“If It’s Not Terrorism, It’s Not Relevant”: Evaluating NATO’s Potential to Contribute To the Campaign Against Terrorism

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November 2003
Abstract:
In response to the increasing threat posed by transnational terrorism NATO is expanding its role in the realm of counterterrorism. Is NATO’s emerging role in this area desirable, or is it merely the outcome of an institutional incentive to ensure the organizations survival? In order to answer this question the following is an assessment of the ability of NATO to contribute to the international campaign against terrorism. The first section sets the groundwork for the overall assessment of NATO’s potential through a brief examination of the literature on the subject of counterterrorism. Overall the literature on the subject stresses the need for international cooperation and a holistic and multidimensional approach to the campaign against terrorism. These two factors present the opportunity for a significant NATO role in the campaign. The second section outlines a number of contributions NATO could make in the campaign against terrorism. These contributions are divided into four main realms, diplomacy, military operations, intelligence-sharing, and defence cooperation. The third section of the paper outlines the two principal challenges facing NATO if it continues to develop a role in counterterrorism, a trend that by all appearances seems destined to continue. The conclusion summarizes briefly and presents a set of specific policy recommendations aimed at adapting the alliance for a counterterrorism role. The paper closes with a few comments on the prospects for a significant NATO role in the campaign against terrorism.
Introduction

Lord Robertson has stated that “9/11 transformed terrorism from a domestic security concern into a truly international security challenge.”¹ In response to this new global security challenge, that of transnational terrorism, NATO is expanding its role in the realm of counterterrorism. While terrorism was a component of NATO’s enlarged post-Cold War security agenda, it is now front and center on the current agenda and is emerging as the principal focus of the alliance. The Secretary-General of the Alliance, Lord Robertson, summarized the emergence of counterterrorism as the primary role of the alliance since Sept. 11 stating that “Defence against terrorism was already one of the new tasks highlighted by our 1999 Strategic Concept. Now it’s front and center – a main focus of our activities.”² In the same speech, Robertson also commented that the alliance “is moving forward with a sense of urgency to retool the Alliance to tackle terrorism” clearly signaling the intent to move forward with an alliance role in counterterrorism.³

In the aftermath of September 11 the emerging dominance of NATO’s counterterrorism role in determining the alliance’s policy agenda can be clearly seen. In response to the September 11 attacks the alliance invoked article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in the alliance’s history – stating that an attack on one member was to be considered an attack on all;⁴ fourteen of 19 NATO allies sent contingents to Afghanistan; NATO has undertaken overall command of the ISAF peace support operation in Afghanistan – its first “out of area” deployment; the alliance has developed both a Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism and a military concept for defence against terrorism for which a concept of operations is being developed to put the concept into effect; and alliance members committed themselves to developing the types of military capabilities that will allow them to take military action against terrorism through the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the developing NATO Response Force.⁵ Indeed, the Prague Summit, held in November 2002, was initially scheduled to focus upon the issue of enlargement. After 9/11 the focus of the summit was changed to the issue of Alliance transformation – reflecting the need for the alliance to adapt and respond to changes in the international
security environment, in particular, to respond to the heightened terrorist threat reflected by the 9/11 attacks.\textsuperscript{6}

In many ways that the NATO agenda has been altered by the events of 9/11 is not surprising. Given that 9/11 altered the environment in which NATO operates, if the alliance did not adapt, especially in terms of its organization, roles and missions, to meet the demands of the new environment it would risk becoming irrelevant as an actor within that environment. This argument has been asserted by a number of commentators including Richard Lugar who states: “If NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming effective in the new war against terrorism, then our political leaders will be inclined for something else that will answer the need.”\textsuperscript{7} Gordon also reveals this line of thought, arguing that “while the anti-terrorism campaign changes NATO’s character and carries many risks, it also demonstrates NATO’s continued utility and provides an opportunity to renovate and give new life to an alliance whose future was uncertain.”\textsuperscript{8}

While not all would agree with Gordon’s assertion that NATO’s future was uncertain, the comment raises an important point. NATO itself has a clear institutional incentive to adapt and take on a counterterrorism role in order to ensure its own survival as an international security organization. Thus, the question that must be asked is whether NATO, an alliance which developed during the cold war as a response to a state-based military threat in the form of the Soviet Union, is suited to this new counterterrorism role and whether the alliance can make a significant and lasting contribution to the campaign against terrorism. Is a NATO role in counterterrorism desirable and clearly beneficial or is this merely a quest by the organization to maintain its relevance in a changed security environment – a reflection of the mindset or the reality that “if it’s not terrorism it’s not relevant”?\textsuperscript{9}

In order to answer this question this paper presents an assessment of the ability of NATO to contribute to the international campaign against terrorism. The first section sets the groundwork for the overall assessment of NATO’s potential through a brief examination of the literature on the subject of counterterrorism. Overall the literature on the subject stresses the need for international cooperation and a holistic and multidimensional approach to the campaign against terrorism. These two factors present the
opportunity for a significant NATO role in the campaign. The second section outlines a number of contributions NATO could make in the campaign against terrorism. These contributions are divided into four main realms, diplomacy, military operations, intelligence-sharing, and defence cooperation. The third section of the paper outlines the two principal challenges facing NATO if it continues to develop a role in counterterrorism, a trend that by all appearances seems destined to continue. The conclusion summarizes briefly and presents a set of specific policy recommendations aimed at adapting the alliance for a counterterrorism role. The paper closes with a few comments on the prospects for a significant NATO role in the campaign against terrorism.

The Counterterrorism Literature: Cooperation, Intelligence and a Multidisciplinary Approach

Throughout the literature on counterterrorism there are three main themes relevant to a possible NATO role in the campaign against terrorism. The literature stresses that the counterterrorism response must be holistic and multidimensional in its approach combining military, diplomatic, economic and financial means to counter the terrorist threat; that intelligence-sharing is the essential foundation of all counterterrorism efforts; and that international cooperation is an essential component of the response to transnational and globalized threats. Each of these interrelated elements is discussed in turn to highlight possible roles for NATO in the conduct of the campaign against terrorism.

The Necessity of a Multidisciplinary Approach

Terrorism has always been a complex phenomenon; yet in the recent years with the development of religiously motivated terrorist groups and the confluence of various trends it has become increasingly complex.\textsuperscript{10} This complexity of terrorism itself is matched by the complexity of the counterterrorism response required to manage it; a complex and multidimensional response combining a diverse spectrum of measures from the military, diplomatic and economic realms is required to manage the complex terrorism problem. It is argued that the counterterrorism response should include a variety of mechanisms ranging from diplomacy, criminal law, financial controls, military force, intelligence and covert action, to economic development and foreign aid.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, since September 11 many have argued that the confluence of failed states and terrorism is a major security threat necessitating large-scale interventions
into such “complex emergencies” as a counterterrorism response dealing with a root cause of the terrorist threat. If that is the case then peace support operations aimed at stabilizing a country or a region can be considered an element of the counterterrorism response. Indeed, preventing the resurgence of an environment conducive to terrorist operations is one of the major justifications for the current peace support operation in Afghanistan.

Paul R. Pillar compares counterterrorism to other policymaking problems. He states that “no single approach makes an effective counterterrorist policy. The policy must have several elements. In that respect, counterterrorism is similar to other policy problems, including other ones that involve the physical well-being of the public.” As a means of organizing the complexity of counterterrorism policymaking Pillar proposes that there are four major fronts on which counterterrorism policies can be enacted, thus dividing measures into categories dealing with the root causes of terrorism; measures affecting the ability of terrorist groups to conduct attacks; measures to affect the intentions of terrorist groups and their willingness to carry out attacks; and measures that are defenses against terrorist attacks. Pillar suggests that each of these categories “corresponds to a phase in the life cycle of terrorism, from simmering discontent to the conduct of an actual terrorist operation.” He stresses that “important and useful work can be done on each front” but that “efforts on any one front are insufficient to manage the problem and are necessarily limited by competing objectives and equities.” Thus, effective counterterrorism requires measures in all four categories but also a coordinated approach that ensures the various measures work in concert or at least not against one another. This reinforces the need for international cooperation, the next element of counterterrorism to be discussed.

**International Cooperation: An essential element of success**

There is perhaps no greater consensus surrounding the possible responses to terrorism than on the subject of international cooperation. Indeed it is difficult to find a contemporary piece on the subject that does not in some way comment on the need for international cooperation. This focus upon international cooperation is a direct impact of the development of the “new terrorism”; groups, more often than not having a religious motivation, able to operate transnationally and more willing than traditional terrorists
to conduct mass-casualty attacks. Bruce Hoffman, analyzing the trends in terrorism resulting from the development of religiously motivated terrorism, argued that,

Terrorism today has arguably become more complex, amorphous and transnational. The distinction between domestic and international terrorism is also evaporating… Accordingly, as these threats are both domestic and international, the response must therefore be both national as well as multinational in construct and dimensions.

However, Hoffman also stresses that sound national measures are an essential prerequisite to countering the terrorist threat. He argues that “national cohesiveness and organizational preparation will necessarily remain the essential foundation for any hope of building the effective multinational approach appropriate to these new threats. Without internal (national or domestic) consistency, clarity, planning and organization, it will be impossible for similarly diffuse multinational efforts to succeed.” Thus international cooperation is an adjunct to sound national policy. This realization points to a main area of for international cooperation in the realm of counterterrorism – technical assistance to assist less developed countries develop the capacities required to counter the terrorist threat. If a strong national response is required, assisting states in this endeavor by assisting planning, training, and the general development of national counterterrorist capacities could make a significant contribution to international terrorist efforts. This argument is reinforced by the realization that most often it is national forces operating within their national territory that are the most appropriate instrument to take action against terrorists operating there. The United States has taken measures to improve the counterterrorism capacities of other states, including the Philippines and Georgia. The need for joint planning, capability development, and training, has also been noted in the area of consequence management and especially in the response to terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

Paul Wilkinson suggests that increased concern related to the transnationalization of terrorism, largely due to the development of religiously motivated terrorism and the intersection of terrorism and transnational organized crime has led to increased concern amongst governments and other organizations. He notes that these concerns led to “the growing realization that terrorism can only be combated effectively through greatly enhanced international cooperation: sound national measures against terrorism
are of course essential, but by themselves they are not going to be adequate to deal with an increasingly transnational phenomenon.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, Like Hoffman, Wilkinson suggests international cooperation is required in addition to sound national counterterrorism responses. This sentiment is echoed by analysts at the RAND corporation who argue that “just as terrorism is becoming an overtly transnational problem, the international dimension of counterterrorism policy is acquiring greater importance, both in terms of counterterrorism efforts and comparative lessons to be learned.”\textsuperscript{24} This statement implies that lessons can be learned from differing national experiences in counterterrorism and shared through the mechanism of international cooperation. Thus, the distribution of “best-practices” in the realm of counterterrorism becomes a possible element of international counterterrorism cooperation.

The need for international cooperation is also clearly stressed within the framework of the current campaign against terrorism. In the most comprehensive outline of the American strategic challenge in the campaign against terrorism, a CSIS publication titled, \textit{To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism}.\textsuperscript{25} The authors stress that international cooperation is an essential element of the campaign noting that “most of the important and enduring elements of the campaign against terrorism will involve the United States acting with other states, rather than acting alone” and that “effective measures from law enforcement and intelligence collection to the prosecution of the military campaign all require international cooperation; \textit{indeed, without it, US efforts will fail}.”\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, arguments surrounding America’s need for allies in the war on terrorism and the need for a large coalition are continually stressed.\textsuperscript{27} Barry Posen has even linked the U.S. need for allies in the campaign against terrorism with the critical role of intelligence in the campaign, arguing that “the critical importance of intelligence is one of the main reasons why the United States needs the support of U.S. allies.”\textsuperscript{28} Thus, the need for international cooperation and the primary importance of intelligence in the campaign against terrorism, the subject of the next section, are interrelated and reinforcing.

\textbf{Intelligence: The “Long-Pole in the Tent”}

Intelligence is perhaps the most essential element in the campaign against terrorism: “Nearly all of the threatened or their experts agree that the key to an effective response to terrorism is good intelligence and
that such intelligence is difficult to acquire.” Posen states that “enhanced intelligence capabilities are necessary for both defense and offense. Students of terrorism and its close cousin insurgency, invariably stress the critical importance of intelligence.” Wilkinson also stresses the critical need for intelligence when he notes that “high-quality intelligence is at the heart of the proactive counter-terrorism strategy.”

Intelligence has also been described more recently within the framework of the current campaign against terrorism as the “long-pole in the tent” - “an indispensable element of the campaign on which the successes of all others will depend.” Clearly intelligence is seen as the key to an effective counterterrorism response.

Intelligence or rather intelligence sharing is seen as a key enabler of international responses to terrorism: “Just as the lack of intelligence sharing between uniformed and non-uniformed security agencies often damages national terrorism responses, so international mistrust and reluctance to share information often vitiates an effective international response.” So if international coordination is required to counter the terrorist threat, the need for intelligence sharing moves to the top of the list of priorities for the international response. Indeed, within a US context it is suggested that “if intelligence is the long pole in the combating terrorism tent, enhanced cooperative relationships with foreign intelligence agencies are the ground lines that will enable it to stand.”

It is clear from the foregoing discussion of the nature of counterterrorism and the contemporary campaign against terrorism that the campaign must be multidimensional, and multinational with a strong focus upon international cooperation. One other element that is often stressed by terrorism experts is that the campaign against terrorism necessitates a long-term vision. It cannot be won in the short-term and necessitates a long-term focus and commitment in order to achieve success. It is also suggested that the long-term focus of the campaign is a challenge in itself: “Such a global threat demands a global response, and the long-term multifaceted campaign against terrorism will require constant coalition-building and maintenance.” Sustaining international cooperation against terrorism may be one of the most difficult tasks facing the leaders of the global coalition against terrorism as the “politics of the last outrage” fade
and other policy priorities emerge to take precedence over the counterterrorism campaign.\textsuperscript{39} Now that the nature of the campaign has been outlined, the possible contributions of the alliance can be presented.

**NATO Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism: A Key Player**

The nature of the campaign against terrorism itself facilitates a strong NATO role in that it puts a priority upon international cooperation in the realm of defence and security. If “organization, cooperation and coordination” are the keys to successfully dealing with terrorism NATO can provide all three.\textsuperscript{40} There are four main realms where NATO can make a significant contribution to the campaign: diplomacy, military, intelligence-sharing and defence cooperation, which suggests that NATO can make a significant contribution to a multi-dimensional campaign.

**The Diplomatic Realm: A Forum for Discussion and Action**

Strobe Talbot suggests that NATO’s “military and political functions have always been intertwined” and argues that “at its inception, NATO was about more than just banding together against a common enemy; it was also about creating, consolidating and expanding a zone of safety within which common values and cooperative institutions could prosper.”\textsuperscript{41} This fact opens room for a significant diplomatic role for NATO in fostering support for the campaign on terror which underpins the critical element of international cooperation - “NATO can contribute in a number of different ways. Its comparative advantage is centered on its military clout, but it is certainly not limited to it.”\textsuperscript{42} If maintaining coalition support and solidarity is a key element of the campaign against terrorism, then surely one role NATO can play is as a forum for the mobilization of such support and solidarity, especially noting the strong, shared values that unite the members of the alliance.

The role NATO can play in this area is highlighted by the invocation of article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Gordon suggests that the “political solidarity” evoked by the NATO response to the attacks was highly significant even if the NATO allies were not very active in the military campaign in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{43} Indeed NATO possesses assets beyond the North Atlantic Council in this diplomatic role. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership council is perhaps the just as important a forum as the NAC in that it includes a wider set of states including some, such as those in
Central Asia, that are key to the war on terrorism. Indeed on September 12 the members of the “Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council” condemned the terrorist attacks on the US and “pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism.” The members of the EAPC have also signed a “Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism” which includes a variety of measures including commitments to sign the relevant UN conventions related to the campaign against terrorism, commitments to find ways of improving intelligence sharing and generally improve international cooperation in the campaign against terrorism. NATO also possesses key assets in the form of the Mediterranean Dialogue, an initiative developed in 1994 as a means of improving cooperation and political dialogue with countries in the Mediterranean region, and the NATO-Russia Council which was launched in May 2002.

The importance of political solidarity in the campaign against terrorism is not just for its own sake; it underpins successful action in the military sphere. Discussing potential roles for the military in combating terrorism Lord Robertson has suggested that all potential roles have one thing in common: they require political support; “a broad base of support, political as well as practical.” He cites the experience of Afghanistan as an example: “The recent operations against Al-Quaida would not have been possible without the political and logistical support offered by a unique coalition – a coalition including Russia, many Central Asian countries, Pakistan and in the Gulf Region.” Thus, NATO contributions in the diplomatic realm facilitating international cooperation are interrelated with contributions in the military realm of the war on terror, the next subject to be discussed.

The Military Dimension: NATO Operations or NATO Toolbox?

There are two primary roles NATO can play in terms of making a military contribution to the campaign against terrorism: NATO can take military action directly, conducting operations under the command and control of NATO itself, in the manner of the Kosovo campaign of 1999, or it can facilitate operations of “coalitions of the willing” by acting as a toolbox from which interoperable forces can be drawn in order to conduct military operations. There are also two types of military operations in which NATO military forces may make a contribution to the campaign against terrorism: the first is by conducting combat operations against terrorist groups or their supporters directly; the second is a military operation in the
form of a peace support operation designed to ensure stability, either national or regional, in an area of terrorist activity.

The recent campaign in Afghanistan contains examples of both types of operation. The American campaign, “Operation Enduring Freedom,” is an example of the former type of operation, which includes direct, high-intensity, combat operations against terrorist forces and their supporters directly. The multinational deployment of the International Security Assistance Force located in Kabul, mandated to support the stability of the Afghan Interim Authority, is an example of a peace support operation (PSO) within a counterterrorism framework. Based upon this analysis it is possible to categorize the possible NATO military contributions to the campaign against terrorism in a two by two matrix showing four possible types of military operations. Accordingly the American “Operation Enduring Freedom” can be categorized as a combat operation in a coalition of the willing operation facilitated by NATO, whereas the ISAF deployment is a PSO deployed under NATO command.

While NATO has not yet conducted direct combat operations in a counterterrorism role within an operation under NATO command, NATO does seem to be putting the requisite pieces in place showing some potential to do so. NATO has developed a military concept for defence against terrorism and is currently developing an operational concept of operations to put it into effect. Critically the military concept against terrorism underlines the Alliance’s readiness to act against terrorist attacks or the threat of such attacks and to deploy forces “as and where required to carry out such missions.” As well NATO is developing the NATO Response Force (NRF), an elite force designed as a highly flexible, rapidly deployable, technologically advanced, elite force. This force is to be initially operationally capable by October 2004 ability by October 2006 and is reported to be well-suited to a counterterrorism role. If this is the case, NATO may have a sound option on the table for direct counterterrorism combat operations by 2006. Until then, one should not underestimate the significance of NATO’s role in conducting PSOs. Indeed, this is most likely the area where the United States needs more assistance, and an area of considerable NATO expertise where NATO can make a significant contribution to the campaign against terrorism.
The Intelligence Dimension: Share and Share Alike

The third major area where NATO can make a contribution to the campaign against terrorism is through participating in intelligence sharing – perhaps the single most important element of the campaign. The alliance has a long-standing intelligence sharing relationship among its members, particularly with the United States. Indeed, NATO’s ability to contribute in this area is reflected in the US request of 4 October 2001 for assistance from the allies in a number of areas. Significantly, increasing intelligence sharing was near the top of the list.

Nor is the potential for the alliance to contribute in this area limited to the allies only. The Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, which was agreed upon by all members of the EAPC (the 19 NATO allies and the 27 Partner countries), includes provisions to improve intelligence sharing arrangements. Paragraph 16.1.2 specifies that “EAPC States will intensify their efforts to share information and views related to terrorism.” The alliance has also created an EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit to promote exchange of intelligence relevant to terrorist threats. It is suggested that the unit should enhance information sharing. Both the Mediterranean Dialogue and the NATO-Russia Council are also being leveraged as mechanisms to contribute to the sharing of intelligence regarding terrorist threats.

However, limitations and constraints upon NATO’s ability to contribute to intelligence-sharing exist – as Pillar notes, “even with an alliance such as NATO, constraints on sharing sensitive intelligence increase along with the numbers of participating countries.” Perhaps the greatest challenge facing NATO is that of the prevailing institutional culture of the alliance regarding intelligence. Michael Herman describes the post-war alliance doctrine as regarding intelligence as “essentially a national matter” and suggests that this remains the case in the post-cold war period today. If this is indeed the case, making the shift to where intelligence and intelligence-sharing is recognized as a main focus of the alliance may be the most significant contribution of the alliance to the campaign against terrorism.

Defence Cooperation: Enhanced Capacity through International Cooperation

NATO has a longstanding history of defence and security cooperation. If a cohesive and capable national response is key to countering the terrorist threat, as both Hoffman and Wilkinson suggest, NATO
can play a key role by facilitating and assisting the development of counterterrorism capacities in both its member states and in its partner countries. Enhancing partner capabilities is extremely important as these countries often do not have the expertise or the resources required to develop such capacities.66 The potential for NATO action in this area is noted in the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, which is being leveraged as a mechanism to guide such practical cooperation. The plan states that:

EAPC States co-operate across a spectrum of areas in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace that have relevance to the fight against terrorism. These include inter alia political consultations; operations; issues of military interoperability; defence and force planning and defence reform; consequence management, including civil emergency planning; air defence and airspace management; armaments cooperation; border control and security; suppression of financing of terrorism; prevention of arms and explosives smuggling; science; and arms control and non-proliferation.67

The plan outlines cooperation on two broad fronts: developing capacities to combat terrorism directly; and developing capacities required to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks especially those utilizing weapons of mass destruction. It has also been suggested that the plan may also serve as an instrument for the dissemination and distribution of lessons learned in counterterrorism. Yavuzalp states that through the plan “Allies and Partners which have developed particularly effective mechanisms for addressing this problem over the years, may provide mentoring programmes to countries seeking to improve there own anti-terrorist capabilities.”68 To this end the plan calls for: defence and security sector reform to aid the development of “properly structured and well-equipped forces able to contribute to combating terrorism”; force planning to that effect; information exchange about counterterrorism forces; joint inter-allied and inter-partner exercises related to combating terrorism to improve capabilities and to share experiences; and the development of enhanced capabilities to contribute to consequence management through joint exercises and the sharing of information and experience in this area.69

Interestingly the plan also calls for the consideration of the establishment of a PfP Trust Fund to “assist individual member states in specific efforts against terrorism” noting that the fund may be particularly relevant to Partners from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans and “will be implemented as a matter of priority.”70 This suggests the alliance collectively understands the important contribution that can be made in this area.
Challenges Facing the Alliance: The Double Gap Dilemma

There are two primary challenges facing the alliance that may inhibit the development of a significant alliance role in the campaign against terrorism: the capabilities gap; and what can be termed the threat/response gap. The capabilities gap is best defined as “the aggregate of multiple gaps relating to the organization and conduct of large-scale expeditionary operations” between European and American military forces. The gaps can be related to either technology, or in investment and procurement; they combine to add up to US superiority, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, especially regarding expeditionary operations, the type required to conduct most anti-terrorist type operations. The threat/response gap is a less tangible concept than the capabilities gap; the term refers to the gap between the United States and its European allies in terms of the perception of the terrorist threat in terms of both the severity and level of threat accorded to it and the counterterrorism responses required in its management. The United States tends to favour technical responses to the problem, especially military measures, whereas the Europeans tend to stress the relevance of a “root causes approach” to the problem.

The significance of the dual gap problem is that they act to inhibit a cohesive alliance response to the challenge of terrorism and reinforces American tendencies towards unilateralism thus undercutting an international response to an international problem. It is likely that the capabilities gap played a large role in the US decision to go into Afghanistan under a coalition of the willing framework acting as the lead nation – the Europeans simply didn’t have the capabilities required to conduct such an operation.

The level of threat the dual gap poses for the alliance should not be underestimated. Indeed, one commentator even goes so far to suggest that dual gap is a mortal threat to the health of the alliance: “continued gaps in capabilities and severe differences between America and its European allies in the gravity accorded to threats is relegating NATO to the graveyard of collective security irrelevance.” While this may be an exaggeration in the short-term, unless measures are taken to mitigate the dual gap the long-term survivability of the alliance and its ability to contribute to the campaign against terrorism will be severely affected.
Conclusion:

It is clear that NATO can make a significant contribution to the campaign against terrorism in four interrelated realms of the campaign by facilitating diplomatic cooperation; military operations; intelligence-sharing; and defence cooperation. If the campaign against terrorism places a premium upon international cooperation in all dimensions of the campaign and upon intelligence-sharing in particular the potential for NATO to make a significant contribution should not be undervalued.

Indeed it appears that NATO is well placed to make a significant contribution largely thanks to the institutions it developed throughout the 1990’s as it adapted to the post-Cold War period, the EAPC, the PfP, the NATO-Russia council and the Mediterranean Dialogue, as it shifted from a collective security focus to that of a cooperative security focused framework. Celeste A. Wallander argues that these institutions developed within NATO as it attempted to reconfigure itself to the requirements of the post-Cold War security environment. She argues that NATO persisted after the Cold War because it possessed general assets for political consultation and decision-making, and military planning, coordination and implementation, which made the alliance an effective security institution capable of dealing with the problems of the post-cold war security environment; the institutions NATO developed through the 1990’s, the same institutions that are the key assets in NATO’s role in counterterrorism, were based on NATO processes and procedures from the Cold War period adapted to the new strategic environment. This process of adaptation in the post-cold war period suggests that if the alliance persisted in the post-Cold War environment utilizing similar institutions, NATO’s persistence in the current period should not be that surprising – the general assets NATO brings to the table, as a mechanism for consultation and action in both the political realm and that of the military, are as relevant to the contemporary security environment as they were in the post-Cold War period - international cooperation is essential to the campaign against terrorism.

However this does not mean that adaptation is not required. Indeed, if NATO is to play a key role in the campaign against terrorism three key changes need to be made. First, NATO should adopt some form of joint intelligence assessment in order to undercut the affects of the threat-response gap. Herman suggests
that joint assessment along the model of the British Joint Intelligence Committee can facilitate international decision-making and coalition action.\textsuperscript{79} As such, instituting such a mechanism within NATO could lead to a closing of the threat/response gap and also invigorate European investment in the military capabilities required for counterterrorism operations. Second, the alliance should update its Strategic Concept so that it clearly reflects the contemporary focus upon the campaign against terrorism. This too could undercut the threat/response gap as the process of updating the concept would require a thorough discussion of the nature of the terrorist threat which could lead to a more focused and shared conception of the threat among all members of the alliance. Indeed, such a discussion could lead to a better strategy in the war on terrorism overall as inherent in the threat/response gap is a “logical complimentarity” which could lead to a more multidimensional and holistic strategy overall.\textsuperscript{80} Third, the alliance needs to improve its capacity to undertake complex peace support operations. NATO does have expertise in the area but more work needs to be done – NATO does not even have a peacebuilding unit – to institutionalize and otherwise improve the capacity to undertake such operations which may be a major contribution of the alliance to the campaign.\textsuperscript{81} All told, these three reforms will facilitate a greater NATO role in the campaign. Together they offer a concise agenda for alliance adaptation to a counterterrorism role.

Yet what is also clear is that NATO cannot be the only international organization involved in counterterrorism; there is no one-stop shopping in counterterrorism. Other institutions such as the UN, the G8, the EU and the OSCE all have a role to play. For example, it is difficult to see NATO playing a significant role in the economic domain of counterterrorism, cracking down on terrorist financing;\textsuperscript{82} as others have suggested, an international “coalition of coalitions” or “network of networks” is required to counter the threat of transnational terrorism.\textsuperscript{83} Can NATO act as the key node in this network, taking on a coordinating role?\textsuperscript{84} Answering this question is strictly beyond the scope of this paper as it involves a comparison of the attributes and strengths of various organizations. However, it is clear that NATO brings significant assets to the table, particularly in the diplomatic and military realms, including
conducting operations and defence cooperation activities, which could allow NATO to play such a coordinating role.

Ultimately however, it is likely that NATO’s participation in the campaign against terrorism will largely be a function of the US choice of grand strategy. In this respect an enhanced NATO role in the campaign faces a tautological dilemma. US unilateralist impulses lead to an American dismissal of NATO’s potential in the campaign against terrorism, negating a significant NATO contribution, thus seemingly confirming that NATO is unable to play a significant role in the campaign. If NATO is to play a significant role, US support and investment is required and will be key to the development of an enhanced NATO role in the campaign. Realizing the many assets NATO possesses relevant to the campaign, those outlined in this paper, may help to shape US grand strategy. Yet perhaps the greatest strategic advantage of NATO participation would be the institutionalization of international cooperation an enhanced NATO role would allow. If international cooperation is plagued by the “politics of the last outrage,” institutionalizing support for the long-term campaign against terrorism could be the alliance’s single greatest contribution and the foundation of success in the campaign; it may be that “A permanent coalition is better than a temporary one. An interoperable coalition is better than an incapable one. A value sharing coalition is better than a coalition of convenience. And a NATO coalition is better than anything else.” While the decision to increase NATO’s role in the campaign may rest with American decision-makers, the way forward may be clearer than we think; that at least, leaves some room for optimism.
Endnotes

3 Ibid.
4 Philip Gordon has pointed out that, interestingly, this first invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty involved a scenario that would not have entered the minds of any of the signatories to the treaty in 1949 – in response to a non-state actors attack upon the United States. He states that “not a single signatory could have imagined that its first invocation would involve Europeans coming to the aid of the United States rather than the other way around. Yet that is precisely what happened, and NATO will never be the same again.” See, Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after 11 September,” Survival 43, no. 4 (Winter 2001/02): 89. Gordon’s comment also reveals the contention that the attacks of 11 September will have a significant, wide ranging impact on the transatlantic alliance – a main theme of this paper. Bennett echoes this assessment suggesting that the invocation of article 5 of the Washington treaty by NATO, an acknowledgement that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor could invoke the treaty, has, in effect, mandated the alliance “to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.” See, Christopher Bennett, “Combating Terrorism,” NATO Review (Spring 2003): 5. Online: www.nato.int/review.
6 Michael Ruhle discussing the summit states: “Initially billed as an “Enlargement Summit,” the idea of making the admission of new members the sole focus of the meeting was dropped after 9/11. All the allies agreed that NATO enlargement would be a historic step, consolidating Europe as a single security space from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, and from the Baltic to the Balkans. There were widespread fears, however, that the United States might lose interest in the alliance if the Prague meeting did no more than issue membership invitations. Accordingly, the Prague Summit was relabeled a “Transformation Summit.” See Michael Ruhle, “NATO After Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11,” Parameters (Summer 2003): 93. Ruhle also suggests Prague was an opportunity for the alliance to prove that it could deliver on NATO reform to ensure its relevance to the new security environment by finding a balance between traditional euro-centric missions and a focus upon new global threats such as terrorism and WMD; acquiring the military capabilities required to operate in the new environment; and by learning to react quickly and flexibly to new challenges. Ibid. While it is perhaps premature to offer an overall verdict on the success of the Summit in achieving these goals, one cannot but be impressed with the output from the summit in terms of the PCC, the NRF, the Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, the reform of the NATO Military Command Structure, and the enlargement of the Alliance with the invitation for seven countries to begin membership-accession talks. If nothing else, such production shows at least a high-level of activity and effort to adapt the alliance to the contemporary security environment.
7 Richard D. Lugar, “Redefining NATO’s Mission – Preventing WMD Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 13; The argument is also implied in more practical terms in Ruhle’s comment cited above when he notes of a European concern that the American’s would lose interest in the Alliance if the Prague Summit did not move beyond the issue of enlargement.
8 Gordon, “NATO After September 11,” 89.
9 This quote is from a senior NATO official in a briefing regarding NATO’s role in counterterrorism. NATO, Briefing to the Canadian Security and Defence Forum, Brussels, 17 June 2003. This may be an accurate reflection of the reality of policymaking in the international security realm at this time. Elinor Sloan suggests that “It is a measure of how profoundly the events of 11 September have affected the American psyche that most US foreign relations are viewed through the prism of its war on terrorism. The post cold war era is over; it lasted a decade. The post 11 September era has begun; the war on terrorism is as all-pervasive an organizing principle for American foreign and defence policy as the cold war.” Sloan, 301. This assertion, if a true reflection of the contemporary American strategic mindset, suggests that such an effort could be as much an effort to maintain NATO’s relevance to the US’ strategic agenda as to meeting the demands of the contemporary security environment.

For example, Forster and Wallace argue that “as the events of September 11 illustrate only too well, the threats to western stability now come from unstable regimes in weak states; from radical movements operating across national frontiers; from anti-Western governments willing to lend such movements support; and from he broader resentments from which such movements grow… Western responses also require a broad spectrum of non-military instruments, from cooperation among police and intelligence agencies through to assistance with political and economic development.” See, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “What is NATO for?” *Survival* 43, no. 4 (Winter 2001/02): 110; A multidimensional response is also stressed by Christopher Harmon, *Terrorism Today* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 235, 241-42. For a good introduction to a variety of measures see, Paul. R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 73-129.

See for example, Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failing States,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2003): 32-44; Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home,” *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 97-108; Campbell and others, *To Prevail*; and Steven E. Miller, “The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux?” *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 16. Takeyh and Nikola suggest that if the United States is serious about rooting out terrorism, it must take reconstruction after military strikes seriously. They suggest that “The United States and its allies cannot conduct the fight against global terrorism in a vacuum. Effective combat is impossible as long as the failed states that terrorist movements use for refuge are left to flounder… Once the military strikes end, state reconstruction must occur.” Takeyh and Nikola, 105. The authors of *To Prevail* suggest that “One of the lessons of September 11 is that failed states matter – not just in a humanitarian sense, but in national security terms as well… If allowed to fester, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks, not to mention organized criminals and drug traffickers who exploit the dysfunctional environment.” Campbell and others, 167-68. Miller states that “the construction of stable polities with reasonably successful economies in places where failed states now exist may be a prerequisite for long-term success in eliminating terrorism” and suggests that “nation-building” is a potentially key element in a counterterrorism strategy. Miller, 16. For an argument stressing the need for a PSO in Afghanistan see, Kimberley Zisk Marten, “Defending Against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan,” *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002-2003): 35-52.


Pillar, 29.

Ibid.

Pillar, 123. Pillar states that “the limitations of each of the counterterrorist instruments make it necessary to use or at least consider the use of all of them. Moreover they must be used in concert. Most counterterrorist work involves more than one instrument. Intelligence has a role in almost every counterterrorist operation, and diplomacy does in most of them. The instruments are complementary, and the value of using them should be-and generally is-more than the sum of the parts. If the process is not properly managed, the value may be less than the sum of the parts, because of the different instruments working at cross-purposes – a military operation making the arrest of a fugitive more difficult, for example, or an arrest negating a valuable source of intelligence.” The need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to counterterrorism is perhaps the strongest theme running throughout Pillar’s work. The fact that intelligence and diplomacy are two realms of counterterrorism that pervade almost every operation, as Pillar states, supports the argument that NATO can play an active role in the campaign on terrorism as these are two of the principal areas, outlined below, where NATO can play a role.


Bruce Hoffman, “The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 10. Hoffman also stresses the need for international cooperation in *Inside Terrorism* his major work. He stresses the critical role of international cooperation stating that “In the future,
therefore, if governments are effectively to prevent and pre-empt other such attacks, increased and strengthened multinational intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation on a more regular and systemic basis will be critical. Given the transnational dimension of many of these threats… any response that is to yield results will have to involve enhanced binational and multinational intelligence exchange, cooperation over extradition, the enactment of more formal accords and treaties both between individual countries and on a more comprehensive basis, and the coordination of national policies to monitor, prevent, pre-empt and judicially resolve terrorist acts.” See, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 211.

19 Ibid. 10.

20 It is noted that “third world and newly independent states are not only the major settings for terrorism, they are also the least well equipped in terms of resources to counter terrorist challenges.” Ian O. Lesser and others, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1999), 94.

21 This is suggested by Elinor Sloan, “Beyond Primacy,” 309. Sloan states: “In many cases it will not be necessary or even possible for American forces to do the fighting. Rather the military and police forces of individual states may be the more appropriate instruments to apprehend terrorists operating within their national borders.” Sloan, 309. This argument is put forward by Barry R. Posen who explains that local forces have a number of advantages including better access to local intelligence, notably HUMINT – they know the territory and the people better – and are better able to deal with any collateral damage that results from an operation. See, Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics,” International Security 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02) in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment Readings and Interpretations, ed. Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford Connecticut: McGraw-Hill Dushkin, 2004), 431-32.

22 Sloan, 309.

23 Wilkinson, 197.

24 Ian O. Lesser and others, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1999), 114. Pillar also calls for lessons learned to be derived from international experience and shared. He argues specifically that the United States should seek out lessons from other countries terrorist experiences and perspectives on the problem of counterterrorism. See, Pillar, 228.


26 Ibid., 26. Emphasis added. The latter quote also reflects the multidisciplinary nature of the campaign as it is outlined by the authors.

27 For good examples see, Jusuf, Wanadi, “A Global Coalition against International Terrorism,” International Security 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 184-189. Wanadi argues that “the September 11 attacks and the global reactions to them, however show that neither isolationism nor unilateralism will suffice in the fight against terrorism. Thus, even in military matters, the United States will need the assistance of various allies when taking specific actions.” Wanadi, 184. See also, Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism,” Survival 44, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 133.


32 Campbell and others, 77. On the importance of intelligence see also Posen, “The Struggle Against Terrorism,” 433; Pillar, 118-116;

33 On the importance of intelligence see also, Christopher Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 255. Harmon states that “Good intelligence must support all long-arm arrests, every successful extradition, and nearly every other counter-terrorism measure.” He also stresses the need for HUMINT. See, Harmon, 257.

34 Wilkinson, 215.

35 The contributors to To Prevail call for a widening and deepening of the United States’ intelligence relationships with other countries. They also note that “for years the centerpiece of US counterterrorism policy has been bilateral intelligence relationships with a number of key countries.” See, Campbell and others, 78. Miller states that the US will need “the active cooperation of at least some other states if it is to prosecute this war in an effective fashion. It will depend on unprecedented international sharing of intelligence for its vision of a relentless, long-term campaign against terrorism to meet with success. Miller, 16.

36 Campbell and others, 87.

37 On the need for a long-term focus see, Campbell and others, 52, 302; Pillar, 89.
Kurt M. Campbell and others, 52.

Wilkinson suggests that sustaining international cooperation is a fundamental problem due to the “politics of the last outrage.” See Wilkinson, 198-199.

Frank J. Cilluffo and Daniel Rankin suggest that “organization cooperation and coordination are the keys to successfully dealing with this problem” that is international terrorism. See, Frank J. Cilluffo and Daniel Rankin, “Fighting Terrorism,” NATO Review (Winter 2001/2002): 12.


The EAPC is an outgrowth of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council developed in 1991 as a means to expand the political side of the alliance and reach out to the Eastern European counties in transition in the post-cold war period. The EAPC brings together the 19 current allies and the 27 partner states that are members of the Partnership for Peace program. See, Forster and Wallace, “What is NATO for?” 115.


The countries involved in the Mediterranean Dialogue include Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. See, NATO, Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 91-92. The NATO-Russia Council is another mechanism to facilitate cooperation at the diplomatic level. Indeed, counterterrorism is identified as one of the areas for NATO-Russia consultation and practical cooperation. See, NATO, “11 September – 18 Months On: NATO’s Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism,” Online: www.nato.int/terrorism/factsheet.htm.


The NATO as a toolbox concept is elucidated by a number of commentators including Michael Ruhle, “NATO after Prague,” 96. He suggests that NATO is the “worlds most effective facilitator of military coalitions.” Ibid., 93. Ruhle asserts that there is an undeniable trend towards this option – it cannot be resisted. He states that “the idea of NATO acting on occasion as a toolbox, i.e. as a pool from which to provide coalitions of the willing with specific capabilities is here to stay. Even if the notion of a toolbox-Alliance does indeed run counter to NATO’s self-perception as a cohesive, all-for-one and one-for-all organization, resisting it may turn out to be futile. Rather than fighting against this concept, the time may have come to look at how a toolbox approach can be reconciled with the continuing need for political cohesion.” See, Ruhle, “NATO After Prague,” 96. See also, Gordon, “NATO After September 11,” 89. The Partnership for Peace program is a key asset in this role as it fosters interoperability among NATO and partner states. The deployments in Yugoslavia were aided by interoperability created by the program. See, Celeste A. Wallander, “NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 728-730. She suggests that the program has thus facilitated NATO’s adaptability to the new security environment: “Partnership for Peace has become the mechanism for extending integration and interoperability beyond NATO members, and these, in turn, have served as the basis for NATO’s adaptability to its political and military non-threat security missions.” Ibid., 729.

NATO took command of ISAF in August of 2003, previously it had been under various lead nations that were NATO member states. NATO allies provide a high percentage of the personnel in the operation; 95% of the personnel in the third rotation of ISAF command were from NATO allies. See, NATO, 11 September – 18 Months On NATO’s Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism. Online: www.nato.int/terrorism/factsheet.htm. Canada is currently the largest contributor to ISAF.

The two by two matrix includes the combinations: combat operation/NATO command, combat operation/NATO facilitated coalition of the willing, PSO/NATO command, PSO/NATO facilitated coalition of the willing.
While the operation was predominantly American a number of NATO members participated as did the Australians among others. NATO countries that participated directly included the UK, Norway, Denmark, Germany, and Canada. Countries contributing other assets or support included: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. See, NATO, 11 September – 18 Months On NATO’s Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism. Online: www.nato.int/terrorism/factsheet.htm.

The ISAF deployment was initially a PSO in a NATO assisted coalition of the willing framework when the lead nation first the United Kingdom and then Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands. See, NATO, 11 September – 18 Months On NATO’s Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism. Online: www.nato.int/terrorism/factsheet.htm.

The military concept is described in NATO, 11 September – 18 Months On NATO’s Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism. Online: www.nato.int/terrorism/factsheet.htm. The concept also outlines possible NATO roles in consequence management and in the support of coalition action or those undertaken by other international organizations.

Sloan describes the NRF as containing “about 20,000 land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to conduct anti-terrorist operations anywhere around the world. The force is to be deployable within seven to thirty days, able to sustain itself in the field for a month and capable of operating effectively with American troops.” See Sloan, 313.

On this point see Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 30-36, 44. In particular Posen identifies a key shortage of military manpower in the form of infantry; those soldiers needed mostly in post-conflict PSOs. Posen states: Several of the allies have good ground forces, and perhaps most, critically, good infantry that seem able to tolerate at least moderate casualties. The British Army and Royal Marines have 43 infantry battalions – all professionals – nearly half as many as the United States; France has another 20. Given the relative scarcity of U.S. infantry, allied ground forces are also particularly useful in the post-conflict peace-enforcement missions necessary to secure the fruits of any battlefield victory.” Posen, “Command,” 44. The current American struggles in Iraq reinforce the contention that allied contributions are required.

This assertion assumes that “nation-building” and PSOs will play a large part in the campaign. However, to this point both key engagements of the opening phase of the campaign, Afghanistan and Iraq, have included a post-combat PSO component indicating the likelihood of a significant role in this area. While Iraq may or may not be considered part of the campaign against terrorism, according to the American’s it is. Even if it isn’t, it still has a significant effect on the campaign from a winning the “hearts and minds” perspective. Thus, the original campaign may have not been a component of the campaign but the after-effects certainly are – making the debate essentially a moot point and somewhat academic.

The expertise of the alliance in this role is noted by Christopher Bennett, “Aiding America,” NATO Review 49, no. 4 (Winter 2001). Online: www.nato.int/review; and by Forster and Wallace who note that NATO has set the standards for such missions in terms of interoperability, command and control and standard operating procedures and that “Multinational forces under NATO command in Bosnia and Kosovo, using NATO procedures and doctrine, have demonstrated levels of professionalism and effectiveness which contrast sharply with UN forces in Sierra Leone and Rwanda.” Forster and Wallace, “What is NATO for?” 117. Though this comparison may be unfair, the expertise of NATO forces in this area is clear.

The relationship is noted by Steven E. Miller, “The End of Unilateralism,” 21.

See Gordon, “NATO After 11 September,” 93. The request was issued by the United States calling for assistance from NATO allies in the fight against terrorism. The allies agreed to take eight measures “to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism.” The measures included, “enhanced intelligence sharing, blanket overnight rights and access to ports and airfields, assistance to states threatened as a result of their support for coalition efforts, as well as the deployment of NATO naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean and Airborne Early Warning aircraft to patrol US airspace.” See, NATO, “11 September – 18 Months On”


Osman Yavuzalp, “Working with Partners to Fight Terrorism,” NATO Review (Spring 2003), 9, Online: www.nato.int/review. Yavuzalp states that “The development of an EAPC/PiP Intelligence Liaison Unit should enhance information sharing. In this context, the possibility of establishing permanent working contacts among intelligence agencies of interested EAPC countries and especially those in the Caucuses and Central Asia could prove particularly useful.”

This is noted in the case of the Mediterranean Dialogue by Strobe Talbott, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk,” 54. Talbott states that the purpose of the Dialogue is to “support scientific cooperation, education, training on
crisis management and defence planning, and the sharing of information on terrorism.” Emphasis added. The NATO-Russia council identifies terrorism as one of the areas of consultation and cooperation to be developed and identifies intelligence sharing and the development of common threat assessments as a possible mechanism. See, NATO, “11 September – 18 Months On”.

63 Pillar, 76.

64 Michael Herman notes that “NATO as a body still seems to feel, as in the Cold War, that intelligence is a suspect national activity, on which exchanges should remain a matter for select groups behind green baize doors, unacknowledged in the mainstream of the alliance.” See, Michael Herman, “Intelligence Doctrine for International Peace Support,” in Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future, eds. Ben de Jong, Wies Platje, and Robert David Steele (Oakton Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003), 162.


66 Pillar notes that NATO member states are in a good position to share their lessons learned. He states: “Developed countries such as the members of NATO do tend to have more highly skilled and professional security services than many other states.” This creates space for the sharing of expertise with other less-developed countries. See Pillar, 186-187. The provision of such technical assistance is suggested, see, Harmon, 258; J. Paul DE B. Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses to Terrorism (Westport Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 73.

67 NATO, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, para 7.

68 Yavuzalp, “Working with Partners,” 8. Indeed, the plan suggests EAPC states “will develop mentoring programmes for specific terrorism-related issues in order to share specific experiences in combating terrorism.” See para. 16.5.3.

69 See, NATO, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, para. 16.2-16.4.

70 Ibid., para. 16.5.2.


72 Yost notes US superiority in expeditionary operation, the connection to anti-terrorism operations is mine. See, Yost, 98-99.

73 For a good exposition of the gap see, Nicole Gnesotto, “Reacting to America,” Survival 44, no. 4 (Winter 2002-2003): 101-102. Gordon also notes differences between the United States and the Europeans and organizes them into five key elements stressed by the Europeans collectively: emphasis on the primacy of non-military measures; insistence that the military response is limited to Afghanistan; the need to avoid falling into a “clash of civilizations”; a focus on legitimacy and the need for a broad coalition; and a focus upon the importance of renewed engagement to resolve regional problems if terrorism is to countered. He also notes European agreement on the need for “short-term diplomatic, economic and military measures to combat terrorism,” and a focus upon the need to take a root causes approach. See, Gordon, “NATO After 11 September,” 94-95.

74 This is suggested by Miller in terms of the threat/response gap. He states that the US “will take the steps it thinks are necessary and expect its friends and allies to stand with the forces of civilization against the global blight of terrorism. It may be, indeed, that the lonely hegemon expects others to adapt to its needs and preferences rather than the other way around, especially now that it is at war.” Emphasis added. See, Miller, “Unilateralism,” 27. The US perceives itself to be at war, whereas others may not feel the same way – a fundamental gap in perception of the threat of terrorism. James Ruhle notes that the capabilities gap increases US unilateralism. See, Ruhle, “The Lessons of 9/11,” 91.

75 See, Gordon, “NATO After 11 September,” 93.

76 Isenberg, “Last Chance,” 641.

77 Allen G. Sens argues that NATO has moved from being a collective defence organization to a cooperative security organization with a collective defence foundation. Cooperative security is based on the principle of inclusion over exclusion and aims “to engage members and non-members and like-minded and non-like minded actors into a larger framework”; aims to achieve shared security objectives and are not aimed at one specific external threat; focuses upon a broadened conception of security and aims at promoting military and non-military security objectives; is aimed at the transformation of existing institutions; utilizes a cautious gradual approach to establish cooperation; and recognizes the value of other bilateral or multilateral security relationships. See, Allen G. Sens, “From Collective Defense to Cooperative Security? The New NATO and Nontraditional Challenges and Mission,” in NATO After 50 Years, eds. S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 165-190.

See, Herman, “Intelligence Doctrine,” 161. Herman discusses decision-making at the strategic level – that of national decision-makers in an international context – within a peace operations framework. He notes that “Decisions are agreed at this level by governments in negotiations in national capitals, and in around the appropriate international forums... Negotiation and decision-taking here is a diffuse and difficult process. The more this applies, the more it would benefit from having agreed intelligence assessments on which it could be based. Inter-governmental agreement is difficult in any circumstances, but it is more achievable if there is concurrence about the relevant facts and forecasts.” Such assessments can counter the challenge of differing threat assessments. See, Herman, “Intelligence Doctrine,” 161.

See, Gnesotto, “Reacting to America,” 102. Gnesotto notes the “logical complimentarity” between the European and American approaches to responding to terrorism, but notes that too often there has been a “dialogue of the deaf.” Promoting a discussion within the framework of the NATO strategic concept could help break this impasse.

Crocker identifies the lack of institutionalization of expertise in reconstruction and state-building and notes that a recent bipartisan commission (US) called for the creation of dedicated staffs addressing the issue within the State Department, USAID and NATO. See, Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” 41. Indeed, while on the NATO SDF Tour Summer 2003, the lack of a peacebuilding unit within NATO was noted.

For an argument in favour a NATO coordinating role see, Johnson and Zenko, “All Dressed Up”.

This idea is developed in the final part of the introduction above.

This tautological problem is identified by Gnesotto in the context of the capabilities gap. I extend the concept to NATO’s role generally. See, Gnesotto, “Reacting to America,” 100.

Robertson, “Tackling Terror”.

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82 This is asserted by Johnson and Zenko, “All Dressed Up,” 63, note 51.

83 Kurt M. Campbell and others, suggests a coalition of coalitions is required. See, Campbell and others, 52-53, 302. The authors of To Prevail even suggest a strong NATO role in the coalition of coalitions: “Long-standing security ties, such as the NATO alliance... are serving as the building blocks for the various anti-terror coalitions.” Ibid., 306. This strongly suggests NATO can play a coordinating role. The network of networks idea is forwarded by RAND analysts John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, see, Lesser and Others, *Countering the New Terrorism*, 55-56.

84 For an argument in favour a NATO coordinating role see, Johnson and Zenko, “All Dressed Up”.

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