"Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities."

Sidney Tarrow (1998:3)

The Social Dynamics of Canadian Protest Participation

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Abstract

A burgeoning literature on protest participation explores the social determinants of this increasingly conventional repertoire as it is applied in various liberal democracies. Little work, however, has addressed Canadian involvement on a national scale. Using recent data from the World Values Survey, my thesis examines the utility of various models of participation as they apply to generic modes of protest in Canada. The results depict a complex social dynamic underlying multiple forms of Canadian protest that reflects similar inequalities to those observed in other contemporary forms of political and civic engagement; typical participants capitalize on high levels of different kinds of resources such as education and social capital. I also conclude, however, that a pattern of secular and liberal values distinguishes protestors from other kinds of civic actors, which may associate the repertoire with the pursuit of progressive goals.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Janet Siltanen, as well as Paul Reed, Zhiqiu Lin, and Steve Prus who have all provided valuable advice and support on this project.

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Introduction

A variety of policy failures and new research have focused attention on the way people participate in the democratic life of their nations. Recent threats of secession, nativist backlashes against immigrants, failures of environmental laws based on voluntary compliance, and religious fundamentalism highlight how political legitimacy and social solidarity require more than just liberal-democratic institutions. Healthy and stable democracy also depends upon a critical threshold of civic virtues among citizens, particularly willingness to engage in public discourse and civil society (Kymlicka 2002). A large body of work, however, points to long-term disengagement from voting and electoral-oriented activities as well as some traditional modes of civic involvement, exemplified by Robert Putnam's seminal *Bowling Alone* (2001). In conjunction with the decline of certain kinds of civic literacy and trust in authorities (Nye, Zelikow, King 1997, Nevitte 1996), the evidence suggests to some the coming of a dark age of citizen participation after increasingly apathetic, materialistic, and cynical cohorts replace participatory golden generations (Goldfarb 1991, Goss 1999).

Others argue, however, that while some forms of public involvement have declined such as voting and political party work, other modes such as political protest have expanded, reflecting the tactical choices of increasingly educated and critical citizenries (Dalton 2006, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Social capital may not be languishing so much as shifting in emphasis from hierarchical, perdurable bonds to less easily measured webs of loose, affinitive ties. This shift may reflect the socioeconomic security and intellectual independence of citizens more apt to create social connections

for themselves rather than inherit and defer to traditional social codes for doing so. Direct political action such as protest seems to reliably accrue with democracy, education, and general social security, making the "microstructural account of recruitment" into social movement activities an important ongoing point of social inquiry (McAdam 1986). Most investigations of protest participation, however, focus on the United States or Western Europe. Very little research has probed the social dynamic[1] underlying Canadian protest (important exceptions include Nevitte 1996, Gidengil et al. 2004). Manifesting the same changes in social capital and civic involvement observed across the west, Canada sometimes figures in political action studies involving a large number of countries using the nation as the unit of analysis (e.g. Inglehart and Welzel 2005). But it has yet to serve as the object of sustained, population-based examination of individual protest behaviours.

In the context of these broad shifts in public engagement and uncertainty surrounding the capacity of contemporary protest to improve democratic politics, this thesis focuses on identifying and elaborating the social dynamic underlying Canadian protest participation at the turn of the 20th century. Building on several theoretical models elaborated and tested within American and European literatures on protest participation, it investigates whether "ordinary" Canadians elect to use protest tactics. Does the generic repertoire of petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes offer a political access point for people at the margins of society, or are these tactics merely another mechanism for articulating claims in the civic toolkit of the well-off? To address this question, I model protest participation using regression analysis with Canadian data from the 4th cycle of the World Values Survey (2000). The results depict a complex social dynamic underlying

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[1] I use *social dynamic* to convey the set of social determinants or range of explanatory variables that cofunction to either raise or depress the likelihood of any one individual within a population engaging in political protest.

multiple forms of Canadian protest that, similar to other kinds of civic and political engagement, reflects structural inequalities in Canadian society at large. Protest demands high levels of different kinds of resources and capital, which may limit the extent to which it can facilitate inclusive collective action and strengthen social democracy. A strong current of liberal, secular, and arguably humanistic values runs through the Canadian protest population, however, suggesting the repertoire may nonetheless provide a launching pad for effecting progressive social change.

Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Protest Participation

The civil rights movement alongside environmental, women's, and peace campaigns marked an era of unprecedented mobilization. They galvanized massive amounts of people into direct contention with political systems, laying down precedents for later people-power protests that toppled authoritarian governments across Eastern Europe and recent anti-corporate globalization and anti-war demonstrations. The pervasive activism behind Berkley's Free Speech Movement, Chicago and Washington's Vietnam clashes, the Stonewall Inn uprising, and Earth Day took many western observers by surprise: "The waves of political protest that swept advanced industrial democracies in the late sixties," Barnes, Kaase, et al. (1979: 13) observe, "startled scholars as well as politicians. … [T]he sudden rise in unconventional forms of politics … fit uneasily into the tentative picture of the political process being sketched out by a generation of empirical researchers." Many researchers, however, were reluctant to revise the conventional wisdom on protest participation.

The decline of deprivation theory

French psychologist Gustave Le Bon, an early trailblazer in collective action studies, characterized public protest as the dangerous confluence of lower class frustrations with the primal and dysfunctional urgings of the anonymous crowd (1895). Classic breakdown models followed, characterizing protest participation as deviant, if coordinated manifestations of shared grievances (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 461). Drawing on the work of Le Bon and American sociologist Robert Park, Herbert Blumer developed a new lexicon in his crowd transformation hypothesis (1939), arguing that "social contagions," infecting "milling" crowds in "circular reactions" and "spirals of stimulation," convert gatherings into dangerous mobs (Schweingruber 2000). Blumer's ideas influenced Ray Momboisse, a California deputy attorney general and prolific disseminator of late 1960s, early 1970s mob sociology. Momboisse urged preemptive thinking: "A crowd is not a mob, but it can become one! Each crowd constitutes a police problem, and each, even the most casual, has latent potential for widespread civil disobedience" (quoted in Schweingruber 2000: 373). With scientific-sounding taxonomies and fearful depictions of a violent and voracious "crowd mind," he provided theoretical justification for the escalated force model of police protesting, which typically encroached on freedom of expression and assembly, minimized negotiation between police and demonstrators, and relied on police infiltration and massive arrests (McPhail 1998). Although the bulk of the literature on protest policing addresses the American and European cases, the general transition from coercion to negotiation is thought to apply to Canada as well (Ericson and Doyle 1999: 591).

As escalated force and the mass mobilizations of the civil rights era began to wane, deprivation and alienation-oriented theories continued to command popular and academic purchase. Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970) established the modern standard for deprivation theories. He argued that relative deprivation caused by uneven social and economic development create volatile discontent over the "discrepancy between the goods and conditions of life [people] believe are their due, and the goods and conditions they think they can in fact get and keep" (Gurr 1970: 319).

> "The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence." (Gurr 1970: 12-13)

Crozier et al. (1975) imputed nothing less than a crisis of democracy to the discontent-driven rise of protest politics. However, it soon became evident that such theories relied on an increasingly untenable blurring of collective violence and civil protest behaviour (Welzel et al. 2005: 123). Barnes, Kaase, et al.'s seminal *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (1979) sought to deepen our understanding of the full range of protest behaviours and their democratic potential with time-series data to be built upon by subsequent World Values Surveys and various other regional and domestic projects. Their investigation complemented a rising resource-based theoretical paradigm of protest participation emphasizing in different strains social network positions, socioeconomic capital, and liberal values of self-expression.

Three prominent strands within this broad paradigm of protest will form the theoretical backbone of participation models to be tested below: *biographical availability*, *strategic resources*, and *structural availability*. Before elaborating their

content, however, I will discuss five fundamental and interrelated shifts in the nature of protest in postindustrial societies since the late sixties that account for the decreasing prominence of deprivation models and, more germanely, contextualize the theoretical discussion and regression modeling to follow.

1. *Broadening of objectives*

The first shift in the nature of modern protest involves the focus of contentious collective action. Historically protest has fed on currents of revolutionary activity, undercutting the very legitimacy of political systems and institutions. Often manifested in the fraught last resort of repressed social groups deprived of political access through conventional channels, protest took the form of tax revolts, attacks on symbolic buildings and officials, urban insurrections, food riots, and worker uprisings. Poignant examples include the roof tiles that rained down on riot squads in Grenoble a year before the fall of the Bastille and the barricades that paralyzed late 1840s Europe. But, as Barnes, Kaase, et al. note, within the new public landscape of the 1960s "direct political action generally, and political protest in particular, do not necessarily assume antiregime properties; rather, it may form one element of an expanded repertory of political action" (Barnes, Kaase, et al. 1979: 27). Modular forms of protest in advanced industrial societies, in fact, incorporate many affluent and well-educated participants with little incentive to overthrow established political orders from which they draw many benefits (Dalton 2006: 63).

A critical factor in the changing focus of protest has been the unprecedented and protracted levels of existential (i.e. socioeconomic) security many western nations came to enjoy in the post-war period. Economic growth, persistence of many social welfare services, unprecedented access to education, and expansive access to information have, argues Ronald Inglehart (1990), precipitated a gradual value shift. Materialist value priorities preoccupied with physical and economic security began to give way to "postmaterialist" value priorities, hitherto perceived as frivolous, elitist, or repressed, such as self-actualization, esteem, self-expression, and aesthetic satisfaction. Such non-physiological needs, Inglehart argues, "have brought new political issues to the center of the stage and provided much of the impetus for new political movements. It is changing the criteria by which people evaluate their subjective sense of well-being" (1990: 66). Relying less on inherited class, religion, and community norms to guide their behaviour, postmaterialists express with direct action their preferences concerning elite corruption, women's rights, and environmental degradation.

Irregardless, we can without deciding on which issues are or should be center stage posit a substantial expansion in the realm of legitimate protest issues. Protest groups today run as diverse as "Norwegian anti-fuel tax car-owners, Florida retirees protesting the ballot design in Miami-Dade County, Philippino "people power" protestors intent on ousting President Estrada, local farmers critical of the McDonaldization of French culture, street theatre celebrations like the gay Mardi Gras in Sydney, and consumer boycotts such as those used against British supermarkets stocking genetically modified foods" (Norris 2002: 192). Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that of the many new claims articulated over the 1970s and 1980s, fewer and fewer have staying power, or are

used again by other movements. Rather than pursuing overarching aims, Soule and Earl observe, emergent claims in this period appear to be more issue-specific, reflecting "a fractionalization of issue area or claims articulated by protest groups" (2005: 361). Their finding supports Dalton's argument that much of the recent growth in protest activity "reflects a general increase in small demonstrations over highways, schools, neighborhood issues, and other specific concerns, rather than a few large-scale movements" (Dalton 2006: 67). It seems the days of monolithic understandings of protest participation, not least the historically determined terms by which Marx felt individuals would collectively define their antagonisms solely on the basis of their class, are gone.

2. *Institutionalization*

The second significant shift in the nature of protest is institutionalization. Protest, that is, has entered the standard repertoire of political and civic action of readily transposable, legible, and legitimate tactics. "Protest marches that once outraged authorities in scores of local communities became so routine," as Putnam puts it, "that police and demonstrators became joint choreographers" (Putnam 2000: 152). Institutionalization, in an important sense, marries modality with legitimacy. In the 1760s the boycott became a powerful tool of American colonists rebelling against British importation controls (Tarrow 1998: 38), providing a model for extra-institutional political action that proved highly contentious right into the civil rights era. However, "what was extremism in the 1960s [became] the legitimacy of the 1970s" (Barnes, Kaase, et al. 1979: 135). Indeed, many scholars agree that after the mass movements of the 1960s civil

demonstrations and boycotts settled somewhere between orthodox and unorthodox political behaviour, petition-signing became a generally mild form of protest, and all three could hardly be referred to as "unconventional" (Fuchs 1990). Survey data across many western states, furthermore, invariably traces rising approval rates for this kind of behaviour (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 464).

But as petitions, boycotts, and lawful demonstrations develop a conventional, if not taken-for-granted character, some observers look back on sixties "flower power" antiestablishmentarianism and scratch their heads wondering if they are looking at the same phenomena. As the grassroots élan of the civil rights movement began to recede by 1970 and that of the women's movement by 1982 with the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, the organizational legacy of many mass mobilizations were professional, staff-run outfits of communications directors, management consultants, and lawyers "concentrating on manipulating the mass media so as to influence public opinion and to get general elite responses and policy changes" (Mayer, quoted in Putnam 2000: 153). Seemingly spontaneous demonstrations can veil meticulous planning, such as in the case of the protests outside the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York: "months of meetings, negotiations, and court decisions were required to shape the terms for protests permits. Protestors then marched along designated routes and received discount coupons for food and shopping, while protest leaders coordinated their activities by text messaging and cell phone communications" (Dalton 2006: 63-64).

The typical price of powerful modularity and diffusion, then, is moderation of tactics. While this phenomenon has been widely observed across liberal democracies as "movement society" theorists predict (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), it fails to describe every

liberal polity's experience. Rucht for example, observes a rising trend in violent protests involving the destruction of property in West Germany (1998). Nonetheless, modern liberal-democratic politics clearly exert a placating effect on revolutionary movements. "The structure of politics through which claims are processed in democratic states," Tarrow observes, "force them into a common crucible from which cycles of reform are the most likely outcome" (1998: 161). Although the complexity of social movement outcomes lies outside the scope of this thesis, it is worth mentioning that conversion to a reform agenda by no means necessarily equates with co-optation. In fact, diffusing and reticulating through conventional politics, "far from diluting the idea of protest, may surely have increased its potency to contribute to political change." Many western nations, Barnes, Kaase, et al. found in the late seventies, "now have to contend with a polity full of young, well-educated men and women who do not accept that their political efficacy is bounded by officially sanctioned channels of representative democracy. They have a wider armory to deploy, and seem very willing to use it" (1979: 135).

Analytically speaking, moreover, institutionalization has not rendered protest indistinguishable from conventional modes of civic and political participation. Empirical work employing factor analyses and other techniques routinely distinguish protest as a distinct style of political action. It also shows its cumulative tendencies, namely that participation in one form, in particular a more intensive form, significantly predicts use of additional tactics (Barnes, Kaase, et al.1979, Nevitte 1996, Norris 2002). As for whether we should conceptualize protest as either a form of "civic" engagement or more precisely "political" activity, any strict classification seems unwise. Protest can constitute both community and private responses to sociopolitical problems as well as more formal and

governmentally engaged inputs; namely, protest may be both civic and political, or combine elements of both in direct efforts of communication and persuasion, or what some refer to as "public voice" (Keeter et al. 2006)[2].

3. *Institutionalization of response*

A third significant shift in the character of protest relates closely to the second: the institutionalizing of a set of response procedures for protest control. Reacting to the great surge in social movement activity in the sixties and seventies and perceived failures of the escalated force style of protest policing (famously at the1968 Democratic National Convention), new models were sought to reconcile security with respect for individual freedoms to political expression. From its beginnings in the late sixties, the "negotiated management" strategy began to routinize the interactions of protestors and police in predictable ways that diminished their respective threats (McCarthy and McPhail 1998). Specifically, negotiated management sought protest permits negotiated under public forum law irrespective of speech content, to formalize open communication channels between police and demonstrators, and to employ arrests and physical force as last resorts (Schweingruber 2000: 380). Some Canadian police departments, for example, have labor liaison officers on staff who, when collective safety is not as risk, often look the other way at the picket line when strikers break the law (Hall and De Lint 2003). Although the model has by no means heralded the end of repressive police tactics – as Ericson and

[2] Further complicating the picture are changing and politically charged relations between the civic and the political. Neoliberal policies have since the early 1980s devolved functions and powers across the policy spectrum to lower level bureaucracies and the nonprofit and private sectors – politically deciding what should not be political, so to speak.

Doyle, for example, detail in the case of Vancouver's 1997 APEC summit (1997) – by and large it has lowered the individual costs of participation (Petrie 2004, Schussman and Soule 2005, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001, della Porta 1999).

4. *Expansion*

Expansion constitutes the fourth shift. Recent population-based studies with longitudinal scope portray a far-reaching phenomenon: protest behaviours have become since the sixties and seventies increasingly frequent in nearly all liberal, postindustrial societies with rising proportions of citizenries engaging in them (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Putnam 2000, Norris 2002, Dalton 2006, Gidengil et al. 2004, Nevitte 1996, Dalton and Sickle 2005)[3]. Among Britain, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, the United States, Finland, Switzerland and Austria, for example, the average increase from 1974 to 2000 in the proportion of those who have said they have signed a petition was 30 percent; the average increase in those who have taken part in a demonstration was 12 points; for engaging in a consumer boycott it was 9 points (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 121-122). Although protest behaviours have not overtaken civic activism, voter-turnout, and political discussion in terms of prevalence, they have surpassed and in many cases dwarfed instances of political party, interest group, and organized electoral activity (Gidengil et al. 2004, Norris 2002). In a recent study, for example, Keeter et al. found after voting, consumer boycotting to be the most prevalent form of public engagement in

[3] They typically rely on a five item measure of protest ranging from petition-signing, boycotting, and lawfully demonstrating to illegally striking and occupying buildings, first applied by Muller (1972) and Marsh (1974) and later replicated in Barnes, Kaase, et al.'s Political Action study, World Value Surveys, national election studies, and General Social Surveys.

the U.S. (2002). While not confined to older, postindustrial democracies with long-held norms of participatory citizenship, recent increases in protest have been most pronounced there. National levels of protest, in fact, correlate strongly with the UNDP Human Development Index and Freedom House measures of democratization (Norris 2002: 198-99), putting paid to a central tenet of deprivation theory: protest most often is simply not a function of pent-up frustrations in oppressive political systems offering few opportunities to redress or express economic and social grievances. “If it were,” Inglehart and Welzel note, “protest activities would be highest in the poorest societies and lowest in rich countries, but the exact opposite is true” (2005: 120).

Canada generally fits into this pattern, although increases have been more modest. As Figure 1 displays, Canadians show a net increase between 1981 and 2000 of 11 percentage points in the number of citizens who have signed a petition, 5 and a half points in those who have joined a boycott, and 6 points in those who have attended a

FIGURE 1
Protest Participation by Tactic, 1981, 1990, 2000



Source: WVS 2006. N=4915

lawful demonstration. The numbers of those engaging in these activities do appear to dip between 1990 and 2000, but the drop is slight and contested by other surveys. The 2000 Canadian Election Study, for instance, reports that 84% of Canadians have signed a petition on at least one occasion, 25% have joined a boycott, and 22% have attended a lawful demonstration. The nation also reflects another disposition pervasive across the western world, namely one against more violent and obstructive activities. The normalization of some modes of protest has meant very little for the continued stigmatization of illegal forms of civil disobedience and especially acts that damage property, reflected in the consistently low proportions of those reporting participation in wildcat strikes or building occupations. Even in France, where “a call to the barricades stirs the hearts of many” in a nation historically ingrained with revolutionary fervour (Dalton 2006: 62), only about 1 percent of French citizens approve of damage to property (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 464).

The most significant voice dissenting form the chorus of scholarship positing an expansion of protest participation over the last several decades has been that of Robert Putnam. In various publications (2001, with Pharr 2000, with Goss 2002) he articulates a latter day crisis-of-democracy framework. Instead of rising amounts of direct action unfiltered by formal organizational intermediaries threatening democracy, as was the case according to Crozier et al. (1975), Putnam attributes its degradation to civic *withdrawal* from all manner of engagement, contentious and conventional alike. A mélange of late modern conditions, he suggests, engender pervasive civic and political disengagement, such as urban sprawl, the pressures of time and money, privatized and ubiquitous infotainment, and, especially, the replacement of generations disposed to public life by

younger cohorts whose formative experiences render them civically inert. "[D]espite rapid increases in education that have given more of us than ever before the skills, the resources, and the interests that once fostered civic engagement, … Americans have been dropping out in droves, not merely from political life, but organized community life more generally" (Putnam 2000: 64). The consequence: a precipitous drop in social capital, of the norms and resources that facilitate and stimulate concerted behaviours.

Putnam measures in prodigious detail the decline of old-style, elite-directed organizations in America such as the Elks, the Boy Scouts/Girl Guides, and the PTA. However, he spills very little ink on trends among the amorphous configurations of loose but bridging social ties critical to protest participation. When he does address the latter he juxtaposes their flexible, and by implication unreliable, nature to the solid and thus democratically useful social capital generated in more permanent, if elite-directed groups. The bulk of his argument for a decline in protest behaviours, however, turns on his account of several national environmental movement organizations crystallizing after the sun set on the grassroots marvel of Earth Day. While recognizing the participatory culture of those halcyon civic sixties, he blasts its modern organizational heirs in Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and National Audubon Society as little more than Washington-bound cadres of Ivy League lawyers, economists, management consultants and communications directors "in which 'membership' is essentially an honorific rhetorical device for fundraising" (Putnam 2000: 156).

Firstly, we should question his selective focus on national environmental movement organizations, his concentration on some organizations versus others, and

even his focus on some parts of complex organizations over other parts. His selectivity leads to unwarranted conclusions. Boggs puts it precisely:

> "Putnam invokes the trajectory of environmental groups as an example of movement sclerosis over time, but he greatly oversimplifies his case: environmentalism has often fallen victim to the D.C. lobby culture built around direct-mail fundraising, bureaucratic stratagems, and minimalist reforms, yet progressive, grassroots organizations with large memberships and broader agendas (Friends of the Earth, Earth First!, Greenpeace, Earth Island Institute, various antinuclear groups, even the rejuvenated Sierra Club) have also proliferated during the 1980s and 1990s, keeping ecological concerns such as global warming, deforestation, resource depletion, toxic waste, food contamination, and animal rights at the forefront of public consciousness more than at any point in American history." (Boggs 2001: 286)

Putnam's oft-cited analysis also fails to fully describe the Canadian case, as environmental concerns overtake the perennial favorite voter issue of health care as the foremost public problem on Canadians' minds (Mittelstaedt 2007). With public attention focused on ecological degradation, global warming, and environmentally sustainable growth, professional environmental lobby groups gain traction. But grassroots organizations such as Canada Climate Action Network have also emerged, building on the less overtly political acts or "environmentally friendly behaviours" that Canadians increasingly integrate into everyday routines (Tindall et al. 2003).

Secondly, and more to the point, by focusing on prominent national organizations, Putnam fails to tap the larger and more generalized uses of protest. As mentioned above, as targets of protest expand beyond overthrowing political orders to encompass zoning issues, highway construction, and sundry other local and regional concerns, an institutionalized array of citizen lobbies, consumer advocacy groups, environmental watchdogs and not-for-profits help forge a reliable social infrastructure feeding future protests. That effectual social movements struggle with and oscillate between radicalism

and reform, between assailing the system and working within it, is not the point; this process has a deep pedigree and will likely persist for as long as direct, contentious collective action does (Tarrow 1998). What is of relevance here, rather, is the mounting evidence that recent cycles of contention and diffusion of postmaterialist concerns may have permanently altered the western style of citizen politics (Dalton 2006: 67).

Cast in this light, mounting distrust in and cynicism with governments and other institutional authorities, rejection of big-city political machines vying to corral once well-disciplined blocs of voters, and disinterest in didactic civic leadership may not herald the end of democracy. Rather, rising levels of criticality may reflect an increasing capacity, and demand, for self-determination and warrant innovation in civic engagement. “This trend,” Inglehart and Welzel argue, “does not indicate an erosion of social capital in general but a change in the nature of social capital, shifting from externally imposed ties based on social control mechanisms to autonomously chosen ties, which people create themselves” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 118). We should be careful not to overstate the political and social beneficence of a widespread emphasis on self-expression values. There is nothing inherent in the ideal of authentic public expression, for example, that precludes a slide towards self-centered and narcissistic modes of its fulfillment in practice (Taylor 1996). Nevertheless, the latter-day crisis of democracy that Putnam and others sketch of wholesale civic decline must certainly be revised to account for well-educated and critical publics increasingly apt to reject dogmatic and elite-stipulated bases for civic engagement and experiment with direct action.

5. *Normalization of the protestor*

Finally, the fifth significant shift has been the normalization of the protestor. Scholars largely take it for granted that more kinds of people protest than ever before. Far less consensus exists, however, over whether protest has actually become more democratic or representative, or whether profiles of demonstrators significantly differ from the average man or woman in the street (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Issues of "differential recruitment" have consequently become a central preoccupation in a body of scholarship "devoted to understanding the types of people who join social movements, the characteristics or circumstances that predispose them to become activists, the mechanisms that mobilize some, and the barriers that deter others from participation" (Nepstad and Smith 1999: 26). Generally associated with the "resource mobilization" paradigm prominent in North America (see Jenkins 1983), differential recruitment is part of a larger research focus on processes of mobilization and the recruitment of individuals into movement organizations. This approach can be contrasted, for example, with perspectives that emphasize the role of political opportunity structures (Kriesi et al. 1995) or cultural processes of framing injustices and building collective identities (Snow et al. 1986). Discussions of differential recruitment and the normalization of the protestor (e.g. Gidengil et al. 2004) also resonate with the "contentious politics" approach that views social movements as series of sustained interactions between power holders and their opponents (Tilly 2004); they share the assumption that protest is largely manifested in visible forms of political action such as demonstrations and boycotts.

Although differential recruitment has been the object of steady examination in the United States since the onset of the resource mobilization paradigm (McAdam 1992), very little attention has been paid to the same phenomenon in Canada. My analysis will apply this approach with Canadian data, testing three theories of protest participation developed in the American literature: biographical availability, strategic resources, and structural availability. In addition to these frameworks, I will examine the direct and moderating effects of political and religious values, ethnicity and gender, and determine whether the effects of these variables vary between active and passive participation.

Biographical Availability

One of the first approaches within post-deprivation frameworks of protest participation, biographical availability, seeks to explain protest activity through the personal constraints that render people uniquely available or unavailable to participate. The presence of such constraints may increase the financial and temporal costs and physical, social, and legal risks associated with activism (McAdam 1986: 67). Biographical availability is typically operationalized along four dimensions – marital status, parental status, employment status, and age. Citizens who bear the responsibilities of a marital relationship, a full-time job, raising children, or who are of an age where these responsibilities are more likely to be expected of them, are thought to be biographically unavailable, or face costs and risks sufficient to suppress activism. Imprisonment or injury, for example, deprive people of valuable time and make it harder to care for partners and children, and potential activists may face negative sanctions from

loved ones should their participation jeopardize family life and stability. Individuals who work fulltime may have less time to devote to activism and stand to lose more financially if they do. Employment may also raise the costs if co-workers or employers disapprove of participation in collective action, especially for people in sectors that oppose the goals of their protest (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006: 301). Lastly, age is thought to curvilinearly relate to protest participation because of biographical availability. Younger and older people, free in youth or retirement from family and professional obligations and sanctions, may have more time to protest and fewer alternative responsibilities (McCarthy and Zald 1973, Nepstad and Smith 1999). The effects of these variables, finally, may significantly differ for men and women because of a gendered division of both paid and domestic labour, a point I address below in the section on gender.

In practice the biographical availability model has produced mixed results[4]. In some cases protestors appear to predominately be unmarried students or individuals without children in flexible employment arrangements, such as the anti-nuclear activists interviewed by Jasper (1997). Schussman and Soule also provide survey-based evidence of the negative effects of parental status while controlling for other relevant factors (2005: 1089). The effects of marital and employment status, on the other hand, typically emerge as insignificant, with unemployment serving in some cases to depress participation (Schussman and Soule 2005, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). This likely

[4] The biographical availability approach originates in Douglas McAdam's case study of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project (1986). He found that people who passively and actively supported the project displayed high degrees of biographical availability, or were relative free of family and work-related constraints. However, McAdam's study faced significant sampling limitations; eighteen to twenty-three year olds at reputable Northern universities were targeted by Freedom Summer's organizers, resulting in a majority of applicants from affluent backgrounds, fewer than ten percent who were married (mostly to other applicants), and less than two percent with children (McAdam 1988: 44). "If virtually all of them had few monetary concerns and were relatively free from the adult responsibilities of employment, marriage, and parenthood," Nepstad and Smith reasonably ask, "then how can we assess whether these constraints do in fact deter activism" (Nepstad and Smith 1999: 27)?

reflects the trend that formerly contentious acts that ran the risk of arrest and/or jeopardizing careers and fulfillment of familial duties have become more innocuous (della Porta 1999). Case study evidence on full-time employees in some inflexible occupations, in fact, has demonstrated that these individuals are more, rather than less, likely to participate in social movements (Nepstad and Smith 1999). Similarly, environmental sociologists identify a positive influence of parenthood on stimulating forms of environmental awareness that can lead to activism (Davidson and Freudenberg 1996). Student status continues in some cases to increase the odds of participation, but this may reflect access to concentrations of movement organizations, leaders, and ideas on university campuses as much as biographical availability (Petrie 2004, Beyerlein and Hipp 2006).

The effects of age are not entirely straightforward. As mentioned above, the biographical availability model, congruent with persistent images in popular culture and the media, predicts the young to disproportionately fill the ranks of protesters along with the old, as both groups lack the biographical constraints thought to quell engagement. It also associates age with lifecycle effects, or suggests that key events that typically occur in the middle of one's life-course suppress participation. The bulk of evidence, however, suggests protestors, like the participatory core of other forms of civic engagement, disproportionately draw from uniquely engaged cohorts that are currently in their middle-age. Most studies posit a curvilinear relationship between age and likelihood of protest, with a drop-off among both the youngest and oldest cohorts (Norris 2002: 202, Gidengil et al. 2004: 138-39, Putnam 2000: 164-65, Deutsch and Welzel 2004: 13-14, Nepstad and Smith 1999: 33). On the other hand, the curve appears to be less stark than in the case of

traditional civic activism, with other projects reporting the propensity to protest to disproportionately characterize younger cohorts (Dalton 2006, Schussman and Soule 2005: 1089, Verba at al. 1995) – tempering Putnam's strong claim of a graying of protest demonstrations (Putnam 2000: 165).

Strategic Resources

Beyond biographical availability are two other important models of individual protest participation drawing more directly from the influential resource mobilization paradigm. For the first, strategic resources, engagement is less about personal constraints rendering one available to protest than the stocks of political, social, and cultural capital on which one is able to trade. Unemployment, for example, will depress participation not because unemployed citizens have more or less time or social freedom to protest, but because they lack the resources that make involvement both feasible and desirable (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Similarly, university students are not disproportionately disposed to protest because of a dearth of professional or familial obligations but, rather, because their status reflects an attainment of the social, intellectual, and cultural wherewithal that engagement in the public sphere may demand. Thus, the central tenet of the strategic resources model of protest participation argues that the resources found crucial in predicting involvement in manifold forms of other civic and political action, from voting to associational activity, also apply to protest. These factors include education, political interest, and political knowledge.

As protest normalized over the latter part of the 20th century, shifting to some degree from the hands of repressed or socially disadvantaged groups to those wielding more power, the effect of socioeconomic shifted to a positive one. It is frequently the same kinds of citizens engaging in contemporary protest and participating in other forms of political or civic participation, such as voting, political party work, and volunteerism (Norris 2002: 200-02, Gidengil et al. 2004: 139-40); the requisite resources for such polymorphic activism help explain why poorer citizens are less likely to engage in protest. However, socioeconomic status must be separated into its constituent elements. While income proves to have little influence after controlling for other resources and structural availability (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006: 309, Schussman and Soule 2005: 1091), education proves invariably and everywhere pivotal. The prodigious extent to which formal education positively influences contemporary western political and civic engagement of *any* sort began to become clear in such works as Verba et al.'s American Citizen Participation Study (1990), with subsequent scholarship adding support (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995, Norris 2002, Gidengil et al. 2004, Dalton 2006, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Beyerlein and Hipp 2006, Putnam 2000). Nonetheless, education exerts its effects on citizenship practices in complex, often indirect ways. Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry identify, for example, "two distinct pathways – the first, to political engagement through network centrality and the second, to democratic enlightenment through cognitive proficiency" (Nie et al. 1996: 6).

Education, therefore, by cognitively preparing and motivating citizens to identify and democratically pursue their political interests, in addition to opening up the networks through which they can do so, may comprise the roots of protest participation; "overall,

education proves by far the best predictor of experience of protest politics" (Norris 2002: 201). Building on its foundation, political interest in and political knowledge about public affairs have been identified as further "critical preconditions for more active forms of involvement" (Putnam 2000: 35). Without the motivation to follow public affairs and an ability to retain a working knowledge of the key players and issues – without some degree of political consciousness – citizens are as unlikely to become protestors, the model argues, as they are voters, party activists, or interest group workers (Schussman Soule 2005: 1091, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Structural Availability

The third model of protest participation, structural availability[5], is sometimes used synonymously with the "microstructural account of recruitment" (McAdam 1986). It shifts the explanatory focus from the conditions rendering people biographically available and resources facilitating participation to the presence of interpersonal networks which enable recruitment to activism. Operationally speaking, structural availability encompasses organizational affiliation, organizational participation, and religious participation. The focus builds on the robust findings that citizens rarely engage in protest activities unless first asked to do so by other engaged individuals (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Klandermans 1997), and that such invitations are uniquely facilitated through organizational membership (McAdam 1986, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). What appears to be important is not necessarily the *kind* of organization involved so much as the baseline *affinity* which they create and consist of. Thus we observe, for

[5] I borrow this term from Schussman Soule (2005).

example, members of the same mosque or church or temple mobilizing each other on issues not directly related to the goals of the organization itself; their ties constitute a potent avenue for mobilization (Schussman and Soule 2005: 1087). In this light we can, again, recast the significance of unemployment: rather than lacking personal constraints preventing participation or strategic resources demanded of participants, people who are more removed from the economy (also including, e.g., pensioners, housewives) lack certain social ties that can reticulate people into webs of activists. “Isolation,” Van Aelst and Walgrave argue, “is the most obvious reason for the absence among protestors of persons not actively engaged in the economy, resulting from a lack of formal and informal networks and mobilizing organizations” (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 471). The institutionalized and professionally orchestrated nature of much contemporary protest may only exacerbate their exclusion.

Organizational participation has in addition to affiliation been demonstrated to foster protest. Moving beyond “mailing-list” or nominal membership to active involvement may not only enhance recruitment possibilities by exacting more commitment from recruiters, but also through increasing the potential of organizations to impart civic skills – the numerous associational and communication abilities shown to be key a critical precursor of political engagement (Putnam 2000, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Intense participation in one politically contentious group, furthermore, “might have a greater influence than being a member of three unrelated groups such as a book club or a neighborhood crime watch group” (Nepstad and Smith 1999: 35).

Although religious activity comprises a substantive subcategory of both organizational affiliation and participation, I single it out here because of its uniquely

fecund historical role in facilitating activism. Supplying an uncommon "incubator for civic skills, civic norms, community interests, and civic recruitment," Putnam observes, religious institutions "have provided the organizational and philosophical bases for a wide range of powerful social movements" from abolition and temperance to civil rights and right-to-life. Rivaling education as a powerful correlate of most forms of American civic engagement, religious participation has been shown to stimulate heightened rates of volunteerism and charitable-giving in Canada as well (Putnam 2000: 66-68, Reed and Selbee 2000, 2002). Religion, in fact, may compensate for a systemic lack of other strategic resources depressing any form of mobilization. Harris and Braine argue, for example, that religious resources, having fortified large-scale oppositional movements in the past, "can also work to sustain the practice of more everyday democratic politics for those whose objective material situation makes them individually less powerful than the average citizen and collectively a distinct minority" (2001: 61).

Finally, religious meanings and symbols help structure or "frame" social injustices or grievances in ways that legitimatize and encourage the use of political protest. Hannigan argues, for example, that new religious and new social movements are cut from the same sociocultural cloth, differing only in the level of ideological emphasis placed upon supernatural elements of meaning. Both articulate grievances, develop identities, and construct new realities and ways of acting upon them (Hannigan 1991). In short, in addition to integrative and anti-radical functions, religion may also have a "disruptive potential" (Smith 1996) emerging in contemporary Canadian protest events ranging from anti-free trade and anti-poverty to pro-life and anti-same-sex marriage (Conway 2004, Stackhouse 1993).

Political and Religious Values

In addition to biographical availability, strategic resources, and structural availability, the literature on protest participation identifies several important factors. Figuring prominently are political and religious values. Despite modularity and legitimation diffusing protest politics across ideological divides, and notwithstanding the fact that the most effective social movement of the last couple of decades has probably been helmed by staunchly conservative American evangelicals (Putnam 2000: 161-62), a large body evidence suggests that protest remains the tactical domain of the left (Dalton 2006: 73). Inglehart and Welzel make an ambitious nomothetic case:

> "Both the shift toward postmaterialism and the rise of elite-challenging political action are components of a broader shift toward self-expression values that is reshaping orientations toward authority, politics, gender roles, and sexual norms among the publics of postindustrial societies. Postmaterialists and the young are markedly more tolerant of homosexuality, abortion, divorce, extramarital affairs, and prostitution than are materialists and the old, and this is part of a pervasive pattern – the rise of humanistic norms that emphasize human emancipation and self-expression" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 126).

Younger, better educated, and socioeconomically secure classes imbibe progressive norms far more readily than older, less secure classes more beholden to the traditional, two heterosexual parent, survival paradigm of the family; acting with the social and economic capital that positively relate to these values they also tend to pursue direct, critical forms of political action to defend them. Relatedly, citizens whose formative experiences were characterized by relative socioeconomic security and who become disposed to challenge elites through protest defer less to hierarchical and dogmatic authorities. In Inglehart and Welzel's language, they "emancipate" themselves from

traditional and conservative sources of moral suasion, relegating religious institutions, for example, from their monopoly on defining good behaviour. Consequently, protestors may be distinguishable from nonprotestors in the lack of *importance* they attribute to organized religion (Inglehart and Norris 2006).

Gender and Ethnicity

Finally, the literature on protest identifies the effects of gender and ethnicity as relevant to participation. The dynamics of recruitment into, and experience of protest activism may differ significantly for women and men and members of different ethnic groups. Their differential experience of social and economic conditions material to recruitment and mobilization structures opportunities for participation. To characterize the influence of these variables we might usefully draw on the concept of *intersectionality* – or “the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations” (McCall 2005: 1771). Gender and ethnicity may directly influence participation, such as when, for instance, explicitly gendered criteria or a particular ethnic identity are used for selecting participants or framing the goals and contributions of movement participation[6]. But by intersecting with unequal distributions of the cognitive, social, and organizational resources and skills as well as prevailing cultural attitudes and behavioral expectations, these variables have also been shown to indirectly differentiate protest participation. McAdam found in the case of Freedom

[6] Regarding gender, Norris has shown as much in the realm of associational activity, where membership of some groups is disproportionately male (e.g. political parties, sports clubs, professional associations, and unions) and membership of others is disproportionately female (e.g. education and arts groups, religious organizations, and social welfare associations) (2003: 12).

Summer, for example, that the substance and tone of the recruiting interviewers' questions differed markedly according to gender. They contributed to a generalized sexism in which issues of sexuality only constituted a barrier to female participation and project staff routinely employed a narrower, more domesticated vision for their role in Mississippi (McAdam 1992: 1220-22). More recently, Kuumba has argued that men are in some cases more likely to be pulled into protest activism through formal networks and organizational connections and take on formal leadership roles. Women, by contrast, may be more likely to be recruited through informal friendship or familial ties and take on pivotal bridging leadership roles (Kuumba 2001).

The conservative period of gender socialization with which McAdam was dealing, however, when rigid conceptions of femaleness and maleness were firmly encoded in social institutions, may have been the last in which men were significantly more likely than women to engage in certain types of protest activism – if we take "engagement" to mean some form of participation as distinguished from nonparticipation. The ongoing consequences, subjective experiences, understandings and intersecting influence of other variables may nonetheless continue to, as suggested above, display distinctly gendered effects. But regarding the likelihood of participation, the influence of gender has recently and repeatedly been shown to be insignificant (Petrie 2004, Schussman and Soule 2005, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001, Gidengil et al. 2004). When it has emerged as significant, moreover, its effects appear to be quite modest (towards disproportionate male participation) (Dalton 2006, Norris 2005). This, of course, may reflect how protest participation is being measured, a point I return to below. It may also reflect a focus on the additive and direct effects of gender through the use of simple linear models, which

ill-capture conditional and nonlinear effects. In an exploration of the moderating effects of gender on other variables that influence protest participation, for example, Beyerlein and Hipp show through the use of interaction variables a significant negative impact of marriage exclusively among women. They interpret the finding as consistent with the "second shift" perspective wherein women in the workforce continue to do the majority of work inside the home (2006).

Influences of ethnicity on the likelihood of protest participation, by contrast, may wax and wane on a group-by-group basis. Fendrich (1977), for example, demonstrates that the biographical consequences for engagement in the civil rights movement differed markedly for black and white activists. But recent, more broad-based evidence suggests that protest likelihood among African Americans[7] after controlling for strategic resources and structural availability, is statistically indistinguishable from majority groups (Petrie 2004, Schussman and Soule 2005). Petrie, on the other hand, shows in a more recent examination that protest likelihood substantially drops in the United States among Latinos. Heading north of the 49th parallel, Gidengil et al. (2004) demonstrate protest to be the preserve of the Canadian born, in particular among those of European ancestry: "Among those of non-European ancestry, fully one-third have not taken part in any from of protest activity [compared to 15% of the overall population]. The same is true of more than a quarter of those born outside Canada" (Gidengil et al. 2004: 140). They suggest this may partly result from the undemocratic background of many newcomers to Canada who emigrate from countries where protest activities are banned, but could not speak to

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[7] Again, likelihood denotes *prevalence*, not the specific ways in which people protest or attribute meaning to their experience, make use of unequal structural opportunities and distributions of socioeconomic resources, or frame their struggle within larger cultural and political movements. That the protest activism of different ethnic groups varies along these and other dimensions is well-established (see, for example, Morris and Braine 2001).

the potentially influential intersection of ethnicity with the resources and values that may be demanded by protest. The literature is also reticent about the intersection of ethnicity and gender, despite strong evidence that said resources and values, as well as attitudes about the roles women and men should play in politics, vary significantly among many ethnic groups (Norris and Inglehart 2003).

Protest Willingness

One of the most significant theoretical advances in the study of social movement activism in recent decades has been the recognition of the multilayered nature of protest participation. Improving models that bifurcate populations into either participants or nonparticipants, a body of recent work seeks to complicate uniform notions of involvement (Schussman and Soule 2005, Beyerlein and Hipp 2006, Klandermans 1997, Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Attitudinal and sociostructural factors do seem to distinguish participants from nonparticipants but, as McAdam puts it, "it is less certain that activists constitute a homogeneous population in their own right. … Researchers have been so concerned with differentiating activists from nonactivists that they have implicitly depicted movement participants as cut from whole cloth" (1992: 1212). Acknowledging that protest involves multiple layers introduces the possibility that the social determinants of protest may not operate in the same way at different levels of participation. Schussman and Soule locate, for example, a substantial positive influence of organizational involvement in its indirect impact of increasing the likelihood of being

asked to protest[8]. Connectivity through social networks matters most, they argue, at a preliminary stage when people are first exposed to protest opportunities. Similarly, Nepstad and Smith, looking at American mobilization to resist U.S. intervention in Nicaragua during the 1980s, found that in addition to facilitating on-going recruitment, organizational memberships helped account for the initial diffusion of interest in the campaign among potential activists and supporters (1999: 35).

Two "layers" within protest participation that may be particularly important are *performance* of protest behaviours and *willingness* to use such tactics. Focusing only on those who show up to the demonstration or march overlooks those whose commitment to the tactics and goals of the movement, although not sufficient to put feet in the street, contributes an important source of quiescent support or sympathy and potential groundswell for future action. Taking protest willingness into account may, for one, challenge the conventional wisdom of weak support for biographical availability. Beyerlein and Hipp, for example, analyze American data that separately measures the willingness of respondents to engage in a range of protest activities and whether they actually did. Their findings suggest that the influence of age, employment status, and, in particular, marital status depends on this multilayered conception of participation: youth, old-age and employment, be it part-time or full-time, depresses the likelihood of protest, but only *indirectly* through their negative relationship with willingness which, in turn, bears a strong positive relationship with action (2006). Modeling participation in this way may also bring nuances out within the effects of gender and ethnicity. The interaction of marital status and gender, mentioned above, may work principally to dampen willingness

[8] The likelihood of protesting without being targeted by an appeal to do so, in fact, appears to only increase among those with a uniquely high endowment of civic skills derived from "hyper-engagement" within politics and other civic endeavors (2005: 1095-98).

among married women which, again, reduces the likelihood of action. Similarly, Beyerlein and Hipp argue ethnicity is important "because of its relationship to expressed willingness to demonstrate," with African Americans "considerably more likely to express willingness to protest against the government than either whites or other ethnic groups" (2006: 310). Given ethnic differentiation within civic dispositions and civic association recently observed in Canada (Tossutti and Wang 2006, Reitz and Banerjee 2007), a similar relationship may apply to Canadian protest activity.

Hypotheses

As the organization of this literature review attests, the conventional wisdom surrounding the dynamics of "differential recruitment" into protest activities does not lend itself to a set of discrete and easily identifiable explanations. After distinguishing three theoretical frameworks in biographical availability, strategic resources, and structural availability, I was required to include two theoretical "addendums" in political and religious values and ethnicity and gender. Complicating matters was the initially unequal footing on which these explanations rested: biographical availability and gender have proven in most contemporary work to be irrelevant to the likelihood of protest participation. But this may not necessarily hold once we take into account a multilayered conception of participation involving both active and passive components. Further complications arise from the fact that much of the literature elaborating these explanations of protest engagement – including the research on protest willingness – draws from American sources. Although many similarities exist between Canadian and

American patterns of public engagement, there is nothing *a priori* to suggest their social dynamics of protest participation will converge. In order to reconcile the ambiguities among these accounts and the rigid hypothesis-testing framework which provides an effective way to organize their adjudication, I will construct "group hypotheses." These hypotheses will still anticipate results for individual covariates but, where appropriate, in a language more reflective of the complexity (and uncertainty) surrounding explanations of Canadian protest engagement than that usually expected in a rigorous slate of individual predictions.

Biographical Availability

The influence of biographical availability on protest participation, I predict, will be less substantial than that of either strategic resources or structural availability. It will be inconsistent, but in some qualified instances nonetheless exert significant effects. To begin with, having children in the home will reduce, if only marginally the likelihood Canadians will engage in protest activities. I predict employment status will largely be irrelevant, before and after controlling for income level and number of social ties, except in two cases: unemployment will serve to depress participation while student status will display a positive relationship. Marital status will not significantly influence the odds of participation *qua* performance, but it will negatively affect participation *qua* willingness among women. Age, I predict, will contradict the expectations of the biographical availability framework, as it has in the majority of recent studies. It will curvilinearly

relate to protest with the young and old showing the lowest odds of participation and with the middle-aged showing the highest relative odds.

Strategic Resources

Strategic resources will play a more consistent and relatively substantial role. I predict level of educational attainment will display a strong and positive relationship, with each additional year of formal schooling significantly raising the odds of protest participation. It will rank among the most influential social determinants in terms of predictive power. Both level of political interest and level of political knowledge will also significantly increase the odds of protest, but to a lesser degree than education.

Structural Availability

Similarly, structural availability will play a relatively significant role within the social dynamics of Canadian protest. Each additional organization an individual belongs to, I predict, will substantially increase the odds of participation. Each additional organization Canadians actively participate within will also significantly increase the likelihood of engaging in protest. Finally, those who frequently attend religious services or ceremonies will be marginally more likely to engage in protest than people who do not routinely worship with others. I expect that this will be a marginal rather than a substantial effect because of a direct tension between the positive influence of structural availability and predicted negative influence of religiosity (see below), both of which

religious attendance may indicate. Another conceivable outcome is that these effects cancel each other out, rendering the effect of religious attendance on the odds of protest participation statistically insignificant.

Political and Religious Values

Political orientation and religiosity will also make a substantial impact on Canadian protest involvement. Those who place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum or who adhere to liberal values will show significantly higher odds of protest participation relative to those who place themselves on the right side or who subscribe to a more conservative political viewpoint. Canadians who place the least importance on religion will show significantly higher odds of protest than those who place a high degree of importance on religion.

Gender and Ethnicity

Men and women will not significantly differ regarding direct protest involvement. A gendered effect will emerge, however, upon taking into account protest willingness. Specifically, women who are married will display significantly lower odds of protest than either unmarried women or men. Members of nonwhite ethnic groups or visible minorities will show lower odds of participation than white Canadians. Female members of visible minority groups, in particular, may be less likely to protest.

Protest Willingness

The effects of marital status, ethnicity, and gender, as predicted above, will be statistically significant. Other than these variables, however, the literature offers very few clues as to how the dynamics of protest participation may change by taking into account its active and passive dimensions. Even the findings of Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) provide only a limited guide for my purposes because of differences between their American data set and the Canadian data availed of here (description below) in the way willingness to engage in protest is measured. The former, that is, measures protest willingness and performance (or action) as separate phenomena, whereas the Canadian data measures them as two mutually exclusive dimensions (along with expressed rejection of protest tactics) of the same variable. As a result, "willingness" denotes in their study a level of support or sympathy that can be theoretically converted into action, while here it conveys specifically a *lower* level and different kind of engagement than action. Indeed, it is this conceptual and empirical separateness between willingness and action that suggests the intriguing possibility of quite different social dynamics or relevant array of attitudinal and sociostructural factors – even if we have little grounds for predicting ahead of time what these differences will look like. Therefore, protest willingness and action will be modeled simultaneously on an exploratory and comparative basis, with the aim of inductively reaching conclusions that can inform future hypotheses.

Chapter 2: Data and Methods

The data for the analysis comes from the 4th cycle of the World Values Survey (N=1925), a nationally representative sample of Canadians 18 and older at the time of interviewing (1999-2000). The WVS is a global investigation of repeated, national surveys spanning 80 countries and four cycles beginning in 1981. It is, therefore, often utilized in cross-national analyses of cultural change, but its battery of indicators on cultural attitudes and beliefs, sociodemography, and sociopolitical behaviours also make it a useful data source for national examinations involving value-orientations and citizen engagement. It comprises an ideal empirical basis for my analysis because it offers suitable and widely used measures for the variables highlighted by each of the above theoretical frameworks for protest participation. WVS information on protest derives from five questionnaire items asking respondents whether they “have”, “might”, or “would never” sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a lawful demonstration, join an unofficial strike, or occupy a building or factory for political purposes (for specific coding of all dependent and independent variables, including details on other variables I have derived such as organizational affiliation and participation, see Appendix A).

I treat Canadians as *active* protest participants if they have already performed at least two of the five delineated actions; I code as *willing* participants those respondents who report that they might engage in at least two of these events. Although some studies operationalize participation as engaging in one kind of protest action (e.g. Schussman and Soule 2005, Petrie 2004), they are typically dealing with questionnaires that specify a time range within which the behaviour must have occurred (such as in the last one or two

years), whereas the WVS data does not[9]. Setting the bar at two forms of protest also makes the important qualitative leap from those only having typically engaged (or be willing to engage) in the relatively undemanding act of signing a petition to those having engaged (or be willing to engage) in at least one other, more demanding form. Finally, construing participation in this way produces a desirable distribution: a little less than a third of Canadians are treated as active participants (29%), while slightly more than a third are treated as potential participants with some degree of tactical sympathy or interest (34.3%) and as explicitly rejecting both active and passive forms of protest participation (36.7%)[10] (WVS 2006).

Given the dichotomous operationalization of protest participation - both action and willingness – I employ logistic regression which uses the maximum likelihood method of estimation. The first round of logistic regression, following the conventional pattern set forth in the literature on protest, models participation on a binary basis, distinguishing those who have performed acts of protest from everybody else (or lumping the willing in with the non-willing). The second round models participation as a process of willingness and action, using multinomial logistic regression[11]. For while some research locates a strong positive link between protest willingness and action (e.g. Beyerlein and Hipp 2006), other studies do not. Hypothetical engagement, in fact, can

[9] The lack of a time parameter presents an important limitation when interpreting age and life cycle effects; the acts of protest participation to which respondents refer may have occurred much earlier in their lives when they, for example, were not parents or spouses. On the other hand, it bypasses other problems. Problems of recall are among the greatest challenges faced in survey administration. Even when respondents recall events in their life they often have trouble placing it in a specific time frame because of "forward telescoping", or the act of incorrectly recalling events as having occurred more recently than they did (Hall 2001: 519-20).

[10] An 8.7% subgroup who have performed two forms of protest and report willingness to engage in two further forms are treated as active participants.

[11] I use logistic regression in lieu of ordinal regression because although willingness is conceivably a lower-level form of participation than action, it is arguably also sufficiently different in a qualitative sense to forgo an ordering procedure.

quite poorly predict, or theoretically fill a rung on the ladder to, actual behaviour. In an analysis of the large peace protests held in the Netherlands during the 1980s, for example, Klandermans and Oegema report a 4% actual participation rate after measuring a 74% protest potential (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Finally, a third stage of analysis will revisit both the binary and multinomial models, but through a series of standardized coefficients so as to formally adjudicate among the determinants of protest behaviours. Placing the effects of the explanatory factors on a common metric will facilitate comparison between the competing explanations of protest participation, between levels of engagement, and between the general binary and multinomial models.

My reliance on quantitative techniques that effectively detect generalities and underlying patterns presents a fundamental methodological challenge in addressing the organizational context of protest participation. This context may be more elusive for broad-scope measures than that of other forms of civic engagement. For example, the Elks, the Moose, the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, the PTA, the League of Women Voters and other old-style elite-directed civic organizations whose precipitous membership declines Putnam pinpoints in the second chapter of *Bowling Alone* all had one thing in common: “club secretaries long accustomed to announcing new membership records with monotonous and annual regularity” (2001: 55). Externally imposed bonding social ties within these organizations based on social control mechanisms contributed to their incentive and capacity to formally keep track of their existence over time (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 118). By contrast, the amorphous configurations of bridging ties that sustain successful protests provide little such incentive or capacity. Effective movements, for example, tend to combine an array of loosely related groups and employ a range of

tactics (Tarrow 1998). The effective coexistence of different techniques, as Plows et al. demonstrate in their analysis of the Earth Liberation Front and Earth First!, can even rely on protestors who employ moderate tactics remaining unaware of those using illegal means with which they are uncomfortable – a kind of generalized plausible deniability (2004). Without standard records over time to quantitatively and qualitatively detail their activities, decentralized protest organizations leave scholars without a valuable means to corroborate contextually rich findings at the case study level with valid and reliable measures in population surveys.

Consequently, population surveys measuring protest participation, while facilitating historical and cross-national comparisons, have tended to poorly distinguish between the issues triggering protest and other situational factors such as the dimensions of mobilizable interpersonal networks and valence of different kinds of protestors (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 468-69). Although it should "be just as interesting to study variation among participants in a single movement," McAdam laments, researchers typically single out factors differentiating activists form nonactivists (McAdam 1992: 1212). This limited ability to assess context is taken to its extreme in arguments that claim any attempt to generalize about participation across particular protest events is inherently mistaken. By this account "the social groups who demonstrate and their underlying attitudinal motivations depend critically upon the specific circumstances set by the particular event, issues, political actors, coalition partners, mobilization processes, and cultural frames surrounding each demonstration" (Norris et al. 2005). If our accounts pursue aggregate explanations, it continues, they at the least should confine generalizations about profiles and resources to specific types of events that systematically

attract certain kinds of protestors. This emphasis on specifying unique contexts reverberates throughout the sociological literature on protest typified by case studies and event analyses.

This methodological obstacle, while challenging and apparent in the limitations of this thesis, is surmountable. Surveys, already biased towards more effectively tapping attitudes and values than actual behaviour, are better equipped to report routinized and repetitive behaviours than occasional acts (Norris 2002: 194). Through normalization and institutionalization, protest has evolved into precisely the kind of modular and recurring behaviour apt to be captured by surveys. "In every country, there are specific reasons for protest," Barnes et al. recognize, "ranging from concern for civil rights to opposition to war to dissatisfaction with the educational system to antiauthoritarian sentiments. Nevertheless, the similarity of both actors and actions across national boundaries suggests more fundamental similarities in underlying processes" (Barnes et al. 1979: 17-18). Since they made this observation, moreover, protest – particularly petitions, boycotts, and lawful demonstrations - has become a *generic* input into the democratic political process, "simply another political resource for mobilizing public opinion and influencing policy–makers" becoming "less noticeable and less newsworthy" (Dalton 2006: 60). Surveys that directly measure the effects of different sociopolitical contexts, finally, show their influence to be moderate. Norris, Van Aelst, and Walgrave (2005: 201-02), for example, parse their Belgian sample into New Right, Old Left, and New Left demonstrations, and find these distinctions to have only a marginal to moderate effect on what kinds of protestors showed up.

More importantly, some measure of contextual insensitivity is appropriate in analyses that are specifically after those "fundamental similarities in underlying processes," with recent trends toward modularity simply making it a more relevant inquiry. The speed at which *modular* repertoires evolve and mutate from context to context, of course, might reasonably still pose a problem. But despite what new ICT-mediated engagements, "ecotage" arsenals[12], and other *outré* tactical innovations may suggest, popular repertoires have and will likely continue to evolve quite slowly; "[p]eople experiment with new forms in the search of tactical advantage, but they do so in small ways, at the edge of well-established routines" (Tarrow 1998: 30). A population-based, quantitative research design constitutes a powerful and appropriate method of measurement, therefore, given both the recent changes in the nature of protest and the dimensions of protest under scrutiny here – namely the properties of a social dynamic underlying its multiple, modular forms. This is not to say, however, that efforts within this kind of design to account for contextual factors would not improve regression models. On the contrary, including such variables represents, by far, one of the most fruitful avenues for improvement of this kind of approach. Such an effort will be made below by disaggregating the effects on protest participation of membership in different kinds of organizations associated with major social movements, such as human rights, peace movement, environmentalist, and church organizations.

A second, and not unrelated, methodological limitation concerns the very kinds of knowledge we can hope to produce with the kind of inter-categorical approach presumed

[12] For example: office, factory and construction site occupations, disruptions of corporate AGMs, rooftop demonstrations, pushing cheese into ATMs, blockades, freeing animals from and "trashing" laboratories, damaging boats used in sea culls, letter bombing, tree-housing, tunneling, "lock-ons," arson attacks, tree-spiking, and crop attacks (Plows, Wall, and Doherty 2004).

by multivariate regression analysis. Can broad categorizations that attempt to describe uniquely experienced social intersections of class, gender, and ethnicity account for the complexity of the social phenomena to which they refer? As McCall notes, other methodological approaches take as their starting point that nothing fits neatly "into any single "master" category … except as a result of imposing a stable and homogenizing order on a more unstable and heterogeneous social reality" (2005: 1777). Nevertheless, we can identify several key advantages that come with the "provisional" use of categories. My concern lies with the complex interplay among already constituted social groups rather than the contested process of finding representative ways to identify them. By this standard, reductionist assumptions about specific groups – e.g. that "white" or "women" say something empirically meaningful about the specific experiences of survey respondents – facilitate insight into *intergroup* complexity, or into how multiple social locations typically interact to influence protest. Furthermore, quantitative analysis offers methods to try and account for intersectional complexity. "In the language of statistics," notes McCall, "the analysis of intersectionality usually requires the use of 'interaction effects' to introduce more complexity in estimation and interpretation than the additive linear model" (2005: 1788). Inclusion of such effects, especially as they apply to gender and ethnicity, comprises the main strategy here to make the inter-categorical approach more sensitive to intersectional complexity.

Chapter 3: Analysis and Results

Logistic regression provides an effective method for modeling dichotomous and trichotomous phenomena. It accounts for discrete or *qualitative* distinctions – in this case between active participants, passive participants, and Canadians who cannot imagine themselves ever employing a specified range of protest tactics. It does so by transforming probabilities into the natural logarithms of odds: the estimated coefficients reported in each table below denote the effect of a one unit change in the explanatory variables on the logged odds of engaging in protest. Because "logged odds" is not at all an intuitive metric, I will refer to their values in exponentiated form as odds, which much more intuitively express the likelihood of an event occurring relative to the likelihood of an event not occurring.

Although the sequencing of models and the order in which their constitutive variables are entered are statistically irrelevant, it makes analytical sense to arrange the data so it tells a coherent "story." To this end, the dichotomous model is presented first. In having it precede the multinomial results I aim to build an increasingly nuanced understanding of protest participation. It should be noted, however, that the dichotomous model provides unique insight in its own right, independent of the complexities broached by modeling more layers of engagement; whether protest "willingness" constitutes nonparticipation or some unique kind of participation distinct from performance and repudiation of protest is contested and warrants comparison. Within the models, political values, gender, ethnicity, and income level are entered in the same block as the biographical availability variables, which are subsequently followed by the indicators for

strategic resources and structural availability. Values, gender, ethnicity, and income do not necessarily relate to lifecycle circumstances rendering people uniquely available to protest, but they are usefully controlled at the outset. In this way we can observe whether these factors indirectly influence protest participation through unequal distributions of human and social capital (i.e. educational attainment and number of organizational ties, both affinitive and participatory), which I have flagged (in the hypotheses) as potentially being of relatively great importance. For example, employment, income, and student status may act as proxy indicators for educational attainment and organizational activity, and entering them first provides an easy means for testing this possibility.

Dichotomous model: Performance vs. Inaction

Gender and Ethnicity

To begin with, contrary to earlier research on protest women appear no less likely to become protestors than men. That the odds[13] of men and women participating in protest are statistically indistinguishable from one another suggests Canadian protest reflects a broad western trend towards gender parity observed of many other forms of political and civic participation. Canadian women, for example, are today as or about as likely as men to vote, join interest groups, volunteer, and engage in associational activity (Gidengil et al. 2004: 51-54, 174). While a strong gender divergence may exist nonetheless in the consequences of protest (McAdam 1992), parity appears to exist at the

[13] Like probabilities, odds have a lower limit of 0, but unlike probabilities, which express the likelihood of some event as a proportion of occurrences and nonoccurrences, odds have no upper ceiling and express the likelihood of an occurrence relative to the likelihood of a nonoccurrence.

level of recruitment. This is, of course, to say nothing of the qualitatively different ways in which men and women may execute, impute meaning to, and leverage their mobilizations for collective goals. As "one of the most fundamental relations of power," gender hierarchy may ideologically differentiate the use of a common repertoire (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005: 48).

By contrast, those of visible minority status, comprising 10% of the sample, are significantly less likely to participate in protest activities. After controlling income, education, age and all other variables identified across the models, their odds of protest participation remain a substantial 70% lower than white Canadians (p<.001). Most ethnic (nonwhite) minorities in Canada are immigrants or their offspring. A dramatic shift away from European sources of immigration since the 1960s has seen their proportion of the population climb ever higher (to 13.4 % in 2001), fueling debates over how to best integrate immigrants with a diverse array of values and customs into Canadian public life. Their political participation can provide an important window into challenges of social cohesion facing a nation that prides itself on its egalitarian multicultural promise. This finding of suppressed protest participation among minorities here corroborates other work showing lower levels of protest among those of non-European ancestry (Gidengil et al. 2004: 140). It also resonates with findings connecting immigrant, ethnocultural, and visible minority status to lower rates of voting and volunteerism (Tossutti and Wang 2006, Reed and Selbee 2000). In short, it points to a gap between the rhetoric of multiculturalism and the participatory options with which minority groups can articulate demands and compel governments and other authorities to incorporate their voices into public policy – voices which, perhaps, we should be paying disproportionate attention to.

TABLE 1
Protest Performance vs. Inaction

Independent Variable	Biographical Availability	Strategic Resources	Structural Availability
Ethnicity	-0.98**	-1.04**	-1.19***
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Gender	0.13	0.17	0.18
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Gender X Minority	0.90*	0.70	0.85
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.44)
Employed Part-time	-0.02	0.08	0.05
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Self-Employed	0.43	0.29	0.29
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Retired	-0.18	-0.23	-0.25
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Housewife	-0.61*	-0.45	-0.42
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Student	0.16	0.03	0.02
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Unemployed	-0.48	-0.39	-0.28
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Generation Y	0.28	0.46*	0.49*
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Late Boomer	0.50**	0.51**	0.45*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Early Boomer	0.76***	0.68***	0.68***
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Silent Generation	0.91***	0.88***	0.84***
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Dutiful Generation	-0.02	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Middle	-0.79***	-0.60***	-0.58***
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Right of Middle	-0.95***	-0.93***	-0.88***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Don't Know	-1.51***	-1.23***	-1.24***
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Marital Status	0.07	0.11	0.13
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Kids	-0.15	-0.06	-0.09
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Religion Important	-0.59***	-0.54***	-0.64***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
God Important	-0.06	-0.02	0.04
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Middle Income	0.34*	0.09	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
High Income	0.41*	-0.02	-0.16
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)

Table 1 (Continued)

Independent Variable	Biographical Availability	Strategic Resources	Structural Availability
Missing	-0.21	-0.45	-0.48*
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Years of Education		0.16***	0.12***
		(0.02)	(0.03)
Politics Important		0.33**	0.31*
		(0.12)	(0.12)
Discusses Politics		0.54**	0.45**
		(0.17)	(0.17)
Follows Political News		0.47***	0.38**
		(0.13)	(0.13)
Religious Attendance			-0.45**
			(0.17)
Number of Organizational Affiliations			0.18***
			(0.04)
Number Organizations Participating In			0.11*
			(0.05)
Constant			-2.55
$x^2(31)$=399.83***; -2 log likelihood = 1869.58			(0.42)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (N =1869, Missing=52, WVS 4)

Among all the ethnic groups in Canada, visible minorities have the lowest incomes and highest rates of poverty (Reitz and Banerjee 2007).

The intersection of ethnicity and gender can be observed in the interaction term in Table 1 which estimates their multiplicative effects. In the biographical availability model the term proves significant (p<.05), suggesting (in accordance with descriptive evidence) net of other biographical availability variables, political values, and income, the odds that Canadian women of minority status will protest are significantly lower than that of male minorities. However, this effect becomes insignificant after controlling for educational attainment. Depressed participation among minority women, that is, appears to be better explained by their relatively lower access to key socioeconomic resources – specifically the human capital manifested in education – than either the direct effects of their ethnicity or gender.

Marital, Parental, and Employment Status

Three of the four core biographical availability variables, marital, parental, and employment status, appear to have very little to do with protest participation. As hypothesized and in line with previous studies (Petrie 2004, Schussman and Soule 2005), the odds of married respondents engaging in protest do not significantly differ from those of unmarried respondents. It seems social obligations and commitments to partners have very little bearing on participation, or that the greater costs and negative sanctions thought to accrue with marriage remain insufficient to countervail activism[14]. Departing from the same studies, however, that found a significant dampening influence on participation of having children (Petrie 2004, Schussman and Soule 2005), no discernible effect emerges here. The presence of children, thought to increase the risks and costs of protest in similar ways as marriage by introducing more important commitments, either has no such effect on the costs of engagement or produces constraints that are nonetheless outweighed by other factors. Both interpretations are plausible, given the range of other significant factors discussed below and lower legal and security risks incurred by lawful forms of protest in today's era of "negotiated management" styles of protest policing.

Surprisingly, unemployment fails to depress protest participation, and student status fails to increase the likelihood of such action; both variables emerge as statistically insignificant. Their insignificance, in fact, spans the three sequentially entered models.

[14] An interaction term multiplying the effects of gender and marital status was included in a model not presented here, on grounds that women working a "second shift" or taking on the majority of the housework after performing a job outside the house might reasonably be expected to find less time and energy to protest than men. It proves insignificant, suggesting that this is not the case.

Employment status fails to influence participation, that is to say, after but also *before* controlling for education and the extent to which respondents are integrated into the organizational life of their communities. This suggests employment plays no proxy role in spurring protest involvement through its connection to either strategic resources or structural availability, challenging the findings of other studies which argue for direct and such indirect effects (Petrie 2004, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Income, moreover, while showing a marginal positive influence on protest in the first block, fails to retain significance after taking into account the demonstrably more important socioeconomic factor of education. The finding coheres with past research (Schussman and Soule 2005: 1091), and corroborates the irrelevance for protest of general engagement with the economy. Similarly, student status shows no direct effect on participation of any significance, and it achieves insignificance before controlling for resources and organizational integration, suggesting it, too, does not play a proxy role for these factors as is often assumed.

Age

Age influences the odds of protest participation in a significant, but by no means clear-cut manner. Part of the reason the literature divides on this dimension of differential recruitment stems from differences in how age is operationalized. While some studies code the variable into a set of categorical predictors corresponding to cohorts, others leave it as a single, continuous measure, often logging it (e.g. Schussman and Soule 2005). The former strategy, arguably, better deals with the complexity and nonlinear

effects of age, and is pursued here. It releases the analyst from the potentially unfeasible task of finding adequate transformations to account for its nonlinearity, while highlighting inter-cohort variation. Indeed, much research on age regarding not only protest but the full spectrum of civic engagement speaks to the salience of such variation. While Inglehart (1990) and Putnam (2001) may not agree on the direction in which the health of our civil society is heading, they both perceive a significant motor of social change in inter-generational turnover, or the replacement of one cohort with another manifesting different orientations. The intersection of personal and collective experiences, shared witness to historical events, and living through unique technological, political, and cultural shifts appear to forge generational differences in political attitudes, opinions, and behaviours (Keeter et al. 2006: 17-19). The dominant narrative of civic change, however, is that of the most cited social scientist of the 1990s, Robert Putnam (Voyer 2005: 3), who characterizes the replacement of uniquely participatory baby boomers and their forbears with more disengaged cohorts (Putnam 2001, Sandel 1996, Goss 1999). GenXers, for example, or those born between 1966 and 1975, are widely perceived as delaying entry into adulthood and its corresponding citizenship obligations, a sentiment captured in the iconic film, *Reality Bites*. "Generation X has been the poster child for poor citizenship. Described as "slackers," and scorned for a worldview that begins and ends with themselves, even their moniker is about something that never happened" (Keeter et al. 2006: 15).

The evidence here offers support for such a generational interpretation in terms of Canadian protest participation. In Figure 2 we can see that substantially higher proportions of both boomers and their predecessors born between 1935 and 1945 report

engaging in at least two forms of protest. 31% of late boomers, 38% of early boomers, and 36% of the 55 to 64 cohort report having done so, compared to less than a quarter of GenXers (24%). Generation Y – those born between 1976 and 1985 – still a bit of an unknown quantity in the literature given their recent arrival, show signs of reversing a quarter-century slide with 30% of the cohort protesting. It has been argued, on the other hand, that younger cohorts are at an inherent *life cycle* disadvantage, given the relatively limited time they have had to accumulate the human, social, and political capital thought to precipitate participation (Keeter et al. 2006: 127). After we hold strategic resources and structural availability constant, however, the results tell a similar story. They also clarify some meaningful differentiation among older cohorts. Net of all else, the odds of protest participation among early boomers are 97% (p<.001) higher than those of GenXers, whereas the odds of late boomers are 57% higher (p<.05). The late WWII generation (55-

FIGURE 2
Protest Participation by Age



Source: WVS 2000, N=1918, Missing=7

64) emerges as the most participatory: members of their cohort are 2 and a third times more likely to engage in protest relative to GenXers (Table 1, $p<.001$). The difference between GenXers and Generation Y, finally, achieves statistical significance. The odds of protest among the youngest cohort prove 64% higher ($p<.05$) than that of their immediate forbears, suggesting, perhaps, the beginnings of a second curve within the age distribution of protest.

Given the cross-sectional nature of our data we cannot, however, fully discount lifecycle influences. Consider recent research on Canadian volunteerism: Generation Y shows high rate of involvement in the 30% to 40% range, reflecting a conducive school and youth-oriented organizational context; Xers significantly drop off by as much as 10%, reflecting in part a diversion of resources to careers and families (the presence of preschool children has been shown to suppress volunteer activity); boomer activity swells back up to levels comparable to youth, reflecting an increase in time as careers and families stabilize as well as involvement in the youth-oriented organizations of their children; and volunteering steadily declines after age 55, the reasons for which are more contested (Reed and Selbee 2006: 10-11). This lifecycle pattern, notably, reflects the same basic shape of the age distribution of protest presented here. Two troughs characterize the second youngest and oldest cohorts of protestors, suggesting the possibility of similar lifecycle effects at work. In short, the distribution conforms to both what work on lifecycle effects on civic participation predicts and, in the case of a sample drawn in 2000, what inter-generational explanations maintain. Nonetheless, with supporting evidence we can tentatively emphasize the latter: precisely those life course events referred into lifecycle explanations – getting married, securing employment,

raising children – are entered and controlled for as biographical availability indicators here, and prove to have little effect on protest participation (Table 1).

Political and Religious Values

Like ethnicity and age, political and religious values also show significant and substantial effects on the likelihood of protest. In fact, these factors appear to rank among the most significant predictors across the three separately entered models, suggesting strong effects independent of education and organizational participation. Looking to Figure 3, we find that nearly half (48%) of those placing themselves on the left side of the political spectrum report engaging in at least two forms of protest activities, more than 20 points higher than those identifying with the middle (27%) and the right (27%). Interestingly, those who do not know where to place themselves constitute the group most disengaged from this repertoire, with little more than an eighth (13%) reporting participation. Once we control for resources and structural availability, moreover, the pattern becomes even more linear. As Figure 4 illustrates, respondents in the middle and on the right remain quite distinct from those on the left, but also differentiate from one another, showing, respectively, 44% and 58% lower odds or participation net of all other factors in the analysis. Those who are unable to identify themselves, once again, comprise the most reticent of all the categories; their relative odds of having engaged in two kinds of protest are .288, meaning their odds are 71% lower than those on the left. Also in line with my hypothesis, those who place a high degree of importance on religion are demonstrably less likely to engage in protest than those who place little to no

FIGURE 3
Protest Participation by Political Disposition



Source: WVS 2000, N=1923, Missing=2

FIGURE 4
Odds of Protest Participation by Political Disposition Compared to Leftists



Source: WVS 2000, N=1923, Missing=2

importance on religion. Specifically, net of all other factors their odds are 47% lower, denoting a strong, negative relationship between the two phenomena (p<.001). We can

usefully contrast this "social religiosity" with the importance which respondents hold God in their own life, or "personal religiosity": those for whom God commands high levels of personal relevance are evidentially indistinguishable from those for whom God is irrelevant (Table 1). This variable accounts for a more private and individualistic dimension of reverence[15], in contrast to the more detached and society-oriented assessment of religion. The insignificance of personal religiosity qualifies the influence of religious values on protest. Canadian protestors appear to disproportionately hail from the secular ranks of those who perceive religious institutions to be of little public or social consequence or to have less political import than they once had – which is not to say they necessarily eschew spirituality or theistic orientations. Indeed, those engaging in protest activities are just as likely as those who do not to report that God is important in their lives, while nevertheless disproportionately questioning the *social* irrelevance of institutions built on such beliefs.

These findings on political and religious values complement one another in the context of value systems or worldviews that guide the actions of certain kinds of civic actors. Reed and Selbee, for example, identify distinctive values and beliefs that characterize avid Canadian volunteers and charitable-givers, by which they mean "the enduring principles, ideals and assumptions that together constitute an ethos and worldview held by individuals and which underlie their preferences and guide their decision-making and behaviour" (2002: 2). The "contributor" social ethos displays several themes. It includes recognition of a common good which they feel they have the responsibility to support, a universalistic, trusting, and prosocial perspective in which

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[15] Religiosity can technically connote the particular intensity with which adherents hold religious tenets, but I am using it here in the broader sense of the word conveying the general importance people give to religion.

different social milieux are interconnected, and the importance and present existence of social justice (2006: 42). By contrast, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) depict a more critical value system guiding typical protestors: emphasis on intellectual and emotional autonomy, skepticism of social and political elites and their capacity to pursue an inclusive common good, and rejection that social justice presently exists. Canadian protest, as symptomatic of a more secular and liberal ethos, reflects what I would describe as a partial fusion of a self-expression value-*content* with elite-challenging *means*. Formative socioeconomic security and education make people demonstrably more tolerant of deviations from the two, heterosexual parent survival paradigm of the family while reducing the appeal of dogmatic, elite-directed institutions that militate against self-expression, of which religious institutions may be the prototype[16]. Accordingly, Canadians who feel abortion, homosexuality, and prostitution are usually[17] justifiable are 15% more likely to protest than those who feel they are usually unjustifiable, with the spread only dropping a few percentage points for divorce and euthanasia (WVS 2006).

Education and Political Consciousness

In the biographical availability model presented in Table 1, it is shown that higher incomes marginally increase the likelihood of protest participation net of gender, ethnicity, and political values. After education is introduced, however, this effect

[16] Intolerance of such "deviations," in fact, provided a common lightning rod over the 1980s and 90s for a disparate and politically reticent Canadian evangelical community, forming the basis for a wide-ranging critical program of government lobbying, coalition-building, and constitutional interventions (see Stackhouse 1993).

[17] "Usually" is defined as scoring 6 to 10 on a ten point scale where 1 equals "never justifiable" and 10 equals "always justifiable".

disappears, affirming the importance of differentiating socioeconomic resources into its different components. When we parse the distribution of protest by educational attainment (Figure 5), a clear, positive and linear pattern emerges. While under a fifth (16.5%) of those with less than high school and just over a fifth (21%) of those who have a high school education report engaging in at least two kinds of protest, the proportion moves up to 29% for both those who have partly or fully completed college. The spread then markedly grows for respondents with university-level training: 39% of those with some university education and half of those who have completed their degree report engagement. The ten point difference between college graduates and those who have started but have yet to finish at university, as well as the significant increase attending university completion, suggests that university education plays a particularly important role in fostering the disposition to protest. Once all other variables across the models are held constant, finally, we can observe with some precision the strong and positive influence formal educational attainment independently exerts on protest participation: keeping biographical availability, structural availability, and political consciousness indicators constant, for each additional year of education the odds of engaging in at least two forms of protest increase by 13% (p<.001).

Political consciousness also positively influences participation, although its influence varies by indicator. Before controlling for structural availability, respondents who discuss politics frequently show odds of protest 72% higher than people who discuss politics occasionally or never, and the odds of respondents who follow politics in the news everyday are 61% greater than for those who follow politics less often, although these differentials fall to 58% and 46%, respectively, upon controlling for organizational

engagement ($p<.001$). Political enthusiasm marginally increases protest likelihood; the odds of participation for those who feel politics are important are 39% higher (37% net of structural availability, $p<.05$). That introducing organizational activity attenuates the

FIGURE 5
Odds of Protest Participation by Educational Attainment



Source: WVS 2000, N=1913, Missing=12

influence of political knowledge and interest – a finding also reported for the American case by Schussman and Soule (2006: 1091) – suggests political consciousness, while of moderate, positive significance to protest participation, is likely less critical than, and, indeed, may partially operate through, organizational involvement. Organizations conducive to protest participation embody politically relevant discourse, or constitute in important respects a routinized way of consuming socially useful knowledge or news. Conversely, organizational engagement and education are necessary, but not sufficient conditions of protest. Political consciousness in the form of personal interest and

knowledge will, in other words, moderately raise the odds of protest participation independently of formal education and organizational engagement.

These results comport rather closely with previous research (Dalton 2006, Norris 2005, Petrie 2004, Keeter et al. 2006). They add credence to Verba, Brady and Schlozman's (1995) resource model of political participation, and support Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry's (1996) contention of a fundamental and robust link between formal education and the cognitive skills and networking opportunities necessary for democratic citizenship. Political consciousness and higher education consistently comprise the common denominators of a diverse range of public engagements; that they positively influence protest helps explain why it is typically "the *same* Canadians who are joining political parties, joining interest groups, and engaging in various forms of protest" (Gidengil et al. 2004: 139). Protest participation, therefore, presupposes more than a mobilization of passions and lack of social constraints; it requires the critical capacity and will to identify and pursue one's interests in relatively democratic social structures whose accessibility, in turn, increases with high levels of human capital. One of the more interesting findings thus far supports such an interpretation: respondents who cannot locate themselves on the political spectrum are the least likely to engage in political protest. Simply by having the capacity to locate oneself within the general ideological scheme of things translates into greater odds of engagement[18]. Education and political knowledge not only steer protestors towards critical engagement with postmaterial targets and issues, but, more germanely, help individuals constitute themselves as political actors with the power to produce concerted actions.

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[18] When the "don't knows" are used as the reference category, only the odds of protest participation of those on the right fail to differ by a statistically significant margin.

Organizational and Religious Engagement

The final model of structural availability hypothesizes that by providing a baseline affinity for mobilization and facilitating recruitment to activism, organizational affiliation and participation will exert strong, positive effects on the odds of protest. Regarding affiliation, this is exactly the case. The number of organizations one affiliates with positively and linearly relates to protest participation (Figure 6). Net of other relevant covariates, in fact, including the extent to which people engage in any one organization, each additional affiliation increases the odds of protest by 19% ($p<.001$). The net influence of degree of voluntaristic participation, by contrast, is less pronounced. For each additional organization respondents actually performed unpaid work for, their odds of protest increase by 12% ($p<.05$), suggesting a small, but positive effect. “Loose” affinitive ties, therefore, appear to play a relatively larger role than the “strong” ties of organizational participation. An emphasis on such ties would suggest Canadian protest fits into a larger “international pattern of social movement organization” predicated on what Sidney Tarrow describes as “impersonal networklike connective structures” (1998: 133). Such horizontal mobilizing structures are in an important sense “flimsier” than centralized and hierarchical organizations that routinize face-to-face contact; they rely more on social webs “in which the cells, or nodes, are tied together, not through any central point, but rather through intersecting sets of personal relationships and other intergroup linkages” (Gerlach and Hein, quoted in Tarrow 1998: 129).

Part of the problem of addressing the organizational context of protest, as mentioned above, stems from the relative lack of incentive and capacity of organization-

FIGURE 6
Protest participation by number of organizational affiliations



Source: WVS, 2000; N=1924, Missing=1

like networks conducive to protest mobilization to formally keep track of their existence over time and related failure of population surveys to tap the peculiar array of mobilizing structures unique to each protest event. I can partially address this problem here because my continuous organizational participation variable derives from a 15-item battery of organizational types in which respondents were asked if they belonged. Decomposing this measure and entering each type separately (see Appendix B) provides us with an idea of whether membership in a particular kind of association – e.g. environmental, cultural, human rights, women's-oriented, or peace movement association – increases the likelihood of protest. We might reasonably suspect ties to an environmental organization, for example, would raise the odds of demonstrating or boycotting given the environmental movement's pervasive and growing reach. Only participation within a labour union, however, proves statistically significant. Canadians who report having performed unpaid work for a labour union are 2.84 times more likely to have also

participated in protest activities (p<.001). Corroborating recent findings in the U.S. (Dalton 2006) and Canada (Gidengil at al. 2004: 140), this finding surely reflects the traditional incorporation of protest tactics, specifically strikes, into union mandates.

The final factor of structural availability and of this stage of the analysis also provides an unexpected result. For several reasons one might try and positively connect religious participation in the form of regular ceremony-going to heightened protest participation. Not only have religious institutions mobilized in many social movements of the past and present (abolition, prohibition, pro-life, anti-poverty) and positively relate to other forms of civic engagement in which protestors also disproportionately engage in, institutions such as the United and Anglican Church furnish resources for all manner of *progressive* social activism, or projects that resonate with much of the protester's ethos. In a critique of contemporary "culture wars" arguments that define two internally consistent belief systems based on religious-conservative and secular-liberal values, for example, Kniss and Burns point to both the pluralist inevitability of cross-cutting cleavages and "the considerable sociological research that indicates that religion can [not only] provide a great deal of motivation, energy, and solidarity in social movements, but that the same religious tradition can have left-wing and right-wing manifestations" (2004: 707, Dillon 1999). Nonetheless, frequent religious ceremony attendance (weekly or more) *decreases* the odds of protest by a substantial 36% (p<.01).

In conjunction with the finding of a significant negative influence of social religiosity, the result is suggestive of a strong secular bent among Canadian protestors. The congruency between two key, but quite different indicators of religiousness in active attendance and belief in the social relevance of religion increases the confidence with

which I can implicate religiousness in the social dynamics of protest. We do not have to posit the existence of monolithic belief systems at war with one another to suggest some fault lines within contemporary cultural conflicts are more important than others. Aligning in protest are liberal and secular elements as well as disproportionate tolerance of homosexuality, abortion, divorce, and other "family values" issues against which increasingly unified religious conservatives have mobilized (Stackhouse 1993); in spite of progressive acts of religion and reactionary secular projects (e.g. libertarianism), a broad coupling of elite-challenging behaviour and secular-liberal beliefs looms large over Canada's varied cultural battlegrounds. The cleft, moreover, seems unlikely to abate, at least in the short-term, as Stephen Harper, among other emergent pan-evangelical leaders (e.g. Charles McVety, leader of several pro-family lobbies such as the Defend Marriage Coalition), consolidates who he identifies as Canada's "theo-cons." "The real agenda and the defining issues have shifted from economic issues to social values," he proclaimed in a speech to Civitas in 2003, "so conservatives must do the same. … The social-conservative issues we choose should not be denominational, but should unite social conservatives of different denominations and even different faiths" (quoted in McDonald 2006: 4).

Multinomial model

In the analysis thus far I have conceptualized protest participation purely as the execution of generic tactics. An alternative conception of participation involves a multi-layered and arguably more complex formulation consisting of both passive participation,

in the form of protest willingness, and active involvement, in the form of performing acts of protest. Although a form of inaction, protest willingness is thought to comprise a mode of engagement distinct from a self-conscious rejection of the repertoire and indicate a limited measure of support for the tactics and goals of a protest or social movement (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006). Modeling performance of, willingness to use, and rejection of the repertoire with multinomial logistic regression entails three possible comparisons: performance vs. rejection, willingness, vs. rejection, and performance vs. willingness. The results of the first two will be presented in tables and discussed below, as my substantive emphases lies with the social determinants that distinguish active and passive participation from people who cannot conceive of themselves as protestors. Nonetheless, by estimating the logits in these two comparisons, I have all I mathematically require in the first two comparisons to calculate the third set of coefficients which denote how the covariates distinguish Canadians who actively protest from those who are merely willing. This third set is thus referred to as the "redundant" logits or model[19], which I will make mention of in several cases in the Willingness vs. Rejection section to help clarify ambiguous results.

Performance vs. Rejection

Table 2 reports the logit coefficients for a model comparing those who perform acts of protest with those who reject the repertoire, while Table 3 displays the results of comparing those who are willing to use acts of protest and the rejecters. Among the

[19] The redundant model can be estimated by subtracting the relevant coefficient in the willingness/rejection from the one in the performance/rejection comparison, or by simply rerunning the regression with willingness as the reference category, which can be found in Appendix B.

notable findings in Table 2, perhaps the most visible is its consistency with Table 1. Conservatism, social religiosity, and frequent religious attendance all substantially dampen participation, reducing the odds of protest relative to leftists, those who do not think religion is important, and infrequent religious ceremony- goers by, respectively, 58% ($p<.001$), 56% ($p<.001$), and 42% ($p<.01$). Similarly, personal religiosity, marital status, parental status, and most of the dummies for employment status fail to reach significance. Finally, years of education, number of organizational affiliations, and political knowledge all exert positive effects similar to those observed in the first model. Keeping all else constant, each additional year of education multiplies the odds of protest by 1.15 and each additional affiliation by 1.25 (both $p<.001$); frequent discussion of politics multiplies the odds of participation by 1.7 and frequent political news consumption by 1.4 (both $p<.05$).

Important points of distinction, however, also emerge when we constrain nonparticipation to both inaction and unwillingness to act. Unlike the binary model in which nonparticipation denotes inaction, which found protest involvement among part-time employees to not differ from that of the unemployed, the multinomial model in Table 2 shows a significant difference between the two groups: part-time employment multiplies the odds of protest relative to the unemployed by 2.1 ($p<.05$). The finding may provide marginal support for biographical availability, but in the context of a resource-based understanding of participation. Protest behaviour among full-time workers remains statistically indistinguishable from the unemployed after controlling for strategic resources, suggesting that part-time work, to the extent that it independently stimulates engagement, may offer both the flexibility and assets demanded of protest activism.

TABLE 2
Protest Performance vs. Rejection

Independent Variable	Biographical Availability	Strategic Resources	Structural Availability
Ethnicity	-0.18	-0.53	-0.54
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Gender	0.22	0.30*	0.33*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Gender X Minority	0.90*	0.64	0.75
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Full-time	0.62*	0.54	0.45
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Part-time	0.85*	0.86*	0.72*
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.36)
Self-Employed	1.04**	0.79*	0.69
	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Retired	0.50	0.35	0.18
	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Housewife	-0.06	0.04	-0.08
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Student	0.97*	0.73	0.65
	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.47)
Generation Y	0.81*	1.08**	1.03*
	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.42)
Generation X	0.73*	0.81*	0.73
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.38)
Late Boomer	1.13***	1.18***	1.05**
	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.36)
Early Boomer	1.07**	0.99**	0.92**
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Silent Generation	1.16***	1.18***	1.13***
	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Don't Know	-1.96***	-1.63***	-1.63***
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Right of Middle	-0.92***	-0.91***	-0.87***
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Middle	-0.92***	-0.73***	-0.69***
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Marital Status	0.02	0.07	0.10
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Kids	-0.29	-0.17	-0.19
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Religion Important	-0.77***	-0.73***	-0.81***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)
God Important	-0.04	-0.03	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Missing Income	-1.01***	-0.82**	-0.72**
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Low Income	-0.75***	-0.25	-0.13

Table 2 (Continued)

Independent Variable	Biographical Availability	Strategic Resources	Structural Availability
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Middle Income	-0.23	-0.03	0.08
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Years of Education		0.17***	0.14***
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Politics Important		0.55***	0.57***
		(0.14)	(0.15)
Discusses Politics		0.66**	0.53*
		(0.22)	(0.22)
Follows News		0.44**	0.33*
		(0.16)	(0.16)
Religious Attendance			-0.54**
			(0.20)
Number of Organizational Affiliations			0.22***
			(0.05)
Number Organizations Participating In			0.04
			(0.06)
Constant			-3.44***
$x^2(64)=609.89$***; -2 log likelihood = 3397.95			(0.78)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (N =1869, WVS 2000)

Interestingly, political interest becomes particularly important. While enthusiasm for politics increases the odds of protest action by 39% (p<.05) in the dichotomous model of participation, it does so by 77% (p<.001) upon comparing active use with rejection of the repertoire, suggesting that the latter group bears a uniquely high level of political disinterest relative to those who support and use protest tactics. Finally, the age distribution changes slightly as the 65 and over cohort replaces GenXers at the bottom of the ladder, with the remaining cohorts (particularly the middle-aged) displaying significantly higher odds of participation than elderly Canadians rather than young adults.

The most interesting areas of departure, however, arguably lie with gender, ethnicity, and organizational participation. In the dichotomous model the gender factor proves statistically insignificant while visible minority status proves substantial, negatively influencing protest participation net of other relevant covariates. When

disengagement is narrowed to expressed rejection of protest tactics, however, their import reverses. Being male, with strategic resources and organizational behaviour held constant, increases the odds of participation by the same margin as being interested in politics, or 39% ($p<.05$). Minority racial status, by contrast, fails to significantly distinguish those who physically engage in actions of protest from respondents who dismiss such tactics. Again, the participatory effect of being female and belonging to a visible minority group is significantly negative ($p<.05$), but only before taking into account levels of educational attainment. The reversal presents some interesting elaborations of my earlier findings regarding the effects of these variables. While in general the gender gap in protest likelihood may be in long-term decline, it nevertheless persists within contemporary protest; males retain a higher likelihood of actively using these elite-challenging tactics than rejecting them relative to females. Put another way, categorizing protest willingness, which women and men report relatively equally (33% and 36%, respectively, WVS 2006), as nonparticipation "masks" a small disparity between performance and rejection. The opposite occurs with ethnicity: only by grouping protest willingness in with rejection of the repertoire does a significant racial difference emerge. In short, the racial imbalance among inactive Canadians is more evenly spread; separately the willing and unwilling do not significantly differ from active protestors[20], but in combination display a statistically significant absence of nonwhite participants.

The other intriguing finding in Table 2 pertaining to organizational behaviour is the now stark emphasis of affinitive social ties over more extensive volunteer labor. Each additional organizational affiliation increases the odds of protest participation by 25% in the revised model ($p<.001$), while organizational participation fails to achieve

[20] The redundant regression model comparing active protestors with the willing confirms this finding.

significance. Just as the effects of education and political consciousness allow some insight into the influence of human capital on engagement, this qualified finding on organizational involvement suggests some interesting things about the role of social capital. One of the most important figures in debates over social capital, as discussed in Chapter 1, dismisses the recent growth of social movement activity as an explosion of undemanding mailing-list memberships. Such affiliations, Putnam argues, "provide neither connectedness among members nor direct engagement in civic give-and-take" (2001: 160), reflecting a thin species of social capital to be contrasted with a thicker (and endangered) sort, forged through formalized face-to-face volunteerism, that more readily leads to civil collective action. By Putnam's own criteria, then, if social capital is on the decline, the consequences for protest networks may be less severe than for voluntary associations.

> "For while the latter depend on steady membership participation [and] sustained activities within institutions, … the main activities of movement organizations today are periodic, rapidly organized mass demonstrations, small-scale disruptive actions carried out by teams of trained militants, and publicity-gaining activities. None of these require the day-to-day work of membership participation, but rather depend on the capacity to assemble mass support for brief and often exhilarating performances." (Tarrow 1998: 133)

Not everybody, however, accepts Putnam's criteria. An alternative evaluation of democratically useful forms of social capital challenges the different normative lens through which routinized participation in institutionalized voluntary associations has traditionally been viewed compared to the more sporadic bursts of elite-challenging activity. Notwithstanding evidence of the "uncivic" effects of many exclusive associations pursing parochial goals (Stolle and Rochon 1998), pervasive participation in voluntary organizations is largely conceived of as rendering institutions more civic or

responsive to more kinds of citizens, and as uniquely facilitative of developing civic and deliberative skills (Putnam 2001, Verba et al. 1995). Protest, on the other hand, continues to struggle with its past, haunted by deprivation theories and mob sociology imputing it to democracy-undermining turbulence. Its contemporary prevalence may not represent, however, a loss or deterioration of social capital. Rather, some scholars suggest uninstitutionalized, elite-challenging actions and the loose social ties of affiliation on which they typically depend, although a qualitative departure from more intimate bonds, may nevertheless facilitate civil collective action. Inglehart and Welzel, for example, argue that the decline of elite-directed forms of public engagement, such as voting and political party activity, and dramatic rise of direct action across the west reflect "the changing nature of social capital: social capital has not eroded but has taken a new form, leading to changing types of collective action" (2005: 116).

Evidence that organizational affiliation plays a relatively more important role than more formalized unpaid labor does not *necessarily* connect affinitive ties with stocks of democratically useful social capital. However, in the context of the broad social dynamic underlying Canadian protest taking shape here organizational affiliation plays an integral role, and the interpretation becomes more credible. Amorphous configurations of loose social ties typically facilitate more critical uses of rising levels of human capital than many tightly-knit associations that rely on higher levels of conformity. Requiring lower levels of deference, horizontal networks reduce the information discipline endemic to hierarchical organizations in which elites largely define collective understandings and actions (from, e.g., political machines marching monolithic blocs of voters off to the polls with suspicious reliability in the industrial age to religious leaders mobilizing "loyal"

congregations of value-voters in recent campaigns). The acts of protest they sustain show stronger population-level correlations with Freedom House, Transparency International, UNDP, World Bank, and Gini good-governance and social welfare indices (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Inglehart et al. 2005, Deutsch and Welzel 2003, Dalton and Sickle 2005, Norris and Inglehart 2004) than acts of volunteerism. In sum, what may matter just as much as the tactics and organizational pathways civic activists avail themselves of are their motivating values - values that can, in the words of Inglehart and Welzel, "decide whether people make civic or uncivic uses of their social capital" (2006: 140). That protestors disproportionately profess a secular-liberal ethos of emancipative ideals and civic self-determination (Deutsch and Welzel 2003: 9) suggests their tactics and the "thin" species of social capital on which they usually rely associate with a uniquely civic content.

Willingness vs. Rejection

The social dynamics of protest willingness display important similarities with the dynamics underlying active participation as depicted in the dichotomous and multinomial models. Relative to unemployed Canadians, for example, the odds of protest willingness among part-time workers are 85% higher ($p<.05$), suggesting the small positive influence for flexible engagement within the workforce observed of action extends to more passive support or interest as well. Of greater substantive significance are the similar effects of loose social ties and political consciousness. For each additional organizational affiliation, respondents are 12% more likely to be willing to protest ($p<.05$). To fully

explicate the effect of affinitive ties on the different levels of protest engagement, consider the additional pairwise comparison between action and willingness. Each additional affinitive tie also significantly increases the odds of action compared to those willing to protest, specifically by 12% ($p<.05$), or by about half the margin observed between use of protest tactics and their rejection (25%). The result provides clear evidence of a strong, linear, and positive effect of organizational affiliation as we move from repudiation of protest to willingness and from willingness to performance. It lends partial support for Nepstad and Smith's contention that organizational memberships matter less in distinguishing different kinds of participation than in building momentum for a campaign among both potential activists and supporters (1999: 35).

In similar fashion to the performance-rejection comparison, political interest takes on more importance than it does in the dichotomous model. The odds that Canadians who express high levels of interest in politics also prove willing to protest are 55% higher ($p<.001$) than those with lower levels of interest, net of other variables in the analysis. Rather than a linear relationship such as that observed of organizational affiliation and protest engagement, however, the substantial positive influence of political enthusiasm appears to bifurcate unwillingness on the one hand, and willingness and action on the other. Indeed, the redundant logit confirms such an interpretation; those engaging in protest behaviours prove no more or less interested in politics than those who only express willingness, while both show significantly more interest than those who dismiss generic protest tactics. Willingness parallels performance regarding levels of political preoccupation. Further evidence for a positive influence of political consciousness on protest willingness stems from the finding that, net of all else, not knowing where to

generally locate oneself on the political spectrum decreases the odds of support relative to those on the left by 53% ($p<.01$). This form of political self-awareness distinguishes, as with organizational affiliation, willingness to protest from unwillingness, active use from willingness ($p<.001$), and, in a more pronounced way, performance from repudiation.

Despite these similarities, the findings reported in Table 3 point to considerable points of divergence between the social dynamics of protest willingness and protest action. While political enthusiasm and self-awareness distinguish willingness to use protest tactics and their use from unwillingness, the relevant split for that other component of political consciousness, political knowledge, lies between action and inaction. Levels of political news consumption and political discussion bear no statistical relevance to differences between the willing and unwilling, while high levels of consumption and conversation increase the odds that Canadians employ rather than simply express willingness to use the tools of protest by, respectively, 54% and 71% (both $p<.01$). These are, notably, the more active dimensions of political consciousness, requiring more specific instances of physical effort, for example, than a generalized level of interest. Similarly, the division between action and inaction is the more relevant one for political and religious values. People who consider themselves to be conservative or centrist and who believe religion is important in contemporary Canadian society are statistically indistinguishable in terms of willingness to protest from self-assessed lefties or people who think religion has lost its contemporary relevance. By contrast, the redundant logits for each of these variables achieve significance. Conservatives and moderates show, respectively, 63% ($p<.001$), and 57%($p<.01$) lower odds of action over

TABLE 3
Protest Willingness vs. Rejection

Independent Variable	Biographical Availability	Strategic Resources	Structural Availability
Ethnicity	-0.20	-0.29	-0.31
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Gender	0.16	0.21	0.21
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Gender X Minority	0.00	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Full-time	0.27	0.27	0.28
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Part-time	0.64*	0.63*	0.62*
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Self-Employed	0.21	0.17	0.17
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Retired	0.29	0.27	0.22
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Housewife	-0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Student	0.61	0.56	0.59
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Generation Y	1.09**	1.08**	0.99**
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Generation X	1.42***	1.40***	1.31***
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Late Boomer	1.32***	1.25***	1.17***
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Early Boomer	0.71*	0.63	0.57
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Silent Generation	0.58*	0.56*	0.55*
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Don't Know	-0.75*	-0.66**	-0.64**
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Right of Middle	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Middle	-0.20	-0.20	-0.18
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Marital Status	-0.07	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Kids	-0.23	-0.21	-0.21
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Religion Important	-0.31*	-0.31*	-0.29
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
God Important	-0.06	-0.07	-0.04
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Missing Income	-0.79***	-0.75***	-0.75**
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Low Income	-0.68***	-0.56**	-0.54**

Table 3 (Continued)

Independent Variable	Biographical Availability	Strategic Resources	Structural Availability
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Middle Income	-0.26	-0.21	-0.21
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Years of Education		0.03	0.03
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Politics Important		0.42**	0.44***
		(0.13)	(0.13)
Discusses Politics		-0.03	0.00
		(0.23)	(0.23)
Follows News		-0.08	-0.10
		(0.15)	(0.15)
Religious Attendance			-0.17
			(0.17)
Number of Affinitive Ties			0.11*
			(0.05)
Number of Participatory Ties			-0.14*
			(0.06)
Constant			-0.70
$x^2(64)$=609.89***; -2 log likelihood = 3397.95			(0.67)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (N =1869, WVS 4)

willingness relative to the left, while the margin of decrease reaches 41% (p<.001) for believers in the importance of religion compared to nonbelievers.

As mentioned above, Canadians who perform protest actions do not significantly differ from those who repudiate such tactics in terms of volunteerism, or unpaid organizational participation. The same cannot be said of Canadians who express protest willingness. As Table 3 reports, each additional organization in which respondents volunteer *reduces* the odds of expressing protest willingness relative to the unwilling by 13% (p<.05). Conversely, each additional organization in which respondents volunteer increases the odds of active protest participation over willingness by 20% (p<.05). This dimension of structural availability thus provides a rare instance in which the relevant group distinction lies between the willing and the rest. It calls into question both the relevance of organizational participation for protest and the depiction of protest

willingness as occupying conceptual middle-ground between action and apathy. Religious ceremony-going, as the final structural availability factor, fails to distinguish the willing from the unwilling. Active protestors show no significant differences in attendance patterns with the willing either, suggesting depressed religious participation serves mainly as a feature of active participants as compared to those who reject protest tactics. Finally, regarding substantive organizational contexts, the active and passive are significantly more likely to volunteer for a local political organization relative to those who reject protest. Active protestors, in particular, show significantly higher odds of union membership (as in the case of the dichotomous model) while those expressing protest willingness show significantly lower odds of performing unpaid work for a women's group (Appendix B).

The most divergent findings pertaining to protest willingness, however, involve socioeconomic resources and age. Educational attainment, widely treated as the most significant factor instigative of civic and political activism (Putnam 2001, Reed and Selbee 2006, Nie et al. 1996, Gidengil et al. 2004, Dalton 2006, Inglehart and Welzel 2005), fails to significantly distinguish the willing from the unwilling. That the robust relationship between education and citizen engagement fails to generalize to protest willingness is indicative of the qualitative distance between expressing interest in performing a political act and actually doing it. The performance of protest clearly demands levels of cognitive mobilization not required of formulating a positive attitude towards its hypothetical performance. Indeed, each additional year of education controlling for all other covariates increases the odds by 12% (p<.001) that Canadians

will move beyond support for or sympathy with the repertoire into actively availing themselves of its means (redundant model).

On the other hand, socioeconomic status is not entirely irrelevant to protest willingness. Rather, an income effect that disappears once controlling for education within models of active participation persists upon comparing the willing with the unwilling. Specifically, income level exerts a moderate positive effect on willingness to protest. Relative to high income-earners, the odds that low-income Canadians express willingness to protest are multiplied by a factor of .582, or decrease by 42% ($p<.01$). The sizable and likely more heterogeneous group who do not report their income also have lower odds of protest willingness ($p<.001$) compared to high-income earners, as do they of active participation ($p<.01$). Interesting, the redundant logit suggests a significant, if small, *negative* effect; relative to those willing to protest, the odds of active protest among those in lower income brackets increase by 51% compared to high-income earners ($p<.05$). Two important dimensions of socioeconomic status, that is to say, appear to work at cross purposes with one another, making passive support more likely than action on the one hand (income), and active participation more likely than passive support on the other (education). That being said, it remains clear that education demonstrates the far greater influence.

The effects of age prove somewhat surprising with respect to protest willingness. In terms of proactive participation, we observe that in both dichotomous and multinomial formulations, GenXers and Canadians over 65 exhibit the most reticence, while middle-aged to late-middle-aged cohorts show the highest likelihood (hedged by the fact that these latter cohorts have simply had more time and consequently more opportunities to

become involved). While late boomers (1956-1965) and Generation Y (1975-1985) remain towards the top of the age hierarchy of willingness and Canadians born before born before 1936 figure at the bottom, early boomers (1946-1955) and their forebears

FIGURE 7
The Odds of Protest Performance and Willingness by Cohort



(All odds $p<.05$, except the performance of 25-34 and willingness of 45-54)
(N =1869, WVS 2000)

(1936-45) essentially trade places with GenXers. Figure 7 graphically illustrates the reversal, reporting the odds that each cohort will express willingness to or actively protest relative to the pre-1936 group (who, as the base of comparison, represent the *x*-axis of 1, or equal odds). For example, while GenXers are statistically indistinguishable from the oldest cohort in terms of action, they constitute the most likely to express willingness to take action relative to this group; the odds of their doing so are in fact a prodigious 3.7 times higher ($p<.001$). On the other end, while the 1936-45 cohort were the most likely to take action relative to their immediate forebears, reflecting in part a sharp diffusion of

protest tactics during the civil rights era, membership in that cohort multiples the relative odds of protest willingness by 1.7 ($p<.05$). If we treat GenXers as the base of comparison, we actually observe a generational bifurcation, with the odds of willingness among all those born before 1956 significantly lower than those of the “slacker” generation and the odds of the remaining cohorts born later statistically indistinguishable.

We can interpret these disparate findings on age in one of three ways. First, the stark difference between protest action and willingness among GenXers could illustrate a large reserve of untapped protest potential that, after key barriers to participation were removed, could translate into a profusion of contentious political action unhinged from the political and cultural freight of the demographically dominant boomers. Second, it could also reflect a systematic bias in favor of passive or hypothetical action that systematically falls short of consummating a political act. Third, protest willingness may simply have very little to do with actual behaviour; it may comprise more of a critical attitude towards the general political or social state of things, reflecting the cynicism and lack of respect for authority figures and experts thought to be endemic in younger generations. The latter two interpretations appear most plausible, particularly in the context of supporting research. Previous work elucidates the sometimes fantastic unreliability of protest potential (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). In contrast to the conditions of unprecedented prosperity and security that characterized the formative years of their immediate predecessors, moreover, GenXers emerged into the public sphere saddled with high expectations and fraying social institutions. Their formative experiences were characterized by rising divorce rates, plummeting parent-child contact hours, economic recession, AIDS, an eroded public education system, and heaps of anti-

political rhetoric, or a profusion of social ills amidst a perceived degradation of public institutions (Keeter et al. 2006). These explanations also shed light on the disconnect between willingness and action among the 1936-45 cohort. Given that active and passive participation are measured as two, mutually exclusive options, and given their demonstrable predisposition for the former, a lack of passive support among 55 to 64 year-olds should not necessarily be viewed as disengagement but, perhaps, more the reflection of an attitude towards popular conceptions of protest.

Lastly, it is worth highlighting what the multinomial modeling did not say about biographical availability, given that expectations regarding its effects based on past findings (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006) provided part of the initial impetus to move beyond a dichotomous model. Specifically, the strong, negative net effects of marital status and its amplification among American women on protest willingness - consistent with the "second shift" perspective of gendered labor - do not show up in this Canadian sample (see Appendix B). Similarly, the strong, positive influence of student status on willingness Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) discover as compared to any form of participation in the labor market fails to find parallel in this analysis. These results do not definitively rule out the relevance of similar indirect effects of biographical availability for protest willingness in Canada, partly because of important differences in the way protest willingness is measured, but they provide fairly good evidence. Nevertheless, protest willingness as a passive component of participation provides insight into a more complex picture of Canadian protest, qualifying our knowledge on the effects of political consciousness, structural availability, and, especially, socioeconomic resources and age.

Standardized comparisons

While simultaneously modeling protest willingness and active participation allows for a deeper understanding into the content of the social dynamics of protest, the logits and odds-ratios alone are limited in what they can tell us about the *relative* influence of each covariate. Within variables entered as dummies, such as political values, income or age, we can compare across categories, but inter-variable comparison - between education and religiosity, for example - remains restricted by lack of a common metric. Although no simple standard deviation exists in logistic regression for the estimated logged odds – "a transformation which represents a dependent variable without bounds and an arbitrarily defined variance" (Pampel 2000: 32) – a couple of options for meaningful measurement present themselves[21]. Tables 4 through 6 report standardized coefficients using these two different methods for both the dichotomous and multinomial models of protest participation. These techniques are not perfect; what matters more than the specific values of the standardized coefficients are their rank order, which remains consistent between Long (1997) and Menard's (1995) methods.

Table 4 reports the relative ranking of factors in the dichotomous model comparing action and inaction. Years of education and number of organizational affiliations top the list of positive factors; one standard deviation increase in either of these two variables produces more of a positive change within protest participation than does a like increase in any other factor. After these dimensions, age ranks next in positive

[21] Long (1997), for example, recommends calculating the standard deviation of the dependent variable by square rooting the sum of the variance of the predicted logged odds and the arbitrarily defined variance of the error term for logistic regression term ($\pi^2/3$). Menard (1995) recommends another strategy. He suggests calculating the standard deviation of *y* by dividing the standard deviation of the predicted logits by the R^2 estimated by correlating the predicted probabilities with the dummy dependent.

TABLE 4
Dichotomous Model: Performance vs. Inaction

			Long		**Menard**	
	b	Sx	Sy	B	Sy	B
Years of Education	0.122	3.012	2.183	0.169	5.800	0.063
Organizational Affiliations	0.176	1.911	2.183	0.154	5.800	0.058
55-64	0.841	0.325	2.183	0.125	5.800	0.047
45-54	0.678	0.378	2.183	0.117	5.800	0.044
35-44	0.454	0.420	2.183	0.087	5.800	0.033
Follows News	0.380	0.474	2.183	0.082	5.800	0.031
Organizational Participation	0.113	1.575	2.183	0.082	5.800	0.031
15-24	0.493	0.329	2.183	0.074	5.800	0.028
Politics Important	0.311	0.491	2.183	0.070	5.800	0.026
Discusses Politics	0.455	0.324	2.183	0.068	5.800	0.025
Gender	0.184	0.500	2.183	0.042	5.800	0.016
Self-employed	0.289	0.225	2.183	0.030	5.800	0.011
Married	0.126	0.475	2.183	0.027	5.800	0.010
Middle Income	0.063	0.484	2.183	0.014	5.800	0.005
God Important	0.042	0.483	2.183	0.009	5.800	0.003
Part-time	0.053	0.291	2.183	0.007	5.800	0.003
Student	0.018	0.195	2.183	0.002	5.800	0.001
65-98	-0.054	0.368	2.183	-0.009	5.800	-0.003
Parent	-0.091	0.444	2.183	-0.018	5.800	-0.007
Unemployed	-0.281	0.244	2.183	-0.031	5.800	-0.012
High Income	-0.164	0.425	2.183	-0.032	5.800	-0.012
Retired	-0.251	0.400	2.183	-0.046	5.800	-0.017
Housewife	-0.422	0.264	2.183	-0.051	5.800	-0.019
Missing (Income)	-0.478	0.320	2.183	-0.070	5.800	-0.026
Religious Attendance	-0.449	0.432	2.183	-0.089	5.800	-0.033
Middle of Spectrum	-0.579	0.499	2.183	-0.132	5.800	-0.050
Religion Important	-0.643	0.489	2.183	-0.144	5.800	-0.054
Ethnic (Visible) Minority	-1.192	0.302	2.183	-0.165	5.800	-0.062
Right of Centre	-0.880	0.411	2.183	-0.166	5.800	-0.062
Don't Know (Spectrum)	-1.245	0.344	2.183	-0.196	5.800	-0.074

(N =1869, WVS 2000)

influence. The standardized coefficients illustrate a march away from late-middle age, with the baby boomers coming after their immediate predecessors (1935-1945) in relative likelihood of performing protest behaviours compared to GenXers. On the other hand, the most effective predictor of protest action appears to be a negative one, in an inability to

TABLE 5
Multinomial Model: Performance vs. Rejection

			Long		Menard	
	b	Sx	Sy	B	Sy	B
35-44	1.052	0.420	2.205	0.200	4.349	0.102
Organizational Affiliations	0.223	1.911	2.205	0.194	4.349	0.098
Years of Education	0.140	3.012	2.205	0.191	4.349	0.097
55-64	1.130	0.325	2.205	0.167	4.349	0.085
45-54	0.915	0.378	2.205	0.157	4.349	0.079
15-24	1.033	0.329	2.205	0.154	4.349	0.078
25-34	0.734	0.393	2.205	0.131	4.349	0.066
Politics Important	0.568	0.491	2.205	0.127	4.349	0.064
Retired	0.686	0.400	2.205	0.124	4.349	0.063
Gender	0.328	0.500	2.205	0.074	4.349	0.038
Self-employed	0.722	0.225	2.205	0.074	4.349	0.037
Following Politics in the News	0.334	0.474	2.205	0.072	4.349	0.036
Unemployed	0.646	0.244	2.205	0.072	4.349	0.036
Part-time	0.447	0.291	2.205	0.059	4.349	0.030
Organizational Participation	0.044	1.575	2.205	0.031	4.349	0.016
Housewife	0.179	0.264	2.205	0.021	4.349	0.011
Marital Status	0.096	0.475	2.205	0.021	4.349	0.010
Middle	0.078	0.484	2.205	0.017	4.349	0.009
God Important	0.056	0.483	2.205	0.012	4.349	0.006
Student	-0.084	0.195	2.205	-0.007	4.349	-0.004
Low	-0.129	0.446	2.205	-0.026	4.349	-0.013
Children	-0.192	0.444	2.205	-0.039	4.349	-0.020
Ethnic (Visible) Minority	-0.543	0.302	2.205	-0.074	4.349	-0.038
Discusses Politics	-0.532	0.324	2.205	-0.078	4.349	-0.040
Missing	-0.719	0.320	2.205	-0.104	4.349	-0.053
Religious Attendance	-0.540	0.432	2.205	-0.106	4.349	-0.054
Middle	-0.695	0.499	2.205	-0.157	4.349	-0.080
Right	-0.874	0.411	2.205	-0.163	4.349	-0.083
Religion Important	-0.815	0.489	2.205	-0.181	4.349	-0.092
Don't know	-1.634	0.344	2.205	-0.255	4.349	-0.129

(N =1869, WVS 2000)

place oneself on the political spectrum, or in the general ideological scheme of things. Lack of political self-awareness relative to lefties produces more of a negative shift in action than does a standard deviation decrease in any other variable. Showing as influential an impact on protest participation as education but in the opposite direction are conservatism and ethnicity. Occupying any other space but the left on the political

spectrum, in fact, significantly decreases the odds of protest relative to most other covariates in the model, including income, old-age, and unemployment. Maintaining a relatively high level of social religiosity, or belief that organized religion remains relevant in today's society, as well as frequently attending religious services, finally, also show comparably large negative effects. Displaying the smallest relative impact are student status (relative to full-time employees) and old-age (over 65 years old) (relative to GenXers).

Table 5 reports the standardized effects for the covariates entered in the multinomial comparison between action and rejection of the repertoire. A couple of notable changes occur in terms of relative influence in comparison with the dichotomous model. Although social religiosity, religious ceremony attendance, and political values still exert the strongest negative effects on participation, ethnicity moves up the list (towards 0, or null effect) out of the significant core of negative influences. Secondly, late baby boomers (1955-1965) move to the top of the age hierarchy, exerting the most influence relative to GenXers and a positive effect comparable to that of educational attainment and number of organizational affiliations. Identifiable between Table 4 and 5 are a primary cluster of variables most relevant to change within protest participation and a secondary cluster of factors that exert significant but less substantial effects:

Primary Cluster	***Secondary cluster***
Years of education	Political interest
Number of organizational affiliations	Political knowledge
Age	Ethnicity
Political values	Religious Attendance
Social religiosity	Gender

Together, these clusters express relative influence and can be thought of together as constituting a social dynamic underlying Canadian protest participation.

Table 6, finally, reports the standardized coefficients for the covariates entered in the multinomial comparison between protest willingness and rejection of the repertoire. Educational attainment plays a relatively irrelevant role, exerting less of a standardized effect than a wide variety of factors spanning the theoretical frameworks. The most substantial positive effect – which also appears to bear the most influence overall – lies in membership within Generation X (relative to the pre-1936 cohort). Along with membership with the immediately preceding and succeeding cohort, it produces more standardized change in the odds of being willing to engage in protest than any other factor. Producing lesser but nonetheless substantial positive change in willingness are political interest and number of organizational affiliations. On the other end, low income (relative to high), lack of political self-awareness or inability to locate oneself on the political spectrum, and number of participatory organizational engagements produce the largest negative effects on protest willingness. In short, the social dynamics of Canadian protest willingness look very different from those of active participation:

Primary Cluster	***Secondary cluster***
Age	Political interest
Income	Organizational Affiliations
	Organizational Participation
	Political self-awareness

Notably irrelevant relative to other covariates that relate to protest willingness are political knowledge, as captured by both frequency of conversations about politics and political news consumption, as well as political conservatism. More generally, it should

TABLE 6
Multinomial Model: Willingness vs. Rejection

			Long		**Menard**	
	b	Sx	Sy	B	Sy	B
25-34	1.307	0.393	1.942	0.264	7.088	0.072
35-44	1.165	0.420	1.942	0.252	7.088	0.069
15-24	0.994	0.329	1.942	0.169	7.088	0.046
Politics Important	0.441	0.491	1.942	0.112	7.088	0.031
Organizational Affiliations	0.113	1.911	1.942	0.111	7.088	0.031
45-54	0.566	0.378	1.942	0.110	7.088	0.030
55-64	0.548	0.325	1.942	0.092	7.088	0.025
Unemployed	0.595	0.244	1.942	0.075	7.088	0.020
Self-employed	0.616	0.225	1.942	0.072	7.088	0.020
Gender	0.208	0.500	1.942	0.053	7.088	0.015
Years of Education	0.030	3.012	1.942	0.047	7.088	0.013
Part-time	0.282	0.291	1.942	0.042	7.088	0.012
Retired	0.173	0.400	1.942	0.036	7.088	0.010
Housewife	0.223	0.264	1.942	0.030	7.088	0.008
Student	0.017	0.195	1.942	0.002	7.088	0.000
Discusses Politics	0.001	0.324	1.942	0.000	7.088	0.000
Right	-0.038	0.411	1.942	-0.008	7.088	-0.002
God Important	-0.036	0.483	1.942	-0.009	7.088	-0.002
Marital Status	-0.050	0.475	1.942	-0.012	7.088	-0.003
Following Politics in the News	-0.098	0.474	1.942	-0.024	7.088	-0.007
Religious Attendance	-0.167	0.432	1.942	-0.037	7.088	-0.010
Middle spectrum	-0.182	0.499	1.942	-0.047	7.088	-0.013
Ethnic (Visible) Minority	-0.305	0.302	1.942	-0.047	7.088	-0.013
Children	-0.209	0.444	1.942	-0.048	7.088	-0.013
Middle	-0.208	0.484	1.942	-0.052	7.088	-0.014
Religion Important	-0.287	0.489	1.942	-0.072	7.088	-0.020
Organizational Participation	-0.139	1.575	1.942	-0.113	7.088	-0.031
Don't know	-0.639	0.344	1.942	-0.113	7.088	-0.031
Missing	-0.753	0.320	1.942	-0.124	7.088	-0.034
Low	-0.541	0.446	1.942	-0.124	7.088	-0.034

(N =1869, WVS 2000)

be noted that less variables make up the clusters for willingness to protest. The parsimony likely reflects less the simplicity of the social phenomenon of passive support or sympathy for protest tactics than the fact that theoretical models built for protest participation better predict actual behaviour. Protest willingness is likely quite a

heterogeneous phenomenon, reflecting a range of attitudes and assumptions towards specific or popular representations of protest as much as actionable protest potential.

Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusions

The selection of variables in this analysis was informed by various theories of western protest participation – biographical availability, strategic resources, structural availability – and other relevant factors such as political orientation, religiosity, gender and ethnicity. Nonetheless, the clustering process wherein the content and relative depth of influences within the social dynamics of Canadian protest took shape was a predominately *empirical* process of adjudication based on estimating standardized effects. It thus begs the question: does the group of most important factors make better *substantive* sense as a cluster or as largely independent streams of influence?

Theoretical vs. Empirical Adjudication

The larger historical context in which elite-challenging civic actions such as political protest emerge suggests the primary socials determinants of Canadian protest participation comprise a substantively logical as well as empirical cluster. The massive expansion of the education system over the last half-century, for example, equipped more people than ever before with the cognitive skills conducive to autonomous decision-making. “Education,” Inglehart and Welzel observe, “makes people more intellectually independent because they no longer depend on other people’s interpretations of the

world" (2005: 28). As postindustrialization arguably dismantles centrally-controlled mass production systems built on highly disciplined labour forces, economic destandardization precipitates with rising intellectual autonomy and socioeconomic development a process of social liberation. In postindustrial societies, as Beck observes, social ties came to emphasize less the conformity pressures within tightly knit "communities of necessity" than "elective affinities," which prioritize freedom of choice over authoritative and dogmatic social codes (2002). This increase in freedom and emphasis on self-actualization may strain forms of social cohesion and solidarity that rely on a common identity and shared way of life to motivate other-regarding behaviours (Taylor 1985). But "a 'loosely coupled' system," observes Phillips, "has the advantage that each unit preserves its own identity and maintains its physical and logical separateness while being responsive to other nodes. Therefore, the network as a whole can retain a greater number of mutations and novel solutions than could be tolerated in a densely tied system" (1991: 768). That social movements thrive upon networks of elective bonds (Tarrow 1998: 133) reflects an expansion of political consciousness among well-educated citizens predisposed to challenge such codes and other issues through direct action. The secular bent of Canadian protest participation, for example, arguably reflects less a critique of spirituality and transcendental beliefs than an unwillingness to defer to other people's interpretations of the world, especially if such worldviews unjustly proscribe behaviours or orientations integral to people's identities. An emphasis on intellectual autonomy is the common denominator[22].

[22] One recent study on protest participation, for example, finds the secular liberalism of postmaterial value-priorities acting as a proxy for (i.e. diminishing the effect of) educational attainment (Benson and Rochon 2004).

If political consciousness, education, organizational affiliation, and secular liberalism make substantive as well as empirical sense as the primary determinants of Canadian protest participation, it is less clear whether comparable differences in empirical influence carry equal theoretical import. For example, while we can say that being 45 to 54 years-old in 2000 effects the same standard deviation change relative to elderly Canadians in the logged odds of protest as being in the middle of the political spectrum compared to the left (in opposing directions), does the effect of one standard deviation change in age have the same *qualitative* import as that of a like-sized effect in political values? I have argued, for another example, that the effect of each additional year of education is about the same as having dark coloured skin rather than light. Can we assume that their comparable effects equally *matter*?

Theoretically adjudicating the significance of similar empirical effects requires value standpoints (such as social equality or negative freedom), insight into changes in those effects over time, and attention to aggravating or extenuating circumstances. For some variables, the result is ambiguous, as is arguably the case for gender. The small disparity between men and women found here regarding active participation vs. rejection appears to be less problematic in equality terms in the context of an overall trend towards gender parity within voting, and interest and civic group participation (Gidengil et al. 2004). On the other hand, when considering representation of women's interests at the formal locus of political power in parliament, on which Canada ranks a dismal 47th in the world (Copps 2007), the small gender disparity within protest appears to tap a current of inequality larger than itself, suggesting it may contribute to a barrier to inclusive political discourse. The participatory gap between racial minorities and white Canadians less

disputably builds such a barrier. Members of visible minorities show substantially lower odds of protest action that persist after controlling for education and other critical pathways to engagement - despite all-time high education levels among immigrants whose proportion of the Canadian population continues to rise (Reitz and Banerjee 2007). This gap, moreover, resonates with other forms of political engagement and equally stark income and poverty divides (Tossutti and Wang 2006; Reitz and Banerjee 2007), pointing to a formidable challenge to inclusive governance. In the end, however, judging either racial inequalities or disparities of educational attainment to carry more moral weight in liberal-democracies may miss the larger point of their toxic synergy. Education largely accounts for the significant intersecting effects of gender and ethnicity, suggesting that foundational inequalities of human capital help structure and magnify further group-based inequalities – affirming the need to examine their effects in tandem.

One of the more surprising results of this analysis involves the substantial negative effects on protest participation of religiousness. This relationship, it must be understood, is probabilistic and fails to describe the reality of many cases. Nearly a quarter of irreligious Canadians (24%) or those who show low levels of social religiosity and infrequently attend religious ceremonies, do not engage in protest (as I define protest participation). Conversely, participants within some religious communities engage in social movement coalitions fighting free trade, poverty, environmental degradation, racism and gender inequality (Conway 2004). But that contemporary movements can effectively mobilize religious resources and meanings or draw on networks of religiously defined or affiliated organizations is another matter. My contention is that individuals displaying relatively low levels of religiousness (as measured by frequency of group

worship and level of social religiosity) account for a disproportionate amount of protest activity - whether or not that activity is framed within religious or transcendental terms or activates social ties based on religious affinity. Volunteers who not only marshal religious symbols and networks but who explicitly link their engagement with religious purpose tend to be conservative and in-group-oriented (Becker 2001). The same may generally apply to protestors. Phillips, for example, in a "network map" of the Canadian Women's movement, illustrates the interconnections among prominent national organizations striving to advance the status of women based on joint projects. Conspicuously estranged from a web of both explicitly feminist groups and more traditional women's organizations are R.E.A.L. Women and the Catholic Women's League (1991: 766). Connected to each other by their efforts in the pro-life movement, R.E.A.L. Women's socially conservative agenda dovetails that of Canada's Christian right, while the CWL "remains strongly embedded in the church and its field of action is primarily at the parish, rather than the national level" (1991: 765).

To further contextualize the secularism at the heart of Canadian protest participation, volunteerism[23] is modeled with the same sample of Canadians for comparative purposes[24]. Volunteerism within formal organizations, which in contrast to protest puts in many cases more emphasis on compliance to institutionalized authority (Deutsch and Welzel 2003), has been shown to positively relate to frequent religious-ceremony attendance, another relatively deferential form of social participation, and

[23] Volunteerism is coded as performing unpaid work for at least two different kinds of organizations from a 15-item battery including a social welfare group or service for the elderly, a religious organization , a cultural group, labor union, political party, local political organization, human rights group, environmental, conservation, or animal rights group, professional association, and youth-oriented group, sports club, women's group, peace movement organization, health-oriented group, or "other".

[24] The model for volunteerism is not identically specified as the models of protest because of the emphasis in the literature on Canadian volunteerism given to geographical context and value placed on service to others as well as irrelevance of political consciousness (Reed and Selbee 2002).

placing a high value on organized religion (Reed and Selbee 2002, 2000; Gidengil et al. 2004; Hall et al. 1998; Smidt 1999). The results reported in Table 7 suggest this is, indeed, the case for the same sample of Canadians for whom the opposite orientations significantly increase the odds of protest. Placing a relatively high degree of importance on religion increases the odds of volunteerism net of other relevant covariates by 60% (p<.01) and frequent religious ceremony-going (weekly or more) multiplies those odds by 3.1 (p<.001). Do these bipolar effects of religion reveal the existence of a Canadian culture war? Can we attribute our cultural conflicts to variations of clashes between a religious-conservative perspective and a more relativistic, secular one accommodative of liberal religious views, as has been argued to be the case in the United States (Hunter 1991)?

A couple of mitigating factors discredit such an interpretation. First, knowing whether Canadians are liberal or conservative or even, for that matter, politically conscious, provides no help in determining whether they engage in volunteerism. Second, and more importantly, it is typically the same kinds of Canadians performing acts of volunteerism and engaging in protest activism, specifically citizens enjoying relatively high levels of human and social capital. Volunteerism exerts a significant positive effect on protest participation (Table 1), while protest participation substantially multiplies the odds of volunteerism by 2.2 (p<.001) (Table 7). The far more relevant cleavage, therefore, divides those who engage in any kind of civic activism from those who do not (e.g. 44% of Canadians in 2000 participated in either protest and/or volunteer activities).

Nevertheless, that religion exerts such diametrically opposed effects on otherwise closely related modes of civic participation says something significant about the way it

TABLE 7
Volunteerism

Independent Variable	Sociodemography	Alternative Engagement	Geographical Context
Ethnicity	-0.37	-0.38	-0.38
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Gender	-0.14	-0.21	-0.22
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Generation Y	-0.25	-0.37	-0.41
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Later Boomer	0.49**	0.36*	0.35
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Early Boomer	0.55**	0.34	0.31
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Silent Generation	0.62**	0.37	0.32
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Dutiful Generation	0.46*	0.20	0.17
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Missing	0.18	0.19	0.16
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Middle Income	0.00	-0.05	-0.07
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
High Income	0.40*	0.38*	0.41*
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Education	0.18***	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Unemployed	-0.95**	-0.84*	-0.84*
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Religion Important	0.65***	0.46**	**0.47****
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
God Important	0.13	-0.22	-0.18
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Service to Others	0.42***	0.39**	0.41***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Religious Attendance		1.16***	**1.15*****
		(0.15)	(0.15)
Protest		0.77***	0.79***
		(0.13)	(0.13)
Quebec			0.19
			(0.16)
Atlantic			0.12
			(0.24)
Prairies			0.62***
			(0.16)
West			0.34
			(0.18)
Small urban			-0.07
			(0.18)

Table 7 (Continued)

Independent Variable	Sociodemography	Alternative Engagement	Geographical Context
Medium urban			-0.44*
			(0.20)
Large urban			-0.09
			(0.15)
Constant			-4.18
			(0.39)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
**p*<.05 ***p*<.01 ****p*<.001 (N =1876, WVS 4)

distinguishes the manner in which Canadian *activists* pursue civic engagement. These effects, crucially, are grounded in multiple dimensions of religiousness. Faith observance with others on a regular basis is in some ways a more reliable indicator of religiousness; whereas religious affiliation can denote something casual if not tenuous, active practice constitutes a “hard” measure denoting more developed commitment (Bibby 2004, Putnam 2001). Its significance, therefore, lends an important source of credibility to the claim that the fork on the road towards compliant and defiant civic engagement pertains, in fact, to religion. But the equally bipolar effects of outward religiosity suggests that the religious divide among Canada’s civic activists is more complex in that it extends beyond behaviour; drawing on beliefs and values as well as conduct, it implicates cognitive as well as social pathways. That communal worship and social religiosity exert substantial effects net of other relevant factors while religious affiliation (see Appendix B) and personal religiosity fail to achieve significance, moreover, further locates the differential effect in the *social* face of religion. Something about enacting faith in a community of like-minded people and attaching relevance to religion as an institution among other social institutions abates protest participation, whereas loose religious affinity and private theological reflection bear no discernible effect. The result lends support to the contention

that the deference and conformity inherent in the social context of many religious collectivities clashes with the organizational and cognitive needs and dispositions of typical protestors.

Summary and Conclusions

The principal conclusion of this thesis speaks to the complexity of the social dynamics of Canadian protest behaviour. No one, or even two, models can adequately account for the diversity of significant factors that shape participation. Of five sets of substantive covariates in biographical availability, strategic resources, and structural availability, political and religious values, and gender and ethnicity, only one fails to play any kind of important explanatory role.

Biographical or life-cycle constraints that allegedly render people uniquely available or unavailable given familial costs and benefits bear little on whether Canadians protest or not. Even in the multinomial model which accounts for protest willingness, or a pre-action stage of participation at which the effects of biographical availability on protest action are argued by some to exclusively and indirectly operate, marital and parental status fail to achieve significance. The age distribution, moreover, while shifting towards younger cohorts for protest willingness, fails to take on the curvilinear pattern hypothesized by the model. Part-time employment, on the other hand, does appear to play a small role in each of the key multinomial comparisons. But as the standardized observations reveal, its influence is, relatively speaking, quite minimal. Part of this overall result may amount to what Nepstad and Smith call “constraint management

skills," which can even mitigate more demanding forms of protest such as illegal strikes and occupations. "Just as the absence of constraints does not automatically lead to activism," they observe in their case study of American resistance to U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, "similarly the presence of life responsibilities does not automatically exclude individuals from participation in high-risk actions" (1999: 39). Much of the irrelevance of biographical availability, however, likely stems from the increasing innocuousness of many generic protest acts. As police forces incorporated negotiated management over time into a crowd control repertoire previously characterized by escalated force, the threat subsides of incarceration and violence, and by extension the compounded costs they pose to those with dependents.

By contrast, extent of education, number of affinitive ties, age, social religiosity, and political values, which, notably, crosscut the remaining theoretical explanations, exert substantial effects. They form a primary cluster within the social dynamics underlying Canadian protest that span sociostructural and attitudinal factors, sociodemography and values, social and human capital. Along with the secondary cluster of influential factors in political interest and knowledge, religious attendance, and ethnicity and gender, they cover qualitatively disparate territory. The social determinants of Canadian protest willingness cover a similarly diverse spread of variables ranging from demography (age), socioeconomics (income), political consciousness (interest and self-awareness) and social capital (organizational affiliation and participation). The main finding regarding protest willingness, however, lies with its marked divergence from the social dynamics of protest performance. Two principal interpretations present themselves for this result. First: protest willingness is not a civic participatory phenomenon, but

rather more like an attitude drawing on indirect experiences with, or popular representations of, protest, disconnected from actual behaviour. Second: protest willingness constitutes an important pre-participatory, if qualitatively unique phase, but one requiring significantly less cognitive resources, graying hairs, and secular-liberal identifications.

Both interpretations hold some water, and few formal methods of adjudication, unfortunately, present themselves. Indirect evidence from the results reported here, however, appears to emphasize the second explanation. The insignificant influences of education and secular-liberalism distance, to be sure, protest willingness from what are widely conceived of as primary stimulants of, respectively, citizen participation in general and elite-challenging forms of engagement in particular. But the demonstrable positive impact of political consciousness and organizational affiliation suggest that protest willingness still qualifies as a sociopolitical phenomenon. Furthermore, the relevant distinctions in the multinomial models for the vast majority of relevant covariates distinguish either the willing and unwilling from the active participants (e.g. political knowledge) or the passive and active participants from the rejectionists (e.g. political interest), or both (e.g. political self-awareness and number of organizational affiliations). These distributions are exactly what we would expect after theoretically locating willingness somewhere in between rejection and action, bearing some similarities with both. In fact, only in the case of income and organizational participation does the relevant split occur between the willing on the one hand and the rejectionists and active participants on the other (with Canadians who passively support protest tactics showing significantly lower odds of reporting low income and higher odds of

volunteerism). This added nuance highlights the virtue of multinomial modeling: without parsing active from passive participation, for example, I would have been limited to the finding that political interest and knowledge, respectively, marginally and moderately increase the odds of participation relative to the inactive. The refinement, moreover, extends well beyond political consciousness. A significant divergence among males and females reveals itself, for instance, only when we compare active participants to rejectionists.

The chief methodological challenge I faced in writing this thesis was how to adequately address the complexity of Canadian protest participation while aiming to identify "fundamental similarities in underlying processes" (Barnes et al. 1979: 17-18). Population surveys geared towards measuring such generalized social processes, as mentioned in Chapter 2, have typically missed the finer contextual variations among disparate and evolving protest environments. In order to truly capture both the idiomatic and the nomothetic, the particularistic and the generalizable in one project would require, I believe, the use of multiple methods. But just as reliance on qualitative approaches does not require insensitivity to generalities, reliance on quantitative methods does not necessitate ignorance of context.

I took several measures to address the weakness of statistical procedures in depicting contextual variation. Geographical variables covering regional and community size variation were analyzed (Appendix B), and to better tap the substantive organizational context an alternative measure of unpaid labor disaggregated by organizational type was used, revealing the significant positive influence on participation of labour union membership. To better account for the intersecting effect of variables

such as gender and ethnicity and potentially related factors such as marital status, interaction variables were employed, revealing a significant drop in active participation among women of minority of status that, as mentioned above, turned out to be largely explained by differences in educational attainment. Finally, moving from dichotomous modeling to a multinomial formation in which more subtle nuances between passive and active involvement and rejection of protest tactics were detectable further sensitized the analysis to the complexities of Canadian protest.

The major contributions of this thesis stem, in part, from the multinomial treatment of protest participation and the theoretically diverse range of covariates I was able to include in the analysis. The WVS offered recent data with which I was able to do several key things: test three theories salient within the American literature on protest involvement with a nationally representative Canadian sample; measure the effects of relevant values, gender, and ethnicity; and determine how the influence of all the explanatory variables vary across two different "layers" of participation in performance and protest willingness. Research on the social dynamics of Canadian protest participation is notably more limited than that on American and European involvement, and largely descriptive (e.g. Gidengil et al. 2004; for an exception see Nevitte 1996). The findings presented here, therefore, provide an important addition to the growing body of knowledge on differential recruitment in Canada. Through detailed multivariate analysis and standardized comparisons, I was able to highlight the particularly important roles played by human and social capital, while controlling for other relevant factors, in the form of educational attainment and organizational affiliations. I have also been able to

show the notably liberal character of Canadian protest and, which appears to distinguish it from the United States, its distinctly secular orientation.

Limitations and possibilities

The analysis is limited, however, in several respects. Data and sampling limitations, for one, prevent the inclusion of relevant factors or their comprehensive interrogation. The WVS lacks information on early life experiences of civic engagement and political socialization and sufficiently large sample sizes from ethnocultural subgroups of the Canadian population to adequately unpack the effects of ethnicity. This latter issue may be more problematic; while alternative data sets such as the GSS provide information on formative civic experiences, the same cannot be said of ethnicity[25], despite the increasing significance of the variable. A shift toward non-European sources of immigration after the 1960s dramatically increased Canada's ethnocultural diversity, with visible minorities constituting 10.2% of immigrants among those arriving during or before the 1960s, 51.8% for 1970s arrivals, 65.4% for 1980s arrivals, and almost 75% for 1990s arrivals. Consequently, visible minority groups have grown from comprising less than 1% of the population in 1971 to 13.4% in 2001, and are projected to constitute 20% by 2017 (Reitz and Banerjee 2007). As the civic and political beliefs and practices of these uniquely racialized groups weave further into larger debates over social cohesion and the viability of multiculturalism, knowledge of their critical citizenship behaviours will become increasingly relevant.

[25] Statistics Canada's 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey, for example, while providing sufficiently large subsamples of many of Canada's ethnic communities as well as indicators of social and civic participation, does not include measures of political protest.

A second limitation concerns the kinds of protest tactics under scrutiny here, specifically petitions, boycotts, legal demonstrations, wildcat strikes, and building occupations. While an arguably valid and comprehensive battery of generic acts of political protest, these indicators betray a bias towards visible public action and protest events[26]. This emphasis has been criticized on grounds that it excludes manifold forms of ideologically structured behaviours and less visible contentious actions (or inaction) in various venues (Zald 2000). Feminist scholarship, for instance, voices this critique, and may provide a useful qualification of my finding on gender. I report above that when we treat participation as active engagement as compared to rejecting the repertoire, Canadian women show a marginally lower likelihood of participation. An overidentification of protest with public protest events, however, may exclude "consciousness-raising, self-help, performative, cultural, and discursive forms of resistance oriented to cultural and social change" (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005: 39, 46). Staggenborg and Taylor argue, for example, that far from being "dead, gone, [or] kaput", as has been proclaimed, the women's movement has explored many unconventional acts of protest that have gone under the radar of many social scientists. They point to tactics "that transgress cultural norms of femininity and sexuality in order to undermine rigid gender and sexual categories and hierarchies" such as performance art (e.g. Eve Ensler's Vagina Monologues), self-produced subcultural media (e.g. punk music and magazines), and even "truth flashings" in which activists publicly expose their underwear emblazoned with political slogans (2005: 46). These unconventional tactics - to the extent they are

[26] Indeed, these protest items are presented to respondents in the WVS questionnaire as forms of "political action" (WVS 2006).

widespread - pose a potential corrective to the interpretation that men are more likely to actively engage than reject protest tactics, and warrant further study.

Another kind of limitation stems from the very nomothetic nature of the analysis. Focusing on the general social dynamics underlying protest participation necessitates a loss of insight into the particular subjectivities of protestors vis-à-vis other kinds of civic activists, not to mention vis-à-vis themselves as they engage in alternative modes of civic engagement, as they are demonstrably apt to do. One citizen can develop multiple identities that exist in tension with one another and a complicated social ethos that proves more helpful in some corners of the public square than others. Surprisingly few projects within the "civic engagement debate" (Fullinwider 1999) pay attention to such protean dimensions. How and to what extent do Canadian activists *selectively* marshal social and economic resources, interpretations of the world, and understandings of themselves? Do they systematically draw on some sources of capital and meaning over others as they, for example, defer to rather than defy institutional authorities? How large of a role do "sacred canopies" (Berger 2001) play relative to other meaning-making mechanisms in the choosing and learning of civic tactics? Are elastic or flexible worldviews as civically actionable as more rigid patterns of values and assumptions? These types of questions require access into qualitative dimensions of protest participation ill-captured by population surveys, at least in their present state. In-depth follow-up interviews present an important means by which we may not only gain more insight into the less quantifiable aspects of protest, but also guide the development of more sensitive tools for future nomothetic explorations.

Focused as it is on the standard repertoire of Canadian protest constituted as a generic, if potentially contentious toolkit, this analysis also lends limited insight into the social determinants shaping individual protest tactics. Future researchers may find it useful to disaggregate, for example, the effects influencing relatively tame acts of Canadian protest such as petition-signing from more demanding forms such as illegal strikes and building occupations. Although the full set of tactics aggregated here strongly interrelate (Barnes, Kaase, et al. 1979, Nevitte 1996, Norris 2002), it is not necessarily clear whether factors such as secular-liberalism or political consciousness operate in the same way for each mode - or in an at all similar way, for that matter, for the plethora of non-generic, if infrequently applied protest tactics such as corporate AGM ambushes or pushing cheese into ATMs. Finally, one of the most promising means of contextually-rich population-level research on protest and other forms of civic participation lies within hierarchical modeling (for an interesting application with WVS data see Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). In such techniques exists the potential to estimate the effects of individual, community, region, and country-level variables directly on individual civically relevant attitudes and behaviours.

Implications for democracy

As fruitful as further research may be that, for example, dissects the competing patterns of values guiding the actions of Canadian civic activists, we should continually reflect on that other, potentially more pressing cleavage between participants and the disengaged. The social dynamics underlying protest participation parallel in many

important respects the social determinants of other forms of public engagement. Popular representations may attribute charitable giving and volunteering solely to generosity and a caring personality and protest to criticality, but both demonstrably demand high socioeconomic status. Rather than providing disadvantaged or marginalized citizens a channel to publicly express their interests, protest appears to provide more depth in the repertoire of those already plying webs of diverse resources with which they can make their demands heard. What does this mean for Canadian democracy? After tracing these socioeconomic biases throughout not only Canadian protest and contributory behaviours but many activities in the formal political sphere such as party and interest group involvement and voting, Gidengil et al. quote Schattschneider in a sentiment appropriate here: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent" (2004: 167).

That the deep structural inequalities characteristic of Canadian society at large have crept into a repertoire once associated with revolutionary ferment and uprisings meant to topple prevailing political orders, confirms the dominance within the ranks of protestors of those with more of an interest in reforming systems from which they garner many benefits. It begs the question: if the same structural inequalities challenging the inclusiveness and responsiveness of Canadian democracy generalize to contemporary protest, is the generic repertoire still contentious? On one level protest seems to have retained its contentiousness in that it still has the ability to provoke elaborate and expensive reactions from police and other agents of social control, such as vividly was on display at Vancouver's 1997 APEC summit (Ericson and Doyle 1997). But consider more challenging criteria, such as that put forth by Sidney Tarrow: "Collective action becomes

contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities" (1998: 3). As contemporary activists passionately mobilize against free trade, global warming, and social injustice, protest may nevertheless have lost in this deeper sense of representativeness some of its former powers to disrupt. In well-connected hands with deeper pockets, in other words, the generic repertoire as currently constituted may more effectively reform rather than revolutionize or reimagine political orders.

On the other hand, the rise of the institutionalized, "normalized" protestor reflects a range of conditions auspicious to critical, if reform-oriented citizenship practices whose advancement may be more ambivalent. Welzel and Inglehart provide an important critique of the dominant civic narrative of disengagement and apathy, persuasively arguing that social capital may have less eroded than intergenerationally shifted from "externally imposed ties based on social control mechanisms to autonomously chosen ties" (2005:118). Their argument resonates with findings here, which show the youngest adult cohort in 2000 with significantly higher odds (64%, $p<.05$) of protest participation than their immediate forebears. Relinquishing traditional sources of authority and identity such as religion and lineage through the spread of democratic (and protest) politics, higher learning and economic security opens the door to higher levels of self-determination, impelling individuals to identify and develop an "authentic" self (Taylor 1996). To the extent that the spread of self-referential freedom deteriorates a communal sense of belonging, however, it may strain the capacity of citizens in postindustrial societies to cooperate with, and make sacrifices on behalf of one another. The

socioeconomic security that facilitates self-actualization takes place in the context of nation states, polities that require legitimate authority to try and effect justice. “We require authority to sustain decent, other-regarding liberty” (2003: 209), Elshtain reminds us, rendering democratic citizenship a delicate balancing act between defiance and civic loyalty, dissent and compliance, rather than the domination of one over the other (Galston 2001: 218). To the extent that protest and its social preconditions press the scale towards passionate criticality, dissent, and diagnosis, the repertoire may further fragment communal authority in a national community set to negotiate ever more ethnocultural and religious heterogeneity.

There is nothing to say, however, that the mobilization of increasingly self-aware, educated critics will necessarily jeopardize political legitimacy. These same civic activists, importantly, also show a propensity to work through civil society’s more compliant institutions. Though important, challenges posed by protest to social cohesion ought not overshadow the larger, if intensely ambivalent potential that an expansion and legitimation of protest represents among people with access to multiple forms of strategic resources and power. The normalization of protest and the flimsy, impersonal “networklike connective structures” through which they typically spread makes civic actors more self-responsible. Less beholden to what Charles Taylor would call publicly available orders of meaning or reference points (1996), grievances are in an important sense up for grabs. They await inscription in collective action frames which people are at more liberty than ever before to align to their peculiar interpretation of the world and the injustices in it. In short, we may do well to resist both the stark optimism of Inglehart and Welzel over the “emancipative” shift toward flexible and self-generated social ties and

blunt pessimism of Putnam over the loss of intimate bowling leagues and rigid fraternities. “It is in the nature of this kind of increase of freedom,” Taylor observes, “that people can sink lower as well as rise higher. Nothing will ever ensure a systematic and irreversible move to the heights” (1996: 77). If breaking the yoke of inherited social constraints does not necessarily produce either dystopia or social perfection, in an era of deepening complexity among tightly coupled ecological, migratory, and economic systems it raises the stakes of civic (dis)engagement.

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Cover Page Picture: Seattleites protest "latte tax," September 7, 2003. Source: www.usefulwork.com/shark/archives/001031.html, retrieved June 26, 2007.

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<u>Appendix A: Description of Variables</u>

<u>Dependent Variables</u>

1. *Dichotomous Protest Participation*: Coded 1 if respondents reporting having participated in at least 2 modes of protest from a five-item battery consisting of petition-signing, boycotting, legally demonstrating, illegally striking, and occupying buildings (29%, 0 cases missing).

2. *Multinomial Protest Participation*: Coded 2 if respondents have neither engaged in one of the five items of protest nor were they willing to do so (36.7%); coded 1 if respondents were willing to engage in two forms (34.3%, 0 cases missing).

3. *Volunteerism*: Coded 1 if performed unpaid work for at least two different kinds of organizations from a 15-item battery including a social welfare group or service for the elderly, a religious organization , a cultural group, labor union, political party, local political organization, human rights group, environmental, conservation, or animal rights group, professional association, and youth-oriented group, sports club, women's group, peace movement organization, health-oriented group, or "other" (26.4%, 0 missing).

<u>Independent Variables</u>

4. *Religious Attendance*: Coded 0 if weekly or more frequent (24.9%, 7 missing).

5. *Importance of God in Your Life*: Coded 0 if very important (37%, 13 missing).

6. *Importance of Religion*: Coded 0 if important or very important (60.5%, 5 missing).

7. *Importance of Politics*: Coded 0 if important or very important (40.7%, 6 missing).

8. *Political Discussion*: Coded 0 if frequent (11.9%, 7 missing).

9. *Political News Consumption*: Coded 0 if frequent (34%, 1 missing).

9. *Political Values*: Self-positioning on political scale coded as dummies: Don't Know (13.7%), Left (18.2%), Middle (46.5%), and Right (21.5%) (2 missing)

10. *Income*: Coded as dummies: Low <$27,500 (27.5%); Middle $27,501-$62,500 (37.4%); High >$62,501 (23.6%); Missing (11.5%)

11. *Marital Status*: Coded 0 if married or living together as married (65.5%, 2 missing).

12. *Parental Status*: Coded 0 if respondents have any children (73%, 5 missing).

13. *Race/Ethnicity*: Coded 0 if non-white (10.1%).

14. *Gender*: Coded 0 if male (49.3%).

15. *Education*: Coded at interval level with each category denoting years of education derived from descriptions of highest educational level attained (complete secondary, incomplete secondary, etc).

16. *Employment Status*: Coded as dummies: Student 4%, Fulltime 46.5%, Part-time 9.5%, Self-employed 5.5%, Retired 20.4%, Housewife 7.7%, Unemployed 6.5% (38 missing).

17. *Age*: Coded as dummies: 15-24 (12.4%), 25-34 (19.1%), 35-44 (22.9%), 45-54 (17.3%), 55-64 (12.1%), 65-98 (16.2%), (7 missing).

18. *Number of Organizational Affiliations*: Coded at interval level, sum of reported affiliations measured in a 15-item battery including a social welfare group or service for the elderly, a religious organization , a cultural group, labor union, political party, local political organization, human rights group, environmental, conservation, or animal rights group, professional association, and youth-oriented group, sports club, women's group, peace movement organization, health-oriented group, or "other".

19. *Number of Organizations Participating in*: Coded at interval level if sum of volunteer engagements (performance of unpaid labor) measured in a 15-item battery including a social welfare group or service for the elderly, a religious organization , a cultural group, labor union, political party, local political organization, human rights group, environmental, conservation, or animal rights group, professional association, and youth-oriented group, sports club, women's group, peace movement organization, health-oriented group, or "other".

20. *Service to Others*: Coded 1 if very important (42.3%, 9 missing).

21. *Region*: Coded as dummies: Atlantic (7.9%), Quebec (24.7%), Ontario (37.8%), Prairies (16.4%), West (13.4%).

22. *Community Size*: Coded as dummies: Rural, <10,000 (28.4%), Small Urban, 10,000-100,000 (16.5%), Medium Urban, 100,000-500,000 (13.1%), Large Urban, >500,000 (42%).

Appendix B: Regression Tables

TABLE 8
Unconstrained Dichotomous Model

	b	Std. Error
Ethnicity	-1.052**	0.370
Part time	0.024	0.218
Self-employed	0.331	0.247
Retired	-0.176	0.278
Housewife	-0.426	0.286
Student	0.023	0.339
Unemployed	-0.327	0.285
15-24	0.556*	0.233
35-44	0.516**	0.191
45-54	0.700***	0.206
55-64	0.870***	0.255
65+	-0.054	0.352
Middle (Political Spectrum	-0.624***	0.154
Right	-0.875***	0.179
Don't Know	-1.303***	0.252
Gender	-0.132	0.218
Marital Status	-0.089	0.194
GenderXEthnicity	0.684	0.455
Marital StatusXGender	0.430	0.260
Parental Status	-0.143	0.167
Religion Important	-0.587***	0.151
God Important	-0.031	0.153
Religious Affiliation	-0.092	0.156
Missing (Income)	-0.321	0.248
Middle	0.160	0.164
High	-0.052	0.196
Education	0.109***	0.026
Politics Important	0.347**	0.130
Discusses Politics	0.448*	0.180
Follows Politics in News	0.347*	0.139
Religions Attendance	-0.346	0.179
Organizational Affiliation	0.185***	0.040
Labour Union	1.220****	0.322
Political Parties	0.082	0.365
Local Political Group	0.161	0.276
Human Rights	0.943*	0.402
Environmental Group	0.391	0.281
Professional Association	0.127	0.247
Youth Work	0.021	0.217
Women's Group	0.064	0.306
Peace Movement	-0.871	0.653
Quebec	0.347*	0.164
Atlantic	0.263	0.242
Prairies	-0.109	0.177
West	0.089	0.198

Table 8 (Continued)

Small Urban	-0.260	0.192
Medium Urban	0.240	0.201
Large Urban	0.002	0.160
Constant	-2.355	0.447

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (N =1847, Missing 74, WVS 4)

TABLE 9

Unconstrained Multinomial Model

	Performance		Willingness	
	b	Std error	b	Std error
Intercept	-3.195***	0.792	-0.694	0.640
Education	0.137***	0.028	0.030	0.023
Organizational Affiliation	0.223***	0.052	0.112*	0.049
Organizational Participation	0.044	0.056	-0.138*	0.060
Ethnicity	-0.525	0.312	-0.293	0.278
Gender	0.508**	0.193	0.222	0.173
Marital Status	0.352	0.265	0.069	0.241
Parental Status	-0.227	0.276	-0.292	0.254
Marital StatusXGender	-0.473	0.335	-0.169	0.297
Parental StatusXGender	-0.052	0.355	0.124	0.319
GenderXEthnicity	0.751	0.484	-0.067	0.369
Full time	0.419	0.301	0.276	0.245
Part time	0.723*	0.357	0.617*	0.295
Self-employed	0.656	0.393	0.164	0.363
Retired	0.148	0.396	0.222	0.347
Housewife	-0.030	0.391	0.016	0.308
Student	0.635	0.468	0.587	0.396
15-24	1.055*	0.417	1.005**	0.369
24-34	0.753*	0.380	1.309***	0.336
35-44	1.074**	0.361	1.173***	0.324
45-54	0.935**	0.353	0.575	0.322
55-64	1.144***	0.299	0.553*	0.269
Don’t Know (Political Spectrum)	-1.634***	0.276	-0.640**	0.227
Right	-0.891***	0.219	-0.042	0.208
Middle	-0.700***	0.188	-0.184	0.184
Religion important	-0.816***	0.166	-0.288	0.148
God important	0.052	0.169	-0.036	0.145
Missing (Income)	-0.720**	0.267	-0.759***	0.228
Low	-0.150	0.224	-0.551**	0.201
Middle	0.073	0.186	-0.211	0.172
Politics Important	0.582***	0.148	0.441***	0.133
Discusses Politics	0.541*	0.225	-0.001	0.231
Follows Politics in news	0.334*	0.160	-0.096	0.148
Religious Attendance	-0.532**	0.195	-0.167	0.166

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (N =1869, WVS 4)

TABLE 10

Redundant Multinomial Model: Performance vs. Willingness

	b	Std error
Intercept	-2.740***	0.769
Education	0.110***	0.028
Organizational Affiliation	0.110*	0.048
Organizational Participation	0.182*	0.057
Ethnicity	-0.238	0.296
Gender	0.121	0.148
Marital Status	0.145	0.163
Parental Status	0.017	0.177
GenderXEthnicity	0.830	0.470
Full time	0.165	0.302
Part time	0.106	0.346
Self-employed	0.513	0.390
Retired	-0.044	0.412
Housewife	-0.101	0.397
Student	0.051	0.429
15-24	0.039	0.420
24-34	-0.574	0.391
35-44	-0.113	0.376
45-54	0.349	0.374
55-64	0.582	0.320
Don't Know (Political Spectrum)	-0.995***	0.270
Right	-0.836***	0.194
Middle	-0.513**	0.169
Religion important	-0.528***	0.155
God important	0.093	0.167
Missing (Income)	0.034	0.264
Low	0.413*	0.209
Middle	0.286	0.163
Politics Important	0.127	0.138
Discusses Politics	0.534**	0.202
Follows Politics in news	0.433**	0.152
Religious Attendance	-0.373	0.196

**p*<.05 ***p*<.01 ****p*<.001 (N =1869, WVS 4)