorism and counter-terrorism; failed and failing states; the nexus between economic development and violent conflict; and global environmental change and security. Regional expertise encompasses the Middle East, Northeast and Southeast Asia and Australasia, Central and Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia.

More information on the Centre and its activities can be found at [www.carleton.ca/csds](http://www.carleton.ca/csds).

## PART D

### CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

**DAVID CARMENT** is Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, and Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). He is listed in the Who's Who in International Affairs. In addition, he is the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project. He has served as Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University and is the recipient of a Carleton Graduate Student's teaching excellence award, Carleton University's research achievement award and the Petro-Canada Young Innovator Award. He has held fellowships at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and a Cadieux Fellowship from the Department of Foreign Affairs. He is recipient of grant awards from SSHRC, DND, FAC and CIDA. His most recent work focuses on developing failed state risk assessment and early warning methodologies and evaluating models of third party intervention. He is author most recently of *Who Intervenes? Ethnic Conflict and Interstate Crises* (with Patrick James and Zeynep Teydas).

**JEAN DAUDELIN** is Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, where he teaches on development and conflict. His current research touches on Brazilian and Canadian trade and security policies, on tenure regimes, property rights and resource conflicts, and on humanitarian interventions. He has recently edited a special issue on Brazil of the *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* and has published in *International Peacekeeping*, *Third World Quarterly*, the *Journal of Church and State*, *International Journal* and the *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*. He holds a B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. from Université Laval.

**GRANT DAWSON** is Research Fellow at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at NPSIA. A specialist on Canadian post-Cold War peace operations and Canadian diplomatic and military history, he is currently working on a comparative analysis of the international approach to failed state reconstruction in Somalia and Afghanistan. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Carleton University and M.A. and B.A (Hons) from the University of Manitoba. His dissertation, which examined the Canadian government's decision-making and commitments to the Somalia peace operations in 1992 and 1993, will be published in expanded and revised form as *Here is Hell: Canada's Engagement in Somalia in 1992-93* by the University of British Columbia Press. He received a Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum Ph.D. Fellowship in 2001-02 and 2002-03.

**JAMES DOBBINS** is Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center. He has held State Department and White House posts, including Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans, and Ambassador to the European Community. As the Clinton Administration's special envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and the

Bush Administration's first special envoy for Afghanistan, Dobbins handled a variety of crisis management assignments. He is the principal author of the two volume "RAND History of Nation Building." After Sept 11, 2001, Dobbins was designated the Bush Administration's representative to the Afghan opposition. He helped organize and then represented the United States at the Bonn Conference where a new Afghan government was formed. On Dec. 16, 2001, he raised the flag over the newly reopened U.S. Embassy. Earlier in his State Department career Dobbins served twice as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, as Deputy Chief of Mission in Germany, and as Acting Assistant Secretary for Europe.

**DAVID M. EDELSTEIN** is Assistant Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University. In addition, he is a core faculty member in Georgetown's Security Studies Program and Center for Peace and Security Studies. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and his B.A. from Colgate University. His research and teaching focus on international security, international relations theory, and U.S. foreign policy. Prior to arriving at Georgetown, he was a pre-doctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation and a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the causes of success and failure in military occupation. His research has been published in *International Security*, *Security Studies*, and *Survival*.

**VICTORIA EDWARDS** began her civilian career with the Department of National Defence in 1996 as a project manager with the Canadian Forces Crypto Support Unit. A member of the Career Assignment Program since 2001, she recently completed an assignment in Industry Canada as the Director of Regional Cohesion. Victoria holds a Masters' degree in Public Administration from Dalhousie University, a Masters' Certificate in Project Management from George Washington University's School of Public Administration and a Bachelors' degree in Military Arts and Sciences from the Royal Military College. She has presented research on Canadian security, defence and Aboriginal policy in various symposia, including the Centre for Conflict Education Centre Symposium on Conflict Resolution, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute Symposium, the Learned Societies Conference, and the Restorative Justice Forum.

**TREVOR FINDLAY** is Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Canadian Centre on Treaty Compliance at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He is a specialist in arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, especially in respect of weapons of mass destruction; conflict prevention, management and resolution; peacekeeping operations generally; and Asia-Pacific regional security. He spent thirteen years in the Australian diplomatic service before being appointed as Foreign Affairs Disarmament Fellow and later Senior Fellow and then acting head of the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University. He then established the program on peacekeeping and regional security at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) before becoming Executive Director of the London-based Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) in 1998. He was chair of the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 2000 and faculty member of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. He is on the editorial board of *International Peacekeeping* and author or editor of nine books, including *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, *The Blue Helmets' First War? The United Nations' Use of Force in the Congo 1960-1964*, and *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from Australian National University and a B.A. (Hons) from the University of Melbourne.

**RICHARD GOWAN** Richard Gowan is Research Associate (International Security Institutions) at the Center on International Cooperation, New York University. He works on multilateral security arrangements, and is the series coordinator for the recently-released *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*. As manager of the Europe Programme at The Foreign Policy Centre (London) from 2003-5, he published and broadcast widely on public opinion towards the European Union and relations between the EU, UN and African Union. He has also worked with the OSCE Mission to Croatia, and published on the political philosophy of Raymond Aron. He holds an MPhil in International Relations and B.A. in History from Cambridge University.

**FEN O. HAMPSON** is Professor of International Affairs and Director of The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He holds a B.A. from the University of Toronto an M.Sc. (Econ) degree from the London School of Economics, and A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University. He is the recipient of various awards and honours, including a Research & Writing Award from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellowship from the United States Institute of Peace; and a Research Achievement Award from Carleton University. He was a fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and was a senior associate at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security at the same time he began teaching at Carleton in 1986. He has served on advisory panels for the Social Science Research Council in New York City, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Senior Advisory Committee, Project on Global Issues, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was a visiting professor at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University in 1995. He is a senior consultant to the United States Institute of Peace, a bi-partisan, Congressionally-funded think tank, in Washington, D.C. He is the author of six books and co-author/editor of some 20 other volumes, including most recently, *Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases* (with Chester A. Crocker and Pamela Aall). His articles have appeared in *International Journal*, *International Peacekeeping*, *International Security*, *Foreign Policy*, *International Studies Perspectives*, and *Millennium* among others.

**RACHEL LEA HEIDE** is Doctoral Candidate in History at Carleton University, and Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at NPSIA. Her dissertation, "Politics, Policy, and the Professionalization of the Royal Canadian Air Force, 1919-1958," examines air force organization, training, leadership, morale, accident investigation, and government policy between the First World War and the early Cold War Period. She has also written on topics of present-day defence policy, peacekeeping intelligence, expeditionary air forces, and the War on Terrorism. She has taught Canadian History at Algonquin College in Ottawa and has been a Distance Learning Instructor for the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College. She is also an Associate Air Force Historian with the Office of Air Force Heritage and History (1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg, Manitoba).

**JEREMY LAMMI** is M.A. candidate at the Center for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the University of Calgary. He is currently writing a thesis on counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. He recently received an honourable mention for his paper, "Carl Von Clausewitz and Insurgency," presented at the 8th Annual CDAI/CDFAI Graduate Student Symposium at the Royal Military College. He holds a BA in history from the University of Lethbridge.

**MAJOR-GENERAL ANDREW LESLIE** is currently Director General Strategic Planning at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. He has held numerous command appointments in the Canadian Forces and with international peacekeeping missions abroad. In 1995-96 he served in the former Yugoslavia as Chief of Staff Sector South, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of UNCRO, and finally Chief of Staff of UNPF. He was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for his actions under fire during the fighting for Knin, Croatia in August 1995. Following the UN hand-



over to NATO forces, MGen Leslie returned to Western Canada as the Area Chief of Staff. In July 1997 he became the Commander of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1CMBG), an infantry-heavy combat formation based in Western Canada. In 1998 he was awarded the Order of Military Merit. In 1999 he was promoted Brigadier-General while a student on the Advanced and National Securities Studies Courses in Toronto. In 2000 he was appointed the J6 of the Canadian Forces, responsible for commanding the communications field groups and regiments, the signals and electronic intelligence functions and supporting the various computer networks used by the Forces. In 2002 he became the Commander Land Force Central Area, responsible for one regular and three reserve Brigades as well as several bases and training establishments. In June 2003 he was appointed Commander Task Force Kabul and Deputy Commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and on his return was awarded the Meritorious Service Cross. He then became the Assistant Chief of the Land Staff. In Fall 2004 to June 2005 he was a full-time PhD student at the Royal Military College in Kingston.

**ANN LIVINGSTONE** joined the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in March 2003, where she is responsible for the management, design, and development of all PPC courses, and point of contact for visiting scholars and researchers. Prior to joining the PPC, she taught at Union University in Tennessee, where she helped design and develop the Scholar-in-Residence program, chaired the Interdisciplinary Studies program, and was involved in the development of courses on Politics of the Developing States, International Organizations and Law, and the Politics, Philosophy, and Economics major. In July 2002 she taught at Al-Ba'ath University (Homs) and at Damascus University on a Syrian-American Professors' Exchange program. She received her M.A. in political science from Vanderbilt University where her study focused on the role of third-party intermediaries in crisis situations, specifically analyzing the Cyprus conflict. In her post-graduate study, she worked with Dr. John Vincent of Nuffield College, Oxford. She holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Keele University.

**D. KIRK MACLEOD** is a specialist on Strategic Security Policy, Security Sector Reform (SSR), and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Counter Terrorism Policy and Counter Organized Crime. He currently works with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre on its United Nations Integrated Mission Senior Officer Course (UNIMSOC), as well as with NATO and the UN. He spent the last five years working for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), first as a Regional Political Advisor and the past three years as Deputy Head of the Advisory Unit on Security to the Special Representative of the Secretary General. He has spent over eight years developing and teaching peacekeeping training courses globally, including two years as a staff member of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. He holds an M.A. in International Relations and International Development from Dalhousie University.

**BOB MARTYN** is Adjunct Assistant Professor of History at Queen's University, and teaches in the War Studies program at the Royal Military College. His current research addresses issues of terrorism, insurgencies, and intelligence. Among his recent publications are an edited volume on military aspects of Domestic Operations, and Counter-Insurgency doctrine for the Canadian Army. He holds a Ph.D. in History from Queen's University. In 2004-05 he served as a Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He is a light infantry company commander in the Canadian Army Reserve, having transferred from the Regular Army following a 25-year career, which included service in Combat Arms, Search & Rescue, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and Intelligence. Operational deployments included Cyprus, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

**SARAH JANE MEHARG** is Senior Research Associate in the department of Research and Learning Development at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military

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**DAVID MENDELOFF** is Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. In addition, he is faculty associate and member of the Management Board of Carleton's Institute of European and Russian Studies (EURUS). His research interests include causes and prevention of war; nationalist, ethnic and identity conflict; post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice; and national misperceptions and ideational sources of foreign policy. He is currently writing a book on historical memory and interstate conflict in the former Soviet Union. He teaches courses in conflict analysis, peacebuilding and reconstruction, and US foreign security policy. He has been a Visiting Research Fellow at the MIT Center for International Studies, Research Scholar at the Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung in Braunschweig, Germany, and at the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet im. Gertsena in St. Petersburg, Russia. He is recipient of research fellowships from the George Eckert Institute, the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University, the MacArthur Foundation Transnational Security Studies Predoctoral Fellowship program at MIT and Harvard University, and the MIT Security Studies Program. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a B.A. (Hons) in international relations from the Claremont Colleges (Pitzer College) in Southern California.

**NATALIE MYCHAJLYSZYN** Natalie Mychajlyszyn is Director, Professional Training and Development at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Her research interests and areas of publication include security regimes and institutions, civil-military relations, conflict prevention and resolution, nationalism and ethnic politics, international relations in the post-Soviet region and European security, in particular Ukrainian foreign and security policy. Her current research focuses on strategic culture and NATO relations with former adversaries and civil-military reform and democratization in the post-Soviet region. Since 1998 she has taught graduate and undergraduate courses in political science and international relations at Carleton University and Concordia University. She currently teaches a course on Civil-Military Relations at NPSIA.

**ROLAND PARIS** is Director of Research at The Conference Board of Canada, and Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs (on leave) at the University of Colorado. He is also Co-Director of the Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building, an international network of scholars whose research is supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Originally from Toronto, he studied at the University of Toronto, the Sorbonne and Cambridge University before entering the Privy Council Office in the early 1990s to work on the Charlottetown Constitutional Accord. He then completed a Ph.D. in political science at Yale University and joined the faculty at the University of Colorado, where he earned three teaching prizes. His writings on peacebuilding, international security and global governance have appeared in leading academic journals and as a book, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), which won two awards including the Chadwick Alger prize from the International Studies Association. He returned to Canada in 2003 to serve as

a foreign policy advisor in the Department of Foreign Affairs, focusing on Canada-US relations, and moved back to the Privy Council Office as a foreign policy advisor in 2004, receiving two awards for public service. He joined the Conference Board in the fall of 2005.

**CHRIS PENNY** is Assistant Professor of International Law and Deputy Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. His research interests include the role of international law in international relations; international legal regulation of the use of force (*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*); and international criminal law. Prior to joining the full-time faculty, he taught as a sessional lecturer at NPSIA, as well as at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law (where he also coordinated the International Law program). Following graduation from law school, he worked as a law clerk to Mr. Justice John Evans of the Federal Court of Appeal. He is a member in good standing of the Law Society of Upper Canada. In addition to his position at NPSIA, he is also a reserve legal officer (Army Major) with the Canadian Forces, serving in the Directorate of International Law in the Office of the Judge Advocate General. He holds a B.A. (Hons) from Trent University, an M.A. from the NPSIA, LL.B. from University of Ottawa, and LL.M. from Cornell University.

**ROBERT A. VENTRESCA** is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History, King's University College, University of Western Ontario, where he teaches courses in modern European history. He specializes in contemporary Italian and European history. His current research and teaching interests include church-state relations in 20th century Europe, the Catholic Church in the modern era, the history of fascism, migration in world history as well as the history of the Holocaust and the history of genocide in the 20th century. He has published in the field of Italian, migration and women's history, and co-edited *A Nation of Immigrants*, a collection of articles on immigration in Canadian history. He is also the author of *From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948*, which received Honourable Mention for the Canadian Historical Association's 2005 Wallace K. Ferguson Prize. He is a graduate of King's College (B.A. Hons) and the University of Toronto (M.A. and Ph.D.).

**COL. KENNETH WATKIN** has over twenty years experience as a military legal officer providing advice on a wide range of issues including operational law, the law of armed conflict, military justice and human rights. From January 2001 to September 2002 and again from September 2003 to September 2005 he served as the Deputy Judge Advocate General/Operations responsible for the provision of legal advice regarding international and domestic deployments of the Canadian Forces. Educated at The Royal Military College (B.A. Hons) and Queen's University (LL.B. and LL.M.), he was a Visiting Fellow at the Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, from 2002-2003. He has written extensively on humanitarian law issues including the interface between humanitarian law and human rights in contemporary armed conflict; targeted killing and assassination; Canadian and American inter-operability; and the status of combatants and unprivileged belligerents.

**MARK A. WOLFGRAM** is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Oklahoma State University. His current research focuses on the intersection of politics and culture in various media, including the media portrayal of ethnic conflict, the sociology of memory, collective memory studies, and critical mass media research. He has several forthcoming publications, including one in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, related to German collective memories of the Holocaust and war. His current research project, "Representing Conflict–Projecting Power: European and American Intervention in the Yugoslav Civil Wars 1991-2005," observes how, and explain why, outside actors' (states, individuals, groups) views of the Yugoslav civil wars changed over time. The project will also take a critical look at how so-called "ethnic conflicts" are portrayed in the media. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

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