Conference Publication:
Canadian Defence and the
Canada-US Strategic Partnership

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Foreword

The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) was established in Calgary in late 2001 to “enhance Canada’s role in the world by helping to inform Canadians about their nation’s defence and foreign policies and the instruments that serve them.” Almost immediately after, CDFAI embarked on a program of public education by supporting research, conferences, publications, and education aimed at introducing Canadians to their nation’s unique security and foreign policy challenges.

In early 2002 CDFAI made contact with the Washington, DC based Center for the Study of the Presidency through CSP President Dr. David Abshire. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, and the declaration by President George W. Bush of a global war against terrorism, CDFAI wished to present the Canadian public with ideas on continental defence. The Ottawa Conference was born from that contact.

Since CDFAI was anxious to build relations with Canadian institutions already engaged in the study of Canadian foreign and security policy, the Norman Patterson School for International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University was approached to participate in organizing and hosting the conference. NPSIA has long been known for its expertise in the study of Canadian foreign policy and its extensive contacts within the Canadian foreign policy-making community. NPSIA was enthusiastic about the project and signed on as the third sponsor.

The conference, held 5-6 September 2002 at the Lord Elgin Hotel in Ottawa, focussed on the Canada-US defence relationship. It brought US and Canadian experts together with a specifically invited group of participants. Papers prepared by CSP and by Canadian experts retained by CDFAI were the focus of two days of broad ranging discussion about Canada-US defence issues, problems, and possibilities.

We at CDFAI were pleased with the Ottawa Conference; it brought forward a rather “full and frank discussion of the issues”, as the diplomats like to say. We believe the conference papers, presented here with appropriate introductions will help the ongoing process of educating Canadians as to the security challenges they face in a very uncertain world.
Introduction

A crisis is developing in Canadian-American defence relations. The events of September 11, 2001 have underscored the fact that despite the hopes of the western world, the international system remains dangerous and unpredictable. Since the end of the Cold War and perhaps even before its end, successive Canadian governments have reduced Canadian defence budgets. Regrettably, this has been done with the assumption that if there was a threat to Canada or to North America, it would be in the Americans’ interests to provide the necessary assistance to help Canada defend itself. Since the tragic events of 9/11, both Americans and Canadians are questioning this assumption. Americans are increasingly questioning why they should shoulder the defence of North America when Canada continues to refuse to maintain its armed forces. At the same time, many Canadians are concerned that no truly sovereign nation should refuse to be responsible for its own defence.

In order to address the issues surrounding the Canadian-American strategic partnership, an invited group of American and Canadian academics, government officials, policy-makers, military officers, analysts, members of think-tanks and journalists gathered in Ottawa from September 6-7, 2002. The two-day event examined the evolving nature of the Canadian-American defence relationship following September 11, 2001. While the discussion indicated that positive developments in the post-9/11 North American defence have occurred, most of the discussion centred on the Canadian Government’s continued reluctance to provide the resources necessary to enable Canada to properly contribute to the defence of the continent. The general theme that emerged from the conference is that the Canadian Government refuses to provide the resources necessary to ensure that Canada’s armed forces can meet the new threats of the 21st century. The papers that were presented at the conference have been collected in this edition and are now being made available to facilitate the debate on this very important issue.

The conference was the result of the collaboration of three organizations: the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Calgary; the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Washington, DC; and the Centre for Security and Defence Studies of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa. The two Canadian institutions with similar mandates joined with an American institution dedicated to the study of issues of signal importance to the US national leadership, past, present and future. In the context of the American global war against terrorism, the question of burden sharing by Canada has risen to the attention of CSP. Thus this conference allowed for a discussion of perspectives from both sides of the border.

The Presentations

The American participants presented their assessments and analysis of the United States-Canada relationship in the war on terrorism on day one, followed on day two with reactions to the American perspective and perspectives on the United States relationship by the Canadian participants. In preparation for the conference the Center for the Study of the Presidency formed a working group. It undertook research that included individual interviews and roundtable discussions with decision-makers in the American defence community, as well as with members of the American and Canadian diplomatic communities. The working group then produced an inclusive report on the US-Canada strategic partnership in the war on terrorism. At the conference each of the main authors of the paper provided a presentation on their thoughts. David Abshire, President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, began the discussion with a historical review of Canadian-American defence relations. Canada has traditionally faced the problem of determining its defence policy in the context of a continent shared with a super-
power. No other state could threaten Canada because it was in the interests of the United States to protect its northern neighbour. But shared values and interests meant that a threat to the US was also a threat to Canada. In the absence of a direct threat to Canada, the Canadian Government developed a tendency to rely excessively on the United States to provide for the defence of North America. This tendency has been reflected in the continued unwillingness of successive Canadian Governments to adequately fund their defence forces.

The next American presenter was James Kitfield, National Security Affairs Correspondent of the National Journal. He focussed on the fact that most Canadian-American defence issues tend to be dealt with at the official level and out of the public eye. One of the hallmarks of the relationship has been the ability to work professionally and quickly when there is a shared view of a threat. Since the events of 9/11, the two countries have worked well to re-develop the smart-border. Officials on both sides of the border were primarily concerned with ensuring that cross-border travel and commerce proceeded as smoothly and safely as possible following the attacks. Given the volume of trade that flows between both countries, this initiative was given substantial support to ensure its success.

Kitfield assured the audience that Canadians need to be aware of important changes occurring in the United States. The September attacks had a profound effect on the United States and it is now reorganizing itself in order to provide for better defence against future attacks. One of the most important changes is the creation of Northern Command. It will not impinge on Canadian sovereignty as it seeks only to better organize and focus American efforts to respond to an attack within its own borders. However, this re-organization will have a substantial impact on Canadian-American defence relations. In particular, NORAD's role is being re-evaluated. While the United States will welcome Canadian commitment to continue to play a central role in the organization, the Canadian Government must soon make its position known or face the possibility that the United States will take matters into its own hands and diminish the importance of the organization. If NORAD is marginalized, then Canada could face the reality that it will have a diminished ability to control events within its own aerospace. Without NORAD, Canada will lose the access to information that NORAD has traditionally provided.

The third speaker was Christopher Sands, Director of the Canada Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Echoing the previous speakers, he also made the point that the United States has been changed by the events of 9/11. The United States has always been obsessed with security, but is now feeling particularly vulnerable. The Government of Canada does not appear to share this view. This, in combination with the unwillingness of Canadian Governments to provide adequate levels of funding to its defence, have led some senior American policy-makers to give up on Canada. Sands then went on to argue that if this conclusion was to spread among other senior officials, Canada-American relations would suffer substantially. Therefore, it is in Canada's interests to ensure that it is viewed as making a meaningful contribution to the defence of North America even if its assessment of the current threat is different from that of the United States.

Dwight Mason, senior associate of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provided an appraisal of how Canadian defence expenditures have hurt Canada's relationship with the United States. Canada does not have the means to move its own forces and must rely on the United States for Strategic Sea and Airlift. Even when Canada was facing the domestic challenge of the ice storms in the mid-1990s, it required American assistance to move generators to Ontario and Quebec. Likewise, in Afghanistan, while Canadian troops performed admirably on an individual basis, they remained dependent on the United States for logistic support. Such dependencies will hurt Canadian sovereignty in the long-term.

Once the presentations of the members of the Center for the Study of the Presidency were completed, Peter Verga, Director, Homeland Security Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defence, provided a briefing on the current plans in the United States to develop its Homeland Security. Speaking on behalf of
the American government he outlined that the three main elements of Homeland Security are: Homeland Defence, Civil Support and Emergency Preparedness. The American Government's main focus is to develop the means to coordinate federal, state and local governments in order to respond to future attacks on American soil. Verga also pointed out that Northern Command is a central component of American efforts. However, he stressed that it is an internal re-organization that does not affect issues of Canadian sovereignty. It establishes assigned areas of responsibility so that in the event of a future attack, there are clear lines of command and responsibility. The only substantial difference between Northern Command and other US Commands is that it, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defence, provides military assistance to civil authorities... This is something that the other commands do not have the ability to do.

The first day of the conference also included a visit by American Ambassador Paul Cellucci. While he did not offer a formal presentation, the ambassador returned to a common theme of the day when he stated that the continual reluctance of the Canadian Government to adequately fund its military forces would hurt the Canadian relationship with the United States.

On the second day, speakers provided the Canadian perspective. The first three speakers each examined the role that the land, sea and aerospace forces of Canada and the United States will play in responding to future threats to North America. Elinor Sloan began the discussions with an examination of the land threat to North America and the role that land forces will have in combating this threat. It is clear that while civilian agencies will have the lead role in responding to any future terrorist attacks on North American soil, the land forces of both states can be expected to provide important assistance. To this end, greater cooperation and training is needed. Sloan also predicts that Canadian forces will continue to be deployed in overseas operations with the Americans to respond to future threats. This will entail both war fighting and peace-building. There will be a need to meet threats directly as was the case in Afghanistan and to assist in the reconstruction of failed states to eliminate bases of support for terrorists. In both instances, Canadian land forces will require substantial resources.

Rob Huebert's examination of the maritime dimension highlighted existing cooperation between the Canadian and American naval forces. As with all other speakers, Huebert highlighted the very capable and professional ability of the Canadian forces. The problem is that there simply are not enough of them to meet the demands that have been placed on them. The contribution of the Canadian Navy to the war on terrorism has been substantial with a significant portion of the fleet being deployed at one time or another. However, there are real limits as to how far service personnel can be pushed and there are immediate requirements to replace key pieces of equipment such as the ship borne helicopter and resupply vessels.

James Fergusson's examination of the Aerospace Dimension of the Canadian-American Strategic partnership laid bare some of the most serious problems facing Canada in the strategic relationship. His presentation began with a review of the cooperation between the two countries in the aerospace sector. In his assessment, this was historically the most evident and pronounced defence partnership between the two countries. From the end of the Second World War, Canada and the United States have cooperated closely in the defence of North American aerospace. This has been most clearly demonstrated by the success in creating and maintaining NORAD. Furthermore, this cooperation has extended itself to the industrial development of the aerospace industry in both counties. Fergusson made it clear that much of this cooperation is now at risk. The United States is preparing to redevelop its ability to defend its aerospace through the development of a global missile defence (GMD). The events of 9/11 have acted to only strengthen American resolve. Canada therefore must decide if it wishes to remain a strategic partner with the Americans or if it intends to play a marginal role in the aerospace defence of North America. The decision will be determined by the role that the Government of Canada prepares to play or not play in the Americans' plan for GMD.
The last two Canadian papers examined the emerging security environment facing Canada. Frank Harvey argued that the events of 9/11 have amplified an existing American tendency to act in a unilateral fashion in the international system. The Government of Canada will need to be aware that its efforts to continue to invoke multi-lateral responses to international issues will increasingly come to be ignored by the United States.

David Charters ended the formal presentations by pointing out that it remains uncertain as to whether or not the attacks of 9/11 represent the beginning of a new era of terrorist action or if the attacks were a tragic anomaly. However, it is clear to him that the attacks have had a tremendous impact on the attitude and preparedness of the United States to defend itself. The United States is more determined than ever to be prepared for any future attacks. However, such an attitude has not transferred to the Canadian Government. Instead, the government has seen fit to refuse any substantial new funds for the Canadian forces. If this continues as expected, then it is unlikely that the Canadian forces will be able to maintain their interoperability with American forces. In the long term, this means an increasingly marginal role for Canada in the face of any new threats to the defence of North America.

**Summary**

Several themes emerge from these papers and from the discussions that flowed from them.

1) The Canadian-American strategic relationship was at the core of Canadian-American relations and has been mutually beneficial for over sixty years. While both countries cohabit a continent, the relationship is truly based on closely shared values and interests. It is in the shared interests of both countries to ensure that these values and interests are protected.

2) This relationship is now being threatened by the continued reluctance of Canadian Governments to adequately maintain its armed forces. The events of 9/11 have demonstrated that despite the end of the Cold War, threats continue to exist. Furthermore, while these attacks were targeted against the United States, shared geography and economic ties means that attacks on the United States will always have significant effects on Canada.

3) The attacks of 9/11 have increased American resolve to defend itself. This has meant that the United States is increasingly more willing to act in a unilateral fashion. This in turn will have a major impact on Canada's role in the international system as it will find that it needs to make hard decisions about working with the Americans or with the rest of the world.

4) The Canadian Forces are a professional and very capable force. However, their continued ability to make do and to hit above their weight has meant that Canadian Governments have continually increased demands on their services while reducing the resources made available to them. However, the war on terrorism has stretched the forces to their full limit and it is doubtful that the CF has the ability to over-extend itself any further. In particular, there is a desperate need to replace key pieces of equipment and to improve resources allocated to training.

5) When Canadian leaders do decide to act Canada can make an important and meaningful contribution to the defence of North America. Canadian support of the Smart Border initiative has been vigorous and well funded. As a result, Canadian economic interests have been well served with the new security arrangements in the wake of 9/11.

6) The Canadian Government's reluctance to raise defence expenditures could mean that the American government will make decisions that do not take into account input from Canadian policymakers. The lack of properly funded armed forces also limits Canada's ability to act on its own when it perceives its interests to differ from those of the United States.
7) The development of Homeland Security and Northern Command in the United States are internal American decisions that do not require Canadian approval. However, parts of the re-organization that these initiatives entail will affect Canada. Specifically, there is a risk that NORAD’s role will be diminished unless Canada makes it clear that it is willing to continue to assist in its support and maintenance. Should Canada find itself left outside of these American decisions, it will find that it will have a much more difficult time in maintaining its sovereignty. If Canada does not join these efforts, it will then need to develop its own means to maintain its own surveillance and enforcement regime. Since the costs to do this on its own would be prohibitive, it remains likely that Canada would simply not be able to meet this task. In effect, Canada would lose the ability to know what is happening in its own territory. This alone is a tremendous loss of sovereignty.

Canada is at an important crossroads for the continued development of its defence relationship with the United States. It has two choices. It can maintain the status quo. However, in the face of a changing United States, this means that Canada will become increasingly irrelevant. It will have little choice to accept any changes to the strategic relationship that the United States makes. The United States is taking decisive steps to respond to what it sees as the major threats to its security and to the security of the North American continent. It is clear that the American Government will proceed with or without Canadian cooperation. However, there are still American policymakers that want Canada to play its role in continental defence. There is recognition of Canada’s contributions to American security in the past. There is a desire on the part of some American officials to reach out and engage the Canadian government. There is the possibility of arresting the decline in influence of the Government of Canada in Washington.

Canada therefore needs to increase defence expenditure and more importantly, carefully re-examine its defence priorities in a changing world. A better equipped armed forces will make Canada’s opinion more relevant to the United States and will better ensure that our interests are heard and protected. However, additional resources alone will not address the problem. Canada needs to make important decisions in regards to its partnership with the United States. It needs to make smart choices.

As a sovereign nation the choice seems clear, but such choices will be made only if Canadians make their views known. It is the hope of the conference organizers that this publication will assist Canadians in thinking about these priorities and to provoke action.

Rob Huebert
Associate Director
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies
University of Calgary
Terrorism and Response:

*The Impact of the War on Terrorism on the Canadian-American Security Relationship*

Dr. David A. Charters
Director
Centre for Conflict Studies
University of New Brunswick

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**Introduction**

Only time will tell if the terrorist attack on the US on 9/11 was a “one-off”, anomalous event, or actually represented a breakthrough in terrorist capability, heralding a potential “Revolution in Terrorism Affairs.” For the United States, it was a terrifying surprise attack, mass murder on an exponential scale, and a national tragedy. While Canadians expressed heartfelt sympathy for our closest neighbours, for most Canadians it was a ‘near miss’; we “dodged the bullet”. Only 24 Canadians were killed in the attack on the World Trade Center. The immediate impact on Canada was limited primarily to looking after thousands of airline passengers stranded when their flights to the US were cancelled or diverted. There was a longer-term, but temporary economic impact arising from delays at border crossings and from the grounding of air traffic. Nevertheless, nearly a year later, the aftershocks continue to be felt north of the border. This paper will reflect on the impact of those events and the subsequent “War on Terrorism” on Canada and Canadian-American security relations. It will consider first, the terrorist threat to Canada, and second, the Canadian response to it, situating both within the wider context of Canadian-American relations. The paper will then try to draw some conclusions about the implications for the Canada-US security and defence relationship. It will argue that short of a sustained terrorist campaign within North America, the current War on Terrorism will not alter that relationship in a major way.

**The Terrorist Threat to Canada**

On 17 September 2001, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that: “I am not aware at this time of a cell known to the police to be operating in Canada with the intention of carrying out terrorism in Canada or elsewhere.” He repeated this view at a Liberal Party dinner in October. Coming in the wake of the most costly terrorist attack in history, against our closest neighbour, these remarks seemed — and still seem — extraordinary. Yet, in a very real sense his statement reflected not only Canadian perceptions of the post-9/11 situation, but also the Canadian reality, which is an anomalous position of vulnerability and invulnerability. This is not an unfamiliar position for Canada; throughout the Cold War, it was said that Canada was both undefendable and unconquerable. The perceived risk to Canada was not that it would a major target or theatre of a war between the superpowers, but rather that it would be caught in the crossfire. I believe this paper will show that Canada’s current position with regard to terrorism is quite similar and thus that the PM’s statement is, at one and the same time, both right and wrong.

The Prime Minister’s view is probably correct in the sense that no terrorist group, except possibly al-Qaeda, is likely to target Canada or Canadians just for the sake of killing and terrorizing Canadians. Although Canada has played an active role in the War on Terrorism, it has been a ‘bit part’, all but
eclipsed by the higher profile of the United States and Britain. Moreover, Osama Bin Laden has been quite clear that his dispute is with the US (“The Great Satan”) and its Middle East allies: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Canada may be a staunch American ally, but it carries very little weight in the world. So, attacking Canadian targets for their own sake doesn’t make strategic sense; it would gain al-Qaeda nothing. Why waste limited resources on a bit player, when the main enemy and a “target-rich environment” is “right next door”?

Which brings us to the part of the PM’s statement which is incorrect. Canada is at some degree of risk because we share a common border (which cannot be made wholly secure), and because our economies and infrastructures are so closely integrated. So a terrorist threat to the US could affect Canada indirectly but seriously. There are at least four terrorist threat scenarios in this regard. While not inevitable, these are not impossible; the first two have already happened.

While none of the 9/11 terrorists appear to have entered the US via Canada, slipping instead through an equally porous American border bureaucracy directly from Europe and Britain, the US had every right and reason to cast a nervous eye toward its longest undefended border, because at least one previous attempted attack did originate here. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested trying to smuggle explosives across the BC/Washington border, en route to bombing Los Angeles airport in a way that would have caused mass casualties (although not on the scale of 9/11). Ressam had entered Canada illegally in 1994, using false documents and claiming refugee status. In fact, he had been a member of the Algerian Islamist GIA terrorist group. Settling among the expatriate Algerian community in Montreal, he became part of a small network of Algerian Islamist extremists operating in Canada, whose efforts were directed toward planning an attack on the US. Canadian immigration was unaware of his terrorist background and lost track of him. He sustained himself on welfare and by petty crime, while avoiding capture by the police. In 1998, he travelled to Afghanistan and trained for six months in al-Qaeda camps, but the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) didn’t know about him. It was as if Ressam didn’t exist. Only vigilance at the US border — and his attempted escape — led to his arrest.

This is the scenario that worries Americans, and it ought to concern Canadians. The problem is that Ressam was not alone; even before he surfaced CSIS had acknowledged that most terrorist groups have a presence in Canada. They engage in propaganda, recruiting, and fund-raising, more or less openly. But as the Ressam case shows, some also have the capability to carry out attacks in other countries and have moved beyond mere talk to planning operations. CSIS is keeping under surveillance some fifty groups and “several hundred” terrorists and supporters. As of early 2002 four al-Qaeda members were being held in Canadian jails on immigration-related charges. Several other suspected or alleged members with connections to Canada have been deported to the US, where they are being detained for questioning, or have been put on trial. None have been implicated in the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, these numbers are not large and should not be blown out of proportion; they don’t make Canada a “haven for terrorists”. But, since 9/11 the extent of al-Qaeda’s global network of “sleeper”cells and its efforts to hide them have become clearer. So, it is probably prudent to assume that some others remain undetected in Canada. If there were to be a mass-casualty attack on the scale of 9/11 or worse, leaving behind a trail that led back to Canada, there would be very serious consequences for Canadian-American relations and for Canadian sovereignty and security. It is in Canada’s interest to ensure that never happens.

The second potential threat to Canadians could arise from attacks on “enemy” targets in Canada. These could include diplomatic installations, personnel, businesses, and tourists from certain countries, and targets identified as “Jewish”. Terrorists have long considered diplomatic missions and their staffs as legitimate, high-value targets. Since they have to be accessible, it is difficult to provide air-tight security for them. Several have been attacked in Canada; British trade commissioner James Cross was the first, kidnapped by the FLQ in 1970. A Turkish diplomat was assassinated in Ottawa in 1982, and the
Turkish embassy seized in 1985. There are at least eight countries whose diplomatic offices and representatives probably would be at high risk of attack by al-Qaeda or similar groups that operate in Canada: the US, Israel, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Russia. Between them, they have eight embassies or high commissions in Ottawa, plus 21 consular offices across the country, together employing several hundred persons. Given past experience in Canada and elsewhere, it is not difficult to imagine an attack on any of these. And it is worth recalling that when the US embassies were bombed in Africa in 1998, most of the hundreds who died were not American diplomats but local innocent bystanders who simply were in the wrong place at the wrong time. A large bomb attack on a foreign mission here could have the same effect.

Likewise, foreign business interests could be targeted. As an advanced post-industrial G-8 nation, whose economy is “globalized”, Canada is host to offices, factories, and sales outlets of many multi-national corporations. Many major American firms have a presence in Canada: the Big Three auto makers; computer and telecommunications companies; airlines, banks and investment firms; aerospace; oil companies; petrochemical, and pulp and paper, just to name a few. They employ tens of thousands of people at hundreds of locations across the country. Since the very nature of business implies openness to customers and others, their physical security is minimal — meant to deter or prevent theft and vandalism rather than attack. There are not enough police, troops, or private security personnel to guarantee foolproof 24/7 protection for Canadian, let alone foreign, businesses in Canada. It would take very little effort and skill to mount an attack on one of these sites, causing damage and casualties — most of whom would be Canadians. The fact that it has not happened yet may be the best indicator that the foreign terrorist presence in Canada is minimal, dormant, or at least under control, for the time being. But we should not assume it will stay that way in perpetuity. If similar targets elsewhere are made more secure and Canadian ones do not follow suit, then the probability of an attack here is likely to increase. While we cannot guarantee security while remaining an open society, we owe it to ourselves and to those we invite to do business here not to let Canada become a “free-fire zone” for terrorists.

The American business presence in Canada is only one dimension of the national ‘target profile’. The third terrorism scenario that could have consequences for Canada would be an attack on shared Critical Infrastructures (CI). Canada and the US share a number of CI that are vital to the functioning of both countries and their economies. These include energy generation and distribution: power stations, electricity grids, and natural gas pipelines; Canada exports a lot of energy to the US. The transportation networks are largely integrated and serve both countries. This applies to railways, bridges, the St. Lawrence Seaway, airlines, and air traffic control. Trade between Canada and the US exceeds $1.9 billion per day; 82% of Canadian exports go to the US. Finally, there is the telecommunications network, especially telephone and the Internet, which is vital to commerce for both countries and flows seamlessly between them. Disruption of any of these, by physical and/or cyber attack would be costly for the economies of both countries. And as the 1998 Ice Storm demonstrated, the failure of power distribution in winter costs lives.

The final threat resides in the “nightmare scenarios”, such as a major chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack on an American city in close proximity to the Canadian border, for eg., Detroit. While there is no consensus on the likelihood of a large-scale, mass casualty event in the near term, it cannot be dismissed out of hand. We know al-Qaeda has attempted to acquire or develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and that it probably has the financial power to buy them. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated a willingness to cause mass casualties (3,005 dead; 6,297 injured). The previously assumed prohibition against terrorists using CBRN has been breached at least three times: by the nerve gas attack in Tokyo in 1995; by the Chechens’ use of a radiological device in Moscow; and by the as-yet unsolved Anthrax attack in the US after 9/11 (which may not have been an al-Qaeda attack). So, the US and other national governments have to take the possible threat — and thus any warnings — seriously. The
WMD attack scenario suggested above could have two consequences for Canada. First, depending on the type and scale of the attack and weather conditions, it is possible that its lethal effects could spread across the border into Canada, in the form of radioactive fallout, a cloud of poison gas or biological toxin, or a deadly epidemic. This would immediately put Canadian lives at risk, requiring a mobilization of responses, including public health and other emergency services, detection systems, quarantining and decontamination, and mass evacuations, with the attendant disruptions of normal life, commerce, transportation, communications, and public services. The second possible consequence could be the requirement to receive, house, sustain, and treat American casualties and refugees from an attack that does not immediately impact Canadians themselves. Again, this would require a mobilization of Canadian resources, some of which might have to be sent into the US to assist disaster recovery there.

There is another CBRN attack scenario, which would more directly affect Canada. This posits an attack on a Canadian nuclear power plant, such as the Pickering station just east of Toronto. An attack could have two potential objectives and outcomes. The first would be to sabotage the plant, causing the release of radioactive material, which would be carried into the US by the prevailing winds. While this would not cause large numbers of immediate casualties, it would generate panic and force evacuations in both countries, as well as imposing a massive and costly decontamination task. A second, alternate objective might be to capture a plant, holding it for “ransom”, for example, to force the US to release all the prisoners held at Camp X-Ray in Cuba. The threat behind the ransom, of course, would be to sabotage the plant if the demands are not met, with the consequences described above. This would also cause panic in Canada’s largest city and probably would put the Canadian government under a lot of pressure to persuade the US to meet the terrorists’ demands. Refusal could result in a major crisis in Canada-US relations.

All of this notwithstanding, it would be a mistake, not to mention irresponsible, to suggest that these catastrophic scenarios are either imminent or inevitable. The same could be said for the two previous scenarios. The 9/11 attacks notwithstanding, al-Qaeda’s members aren’t ‘supermen’, and the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere has dealt it a blow. The problem is that we cannot rule out any of the scenarios with a high degree of confidence, because there are gaps in our knowledge. There is great uncertainty about al-Qaeda’s residual capabilities, future plans, and the status of its resources (people and funding). Because of that uncertainty, we must assume that some degree of threat remains. So, what is Canada doing about it?

**Canadian Counter-Terrorism Efforts**

The Canadian response to 9/11 has been multi-faceted, involving military operations, anti-terrorism legislation, financial resources, border security measures, and police and intelligence activity, among others. It developed with — for Canada — remarkable speed, although not without some confusion and debate about what to do and how to do it. Moreover, it exposed some glaring weaknesses in Canada’s preparedness to deal with terrorism at home and to participate in the war against it abroad. In many respects, Canada has been playing ‘catch up’ since 9/11, and is fortunate that, except for the military, its institutions, plans, and resources have not been truly tested by contact with the enemy. This portion of the paper will examine the Canadian response in the military, legal, and security domains.

Canada’s military involvement in the War on Terrorism has been the most visible portion of the response. In October Canada deployed a naval task group, eventually totalling six ships, to the Arabian Sea to assist American and other coalition warships in conducting sea control operations. The naval contingent, some 2,000 strong, was the largest component of the Canadian military action, code-named Operation Apollo. At about the same time, a small contingent (about 40 personnel) of Joint Task Force 2 — Canada’s anti-terrorist unit — deployed to Afghanistan to fight alongside American and coalition spe-
cial forces against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In November, Canada announced that it would deploy a battalion battle group of some 750 troops to Afghanistan to fight remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The deployment began in January; the unit became operational in February and was reinforced by additional troops, bringing its strength up to about 900. It conducted a number of joint operations with US forces over the next several months. In May 2002, the Canadian government announced that the battalion would not be replaced. It completed re-deployment to Canada in July. In addition to these combat units, the Canadian Forces also deployed three transport aircraft to support CF operations in the theatre. A reduced naval and air transport presence remains in place for the time being.

Given the size of Canada’s regular forces, this was a substantial commitment in numerical terms. Moreover, individually and as formed units, the deployed forces appear to have performed well. But, the deployment also laid bare all of the weaknesses of the Canadian Forces, eg: low state of readiness, insufficient personnel, inadequate equipment and logistical support, and lack of strategic mobility. Given its small size and on-going operations elsewhere, deploying a single battalion group (less than 1,000 personnel) to Afghanistan stressed the army to the limit.

Far from being the “First in, first out” that the former Minister of National Defence had once advocated, the Canadian troops were among the last to arrive, some four months after the American forces. Barely four months later the government announced that they would not be replaced. Though the troops had seen relatively little action, the operation could not be sustained beyond a six-month tour. While this confirmed everything that parliamentary committees and external critics had said about the state of the Canadian Forces, it also said a great deal about the priorities of the Canadian government. Maintaining Canada’s peacekeeping operations comes first; the War on Terrorism is clearly a second-tier priority.

By comparison with the army deployment, the naval contribution was disproportionately large. Yet, while it has conducted hundreds of boarding operations and searches in the Arabian Gulf, the navy has captured only two suspected terrorists in nine months on station. This raises serious questions as to whether the naval contingent was fulfilling a necessary purpose. Was there genuine evidence that many al-Qaeda operatives were fleeing Afghanistan by sea? Was there a real threat that al-Qaeda might attack the US fleet at sea? And if so, could the US Navy not deal with these problems itself? Or were these scenarios advanced simply to give some operational validity to a deployment which was largely symbolic, to show solidarity with the US? If its purpose was symbolic, then six ships seems like ‘overkill’, one or two would have sufficed. It may be fair to conclude that the naval deployment reflected a ‘capabilities-driven’ (rather than a threat-driven) strategic decision. More than any other element of the Canadian Forces, the navy is interoperable with its American counterpart, and sails regularly with American carrier battle groups. Whether or not there was a threat that Canada’s navy could counter, it was a readily deployable capability, easily integrated into American forces and their operations.

On the legal front, parliament passed omnibus anti-terrorism legislation (Bill C-36), which became law on 24 December 2001 (certain provisions were not enacted until 2002). Work on some aspects of this bill actually had begun before 9/11, as part of a long-term plan to update older legislation. So the 9/11 attacks gave momentum to a process that already was underway. Bill C-36 amended the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the National Defence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and a number of other extant acts of parliament in the areas of public security and human rights. With the proclamation of Bill C-36 into law, Canada also ratified two international law conventions: the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Convention, and the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Convention. In practical terms, the new legislation allows the government to designate certain groups as terrorist groups, making leadership of, participation in or assistance to the group illegal. Knowingly collecting or providing funds, directly or indirectly, in order to carry out terrorist actions, was also made illegal. Groups that support terrorism and related activities will not be able to claim tax-exempt charita-
ble status. Police are given additional legal powers and processes to investigate and prosecute terrorist financing activity. Property and other assets belonging to terrorist groups can be seized and forfeited. In addition, harbouring or concealing a terrorist becomes a crime. The law gives the police the power to conduct “preventive arrest” of persons believed to be about to commit a terrorist act, and lifts some restrictions on electronic surveillance of terrorist groups. It clarifies the powers of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) — the SIGINT agency — to gather foreign intelligence on terrorist groups that might attack Canada or Canadian interests, and allows CSE to undertake security measures to protect government computer networks from terrorist activity. It also allows the authorities to delete hate propaganda from websites and to prosecute those who damage religious property. Certain kinds of evidence, based on classified information, will be protected from open courtroom disclosure if its exposure would jeopardize intelligence operations. The law creates new offences for intelligence-gathering by terrorists and for attempting to enter or sabotage critical infrastructures. In short, Bill C-36 was a comprehensive package of anti-terrorism legal measures.

But controversy swirled around the bill, as politicians, lawyers, and human rights activists questioned both its necessity and its implications for civil liberties. Given that the Prime Minister himself had suggested that Canada faced no direct terrorist threat, it was not hard for critics to query the need for such legislation. By Spring 2002, the pendulum had swung far enough that the government was forced to withdraw a companion piece of legislation, Bill C-42, and replaced it with Bill C-55, the Public Safety Act, which was seen as less repressive.

At a relatively early stage the government began to allocate additional funding for defence, internal and border security. The first step, announced in October 2001, was to add $250 million to the current (2001-2) budget for border and airport security and immigration control. The second step was a much larger spending program, contained in the 2001 Budget (for FY 2002-3), tabled in the House of Commons in December. Significantly, the budget was titled, “Securing Progress in an Uncertain World: Enhancing Security for Canadians”. The budget promised $7.7 billion in spending over a five-year period to support Canada’s role in the War on Terrorism and to enhance Canadian internal and border security. Specific allocations included: $1.6 billion to deploy more police and CSIS intelligence officers, to improve coordination and information-sharing among police, intelligence, and security agencies, and to strengthen the role of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) in eliminating terrorist group financing; $1 billion to improve screening of visitors, immigrants, and refugee claimants; $1.6 billion for Canadian Forces operations against terrorism overseas, as well as to double the strength of JTF2, to improve Canada’s capacity to respond to CBRN threats, and to protect Canadian CI; $2.2 billion for air travel security, including the creation of a new federal air security agency, armed undercover police officers on flights, ‘state-of-the-art’ explosives detection equipment and improved training for baggage screeners, more police at airports, and securing aircraft cockpit doors; and finally, $1.2 billion for border security, including new technology and the creation of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs). The Finance Minister claimed that the main goal of the budget was “to keep Canadians safe, keep terrorists out and keep our borders open.”

Looking closely at the budget, critics suggested that in their view it did not commit the government to a long-term program to refinance defence. Their fears were confirmed when the Prime Minister said later that if the military needed more money, it would have to “get in line”. In fact, keeping the border open for trade was probably the government’s highest priority, since the Canadian economy is so dependent on cross-border trade. A more restricted border/trade regime would impact the Canadian economy far more severely than its US counterpart. Thus, it was essential to alleviate any American concerns about the supposedly “porous” border and Canada’s allegedly “lax”immigration/refugee policies. In this regard, it is hardly surprising that border security was featured more prominently than defence in the budget and in initiatives that followed.
Efforts to make the border more secure actually pre-date 9/11 by a large margin. For example, the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism was established in 1988, and a cross-border crime forum in 1997. These involve representatives from the many law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies of both countries, and their work supplements and enhances long-standing cooperative efforts. The Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum was created in 1999 to promote high-level dialogue with a view to streamlining and harmonizing border policies, increasing efficiencies in customs, immigration, and related activities, and collaborating on threats outside Canada and the US.

All of these efforts were given extra emphasis in the period immediately following the attacks. On 12 December 2001, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley and Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge signed The Canada-US Smart Border Declaration. The broad intention of the Declaration was to collaborate in identifying and prevent security threats before they reach North America, while facilitating the flow of regular travel and trade. Simultaneously, the two governments announced a joint 30-point Action Plan to implement the Declaration. More than a dozen initiatives in the immigration field included: the development of biometric identifiers for travel documents and fraud-resistant permanent resident cards; a review of refugee/asylum practices and procedures to ensure thorough screening for security risks; limiting access of asylum-seekers; coordinating visa policies, including watch lists and exemptions; sharing advance airline passenger information; and increasing the number of immigration officers overseas. Cooperation on these issues would be facilitated through the joint “Border Vision” process that began in 1997 to develop a regional approach to immigration through policy co-ordination, intelligence-sharing and joint overseas operations. Border Vision’s Working Group on Intelligence and Enforcement is supposed to achieve a joint intelligence-led approach to deterring, detecting, and preventing exploitation of illegal immigration by organized crime and terrorists.

Security initiatives included: reinvigorating existing joint efforts, such as Project Northstar, to improve cross-border coordination of law enforcement efforts through information-sharing, networking, training, and planning; establishing an integrated intelligence effort (e.g., joint analysis/dissemination teams and threat assessments); improved sharing of fingerprint data; addressing the legal and operational problems arising from joint deportation actions; and expanding the IBETs, which had existed as a pilot program for several years before being formalized in October 2001. IBETs and their marine equivalent (IMETs) are drawn from state, provincial and local police forces and the RCMP, the customs and immigration services, the US Border Patrol, and related agencies. They conduct joint patrols and operations and share intelligence, a process that has shown considerable promise in countering cross-border smuggling and drug trafficking. The Action Plan anticipates extending the areas covered by the IBET/IMETs, particularly along the Montreal-Windsor border corridor. In April 2002, the RCMP’s Customs and Excise branch became the Canadian ‘lead agency’ for the expanded program.

For CSIS, the 9/11 attacks came at a time when it was just beginning to rebuild its strength after several years of budget cuts and staff reductions of about 25% over some six years. Even before the attacks counter-terrorism was its top priority, but it did not have the resources to cover all potential threats. After 9/11, even more resources were diverted from other programs to the counter-terrorism task. The budget will allow CSIS to increase its strength by about 30%, but over a five-year period (which is, in any case, the amount of time it takes to train and develop a new intelligence officer). In the interim, it will have no ‘surge’ capacity, and will have to continue to ‘manage risk’, by allocating resources to certain priorities while downgrading others and by relying on cooperation with other agencies, such as the RCMP, customs, and immigration bodies. The Anti-Terrorism Act widens the range of terrorist-related activities that CSIS can investigate, and gives it additional powers to do so. But, realistically, it can never make Canada risk-free.

Finally, Canada is making a substantial effort to improve Critical Infrastructure Protection. In fact, following the US lead, and spurred by the Y2K problem, it had begun to do so before 9/11. The govern-
ment established the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) in February 2001, and has expanded its budget and strength considerably since. That said, OCIPEP has a limited remit, just as in the US, most of Canada's CI resides outside the jurisdiction of the federal government, in the provincial, municipal, and private sectors. So OCIPEP's role outside of government is likely to be limited to drafting national policies and standards for 'best practices', advising other levels of government, and stimulating and facilitating projects and cooperation between the public and private sector stakeholders. But it will be up to the latter to secure the CI themselves, and how much they do will depend on their priorities.

**Implications for Canada-US Security Relations**

As the foregoing suggests, Canada has a lot at stake — and much more to lose — in its relationship with the United States, particularly in its economic dimensions. It is an unequal relationship, in economic and military terms, between a superpower and a minor power. This asymmetry means that Canada has to struggle to make its voice heard in Washington, let alone to wield any influence there. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Canada quickly rallied to the defence of its neighbour and of their shared continent. It committed modest military power, legal, financial and other resources to the War on Terrorism, at home and abroad. But, what are the implications of this for the Canada-US security relationship?

In their article on Canada and Homeland Security, Michel Fortmann and David Haglund observe correctly that the Canada-US defence and security relationship was already changing when the 9/11 attacks occurred. Increasingly, that relationship was focusing on continental security. They go on to argue that the “Kingston Dispensation” — the idea (originally advanced by President Roosevelt and affirmed by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1938) that the two countries would not pose threats to each other and would come to each other's defence — is still valid. Indeed, 9/11 gives Canada-US defence and security cooperation greater salience than it has had since the early years of the Cold War. Jack Granatstein concurs, drawing not only on the long history of defence cooperation, but also the more recent trend toward force interoperability, and the issues raised by the US continental defence programs: National Missile Defence (NMD) and Northern Command. In light of all this, he says, “Canada must cooperate militarily as fully as possible with the United States.” The logic of these arguments may be unassailable, but defence and security are political issues, and in politics pure logic rarely prevails. Instead, attitudes, interests, and perceptions are likely to be more influential. Memories of 9/11 are already beginning to fade — at least in Canada and Europe — and as they do, ‘traditional’ issues, attitudes, and concerns, such as health care and the economy, are regaining center stage. The withdrawal of Bill C-42 and the Prime Minister's casual dismissal of extra funding for the armed forces are good indications that the political mood has shifted away from security concerns. Short of another catastrophic attack in the US or a more sustained terrorist campaign there (including attacks originating in or affecting Canada), the surge of support for defence and security so apparent in Fall 2001 seems destined to be an anomaly. Part of the problem may be that while defence specialists and some politicians instinctively recognize the link between foreign and defence policy, the benefits of such a link are not necessarily obvious to the public. In the context of the War on Terrorism, sending a Canadian battalion to fight alongside American troops in Afghanistan did not prevent the US from imposing duties on Canadian softwood lumber, risking the destruction of an industry and the loss of thousands of Canadian jobs. And — to add insult to injury — that after an American pilot had killed four Canadian soldiers in a ‘friendly-fire’ incident in Afghanistan. With these events in mind, Canadians could be forgiven for thinking, “With friends like this, who needs enemies?”

If the foregoing is correct, it may be reasonable to conclude that Canadian-American defence and security relations will remain substantially unchanged by the War on Terrorism. The long-standing trend toward closer collaboration between the armed forces of both countries will continue. But so long as the
current government stays in power — and, in light of the weakness of opposition parties, it seems destined to be there for a considerable period — there will not be a dramatic reversal of the deterioration of the Canadian Forces. The best that can be hoped for is that the erosion of its capabilities can be slowed or stopped. In the meantime, as the American military continues to evolve into a force shaped by the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, the gap between the Canadian and American forces seems likely to widen. 

This will tend to counteract the trend toward interoperability and will limit the utility of the Canadian Forces in joint operations.

So, while Canada may wish to have some say in defining the mission of US Northern Command, if only to ensure that it does not infringe Canadian sovereignty, it will have little to offer in return and is unlikely to gain a seat at the table. 

Nor will Canada surrender control of its side of the border or of ports of entry. A shared North American security perimeter might make sense from practical standpoint, but again, short of a major ongoing terrorist threat, the sovereignty ‘optics’ are unsellable, even if they are overstated. Clearly, joint border patrols and information-sharing are now accepted practice. But, that is a long way from posting American customs and immigration officers alongside their Canadian counterparts, looking over their shoulders and vetting all arrivals. The most the US can expect — indeed, what it has the right to expect — is that Canada will exercise ‘due diligence’ within its own territory and jurisdictions to ensure that its border controls, refugee, immigration, and other policies and procedures limit as much as is reasonably possible the ability of terrorists to infiltrate Canada and to use it as a base for attacks against the US. It is in Canada’s interest that it do so, for an attack on the US originating here would violate the “Kingston Dispensation” and could create irresistible pressures for greater American influence — or control — over Canadian internal security. The 2001 budget gives some reason for optimism in this regard, but the proof will be in its application over the long term. In the absence of a direct threat, it may be difficult for any government to sustain a significant financial commitment to increased security in the face of pressures to spend more in other equally vital sectors. Likewise, lacking jurisdiction over most of Canada’s CI, the federal government will be able to do little more than cajole the owners and operators to increase security.

That will mean, first, changing attitudes toward threats and security, and then increasing standards and procedures to match. That may be hard to do without a “clear and present danger”. However, those CI whose products serve the US market may see it in their own business interest to take the security issue seriously.

The 9/11 attacks may come to be seen in retrospect either as the start of a “Revolution in Terrorism Affairs” or merely as a tragic anomaly that was never replicated on a similar scale. What is clear at this point (August 2001) is that they have not yet ‘revolutionized’ Canadian-American defence and security relations.

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**Notes**

1 The author has addressed this issue in several (unpublished) lectures, eg: “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in a New Century”, address to Command and Staff Course 28, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 10 December 2001; and in testimony to parliament: “Terrorism in a New Century: A Perspective in Light of the Attacks on 11 September”, testimony to House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1 November 2001.

tacked/cdncasualties.html, “Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Manley ... to the CanAm Border Trade Alliance”, Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 6 May 2002, found at: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca


5 Ibid., pp. 110-111.


7 Remarks by WPD. Elcock, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, to the House of Commons Sub-committee on National Security, 27 May 2002. In his testimony to the sub-committee, Elcock was at pains to point out that the exact number of terrorist-related CSIS targets fluctuates over time and is, in any case, quite small.

8 Presentation by a CSIS official to an academic conference in March 2002.

9 These include, among others: Nabil al-Marabh, an illegal immigrant to Canada, who was arrested in Chicago in September 2001 and was charged in June 2002 with use of false documents to enter the US; Mokhtar Haouri, a Montreal store owner, convicted in January 2002 as co-conspirator in the Ressam bomb plot; and Mohamed Mansour Jabarah, a Kuwait-born Canadian from the St. Catharines area, who was arrested in Oman in June 2002 and is in detention in the US. He has confessed to being part of a plot to blow up the US embassy in Singapore.

10 Gunaratna, pp. 58-59, 76-80, and chapters 3 and 4.

11 In November 2001, court documents revealed that Samir Ait Mohamed, who was being held in custody in Vancouver, had discussed with Ahmed Ressam in 1999 plans to place bombs in two Jewish neighbourhoods in Montreal: CBC news reports, 30 November 2001.


15 For eg., in 2001 Hydro Quebec provided 4,430 MW of power to New York State and New England (mostly in peak summer months). See: Hydro Quebec - Transenergie “Our Transmission System”, 15 April 2002, at www.hydroquebec.com/transenergie. All of Canada’s electricity providers belong to the North American Electricity Reliability Council, and operate in three cross-border control areas that oversee system security and bulk energy transfers between the provinces and states in those areas. Canada is also the US’ largest supplier of crude and refined petroleum products, natural gas, and uranium: details in Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and the United States: A Strong Partnership”, at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca


18 For a description of the impact of the Ice Storm on CI and the resulting fatalities, see: Ibid., pp. 3-4.

19 Gunaratna, pp. 11, 36, 49, 60-69, 93.


21 There is some debate about the residual threat from al-Qaeda. The FBI asserts that it may have been reduced to no more than 200 operatives world-wide (report in Palm Beach Post, 30 July 2002, cited in Daily Defense News listserve, periscopenews.ucg.com.). However, Gunaratna, pp. 8, 54-55, believes that al-Qaeda is capable of regenerating its depleted ranks from the thousands of members of related groups who trained in its camps and who are now dispersed around the world.

22 Prior to 9/11 there had not been a cabinet-level committee on foreign affairs, defence, or security for many years. Then Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley acknowledged shortly after 9/11 that there was no single person in government responsible for national security. An ad hoc cabinet committee on security was created in October 2001 under Manley’s leadership.


34 Christopher Sands, Canada and the War on Terrorism: The U.S. Challenge on the North American Front, Canada Focus, vol. 2, issue 3 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2001), at: www.csis.org/americas/canada/focus/Focus/0110.htm


41 Granatstein, pp. 1-7, 13.
An Ipsos-Reid Poll released 21 September 2001 showed that 73% of Canadian felt that Canada should join the US War on Terrorism, although that number fell to 54% when the risk of terrorist retaliation in Canada was factored in. Polls over the next few weeks showed overwhelming support for a joint security perimeter and majority support for giving police and security agencies more power to suppress terrorism. But by December, opinion had shifted dramatically, with 86% saying the government should continue with its pre-9/11 agenda. 82% favoured more spending on health care, while only 16% wanted increased spending on security. By the end of that month, in the wake of the budget, 66% felt that Canada had done enough to support the US War on Terrorism, but only 28% felt that the government had allocated sufficient funds to properly equip the armed forces. See www.ipos-reid.com

See: Facing Our Responsibilities, p. 17.


Fortunately, a majority did not think that way Ipsos-Reid reported in April 2002 that while 44% of Canadians were very angry with the US over the incident, only 29% felt Canada should withdraw its troops in response to it.


Granatstein, pp. 11-13.

For eg., In the wake of 9/11, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission instructed all major nuclear facilities to initiate enhanced security measures, including a capability to mount an immediate armed response on site. See: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Background: CNSC Action on Nuclear Security Post September 11, 2001, CNSC Media Center, 19 November 2001. It has been suggested that more recently the CNSC has informed nuclear power plants that they must be able to repel an attack by a minimum of four persons armed with automatic weapons. Whether that minimalist scenario for an attack is realistic — in light of the innovative character of the 9/11 attacks — is open to question.
Arguably, the existence of a strategic defence partnership between Canada and the United States (US) has been most evident and pronounced in the aerospace sector. While elements of such a partnership do exist on the land (army) and maritime (navy) sides of the equation, they have been historically centered on the NATO linkage, and since the end of the Cold War on overseas operations from the Gulf, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, to Afghanistan. As a result, the land and maritime sides have largely existed at the operational/theatre level down to close tactical cooperation. Only on the aerospace side does their exist an integrated, institutionalized command structure — the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). As a result of this command, and the missions assigned to it, only in the area of aerospace has the bilateral relationship truly possessed a strategic quality. By virtue of NORAD’s overall mission in the defence of North America in general during the Cold War, and its role in providing Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) to the National Command Authorities (NCA), and through the US NCA to its strategic nuclear forces, NORAD has operated at the strategic level, and for Canada, it has provided its only window into US strategic level considerations. In so doing, its mission and this role has also provided Canada with a strategic entrée into outer space.

The strategic quality of the aerospace relationship also extends beyond NORAD and, of course, related close cooperation between the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Canadian Air Force (CAF). It also exists in the defence industrial and technology areas. The Defence Production Sharing Arrangements (DPSA), the Defence Development Sharing Arrangements (DDSA), the North American Technology Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO), and the evolution of corporate relationships, inter alia, has created an integrated North American defence industrial capacity, and this capacity is overwhelmingly centered upon the aerospace sector. Certainly, this integrated aerospace industrial relationship emerged for a variety of reasons independent of the NORAD elements. However, one should not ignore the symbiotic linkage between the industrial and defence components. NORAD provided Canada with access into strategic areas of US aerospace development and this access in turn created a conducive, or supportive environment for industrial/technological cooperation.

Today, this strategic partnership has come to a fork in the road. As the US moves in the near future to deploy a range of missile defences, continues to develop new technologies to practice space control, and proceeds to create a real global engagement, precision strike capability beneath the rubric of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Canada faces a difficult choice. It must decide whether to continue a strategic aerospace partnership, or transform the partnership into an operational or theatre one limited to North America and operating within only a portion of the aerospace sector. In fact, it must make a decision very quickly on the most pressing issue — missile defence. Failure to do so will likely result in having the decision made in Washington; one which will result in transformation to the detriment of a range of Canadian national strategic interests.
The Past

North American defence co-operation, dating back to Ogdensburg (1940), has always been problematic, yet essential for Canadian self-interest. Successive Canadian governments, Liberal or Conservative, have always been sensitive about a public image of Canadian subservience or satellite status stemming from the relationship. As a result, NORAD as the institutional embodiment of a strategic partnership has generally been downplayed. Rarely has it been portrayed as an alliance, but rather as a simple functional relationship driven by the Cold War and new technologies (the airplane and ballistic missile); in effect, almost a necessary evil. Furthermore, NORAD has rarely been seen as a strategic partnership, not least of all because strategic connoted nuclear weapons. Instead, NORAD has been compartmentalized, with a policy emphasis instead placed upon the NATO relationship, followed by the United Nations as representative of Canada’s internationalist role.

Certainly, the roots of aerospace cooperation that would lead to NORAD were primarily a function of the Cold War Soviet Union’s long-range bomber, and subsequently ballistic missile threat to North America. Canadian interests in pursuing the relationship, and agreeing to its institutionalization were a product of legacy of the World War II trade-off, and the geo-strategic location of Canada sandwiched between the US and the Soviet Union on the north-south axis. These two factors were the basis for the fundamental strategic interest of a close aerospace defence relationship with the US. The US would defend itself, and thus Canada, and thus Canada had a direct interest in ensuring that it was defended (and thus the US as well) in a manner of reflecting Canadian national interests. Thus, the heart of the aerospace relationship for Canada was obtaining the means to influence directly US defence planning.

With the primary threat aerospace, integrating the relationship created that avenue of influence, as much as anyone could hope to influence the relationship with a Superpower.

This institutionalized relationship on the surface concerned only North America, as both the US and Canada sought to isolate it from NATO and wider global US activities. However, it had two strategic qualities for Canada. First, Canada gained access to US strategic level activities manifested in the assignment of the ITW/AA mission to NORAD, which was supported by US space assets. In so doing, Canadians played a role in enhancing strategic deterrence by ensuring that US strategic nuclear assets would not be eliminated in a surprise first strike. In addition, the relationship provided Canada with a strategic entrée into space, especially after the establishment of Space Command in 1985. Canada was the only ally to obtain such a position, and its access to space thinking, planning, and operations were far beyond Canada’s capacity to obtain on its own. In this sense, it was Canada’s only window into the strategic, global picture.

Second, the value and importance of the aerospace defence relationship for Canada was much greater than North America. Certainly the relationship and NORAD provided Canada with a cost-effective method to ensure the surveillance of its national territory and airspace, and in so doing enhanced Canadian sovereignty claims especially over the North. But, it was the favourable operational and capital cost-sharing arrangements that had strategic significance for Canada. Given the relatively low levels of Canadian defence spending and the lack of will to invest greatly in defence, a national approach to airspace surveillance and sovereignty missions would have either absorbed most of the defence budget or required a significant increase relative to maintaining other Canadian commitments overseas. Thus, cost sharing enabled Canada to maintain its overseas NATO and peacekeeping commitments without increasing defence spending. In other words, Canada’s internationalist role was made possible by the cost-effectiveness of the North American aerospace defence relationship. It is in this sense that the North American relationship underpinned a greater role for Canada on the international stage, and elements of that role through the presence of Canadian Forces in Europe and UN peacekeeping as the representative of the West reflected a strategic partnership, albeit not fully recognized in this way during the Cold War.
A final consideration of the Cold War strategic relationship is found in the area of defence industrial cooperation. Notwithstanding the Avro Arrow myth, the development of the DP/DDSA within the context of evolving corporate relationships embodied a strategic partnership and trade-off. For the US, the relationship reflected core US strategic concerns about ensuring second-sources of supply and the dispersion of industrial assets. For Canada by virtue of its privileged access to the US defence market, it represented vital economic interests relative to technology and production in which the Canadian market was simply too small to support a viable independent base. Certainly, the relationship has had its irritants relative to behaviour on both sides of the border contrary to its spirit. Nonetheless, its existence and deepening into an integrated North American base, for all intents and purposes during the Cold War, spoke to another element of the strategic partnership, and with its dominance in the aerospace sector, directly relates to the strategic quality of the larger aerospace relationship.

**The Present**

The fundamental implication of the end of the Cold War for the aerospace relationship can be summed up in one phrase — territorial obsolescence. The ability of Canada to pick and choose about the aerospace elements it would or would not get involved in largely stemmed from its geo-strategic location. Canadian territory was vital for US strategic interests, and Canada could leverage its location to act only in areas deemed central to its foreign policy interests. Thus, for example, Canada could sidestep US Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) efforts without damaging the overall relationship. However, with the end of the Cold War, the new relationship with Russia, and the end of the primary military threat to North America, Canadian territory lost its strategic significance, at least until the attacks on September 11th, 2001. As a result, the aerospace relationship and the future of NORAD emerged quietly as an issue, and both became seen to revolve around the return of ballistic missile defence (BMD) to prominence on the US security agenda.

For Canada, the overall relationship as embodied in the 1994 White Paper remained conceptually restricted to North America. With regard to BMD, policy moved forward slightly to a somewhat more active role from that established in 1985, when the Mulroney government rejected official Canadian involvement in SDI R&D, but allowed for the participation of Canadian companies. Consultation on BMD became formal policy, and the government identified a potential Canadian role in the surveillance and reconnaissance elements relative to their potential contribution to other Canadian defence interests. Thus was born in nascent form the idea of a Canadian asymmetric contribution to BMD. It would evolve into ideas of a Canadian contribution to the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) and the possibility of deploying tracking and damage assessment radar on Canadian soil to facilitate the US National Missile Defence (NMD) effort. Most importantly, the idea of an asymmetric contribution has been a Canadian one, with the US largely leaving the door open with regard to a Canadian contribution, as well as Canadian participation.

Prior to September 11th, the future of the strategic aerospace relationship, and NORAD centered upon the issue of Canada participation in NMD made possible with the new clauses in the 1996 NORAD renewal allowing for new missions if both parties agreed. As far as can be determined from the American perspective, there has been no direct pressure on Canada to consider the use of its territory for radar, tracking centers, communications nodes and/or interceptor sites, not least of all because of the Article IX prohibition in the ABM Treaty (now defunct), even though a ground-based system for the defence of North America would likely be more effective with such sites in Canada. Nonetheless, the US proceeded through the NMD programme and its successor Global Missile Defence (GMD) to plan on the basis of no Canadian territorial involvement. Thus for Canada the only possible areas of participation rested in Command and Control and Battle Management (C2/BM), which rested outside the Treaty.
However, C2/BM participation spoke to the heart, and thus future of the strategic relationship. Canadian NORAD personnel as a function of the structure of the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC), and associated Air Defence, Missile Warning, and Space Control Centers occupied a variety of key positions in all of these centers, including the post of Command Director. It was through these posts in part that Canada obtained access to space and strategic level considerations. The proposed NMD system, once operational, hinged upon centralized C2/BM, which could have been assigned to either NORAD or SPACE Command. Without Canadian agreement, the mission would have gone to the latter, and because of the short time lines for decisions to release an interceptor and the key role of space in the BMD mission overall, the viability of Canadian personnel in the various posts was in jeopardy. Not only would space and missile defence become closed to Canadians, but also Canadian access to US strategic plans in both areas would disappear, and NORAD would likely have reverted back to an air defence mission only. Given the absence prior to September 11th of any serious air breathing threat to North America, the future of NORAD came into question.

However, the key issue for Canada today is not the future of NORAD per se relative to Canadian strategic interests. Rather, it is the loss of access to, and involvement in strategic level areas in the realm of space in particular. September 11th, not least of all because of the important role NORAD played in responding to the attacks and since then, has largely removed concerns about its future. The threat of similar attacks, alongside concerns about cruise missiles being launched clandestinely from ships off the North America coast, has provided NORAD with a vital air defence mission once again. But, there still remains the key issue of the BMD/space side of the equation for Canada, and it is this issue which will likely determine whether the aerospace relationship with the US continues to be a strategic partnership for Canada.

In this regard, too much attention has been paid to implications of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and little to the apparent merger of SPACE Command and STRATEGIC Command. The separation of NORAD from SPACE Command by virtue of CINC NORAD exchanging CINCSpace for CINCNORTHCOM, and thus the lateral move of NORAD itself raises significant issues about Canadian involvement in space. It is difficult to predict how this will impact upon the current structure of the CMOC not least of all because it hinges upon GMD. If Canada agrees to participate, it is likely that the ground-based component in Alaska would be operationally assigned to NORAD by virtue of the link to NORTHCOM, or some variant therein. Other space-related elements of the NORAD mission would remain, with little, if any need to physically re-structure the CMOC. Canada would not only maintain its strategic access, but also be in a position to provide a real asymmetric contribution by considering the use of its territory, and engage in more active research and development across the aerospace spectrum. In effect, it would amount to continuing the longstanding strategic partnership.

If, however, Canada either says no to GMD, or simply refuses to make a decision, it is likely that the NORAD mission would have to change, with possibly its terms of reference reverting back to the pre-1981 air mission only. The CMOC would be re-structured to remove NORAD personnel from vital GMD/space elements, with the status of key posts, such as Command Director at issue. Any attempts by Canada to argue that contributions elsewhere in the broader aspects of North American defense (land, sea, or air only), and/or limited aerospace efforts will not keep the strategic window open. The US will likely to operate on the principle of need to know, and with Canada outside GMD, and the symbiotic relationship between BMD and space, Canada will not need to know.

The narrowing of the aerospace relationship will not only affect Canada’s strategic interests with regard to space, and access to US thinking, planning and intelligence with regard to space as it concerns North America. It also will have four other significant effects. First, it will also close the door on the global, strategic picture that derives from space and with it the key elements of space linked to larger, global security considerations. Specifically, this relates to the key role of space in the practical elements of the
Revolution in Military Affairs. The net result will be Canada more dependent upon the US in operations outside of North America, because Canada will not have that key access and information that comes from the space linkage.

Second, with access to Canadians closed or narrowed, Canada's current space investment strategy, military and civil may be significantly affected. This strategy has hinged upon the close relationship with the US as evident in the Joint Space Project. There is no direct evidence that the RADARSAT II dispute related to Canadian policy on BMD. However, it may be harbinger of the future relationship on space, if Canada is on outside. Certainly, other options exist, such as developing the relationship with the European Space Agency (ESA). But, there are problems here as well, and certainly such a relationship or a more national approach which may be needed will not be as cost-effective, or as fruitful as close cooperation with the US.

Third, it will also likely effect the defence industrial/technological relationship. In the past, Canadian firms have been reluctant to invest in areas of R&D without the engagement of the Canadian government, as has occurred for example in the missile defence sector since the 1985 SDI decision. Canadian companies tend to view such investments as too risky. At the same time, the US is unlikely to provide highly classified data with regard to missile defence and space vital for a firm to engage in such R&D, because the Canadian government is not directly engaged. There are limits to how far the US will go in obtaining advanced technology offshore. Finally, US concerns about technology diffusion, which underpinned the recent International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITARS) dispute, are also likely to reinforce a US decision to forego Canadian company involvement. These are likely to combine to affect the decisions of US parent firms of Canadian companies on the type of work and R&D they will be allowed to undertake. Thus, the narrowing of the relationship is likely to impact directly on Canada's industrial and technological interests.

Finally, consideration also has to be given to the loss of Canada's privileged and unique relationship with the US as compared to other allies. Naturally, this is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the perceptions and beliefs that will be generated by a Canadian decision not to be involved in GMD, and their impact on Canada's status in this regard. It is important to remember the consternation of Canadians when Canada was not mentioned in President Bush's first address to Congress after September 11th, and when a US poll identified the United Kingdom as the US' closest ally.

The Future

Although US planners must proceed on a US only basis for the time being, this doesn't mean that Canada has lost the opportunity to engage in GMD, and, in so doing, protect its strategic aerospace relationship. However, the longer Canada waits, the more difficult it will likely be to engage because decisions have to be made sooner, rather than later. It appears that the opportunity will exist only until 2004, even though the NORAD agreement stretches until 2006 for three reasons. First, the GBI test bed in Alaska is planned to be operational in 2004, and this will provide an emergency capability for the missile defence of North America. Second, the next Unified Command Plan evaluation is legislated for this year, and the specifics about C²/BM among the various commands are likely to be settled at this time at the latest. Finally, it is a presidential election year, and the Administration will seek to ensure that GMD is well advanced, such that it will not be an issue in the election, and the next Administration, if Democrat, will not be able to undo its efforts.

Today, opposition to Canadian participation with the end of the ABM Treaty has now focused upon the weaponization of Outer Space. Canadian policy since the 1960s has opposed weaponization, and many fear that beneath GMD, or as part of GMD (the SDI legacy) lies the deployment of space-based weapons.
However, several factors need to be considered with regard to this argument. First, the technology to weaponize outer space is at least fifteen years into the future. Second, the key role of outer space assets relative to GMD is launch identification (which Canada has been engaged in through NORAD’s ITW/AA mission), tracking, target discrimination, and cueing. This use of outer space is consistent with existing practices and Canadian policy. Third, the case for space-based weapons goes well beyond missile defence, and is being driven by reasonable concerns about the vulnerability of critical military and civilian space-based infrastructure. In other words, weaponization is an issue driven by strategic considerations outside of missile defence per se. The linkage is that a space-based boost-phase intercept capability simultaneously provides missile and space defence as the launchers are the same.

Finally, and most importantly, the question is whether engagement in GMD traps Canada into the weaponization of outer space. Certainly, many of the arguments employed above suggest that Canadian strategic interests would be similar, with regard to space defence itself. However, it is difficult to predict the strategic world and Canadian political considerations fifteen or more years into the future. Engagement on GMD does not bind Canada to weaponization, and a future Canadian government can say no. Moreover, the answer to the future lies in the most useful ways to influence the US debate, as much as anyone can influence the US. It is difficult to see how Canada would be able to influence the US in the future at all if its strategic aerospace relationship becomes limited in the manner suggested above. Canada may stand on principle, but it unlikely to carry much weight in a US debate. On the other hand, Canada as a full strategic aerospace partner in GMD and elsewhere may be able to do so.

In conclusion, it is important to recognize that the weaponization issue is in the distant future. It is also vital to recognize that the key strategic issue of Canadian participation in GMD of today is not all or nothing. To decline participation by making an explicit policy statement in this regard, or by making no policy statement whatsoever does not mean that the Canada-US defence relationship, and much broader and deeper political, economic, and social relationship will collapse. Fears of economic punishment are simply unfounded, because of the complicated and compartmentalized nature of US politics. This is also the case for the defence relationship overall, especially given the importance of air defence, surveillance and control in the wake of September 11th. Certainly, concern must be given to the future here as September 11th fades into memory, if no future attacks take place. Nonetheless, in this area, along with many others, the integrated nature of North American security and defence, stemming from the complex interdependent relationship between Canada and the US, and the larger common values and interests of the two societies ensures that cooperation will continue.

They key issue is thus not cooperation itself, but the scope and nature of cooperation relative to Canadian strategic interests. Whether Canada should now also consider offering its territory to GMD with the ABM Treaty gone, needs to be evaluated closely relative to the payoffs for Canada in aerospace and elsewhere, which would likely be funded on a cost-sharing basis. Regardless, the relationship will change if Canada does not participate in GMD. The longstanding strategic aerospace relationship will likely become a limited air-breathing theatre or operational relationship, which will significantly affect Canada’s strategic interests and its role on the international stage. Perhaps, at the end of the day, one other point needs to be raised. Missile defence is designed to protect a nation’s citizens, and the fundamental role of a democrat government is to provide protection to its citizens.

Notes

1 This is a draft discussion paper for purpose of the September 5-6 Seminar hosted by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Please do not cite or quote without the permission of the CDFAI or author.
For the purposes of this paper, the aerospace sector also includes electronics, recognizing that there are significant land and sea elements in the electronics sector.

Essentially, the US pledged to defend Canada if it came under attack, and Canada agreed that it would not allow a hostile power to use its territory to threaten the US. In current terms, this is represented by the notion that Canada would not become a security liability.

As part of the downplaying of the North American relationship, security thinking in Canada was based upon the east-west axis with NATO at the center.

Reflecting this was the moribund status of the NATO Canada-US Regional Planning Group (CANUS-RPG). Internationally, this was evident in the various military interventions undertaken by the US, which Canada stayed aloof from. Certainly, Canadian peacekeeping did reflect a strategic relationship in undertaking key tasks, such as Suez, Cyprus, and the International Control Commission in Vietnam as a faithful ally and representative of the West.

These were (are) the Defense Support Program (DSP) infrared satellites in geosynchronous orbit, which are earmarked for replacement by the Space Based Infrared - High System (SBIRS-High).

Simply, a Canadian as Command Director in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) would have provided the ITW/AA to the US NCA with adequate time for a decision to launch its ICBM and bomber forces prior to the detonation of Soviet warheads.

Operational costs are divided on a 90 (US) - 10 (CDN) basis. Capital costs historically were 2/3rds (US) - 1/3 (CDN), with the exception of the 1980s North Warning System modernization divided on a 60 (US) - 40 (CDN) basis. Importantly, capital cost sharing entailed only Canadian infrastructure. The US paid 100% for infrastructure in the US.

On the US side, the irritants largely related to Canadian Industrial and Regional Benefits (offsets) and on the Canadian side to specific Congressional legislation limiting contracts to US only and Canadian access to black box technology.

Canada and the US negotiated an anti-ballistic missile clause into the 1968 renewal, which was only removed in 1980. In 1985, the Mulroney government announced that it would not officially participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the relationship was not damaged overall. However, it did affect Canadian access to US planning the aerospace sector until the early 1990s following the appointment of General Horner to CINC-NORAD/SPACE.

The contribution to the SSN began in the late 1990s with ground-based sensors, and is now transitioning to the deployment of a space-based optical sensor.

The agreement was renewed a year early with no changes and now extends to 2006.

The Bush Administration merged the previous independent Theater Missile Defence (TMD) and NMD programmes into a single overarching missile defence effort. Its architecture for the defence of North America entails a layered system of forward deployed naval and air assets, Navy Theater Wide and the Airborne Laser, and a ground-based mid-course phase layer now under construction as an initial test bed and emergency operational capability at Fort Gritli, Alaska. The term GMD is employed to distinguish the actual programme from the generic BMD concept, and also reflects the extension of BMD to US allies overseas.
The ABM Treaty contains no reference to C²/BM, and Article IX is explicit in reference to interceptors and radar. The only possible stumbling block here was Agreed Statement 1(G), which refers to the transfer of blueprints to allies concerning the construction of an ABM system and its components.

It was reported that the US Joint Requirements Oversight Council in 1996 expressed a preference for NORAD to take on the NMD mission, if Canada agreed. The alternative, at the time, was linked to NORAD at the top through the dual hating of CINC NORAD and SPACE.

The Canadian Space Agency (CSA) has had a long relationship with ESA. However, it is limited because of tendency of many in Europe to see ESA as a European-only institution, reflecting a component of the much bigger European Union political agenda.

The other major elements of GMD, Navy Theater Wide, the Airborne Laser, and the Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) are planned to be operational around 2007.

According to many analysts, space has now become a military and economic center of gravity for the West. Hostile states acquiring long-range ballistic missiles will also likely possess a space launch capability, which could enable them to employ, for example, nuclear warheads to destroy space-based assets as a crude anti-satellite capability.
Terrorism, Proliferation and the Myth of American Independence:

Multilateral vs. Unilateral Approaches to Security after 9/11 and the Implications for Canada

Dr. Frank P. Harvey
Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Professor, Department of Political Science
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

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The Conventional Wisdom

The emerging consensus in the literature on 9/11 is clear — the attacks on New York and Washington destroyed, once and for all, the myth of American independence. According to this view, U.S. officials can no longer remain complacent in the belief that they are somehow isolated from global conflict, or that they have the power to independently protect the U.S. from external (and internal) attacks. The death of independence, in turn, will inevitably have a profound impact on U.S. foreign and security policy. The death of independence, in turn, will inevitably have a profound impact on U.S. foreign and security policy. American unilateralism (a key feature of U.S. foreign policy prior to September 11) will be replaced by a strong preference for multilateralism, because only multilateral strategies and institutions can provide the coalitions and international cooperation required to address the security threats created by the forces of globalism. These arguments, predictions and associated policy recommendations represent the conventional wisdom on globalism and the inevitable (and rational) trend towards multilateral solutions to security after 9/11.

Unfortunately for those who embrace this conventional wisdom their predictions about the inevitable (and rational) preferences for multilateralism do not match the U.S. response to 9/11, nor are they consistent with the emerging trend in American security policy. Rather, the evidence confirms that the more insecure the U.S. becomes as a result of the globalization of terrorism and WMD proliferation, the more effort, money, time and energy the U.S. will invest in re-establishing independent, autonomous, self-directed, sovereign and unilateral control over American security. In other words, despite the reality of interdependence, and increasing levels of U.S. vulnerability and sensitivity to global events, Washington will continue to implement policies that prioritize re-establishing American independence. This is precisely why the American response to 9/11 has been so reliant on unilateral initiatives.

All of these efforts have one overriding objective in mind — to acquire more independent control over U.S. security. Officials in Washington are committed to becoming less dependent on other states and international organizations for the safety of American citizens, compelled to be less dependent on the United Nations, less dependent on European allies, and less dependent on Russia and the multilateral arms control regime. Compare for example the combined investments listed in Table 1 to the $870 million Washington still owes the U.N. in outstanding dues — a relatively straightforward illustration of American strategic priorities and commitments to multilateralism.

Washington is unlikely (and apparently unwilling) to heed the concerns expressed by multilateralists regarding the futility of American unilateralism. Nor are they likely to accept the obsolescence of geo-
Table 1

American Unilateralism after 9/11

- Short-term (unilateral) shifts in U.S. alliances and coalitions to combat immediate security threats, often at the expense of long-term, multilateral strategies;
- Accelerated deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence;
  + requested increase of $3 billion (to $8.3 billion) for Missile Defence (FY 2002/2003);
- Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (and multilateral arms control more generally);
  + refused to ratify CTBT;
- Re-interpretation of Geneva Convention regarding status of Al’Qa-ida and Taliban prisoners;
- Rejection of Land Mines, International Criminal Court, and Kyoto Treaties;
- Imminent invasion of Iraq to replace Saddam Hussein, despite growing international condemnation;
- Unilateral declaration demanding that PLA replace Arafat;
- Substantial increase in U.S. defence budget by $48b to $396.1 billion (FY 2002/2003) — the largest single increase in defence budget since Korean War;
- Revising regional command structure to include new Northern Command (NORCOM) to facilitate homeland defence and continental security;
- New cabinet level Department of Homeland Security;
- $30 million/day, $1 billion/month for the war on terrorism;
- $90 billion economic stimulus bill to deal with economic impact of 9/11;
- $39 billion for homeland defence;
- $20 billion increase for Intelligence (to approx. $40 billion);
- $23.8 billion on Border and Transportation Security (156,169 employees);
- $15 billion emergency assistance package for airline industry (cash and loans);
- $8.4 billion on Emergency Preparedness and Response (5,300 employees);
- $7.8 billion for Defense Department anti-terrorism efforts;
- $5.9 billion to enhance defenses against bioterrorism, including:
  + $1.2 billion to increase capacity for health delivery systems;
  + $2.4 billion for research and development on bio-terrorism responses;
  + $420 million for the Pentagon to study bioterrorists;
- $3.6 billion on WMD Countermeasures (598 employees);
- $3.5 billion to enhance response capabilities of America's first responders — firefighters, police officers and emergency medical workers;
- $1.4 billion to secure diplomatic facilities:
  + $755 million for security-driven construction;
  + $553 million for upgrades for worldwide security;
  + $52 million for a new Center for Anti-terrorism Security Training;
  + $60 million for public diplomacy through international broadcasting;
- $1.2 billion for the Secret Service (6,111 employees);
- $364 million on Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (976 employees);
- Over one hundred new bills, acts and other pieces of legislation passed by U.S. government since September 11, most of which assign new powers to FBI/CIA/NSA for surveillance and law enforcement;
  (Please see http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm)
- Established more state control over traditional non-security areas – e.g., air transport, trans-national finance, and refugee and immigration laws;
- Mounted extensive diplomatic pressure on Canada to pay additional $5 billion to improve Canada-U.S. border security, and to rationalizing refugee and immigration policies;
- Etc. …
graphic boundaries or suddenly acknowledge the death of their own independence. When it comes to protecting Americans after 9/11 there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that American officials are in favor of becoming more dependent on the U.N. or, for that matter, any other state, alliance, multilateral coalition, organization, institution or regime. Charles Krauthammer (2001) offers perhaps the most insightful interpretation of U.S. priorities after 9/11:

It took only a few hours for elite thinking about U.S. foreign policy to totally reorient itself, waking with a jolt from a decade-long slumber. After the apocalypse, there are no believers. The Democrats who yesterday were touting international law as the tool to fight bioterrorism are today dodging anthrax spores in their own offices. The very idea of safety-in-parchment is risible. When war breaks out, even treaty advocates take to the foxholes ... This decade-long folly — a foreign policy of norms rather than of national interest — is over ... On September 11, American foreign policy acquired seriousness. It also acquired a new organizing principle: We have an enemy, radical Islam; it is a global opponent of worldwide reach, armed with an idea, and with the tactics, weapons, and ruthlessness necessary to take on the world’s hegemon; and its defeat is our supreme national objective, as overriding a necessity as were the defeats of fascism and Soviet communism.

Critics are correct to warn that unilateral, state-centric approaches are destined to fail, because of the uncontrollable forces of globalisation (see endnote #1). But the futility of unilateral strategies is almost irrelevant today. What is relevant is that major powers will forever struggle to re-establish independent control over their security even in the face of failure. This fact should be the starting point for our theories, explanations and predictions of international behaviour after 9/11, and our policy recommendations as well.

The Inevitability of American Unilateralism

How does one explain this ever present and powerful fixation with maintaining independent control over one’s security, notwithstanding the evidence that successful unilateralism is difficult in a globalizing world? Doesn’t this imply that leaders prefer strategies that are not particularly rational, unlikely to enhance security and may actually make things worse?

On the contrary — what appears on the surface to be an irrational response to the contemporary realities of globalization is in fact a perfectly rational strategy derived from an objective assessment of the costs, benefits and risks of available alternatives. Unilateral approaches to security are never evaluated (or selected) in isolation — they are always compared to the successes, failures and overall potential of multilateral alternatives. With respect to that comparison, it is becoming increasingly apparent that multilateral approaches to security have not succeeded, and that unilateral strategies offer a better return for one’s security investment, with fewer risks.

The debate between supporters of ballistic missile defence (BMD-unilateralism) and their critics who favour reliance on the nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime (NACD-multilateralism) serves well to highlight reasons why Washington prefers unilateral solutions.

The main challenge for proponents of the NACD regime is the lack of demonstrable proof that multilateral arms control actually works. As a regime with a very specific and straightforward set of objectives it has never achieved the kind of success that would warrant giving its proponents the moral or intellectual authority to dismiss unilateral alternatives, such as BMD. Without this evidence there is no logical, empirical, legal, moral, or policy relevant foundation for embracing multilateral arms control. Several additional points related to measuring the success and failure of the NACD regime should be noted.
First, ongoing disagreements over appropriate criteria for measuring success and failure preclude definitive statements about the real (and relevant) contributions of the NACD regime to global security. For instance, should we rejoice in the success of indefinite renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or remain highly sceptical of the treaty’s capacity to prevent signatories (including, but not limited to, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria and Libya) from acquiring and/or selling prohibited WMD technology? Should we focus on the portion of any draft arms control treaty that achieves consensus, or the portion that remains contested because of a combination of insurmountable political, financial or military hurdles? Consider, for example, how much of the 450 pages of text in the most recent draft of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remain highlighted and bracketed — i.e., contested. Should we focus on the minutia of pre-negotiation concessions on the location and timing of the next conference, chairmanship, conference schedules, etc., or should we acknowledge the fact that the combined efforts of those involved in virtually thousands of similar conferences have failed to stop WMD and ballistic missile technologies from proliferating to states who want them? Examples of NACD successes typically highlight less significant accomplishments in the area of ‘process’ rather than ‘outcome’, or minor revisions to the text of draft treaties, because these ‘successes’ are far easier to identify. But this approach simply lowers the bar for measuring progress — indeed, the evaluative criteria for the NACD regime is increasingly removed from straightforward questions about whether WMD technology continues to proliferate and how we can prevent it.

Second, proponents of multilateralism are quick to offer as clear ‘evidence’ of success a long list of multilateral treaties, protocols, agreements and conventions; nuclear weapon-free zones; hundreds of multilateral declarations, verification programs, monitoring agreements, protocols, export control guidelines and clarifications/modifications/amendments and other MOUs. In addition, multilateralists are likely to list as illustrations of progress hundreds of governmental and non-governmental institutions, organizations, conferences, annual meetings, boards and agencies with arms control, verification and monitoring mandates; hundreds of U.N. resolutions and legal opinions designed to address proliferation; hundreds of independent departments, intelligence agencies and legislative committees established by western governments (with billions of dollars invested world-wide) to solve one or another part of the proliferation puzzle; and virtually thousands of non-governmental organizations and think-tanks with the same mandate receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in public and private funds. All of this activity is held up as concrete evidence of what four decades of multilateral arms control and disarmament activity has accomplished — incontrovertible evidence that multilateralism is alive and well.

But evidence that multilateralism is rampant and spreading does not, in any way, constitute proof of successful multilateralism. Notwithstanding all of this activity there is no demonstrable proof that we have dealt effectively with the proliferation problem, or that the planet is any safer today than it was before we engaged in all of this activity. Indeed, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (and their delivery vehicles) continue to proliferate and pose a more significant global threat today than ever before. Please refer to the following link for evidence of WMD proliferation — compiled by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University.

<http://www.is.dal.ca/~centre/NMDchart.pdf>

Two final points regarding the ‘choice’ between multilateralism and unilateralism should be noted. First, policy choices are not always a matter of ‘preferences’ but rather are products of systemic pressures that push leaders in one or another direction — imperatives, not choices, explain behaviour. “People and countries might shape systems, but systems shape countries and people. It is impossible to divorce the exercise of power from the context in which it is set ... A singularly unipolar political structure will produce, absolutely inevitably, a unilateralist outcome ... The sole viable alternative to unilateralism is not multilateralism, but isolationism.” In order to protect their own security and economic imperatives after 9/11, European, Canadian and Russian leaders simply cannot afford American isolationism and will
reluctantly come to support almost any U.S. foreign policy initiative (unilateral or multilateral), even while criticizing the approach in public.

Second, the unilateralism-multilateralism debate often creates a false dichotomy — there are no pure unilateralists or multi-lateralists, and one’s preferences are likely to vary from issue to issue, region to region, threat to threat. Historically, American foreign policy has exhibited elements of both strategies — in fact, some recent descriptions of contemporary U.S. strategy include multiple bilateralism and à la carte multilateralism. But Washington tends to receive far more criticism for its unilateral initiatives than praise for its contributions to multilateralism. This often creates an exaggerated impression that Washington prefers unilateralism even when the record is more balanced.

However, when it comes to American ‘security’ after 9/11 unilateral priorities are likely to prevail for the many reasons outlined in this report. In essence, multilateralism has become a liability and a security threat. It is perceived by Washington today as “a strategy by smaller states to tie the U.S. down like Gulliver among the Lilliputians. It is no wonder that France prefers a multi-polar and multilateral world, and less developed countries see multilateralism as in their interests, because it gives them some leverage on the United States.” These states are not driven by some higher moral imperative to create a truly global order based on justice and international law; they are motivated by the same fundamental imperatives that drive American foreign policy: power, security, self interest and survival.

**Implications for Canada**

There are at least two obvious predictions that follow from the preceding analysis. First, terrorism has become a fact of life for the United States. The U.S. will continue to be threatened by terrorism and will inevitably experience additional (and devastating) terrorist attacks. This emerging security reality will create enormous pressures on American officials to respond, and these responses will continue to mould and shape the U.S. foreign and security policy paradigm.

Second, current and future U.S. administrations will respond to terrorism with unilateral initiatives. These unilateral responses, in turn, will have a direct impact on Canadian foreign, economic, security and defence interests, especially if the security threat in question is alleged to have originated inside Canada. Several recommendations follow from these two inevitabilities.

1. Canadian officials should develop planning scenarios to help prepare for a variety of U.S. responses to terrorist attacks. The objective is to go beyond emergency preparedness (an obviously important component of immediate responses to terrorist attacks in Canada or the U.S.) and to begin thinking about how Canada could respond to a range of potential U.S. reactions. These responses should be coordinated in ways that avoid the negative consequences of being caught off guard, and that ensure Canadian interests are not jeopardized in the wake of U.S. unilateralism. The recent case of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian citizen suspected of working with Al’ Qaeda terrorists, illustrates the potential costs to Canada’s security. Although Mr. Jabarah was in Canadian custody (after being captured in Oman) he was recently shipped off to the U.S. without a clear explanation from either DFAIT or the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). “CSIS, no doubt, was interested in knowing everything that Mr. Jabarah could tell them about his recruitment to al-Qaeda and anything about al-Qaeda’s presence and operations in Canada.” But, as Wesley Wark rightly asks, if Jabarah had information about potential terrorist operatives and activities inside Canada then why did Canadian officials let this Canadian citizen go?

2. A coordinated legal and diplomatic action plan would also help to avoid the strong tendency in Ottawa to be reflexive when dealing with the U.S., or when facing any major international crisis. Canada’s reaction to 9/11, as Jeffrey Simpson accurately points out, was coloured “by a fear of being
seen to have agreed with Washington, and being accused of having ‘caved,’ ‘sold out’ or not ade-
quately protecting Canadian sovereignty ... A confident country, whose identity is rooted in its sense
of self rather than a determination to highlight differences, would not have worried, as the Chretien
government did, about criticism of being too close to the United States.” Simpson's observations go
well beyond Prime Minister Chretien's tentative response to 9/11 — the same pattern was repeated
over the last ten years in Bosnia circa 1990-1995, in Kosovo 1998, throughout the NMD debate, in
Canada’s initial response to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, in Ottawa’s subsequent PPCLI deployment
to Afghanistan, in our reactions to the U.S. NORCOM announcement, and, most recently, in our ten-
tative response to Washington’s plans to deal with Saddam Hussein and WMD proliferation by Iraq.
Waiting for the U.S. to act/respond may be appropriate when the policy in question affects some
other region or state, but reflexive responses are entirely inappropriate when U.S. actions have a
direct (and sometimes instantaneous) impact on Canadian economic and security interests. In a post-
9/11 environment, the imperative to be confident and proactive when crafting Canadian foreign and
security policy has never been greater.

3. With limited resources, however, Canadian officials should avoid the tendency to implement (and
pay for) quick fixes. This will become increasingly difficult as Canada gets swept along by U.S. uni-
lateralist pressures, but officials in Ottawa should be prepared to handle these pressures in ways that
steer U.S. unilateralism in more productive, cost effective, security maximizing directions. The objec-
tive here is to avoid unintended consequences and to prevent what Gladwell (2001) refers to as the
'paradox of law enforcement'.

The way in which those four planes were commandeered ... did not simply reflect a failure of our
security measures; it reflected their success (emphasis added). When you get very good at cracking
down on ordinary hijacking ... what you are left with is extraordinary hijacking ... The history of
attacks on aviation is the chronicle of a cat-and-mouse game, where the cat is busy blocking old
holes and the mouse always succeeds in finding new ones ... During the nineties, in fact, the num-
ber of civil aviation "incidents" worldwide — hijackings, bombings, shootings, attacks, and so
forth — dropped by more than seventy per cent. But this is where the law enforcement paradox
comes in: Even as the number of terrorist acts has diminished, the number of people killed in hijack-
ings and bombings has steadily increased ... Airport-security measures have simply chased out the
amateurs and left the clever and the audacious.

Similarly, Rubin (2001) has shown that almost all American security measures put in place since
September 11 are designed to prevent a repeat of September 11, and they will very likely succeed.
But preventing the same attacks from occurring again is a very small part of what needs to be done
— “Counterterrorist planners need to have some imagination in figuring out the more likely threat
and not just a rote repetition of the previous assault.” Solutions should avoid exclusive reliance on
inventing new technologies and should focus on making existing technologies work properly. Rubin
cites Israel's airport security systems as an example — it is among the most efficient and effective
airport security systems in the world yet has remained virtually unchanged since the 1960s.

4. Although the gap between Canadian and American objectives and priorities in the war on terror is
arguably quite narrow, there are specific priorities on which Canadians officials should focus. For
example, port security is a high risk area for future terrorist activity that demands proactive Canadian
planning. If Canadian security and sovereignty is a priority, then Ottawa should accelerate Canada-
U.S. joint planning under NORCOM and establish additional integrated enforcement mechanisms
with the U.S. for homeland security. Canadian officials should also seriously consider support, in
principle, for American ballistic missile defence, especially now that Canada's concerns about auto-
matic proliferation by Russia and China are no longer valid.
5. Officials in Ottawa must be better prepared to defend the security policies they put forward as alternatives to U.S. unilateralism, and should bring to the table more than the hope that multilateralism, if given enough time, will solve everything. Canadians must engage Americans on the right debates, with the right arguments derived from the right evidence. Take for example Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s reaction to current American plans to invade Iraq — “The question of the production of unacceptable armaments in Iraq,” the Prime Minister argued, “is a problem that is under the authority of the United Nations, and it is completely different than the problem of terrorism. If we try to do it unilaterally it will go absolutely nowhere.” The Prime Minister continues to urge the U.S. to work with allies and through the U.N. In other words, avoid unilateralism at all costs. As Fulford observed,

We Canadians love to lecture Americans on their shortcomings in world affairs, not because the Americans listen but because it makes us feel we are part of great events and bring to them a superior wisdom. While we habitually denounce all generalities made about culture, we are able to identify with ease what we consider the sins of the United States ... The idea of dealing even-handedly with both sides holds a particular appeal for Canadians. It, too, provides a feeling of cool superiority. Unfortunately, it may also leave us incapable of the one act that has always been essential to survival, distinguishing friends from enemies.18

But, from the point of view of our American allies, rejecting unilateralism without explaining precisely how Prime Minister Chretien's multilateral solutions will address these very real security threats is not particularly helpful. In fact, the Iraqi case is perhaps the best illustration to-date of the failure of multilateral organizations to control WMD proliferation. The U.N.’s inspection regime (UNSCOM) was the most intrusive multilateral arms control regime in history, yet it failed to prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. The suggestion that we work through the U.N. may appeal to some members of the Canadian public, but it will be ignored and dismissed by American officials who are responsible for protecting the American public and American, European and Canadian troops.

6. U.S. dependence on (and preference for) unilateral approaches to security (such as BMD) will have a direct impact on Canada’s ongoing commitments to multilateral arms control (NACD). If globalism diminishes the capacity of multilateral institutions and regimes to provide core security guarantees, and if these multilateral regimes become less credible and reliable as a result, Canadian officials will be forced to reassess Canadian priorities. Ironically, one way for Canada to increase respect from multilateral alternatives is to accept the fact that, occasionally, unilateralism may be the only option available for meaningful security. If we fail to establish that balance in our policies (and official statements) then Canada will face increasing marginalization on arms control and disarmament issues. To reject any and all unilateral options simply because they are ‘unilateral’, or because of some hope that, with enough time, multilateralism can be made to work, is not a credible solution.

Of course, given our middle power status and the relatively minor influence this carries on the international stage, multilateralism may be the only game in town for Canada. There is nothing wrong with this — Canada has done an outstanding (although not error free) job as the world’s favorite multilateralist. But Canadian officials should not assume that the priorities we are forced to accept by virtue of our position in the world should be imposed on others, simply because they represent the best (or only) option we have. Regardless of how commendable ones goals are of establishing a truly multilateral global order, the refusal to acknowledge the deficiencies of multilateralism is morally suspect. This is particularly true if there is no clear evidence that multilateral alternatives worked in the past, or can be made to work more effectively in the future. Indeed, the unintended consequence of maintaining an almost religious commitment to multilateralism is that weapons of mass destruction
will continue to proliferate, especially in places such as Iraq. Something more must be done today. If U.S. unilateralism is not the answer, then what is?

Notes

1 Globalism typically refers to one (or more) of the following five trends:

(a) death of geography — geographic boundaries and territorial borders/barriers are becoming increasingly insignificant, porous and permeable (soft) — state control over domestic economic, social and cultural affairs is diminishing as state sovereignty (i.e., the capacity to protect and promote national interests and values) evaporates;

(b) death of distance (space and time) — distances between countries (and cultures) are decreasing as information, communication and transportation (ICT) technology continues to improve. Advancements in ICT also increase the efficiency of financial, trade and military activities — i.e., the time required to perform these activities is declining, in some cases at exponential rates;

(c) sensitivity — as the planet shrinks, both small and large states are becoming more sensitive to economic, political and military crises that occur in any part of the world; relatively minor political, economic and military events are having a larger impact on states and regions in the system;

(d) vulnerability (ripple effects) — states are becoming more susceptible to the negative consequences of these crises, and these consequences are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing;

(e) death of independence — all of these pressures (a-d) combine to eliminate the capacity of both small and large states to maintain independent control over their own defence and security. The policy implications of this last feature will be addressed in more detail in section three below.


2 Lael Brainard (2001: op. cit.) — “The aftermath of September 11 confronts America with countervailing pressures. When a sense of safety previously taken for granted is profoundly undermined, there is a natural tendency to pull up the drawbridges and pull back from the world. And when jobs and economic security are put at risk, there is a tendency to look towards protectionist solutions.”

3 http://www.cunr.org/priorities/Arrears.htm


5 Citing Washington’s return to the U.N. Security Council after the attacks, Keohane (2001) argues that multilateralism offers a better explanation for the U.S. response to 9/11. The Bush administration needed desperately to legitimize its war in Afghanistan and required institutions and international law to accomplish this — “only the U.N. can provide the breadth of support for an action that can elevate it from the policy of one country or a limited set of countries to a policy endorsed on a global basis.”
But Keohane’s interpretation of U.S. actions and motivations is misleading, for several reasons. First, the U.S. response required very little ‘elevation’ to be endorsed as legitimate by other leaders. The deaths of over 3,000 innocent Americans provided more than sufficient justification for American retaliation. Second, expressions of support from almost every other country and international organization on the planet fully endorsed the U.S. right of self defence, as entrenched in the U.N. charter. That support was immediate, unanimous and virtually guaranteed, for the same reason — the destruction and associated devastation in New York and Washington. European leaders were competing with each to provide whatever assistance the U.S. requested, and all reaffirmed their NATO charter commitments to support the U.S. In contrast to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who received praise for his reaction to 9/11, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien lost credibility and enraged the Canadian public when his expression of support was slow, equivocal and ambivalent. European and Canadian leaders, international organizations and multilateral institutions needed U.S. to legitimize their reaction to 9/11 more than the U.S. needed them — Keohane got it backwards. While the Bush administration welcomed any and all support it received after 9/11, that support was never perceived as a precondition for responding, for the same reason NATO’s response to ethnic cleansing by Milosevic in Kosovo did not require a U.N. Security Council resolution for legitimacy.


7 Consider, for example, the competition between multilateral and unilateral approaches to border security and immigration surveillance. Given finite resources, American officials are currently weighing the benefits of, on the one hand, increasing the number of customs inspectors and x-ray machines at the U.S. border and, on the other, working with other states to examine containers at their origins and to coordinate visa strategies. As Brainard (2001) points out, terrorists often calibrate their visa strategies “to take advantage of different levels of scrutiny across countries.” Obviously working with other states to develop effective multilateral approaches will help. But when it comes to comparing levels of overall confidence, there is a natural tendency to be much less confident in strategies that depend on the expertise, motivation, good will and priorities of other states, especially if these states are not being targeted by terrorists. Lael Brainard (2001) “Globalization in the Aftermath: Target, Casualty, Callous Bystander?” Anlaysis Paper #12 (November). Washington: The Brookings Institute — www.brookings.com.

8 In fact, the only example of real progress on nuclear disarmament in the last half century was a product of unilateral moves by the Bush administration to exchange the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for deep cuts in nuclear forces to between 1700-2200.
For a discussion of what Charles Krauthammer (2001) refers to as the “utter bankruptcy” of multilateral arms control, see “The Real New World Order: The American and the Islamic challenge.” The *Weekly Standard* (November 12, Volume 7, Number 9). As Krauthammer points out, “[t]he 1972 Biological Weapons Convention sits, with the ABM treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in the pantheon of arms control. We now know that its signing marks the acceleration of the Soviet bioweapons program, of which the 1979 anthrax accident at a secret laboratory at Sverdlovsk was massive evidence, largely ignored. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union that the vast extent of that bio-weapons program was acknowledged. But that — and the post-Gulf War evidence that Iraq, another treaty signatory in good standing, had been building huge stores of bio-weapons — made little impression on the liberal-internationalist faithful ... The very idea of safety-in-parchment is risible. When war breaks out, even treaty advocates take to the foxholes.”

For details on the ‘products’ of four decades of multilateralism, please refer to any number of Internet resources — examples include:

  * [http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/CHEMICAL.txt](http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/CHEMICAL.txt)
  * [http://www.library.yale.edu/un/un3b1.htm](http://www.library.yale.edu/un/un3b1.htm)
  * [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/disarm/warfare.htm](http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/disarm/warfare.htm)

Tim Hames (2002) “Arrogance, ignorance and the real new world order.” *The Times of London* (February 15) — [www.thetimes.co.uk](http://www.thetimes.co.uk) — As Hames correctly points out, “Genuine multilateralism requires a multipolar order. That can only be achieved when authority is distributed evenly across a number of players (a transient event in human history so far) or if the largest power chooses, for some reason, to shrink itself to meet the occasion. That was the essence of American foreign policy in the decade between the Gulf War and September 11.”


Jeffrey Simpson (2001) “Timing is Everything for PM’s New York Trip.” *Globe and Mail* (Friday, September 28) — [www.globeandmail.com](http://www.globeandmail.com). As Simpson (2001) correctly points out, “rarely does our government take an initiative vis-à-vis the United States ... Governments have historically preferred to react to pressures, proposals and developments coming from Washington. That way they can pick and choose among responses, trying all the while to protect themselves from a public opinion wary of a government being seen as “too American.” ... The continuing Canadian hang-up in bilateral relations, much on display (in the Post September 11 crisis), is a persistent reluctance to take the lead in dealing with the United States, with the result that the Americans tend to take initiatives.”

Malcolm Gladwell (2001) “Safety in the Skies”. *New Yorker Magazine* (posted 2001-09-24). [www.newyorker.com](http://www.newyorker.com) “The better we are at preventing and solving the crimes before us, the more audacious criminals become. Put alarms and improved locks on cars, and criminals turn to the more dangerous sport of carjacking. Put guards and bulletproof screens in banks, and bank robbery gets taken over by high-tech hackers. In the face of resistance, crime falls in frequency but rises in severity, and few events better illustrate this tradeoff than the hijackings of September 11th ... The contemporary hijacker, in other words, must either be capable of devising a weapon that can get past security or be willing to go down with the plane (or both). Most terrorists have neither the cleverness to meet the first criterion nor the audacity to meet the second, which is why the total number of hijackings has been falling for the past thirty years.”

For a discussion of the unintended consequences of fighting the last war, see Barry Rubin (2001) “Don’t fight the last war.” *The Jerusalem Post* (Friday, September 28) — [www.jerusalempost.com](http://www.jerusalempost.com)
According to Lloyd Skaalen and Migs Turner (2002), “more than six million foreign maritime cargo containers pass through North American ports annually. According to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the contents of less than 3% of these containers are physically inspected. And when they are ‘inspected’, with potentially fraudulent certification, only one end of the container is seen.” See Lloyd Skaalen and Migs Turner (2002) “Put-up or Shut-up Canada!” Journal of Homeland Security (22 March). For an excellent account of the maritime dimensions of homeland security, see http://lipafletchercambridge.info/USCGFR.pdf


Robert Fulford (2001) “From delusions to destruction: How Sept. 11 has called into question the attitudes by which our society lives.” National Post (October 6) — www.nationalpost.com
The Canadian Navy:  
*Continental Maritime Security and Beyond*

Rob Huebert  
Associate Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies  
University of Calgary  
Rhuebert@ucalgary.ca  
(403) 220-3995

**Introduction**

The purpose of this paper is to consider the maritime dimension of the Canada-US security relationship in the wake of September 11. Since the attacks, Maritime Command has been working almost seamlessly with the United States Navy. It has committed almost its entire operational capability to the war on terrorism.

New demands have been placed on the Canadian Navy since September 11th. However, as the war on terrorism continues, Maritime Command still needs to meet its other, ongoing commitments. It will have to do so in the context of a political landscape that tends to ignore the contributions of the branches of the Canadian Forces, particularly the navy. This despite the fact that since well before the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Navy has been deployed as the first instrument of response to international crises.

Most Canadians are unaware that the Canadian Navy is a modern, well trained force that has a close working relationship with the United States Navy. During the Cold War, NATO commitments provided an opportunity for the two navies to train and to work together. The Canadian Navy has continued to develop many core competencies, such as anti-submarine warfare that was developed during the Second World War, which gives it a “blue water” capability; the Canadian Navy is one of the few navies that is able to deploy to almost any ocean.

After the end of the Cold War, the navy received 12 Halifax-class frigates and re-commissioned four rebuilt tribal destroyers. The subsequent purchase/lease of the 4 Upholder class submarines means that with the exception of having ship-borne helicopters and replenishment vessels, in 2002 the navy is an up-to-date, modern force. Except for polar waters, it has the capacity to operate almost anywhere on the globe.

While the importance of Canadian naval cooperation in NATO diminished with the end of the Cold War, the close cooperation between the Canadian and American navies continued. This is best indicated by the level of cooperation during the Gulf War and by the subsequent attachments of Canadian frigates to American carrier battlegroups. During the Gulf War, the commander of the Canadian taskgroup was given operation command in his area of operation. He was the only non-American to be given such responsibilities. In 1995, MARPAC arranged for one of its frigates to be attached to an American carrier battlegroup as a complete integration of the Canadian vessel. This successful integration has resulted in an annual attachment, except for one year when id did not occur. The American Navy benefits by being able to reduce the number of deployed frigates while the Canadian Navy has learned how the American Navy operates at its most intense level. Part of the Canadian commitment to the war on terrorism has been the commitment of frigates to serve with a battlegroup off the coast of Afghanistan.
The Changing International Environment

While the events of September 11th are generally perceived to be a new threat against North America, the reality is that attacks were the continuation of a trend that began with the end of the Cold War. Bin Laden had begun his attacks on western targets in 1992. Canada was targeted by international terrorists as early as 1985. However, the attacks of September 11th changed the perception of the seriousness of the threat and of the need to respond. The North American maritime dimension of this threat can be divided into three main typologies: target, prevention and response.

Target: As the attack on the USS Cole demonstrates, maritime forces can be targets of terrorist activity. While it is unlikely that an attempted repeat of the attack in Yemen would be successful, the symbolic nature of warships, plus the fact that both Canada and the United States continue to deploy their vessels to the Middle East, means that they will still be a potential target. The two navies already share information and it is difficult to see what else can be done to avert attacks besides constant vigilance when visiting foreign ports. This will be of particular significance if the war on terrorism expands in the Middle East.

Prevention: There is a limited, but important, role that the two North American maritime forces have in protecting North America from future terrorist attacks. It is necessary to tighten security over the entry into North America of foreign goods as concerns have been raised that terrorist organizations could attempt to smuggle dangerous materials such as explosives and even nuclear weapons into North America. The attacks on and the subsequent destruction of the World Trade Centres demonstrated that the enemies of the west do not hesitate to wreak severe damage in North American cities. However, the attacks and the prior arrest of Ahmed Ressam also demonstrate that it is easier to obtain the necessary weapons within either the United States or Canada rather than to smuggle them in. In the two well known uses of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., the 1995 Sarin Tokyo Subway attack and the use of Anthrax in the fall of 2001, the weapons were probably obtained in the country that was the focus of the attack. Both attacks demonstrate that tighter controls within the state are necessary.

It would be extremely difficult to acquire a nuclear weapon within Canada or the United States. While it cannot ever be assumed that a nuclear weapon cannot be stolen from an American base, it is highly unlikely. If a nuclear weapon was smuggled in, the most likely means of transport would be by sea.

With globalization, both Canada and the United States experience tremendous increases in the amount of maritime traffic entering their major ports and, consequently, difficulties in monitoring the traffic. There are several factors that complicate the task of monitoring. First, the containerization of maritime trade makes it very difficult to physically inspect all maritime cargo. Tactical nuclear weapons, given their relatively small size, could be hidden within the containers. It is very unlikely that any inspection system could ensure that all cargo would be inspected. In addition, there has been a trend in the United States and Canada to deregulate and/or privatize Port Authorities. Thus, security measures that were in place in the 1970s and 1980s have in the 1990s been scaled back and, in some instances, eliminated from most North American ports. While it is unlikely that a maritime route would be used to transport weapons or explosives into North America, it is becoming increasingly difficult for maritime forces to monitor and avert the potential risk. There is no question that the Canadian and American Navies and Coast Guards simply do not have the capabilities, let alone the mandate, to allow for proper surveillance of container traffic. Increased surveillance capabilities and greater shared intelligence are required.

Response: Maritime forces will play a pivotal role in North America’s responses against states that support terrorism as well as in overseeing bases of operations. For example, almost the entire operational capability of the Canadian Navy has been deployed to Afghanistan. Likewise, if the United States decides to attack Iraq, Canadian participation will likely be in the form of maritime assistance. Many Canadians
are unaware that even before the war on terrorism had begun, a Canadian vessel almost fired against terrorist targets. In 1998, following the attacks on the American embassies in Africa, President Clinton ordered an attack on targets in Afghanistan and in Sudan. The cruise missile attack was launched by an American carrier battlegroup which included a Canadian frigate. At the time, the Canadian Government had not yet endorsed its commitment to the war on terrorism. The Canadian vessel and a British frigate that had temporarily joined the battle group detached when the missiles were fired and then subsequently reattached to the group.

Following the September 11th attacks, the Canadian Government’s first commitment was to dispatch a Canadian naval task group consisting of two frigates, a destroyer and a replenishment vessel. At the same time, a Canadian frigate was attached to an American battlegroup that was deployed to the region. An overall deployment of five vessels out of a total of 18 vessels is almost the entire operational fleet. A general rule of thumb for most navies is that for every vessel that is in a state of operational readiness, one vessel will be entering a refit while another will be leaving and undergoing training. As such only 1/3 of a navy is ever actually ready for deployment. The initial Canadian deployment has already been replaced by a second deployment.

The main duty of the Canadian task group is to search for Taliban or al-Qaeda members who are attempting to flee by ship. Few have been caught but it is important to convey the message to these various organizations and their members that they do not have an escape route through the sea.

The next attack against international terrorism is unknown. However, American leaders have indicated that Iraq will be the next target. How and when such an attack will occur is unknown. It is becoming clear that international support for such an attack is limited. Considerably fewer bases will be made available to the United States than was the case during the first Gulf War. It appears that Saudi Arabia will not allow its bases to be used by the Americans. These limitations will amplify the need for using maritime forces. Canada can play a role in the use of such forces, however, it remains to be seen whether or not the Canadian government will agree to participate.

**Canadian Maritime Forces and the Evolution of North American Security Relations**

Having briefly considered the nature of the maritime relationship following the events of September 11, this analysis will now consider some of the costs and benefits to the Canadian Navy.

Of the three main branches of the forces, Maritime Command is best able to provide an independent contribution to the war on terrorism in overseas regions. Its units can proceed to any point on the globe that is bordered by an ocean and it does not depend on the assistance of others. Furthermore, it has the ability to maintain a sustained presence on its own. However, this ability is time sensitive in that the Canadian Navy’s two remaining replenishment vessels are old and will be taken out of service soon. While some discussion regarding their replacement has taken place, the Canadian Government has made no decision. When both vessels are withdrawn from service, the Canadian Navy will lose its ability to independently proceed overseas. The frigates and destroyers will be deployable only if allied refuelling arrangements are made, primarily with the United States by virtue of geography and the size of the American tanker fleet. Thus, any such deployment can occur only when the Americans have a tanker available in the proper location for Canadian use. This will severely restrict Canadian mobility.

The issue of replacing the two replenishment vessels raises the possibility of developing new force capability. Any replacement vessels would likely have a greater troop carrying capability, which would allow these vessels to be used in an indigenous, Canadian, strategic, sealift role. However, this capability would reduce the replenishment capability of the vessels. The ship designer would be challenged to achieve a
workable balance between these different requirements. Ideally, more than two of these vessels would be purchased, but it is unlikely given the traditional reluctance of the Canadian Government to engage in such expenditures.

Nevertheless, if new vessels are approved and built with a more robust, strategic, sea-lift capability, in the long term, Canada will have greater independence in deploying its ground troops in any future overseas operations. Canada could send its troops in accordance with its own agenda rather than having to wait for American assistance. This benefits Canada in two ways. First, it allows Canada to have the option of deploying its troops overseas even when the United States is not involved. While this scenario is presently unlikely, it is not impossible. At the same time, the United States would find a Canadian sea-lift capability to be to its own benefit. It would reduce the strain on American capabilities in a time of crisis. It is also conceivable that, in certain circumstances, the Americans would prefer that Canada use its own resources for the sake of appearance. For example, during the East Timor crisis, the United States did not want to appear as a major player preferring to have Australia take the lead. Presumably, Canada could find itself in a similar role in the future.

As mentioned earlier, the current Canadian naval deployment in the war on terrorism is a combination of direct integration into the USN and of independent action. The Canadian frigate that operated with the carrier battlegroup provided direct assistance to the American Navy. The task group allows for greater independent action with a Canadian identity. In terms of the attached frigate, such interoperability requires that its crew and its communications equipment be completely compatible. The major cost of such a deployment is the elimination of that particular ship from other duties. Once committed, the training and actual deployment can mean that the Canadian vessel is unavailable for up to eight months. With other factors such as refit time when the ship returns, the length of time where the ship cannot be used for other duties can be up to over a year.

There is also a political cost. Canada reserves the right to pull the vessel from the battle group at any point. However, since the integration is not a token act, such a withdrawal would create significant problems for the battlegroup. Therefore, any withdrawal from the battle group could not be made for frivolous reasons. Thus, when Ottawa decides that one of its vessels is to be used in this manner, it must be willing to accept the missions that have been forecast for the battlegroup. With the changing nature of the war on terrorism, the question must be asked: what would Canada do in the case where the United States wished to use the battlegroup to attack a new target? For example, under what circumstances would Canada allow its frigate to be used in an attack on Iraq? Canada would obviously need to make a decision about its participation. It could try to hide its participation as it did with the 1998 missile attack on Afghanistan. By disengaging for the actual firing, the frigate was able to pretend that it was not involved. But a war in Iraq would not be a short-term affair. If serving with a battlegroup, a Canadian frigate would be expected to perform its duties or would be replaced. This is not to suggest that this is an insurmountable problem, but it does require political decisions to be made on operational issues. Any withdrawal would come with a cost.

Canada will incur other costs for continued cooperation between the two navies. The USN is the most technically advanced navy in the world and it has no intention of slowing its rate of technological development. Canada will need to ensure that the technology on its vessels continues to be updated. In particular, the Canadian Navy will need to ensure that its C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence) remains compatible with the United States Navy. This will not be easy or inexpensive. But doing so will provide Canadian decision-makers with the widest range of options for future operations either with or without the United States.

Canadian maritime forces will also need to stay abreast of current naval weaponry technology. If Canada is going to continue to send its warships into missions with the United States, it needs to ensure that its
vessels are capable of responding to all threats. This means a willingness to maintain a general combat capability for its maritime assets. A continued willingness to engage with the United States is probably the most inexpensive and efficient way to gather the necessary intelligence on new threats.

Close cooperation with the American Navy will create opportunity costs. The overseas deployment of Canadian warships means that those particular vessels are unavailable for use in Canadian waters. For example, Canada recently re-engaged in northern waters sovereignty patrols for the first time since 1989. The intent originally was to send at least one Canadian frigate, if not more. However, with the demands placed on the Canadian Navy through its commitment to the war on terrorism, no frigates were available for “Operation Narwal”. Instead, two coastal patrol vessels were sent. Although the navy was still able to deploy, it did so in a much smaller fashion. However, the ability to still send naval units to the north underscores the fact that the Canadian Government was able to maintain its substantial maritime commitment to the war on terrorism and was able to engage in Canadian coastal patrols only because the navy is currently relatively robust.

The deployment of the two coastal patrol vessels to the north raises the one issue where Canadian maritime interests differ from those of the United States. There has been long-standing disagreement between Canada and the United States over the international status of the Northwest Passage. While both sides have agreed to disagree, current ice conditions have generally allowed the issue to be ignored. Scientists now believe that climate change will lead to a melting of the ice cover for some part of the year. The USN has already begun considering how its surface fleet will operate in an ice-free Arctic.

It is possible that this disagreement could be renewed in the near future. If this is the case, closer cooperation with the United States on the war on terrorism could be levered to reach a deal on the Northwest Passage that is acceptable to both states. Traditionally, the United States has been concerned with the precedent that would be set with Canadian control over the Northwest Passage. However, given the new concerns about the security of North American boundaries, it would appear that the current American administration might be convinced that internationalization of the Passage would run counter to its security. Although it is unlikely that the United States would formally withdraw its claim that the Passage is an international strait, it may be more willing to reach a compromise agreement. In return for the Canadian commitment to ensure that its northern boundaries are properly guarded with modern surveillance means, the United States would agree not to press its position in International Court. Canada would gain security for its claim and the United States would gain assurances that the northern tip of North America was properly monitored.

Conclusion

Does Canadian maritime cooperation with the United States impact on Canadian sovereignty? From the above discussion it should be apparent that as Canada develops closer maritime cooperation with the United States, Canada’s ability to act independently is actually enhanced. In order to cooperate with the United States in a meaningful manner, Canada requires a navy that is modern and combat capable. Such a navy, by virtue of the unique nature of maritime forces, means that it can easily be used by itself or in combination with other Canadian forces. The Canadian Navy is not dependent on foreign support or logistics to the degree that Canadian land and air units are. However, such forces are expensive.

Notes

1 Officially there is no Canadian navy. Instead the maritime elements of the Canadian Forces (CF) are under the control of Maritime Command. For the purpose of this paper, the terms Maritime Command and Canadian Navy will be used as the same.


In 1985, over 200 Canadians were killed and several hundreds other narrowly escaped death when bombs planted on an Air India and Air Canada plane exploded. The Canadian response to this act of terrorism has been universally seen as very weak.

One interesting aside is that prior to the attack on the *Cole*, the Canadian Navy had been offered fuelling rights in Yemen, but had declined them on the grounds of security. The American Navy considered the risks but had viewed them as acceptable.

This would include not only the naval forces but also the coast guards of the two countries.

It is assumed that if terrorists are able to acquire such weaponry it would be in the form of an ex-Soviet tactical weapon since they were more numerous and controls over them were weaker.


Land Threats to North America 
and the Role of the Army

Dr. Elinor Sloan

I have been asked to give my thoughts on the impact on Canadian sovereignty of a new Canadian/American defence relationship, and to do so in the context of land threats to North America. I have chosen to look at the role of the army in addressing these threats. Approaching this topic, the question that immediately comes to mind is what is the nature of the land threat to North America today? The answer to that question helps point us in the right direction when it comes to examining what role land forces may have in responding to this threat, how this might be done in cooperation with the United States, and what impact such arrangements would likely have on Canadian sovereignty.

Nature of the Land Threat to North America

Reports by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) are perhaps the best place to start when examining the land threat to North America. In March 2002 the director of the CIA testified before Congress that the most immediate and serious threat to the United States remains international terrorism. The CIA assesses that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups will continue to plan to attack the United States. Similarly, the CSIS public report published in June 2002 concludes that the threat of another terrorist attack by Islamic extremists or other like-minded groups on North America has not diminished. A senior Canadian intelligence agent is reported to have stated that when it comes to Canada “the threat is real, it’s immediate, it’s here.”

The September 11th attacks suggest that terrorists will continue to use conventional weapons, and the potential for a physical attack against North America’s critical infrastructures is an important area of focus for both the CIA and CSIS. But perhaps their greatest concern is that the ‘next’ international terrorist attack on North American territory will involve weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — that is, chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear weapons.

To a lesser degree Canada is confronted by domestic terrorism, as is the United States, but it is terrorism from international sources that is of greatest concern. Both the CIA and CSIS highlight the overseas dimension of the land threat to North America. The CIA draws attention to places like Somalia where the absence of a national government has created an environment where terrorists can find an operational base. CSIS notes that many of Canada’s security preoccupations originate abroad, making it imperative to identify and understand overseas developments that could become ‘homeland issues’ for Canada.

This brief discussion of land threats to North America reveals at least three things:

First, the threat is primarily, if not exclusively, from individual terrorists and not from states. This is distinct from, say, the air threat to North America, which could originate from a state actor in the form of a rogue state ballistic missile strike. This has implications for crisis prevention.

Second, the land threat to North America can be characterized as ‘doubly asymmetric’ in that it potentially involves not only unconventional parties (terrorists) but also unconventional means (weapons of mass destruction). This has implications for crisis response.
And third, although there is a notable domestic terrorism aspect — highlighted all too well in Oklahoma City in 1995—the primary origin of land threats to North America is to be found overseas.

Understanding the nature of the land threat to North America helps point us in the right direction when it comes to examining what role land forces may have in responding to the threat. Here the bottom line must be how best to protect Americans and Canadians from terrorist attack. “Protection” in turn, has two key elements: crisis prevention and crisis response.

**Crisis Prevention**

Crisis prevention falls primarily in the civilian realm when it comes to the land threat to North America. The threat is primarily from individual terrorists. What we are talking about here is the control of individuals as they cross the Canada-U.S. border, or as they disembark ships on the North American coast or airplanes at any number of international airports on North American soil. We are also talking about the need for intelligence on potential terrorists that may already be in North America.

Both the ‘border control’ aspect of the land threat to North America, and the intelligence dimension, lend themselves not so much to military involvement as to robust and well-resourced civilian agencies that communicate well with one another. Customs, border and immigration officials are on the front line of crisis prevention, as are intelligence-gathering organizations. In this context it is not surprising that in Canada’s first post-September 11th budget, released in December 2001, the Canadian government announced significantly increased funding over the next five years for border security, the screening of immigrants, and CSIS ($7.7 billion, less $1.2 billion for the Canadian Forces). Similarly, border security and intelligence agencies are the big winners in America’s $38 billion domestic security budget for 2003.

It is also in the area of crisis prevention that national efforts in Canada and the United States, and cooperative initiatives between the two countries, have moved forward most quickly. In the months after the attacks Canada tightened immigration and refugee policies and reassigned some 2,000 RCMP officers to antiterrorism and patrol missions along the border. Canada passed into law a new Anti-terrorism Act and started drawing up a new Public Safety Act. The United States meanwhile set up a new Office of Homeland Security and is now in the process of establishing the parameters of a new Department of Homeland Security. In terms of cooperative measures, last December Canada and the United States signed a declaration for a Smart Border initiative to increase border security while facilitating the flow of legitimate traffic. On the intelligence side, CSIS and the CIA, and the RCMP and the FBI, have increased their intelligence sharing activities to monitor potential threats.

Thus there is a lot going on in, and a lot of money being spent on, the civilian component of defending North America, otherwise known as homeland security. Running parallel to these developments is a substantial debate within the United States as to whether the role of the military in homeland security should be increased. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, first raised the question in his confirmation hearings a year ago. Since that time, some members of Congress have pressed for a greater military role in homeland security, particularly on the part of the National Guard, which has historically been trained and equipped as a strategic reserve for overseas combat. This summer, for example, there were calls for thousands of National Guard troops to be stationed on U.S. borders. Doing so would involve changes to Civil War-era legislation which bars the military from a domestic law enforcement role. Most recently, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, released by U.S. President George Bush in July, calls for a thorough review of laws permitting the military to act within the United States to determine whether there should be greater military involvement.

The question of the role of the military in homeland security is not generating the same degree of debate in Canada. With the increased continental focus one might expect calls for the militia or army reserve
to play a greater role in homeland defence, much as former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker assigned
civil defence and "national survival" duties to the militia in the late 1950s. But this idea has not been
seriously revisited. The first public report on Land Force Reserve Restructure, presented to the Minister
of National Defence in February 2002, confirms that national mobilization is the primary mission of the
reserves. However, there is some discussion of using the militia in "non-traditional roles" like domestic
NBC defence and critical infrastructure protection. Similarly, the Army's strategy document released in
May 2002 notes that the prevention and timely response to terrorist attack may lead to new Regular
Force and Reserve roles and missions. But overall the strategy has a strong expeditionary focus and looks
to increasing the Army's ability to combat the international dimension of terrorism.

The nature of the land threat to North America — the fact that it comes from shadowy individuals
rather than formed state units — is such that crisis prevention lends itself to a predominantly civilian
response. Increasing crisis prevention capabilities would best focus on more robust and better-resourced
border, customs, immigration and intelligence officials.

**Crisis Response**

The second point I mentioned above about the nature of the land threat to North America is that it is
likely to involve weapons of mass destruction. This has important implications for crisis response. In the
event of a WMD attack the first line of defence would be the nation's 'first responders' — local police
and fire department personnel trained as hazardous material experts, along with ambulance drivers,
doctors and nurses. They would work with those federal agencies charged with 'consequence manage-
ment' — the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the United States and the Office of Critical
Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness in Canada.

But the character of this component of the threat is such that there would also be a significant role for
the military. For many years the Canadian and American armed forces have been trained to deal with
weapons of mass destruction in an overseas environment. The Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons School at Canadian Forces Base Borden, for example, dates from the Cold War, long before it
was ever expected that such expertise would be needed at home. It only makes sense that the military's
skills in this area be used in the event of a terrorist attack on North American soil that involves WMD.

Both the Canadian and American militaries have developed units that can be called out to assist civilian
authorities if necessary. The Canadian Forces' Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Response Team is
designed so that it can work with the RCMP in responding to terrorist incidents involving WMD. Joint
Task Force 2 is also trained to operate in a WMD-contaminated environment. On the American side, in
1999 Joint Forces Command created a Joint Task Force – Civil Support to provide command and con-
trol of military forces in support of a designated lead agency in the event of a WMD attack. It is this task
force that is now being transferred to Northern Command.

The nature of their expertise lends the U.S. and Canadian armies to a significant role in the crisis response
aspect of addressing the land threat to North America. This would particularly be the case if a crisis were
to involve weapons of mass destruction, but one can also envisage an important military role in responding
to a conventional terrorist attack. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the military should be taking on lead
agency status for these missions. In creating Northern Command the Pentagon has been consistent in stat-
ing that in all cases where Northern Command's forces operate inside the United States they are to be in
support of civilian agencies. Canada has similarly well-established rules for military aid of the civil power.

It is in this context that one should view increased cooperation between Canadian and U.S. land forces
in responding to a land threat to North America. For roughly sixty years Canada and the United States
have had a basic security plan, with varying names, that provides for the coordinated use of both coun-
tries’ land forces in the event of an attack on North America. But North America’s geographical situation — the fact that there are no viable land routes for attack — has meant that the Canadian and American armies have never needed to formalize the land defence of the continent. Cooperative arrangements have focused on training opportunities, including access to training facilities and the temporary exchange of small land force units for exercises. Now the prospect of a land attack against North America, conducted by terrorists, is much greater. Since the military would likely play a substantial part in responding to a terrorist incident, particularly one that involves WMD, it would be beneficial for the Canadian and American militaries to more formalize their cooperation in this area.

A High Level Working Group of Canadian and American defence and foreign affairs officials is currently engaged in discussions on how Canada and the United States can better cooperate to enhance continental security and defence. The discussions do not involve Canada ‘joining’ Northern Command per se since this, like America’s other nine Unified Commands, is a solely U.S. operation. Rather, given that the Canadian and American air forces already cooperate in the context of NORAD, the group has been focusing on how the two countries can increase North American security from a maritime and land perspective. Recently it has been reported that the two countries are close to an agreement on setting up a bi-national planning and monitoring group, perhaps co-located at NORAD headquarters in Colorado. The planning group would write protocols for U.S. and Canadian troops to operate on each other’s territory under the host force’s control in the event of an emergency. The group would not represent a NORAD-like arrangement for land forces. There would be no formalized command structure, nor any assigned forces, and each emergency would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Such a planning group, in my view, makes sense if it does the following things:

First, it should look at possible scenarios that might demand land force involvement and establish in advance the appropriate procedures and modes of operation between U.S. and Canadian land forces. Moreover, it should look at how these forces would relate to the civilian authority of the country in which they are operating.

Second, based on these scenarios the group should propose appropriate joint training exercises between Canadian and U.S. land forces. It would be useful, for example, for specialized units of the two armies to practice responding jointly to a WMD terrorist incident that takes place on or close to the border. The idea would be to increase the ability of Canadian and American military response units to work together effectively and coordinate their activity in a WMD environment. Civilian agencies would usefully participate in these exercises since, unless the Emergencies Act were invoked, any military action would still be in support of civilian authority.

And third, the planning group should play some sort of a coordinating role with civilian authorities in the event of an actual terrorist attack.

Developing plans and carrying out training that would enable the military to more effectively respond to a crisis if so requested is a sensible approach. It is the monitoring aspect of the planning and monitoring group that perhaps raises some questions. This is because it refers, in essence, to crisis prevention and is an area where, as I have mentioned, better-resourced civilian agencies would best play the primary role. Protocols would have to be established whereby military monitoring information would be fed into the appropriate civilian lead agency.

**Overseas Dimension**

The third point I mentioned earlier about the nature of the land threat to North America is that the origin of most such threats is to be found overseas. This aspect of the threat calls for a significant role for
land forces in at least two broad areas: warfighting and peacebuilding. The warfighting role demands land forces that are more rapidly mobile and deployable than their Cold War counterparts, and yet are still highly lethal. While the overall size of armies should not decrease, their component units need to be smaller and equipped with lighter platforms armed with precision firepower. In Afghanistan a particular emphasis has been placed on special operations forces, however, in future conflicts armies that have transformed themselves in accordance with the demands of the new international security environment will likely play a greater role. In 1999 the United States Army launched a major transformation effort that is to be complete by about 2010. The Canadian army's new strategy document is also in line with the requirements of future warfare.

A second broad and increasing role for the army is peacebuilding. Failed states create an environment where terrorists can establish a base of operations to inflict harm on North America. Countries such as Afghanistan, where terrorists have been forcibly rooted out, continue to provide a security threat to the Western world until such time as they are reconstructed and stable. This would similarly be the case if military force were to be used to remove the regime in Iraq. The international warfighting aspect of addressing the land threat to North America is therefore only the tip of a very large iceberg that is likely to reveal an extended period of post-conflict peacebuilding. Although civilian agencies would play an important role, ground forces would be needed to provide the secure environment in which these organizations can do their work. It is for this reason that I argue that ground forces should not be reduced in overall size; rather their component units should simply be made more tailorable to the mission at hand.

**Impact on Sovereignty**

Thus addressing the land threat to North America has three key aspects: First, a crisis prevention element shaped by the fact that we are dealing with individual terrorists; second, a crisis response component strongly influenced by the prospect that terrorists may use weapons of mass destruction; and third, an important overseas dimension that recognizes that much of the terrorist threat to North America originates abroad. It is the second dimension, that of crisis response on North American soil, that is generating the greatest concerns about a threat to Canadian sovereignty — perhaps because this middle ground is most difficult to define. In particular, the prospect of American ground forces operating in Canada is raising alarm bells in some quarters. For this reason it is useful to look more closely at what we mean by sovereignty and the benefits to having cooperative arrangements in place.

Sovereignty is the power to choose. In a strict sense, then, if Canada should decide to step up cooperation with the United States in addressing the land threat to North America it would be exercising its sovereign right because it will have chosen to agree to put such an arrangement in place. Should the agreement go ahead sovereignty would still not disappear. Canada would still choose on a case-by-case basis whether or not to allow such cooperative arrangements to go into effect, depending on the particular scenario involved. And, to take this to yet another level of detail, should such cooperative arrangements go into effect, Canada would still retain its sovereignty because American forces operating on Canadian soil would be under Canadian operational control.

In terms of the benefits of cooperation, it is useful to recall that the number one responsibility of any government is to provide protection to the citizens of its country. Therefore the most important yardstick by which any agreement should be measured is whether or not it increases the security of individual Canadians. Answering this question involves looking at necessary response times. How much time do we need to effectively respond to a land threat to North America? NORAD was established because Canadian security demanded an almost instantaneous response to potential air and later aerospace threats to the continent. Forces and command arrangements had to be in place in advance because the time between when an aircraft or missile was detected, and when a response was needed to defend against them, was (and is) literally only minutes.
Land threats to North America do not travel so quickly. More time can be taken to assess the nature of the threat and decide on an appropriate response. But because the land threat is now from difficult to detect terrorists, and because it could involve rapidly spreading and highly lethal weapons of mass destruction that know no borders, lead times for effectively responding to a land threat to North America are diminishing. The time involved has not been reduced to the degree that there is a requirement for formal command arrangements and standing military forces, as is the case in NORAD. But it has been reduced to the degree that Canadian security would be enhanced if protocols for potential contingencies were place, and if the troops that are likely to be called upon to support the civil power have practiced together in advance.

Notes


xii Lieutenant-General George MacDonald, “Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the Unified Command Plan,” testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 6 May 2002. See also MacDonald’s testimony before the committee on 14 August 2002.
THE U.S.-CANADA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Working Group

Stephen Cundari
Jonah J. Czerwinski
James Kitfield
Dwight Mason
Christopher Sands
Foreword

From the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817, which limited armed vessels on the Great Lakes, to the NORAD agreement of 1956, Canada and the U.S. have shared common interests and values in innumerable ways, enabling both to prosper from their deep friendship. This policy paper, and the jointly held conference on September 5-6, 2002 in Ottawa, aims to strengthen the special security relationship for both Canadian and U.S. decision-makers.

It is fitting that the Center for the Study of the Presidency — which seeks to improve Presidential leadership and strengthen Executive-Legislative relations — should undertake this initiative. The Center also aims to raise the importance of consultation and cooperation and has partnered with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University for this endeavor.

After several months of consultations with leaders in the diplomatic and military communities, including direct consultations with the Vice President of the United States, the Center’s team for this project — coordinated by Jonah Czerwinski and advised by Stephen Cundari, James Kitfield, Dwight Mason, and Christopher Sands — found encouraging evidence of a long-standing and critical relationship between the United States and Canada in good health. But certain rifts also have emerged. Beyond the oft-cited disparities in defense spending, questions of infringements upon Canadian sovereignty have grown louder since the war on terrorism slowed and sweeping U.S. reforms accelerated.

A new Department of Homeland Security will be forged in Washington, but the greater challenge vis-a-vis our common border has already been met. When NATO invoked Article V of its charter after the 9/11 attacks, Canada, as a traditionally important and valued NATO ally, supported the United States. It is the purpose of this report to examine the unique binational partnership between these two allies in a new paradigm sparked by terror but managed by mutual cooperation.

David M. Abshire
President
Center for the Study of the Presidency
U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 1983-1987
Introduction

Far reaching reforms made all the more necessary by September 11 — such as establishing the Office of Homeland Security, standing up a new unified command for North America, and consolidating an array of government agencies — inevitably beg the question of how relations between the United States and her allies have changed. To examine the strategic partnership between the U.S. and Canada, the Center for the Study of the Presidency partnered with the Calgary-based Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa.

This report seeks to distill in a readable fashion the most critical aspects of the post 9/11 U.S.-Canada relationship. This report is part of an on-going series of CSP conferences, seminars and white papers aimed at strengthening the U.S. Presidency for better leadership. For example, a September 2001 panel report entitled Comprehensive Strategic Reform offers a number of recommendations on how best to reorganize U.S. national security decisionmaking structures to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Several of those recommendations have been implemented, and the Center continues to consult with the Executive Branch and Congress on additional national security reforms.

The Center for the Study of the Presidency owes the success of this report to the members of the working group and the generous input of those experts in the diplomatic and military communities of both the United States and Canada. With the benefit of their insights, and the perspectives to be shared at the conference in Ottawa on September 5-6, 2002, we hope to better inform policymakers on both sides of the 49th parallel, as they make vital decisions on the costs and benefits of greater cooperation between the United States and Canada.

Jonah J. Czerwinski
Senior Research Associate
Project Director
Center for the Study of the Presidency
The U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a U.S.-Canadian relationship so close and symbiotic that it is too often taken for granted was suddenly thrown into high relief. A Canadian general serving as Director of Combat Operations at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, gave the order to launch combat air patrols to protect American cities from additional attacks. With the closure of U.S. airspace, more than 33,000 passengers and aircrews bound for the United States touched down instead on Canadian soil, where they were welcomed with north-of-the-border hospitality and empathy.

As in past national crises — whether during two World Wars, in Korea, the Persian Gulf or more recently in Kosovo — when U.S. service members were sent into battle against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, they fought alongside Canadian forces. When a U.S. carrier battle group deployed from the west coast to Southeast Asia in response to the crisis, it included a Canadian frigate, bespeaking a routine yet virtually unprecedented level of defense cooperation between the two countries. A Canadian Naval Task Group on station in the Arabian Sea captured suspected Al Qaeda terrorists and handed them over to U.S. authorities. In a tragic “friendly fire” incident on April 17, four Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan made the ultimate sacrifice while defending our freedoms in the U.S.-led war against international terrorism.

Within just days of the 9/11 tragedy, another sinew in the tightly-interwoven U.S.-Canadian relationship also became painfully apparent. Both Daimler-Chrysler and the Ford Motor Company announced the planned closure of various U.S. auto assembly plants for lack of crucial spare parts produced in Canada and purposely delivered on a “just-in-time” basis to keep expensive inventories to a minimum. The Canadian parts were stuck in long traffic jams along a 5,526-mile U.S.-Canadian border where 70 percent of the traffic flows through just four major crossings.

In normal circumstances the free flow of traffic and goods along that lengthy border serves as an apt symbol of the largest trading partnership between any two countries in the world, conduit to over $1.5 billion in daily commerce and the crossing of over 200 million people each year. But as the weeks and months following the September 11 terrorist attacks all-too conclusively proved, these are anything but normal times.

In many respects, the September 11 terrorist attacks and the United States’ declared war on international terrorism have revitalized bonds of shared culture, values and geography that have long been at the center of the special U.S.-Canadian relationship. As history has amply demonstrated, in times of crisis officials in both countries know that their counterparts across the border can be counted upon for aid and cooperation.

As in past times of stress and dynamic change, however, the post-9/11 period has also forced Canadian and U.S. officials to make difficult adjustments in the formal and informal linkages at the core of their
relationship in order to meet new challenges. U.S. and Canadian officials, for instance, are in final negotiations over a proposed agreement to expand — possibly to include the realms of land and sea — the operational scope of NORAD, the cornerstone of the U.S.-Canadian security relationship. On October 1, the Pentagon will also stand-up the new homeland defense headquarters Northern Command, whose area of responsibility (AOR) will include the United States, Canada and Mexico. Last December 12, U.S. and Canadian officials also signed a comprehensive and far-reaching Smart Border Agreement designed to improve security and screening along the border, while not impeding the free flow of legitimate goods and people on which both economies are so dependent in this age of global trade.

The intense reappraisal of the U.S.-Canadian relationship necessary to formulate and implement those changes has not been easy or altogether free of controversy. Not surprisingly, relations between the two countries are often conducted most smoothly at the pragmatic level of day-to-day cooperation — whether at the border, between closely engaged Canadian and U.S. military and law enforcement forces, or in bilateral trade — rather than in the more politicized policy debates that occupy Ottawa and Washington, D.C.

Because they directly touch on issues of national identity, sovereignty and burden-sharing, the proposed post-9/11 reforms have raised difficult questions and highlighted some natural tensions in the relationship. If past periods of dynamic change and challenge offer any lessons, however, it is that the foundation of the U.S.-Canadian relationship will emerge all the stronger for a thorough examination of those ties that bind us as close neighbors, trading partners and strategic allies.

**Bound By Geography**

For better and worse, throughout their histories the fates of both the United States and Canada have been closely interlinked by geography. In the early years of America's fight for independence and its conflicts with colonial powers Great Britain and France, that natural proximity mostly bred distrust and tension. Though few U.S. citizens likely recall the fact from their history books, American revolutionary troops actually invaded Canada in 1775, capturing Montreal and nearly taking Quebec City. During the war of 1812, U.S. armies once again nearly gained control of Upper and Lower Canada. The Canadian fear of future invasion from the south was a driving factor in the move towards Canadian Confederation in 1867.

However, in the 20th century especially, with free peoples the world over threatened by the tyrannical scourges of fascism and communism, the United States and Canada formed a natural alliance based not only on their geography, but also on their shared values of democracy, rule of law and free markets. The turning point in formalizing that alliance came in 1938, when U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King came to an understanding that culminated in the Ogdensburg Agreement, which pledged mutual assistance to repel any attack on the North American continent. In formalizing the agreement the two nations formed a Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

In many ways, the tacit principle underscoring the Ogdensburg Agreement is still operative even after five decades of dramatic change in the geo-strategic landscape: the United States agrees to come to the aid of Canada should its northern neighbor be attacked, while Canada agrees not to let its territory be used by any entity that would threaten the United States.

During the long decades of the Cold War, numerous formal plans, memorandums of understanding and agreements between the United States and Canada added operational mortar and concrete to that framework of mutual security and defense. A classified Basic Security Document and Combined Defense Plan postulated a coordinated military response to various Cold War scenarios, including a Soviet invasion of Canadian territory and attacks on the United States launched over Canadian airspace. In addi-
tion to the Combined Defense Plan, defense and security cooperation between the United States and Canada is codified in more than 80 treaty-level defense agreements and more than 250 “memorandums of understanding” between the two defense departments.

In response to the growing threat from Soviet bombers, and later missiles, the United States and Canada further institutionalized cooperative security arrangements with the founding of NORAD in 1956. With its integrated early-warning and command-and-control capabilities — and its joint command, with the tradition of a U.S. commander and Canadian deputy commander — NORAD is arguably the most integrated binational defense organization in the world. Inarguably, it is the foundation stone of the U.S.-Canadian mutual security relationship.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, NORAD and the close U.S.-Canadian security relationship were largely validated. Canadian Forces immediately increased the number of aircraft assigned to NORAD missions, for instance, and NORAD soon broadened its scope of operations. In conjunction with civilian air control agencies in the United States and Canada, NORAD today is not only focusing on airborne threats originating outside North America, but is also monitoring potential threats coming internally from within North American airspace.

In addition to the Smart Border Agreement to better secure the U.S.-Canadian border, the two countries also created for the first time a Great-Lakes/Saint Lawrence Seaway Cross Border Task Force to target the illicit traffic of people and goods across the Great Lakes, a historical smuggling route going back to the 1920s Prohibition Era.

**Gaps in Defenses and Perceptions**

Despite the expanded scope of security operations and unprecedented cross-border cooperation, the aftermath of 9/11 also revealed gaps both in North American defenses and in the threat as perceived from Washington and Ottawa. While citizens of many nations were murdered in the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the psychological trauma undeniably fell hardest on Americans accustomed by history and experience to consider the U.S. homeland as sanctuary from direct attack. Foreign dignitaries visiting Washington since the tragedy have often remarked that the key new dynamic at play in world affairs is that the United States really does see itself as being at war, while even many of its closest allies have come to believe the crisis has largely passed with the fall of the Taliban and roll-up of significant portions of the Al Qaeda terror network.

Even before the 9/11 attacks, much of the rest of the world was attempting to adjust to a rare historical epoch. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has wielded preponderant military and economic power in relation to any potential competitors. In such a unipolar period, the primary foreign policy challenge for many nations of the world, America’s friends and potential foes alike, was how best to manage relations with Washington, D.C.

As successive U.S. administrations wrestled with the issue of how to wield the unprecedented muscle of a lone superpower in pursuit of national interests and as a positive influence in the world, tensions have arisen between Washington and even many of its closest allies, including Canada, over issues ranging from trade, global warming, arms control, peacekeeping, international justice, ballistic missile defense and the role of the United Nations.

While to some degree natural, those tensions must now be managed within a context of the September 11 attacks, and Washington’s determination to lead the fight against international terrorism and restore to the degree possible a wounded American people’s sense of security. In somewhat typical American fashion, the United States embarked on that mission at breakneck speed, launching airstrikes in
Afghanistan within a month of the terrorist attacks and prosecuting a war against international terror on multiple fronts abroad, even while beginning the largest reorganization of the U.S. government in 50 years in order to improve homeland security. For more deliberative and cautious European and Canadian governments, the pace of U.S. actions and demand for short-term, tangible results can seem at once dizzying and disconcerting.

It is against that backdrop that U.S. and Canadian officials have been negotiating for much of the past year the most fundamental restructuring of the U.S.-Canadian security relationship since the Ogdensburg Agreement and founding of NORAD in the 1940s and 1950s.

Given the sense of urgency and highly charged political atmosphere, it might be tempting for officials on both sides of those negotiations to resort to well-worn arguments about “infringements on sovereignty” and “inadequate burden-sharing”. Both sides must resist the temptation. Quite simply, the stakes are far too high in this age of asymmetrical threats, the strategic and economic interests for both sides are too clear, and the areas of fundamental agreement too broad and deep not to reach a consensus on the best ways to improve mutual security and strengthen cooperation between neighbors and natural allies.

Northern Command

The idea of naming a U.S. regional commander-in-chief and military command with responsibility for North America has been debated inside Pentagon corridors for years. After the September 11 attacks, however, that debate greatly intensified and momentum grew for a new command. As part of the biannual, Congressionally-mandated review of the Pentagon's Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Joint Staff and service chiefs were thus asked for recommendations on how the U.S. military could better organize itself for the war on international terror and the mission of homeland defense.

As a result of that process, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced on April 17 plans to create a new Unified Command called Northern Command, with responsibility for protecting the American homeland and coordinating the operations of U.S. military air, land and sea elements in its area of responsibility.

Because of its classified nature, the UCP review process inevitably created valid concerns on the part of Canadian officials. By necessity the Canadians were not formally briefed on the proposed blueprint for the new command until January, when it was first approved by President Bush, giving Canadian media months to speculate on the potential impact of the new command on mutual security arrangements. Clearly the creation of such a major command would affect the form and function of NORAD. But how exactly?

At first blush, the idea that a U.S. military command would have Canada within its “area of responsibility” was bound to set off warning alarms among Canadians alert to even potential infringements on sovereignty. The Canadian body politic remains determined to protect a national identity and foreign policy distinct of, and distinguishable from, those of the United States.

U.S. officials must also be sensitive to Canadian counterparts who sometimes rightfully feel that they toil in the shadows as junior partners in the U.S.-Canadian security partnership, their significant contributions oft-times going unnoticed or under-appreciated. Just as Washington does not speak in a single voice or easily adopt a unified position on such complex and difficult issues, so too have Canadians struggled to find consensus on the proposed changes in the security partnership. As both the United States and Canada have learned over the past 50 years as founding members of the North American Treaty Alliance (NATO), accommodating domestic political dynamics and respecting national sensitivities are critical to maintaining strong alliances.

However, a careful review of the planned Northern Command, which is scheduled to become operational on October 1, 2002, dispels most serious concerns. The commander of Northern Command will
be no different than his counterparts at the helm of U.S. regional commands in Europe, Asia, Central and South America and the Middle East (European Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command or Central Command, respectively). Each has a geographic area of responsibility, directly commands the activities only of U.S. forces in that region, and coordinates cooperative military-to-military engagements and exercises with friendly countries in the region. As regional U.S. commanders, none automatically assumes “command” over foreign forces within his area of responsibility.

Similar to Southern Command, which has no forces permanently forward deployed in its region, Northern Command will depend not on large standing forces, but rather on forces designated as available for its use under certain scenarios. Secretary Rumsfeld has also made clear that Northern Command’s main mission will be to support civilian agencies in times of crisis, such as helping organize a response to an attack using weapons of mass destruction.

No fundamentally new missions or roles for U.S. forces are envisioned as a result of the establishment of Northern Command, whose area of responsibility will encompass the Continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and a 500-mile air and maritime buffer zone around the North American landmass. The overriding goal of the new command is to streamline command-and-control of U.S. forces assigned to defend the United States. Up until now no single U.S. commander had direct responsibility for coordinating the defense of the United States, a state of affairs that the events of September 11, 2001 proved to be tragically unsustainable.

An understanding of Northern Command’s intended role and structure also makes clear what the new command will not be. It is not an instrument for integrating U.S. and Canadian armed forces under the command of a permanent, U.S. Unified Command. Canadian forces will continue to patrol their own skies and maritime approaches, just as their U.S. counterparts will below the northern border.

Any cooperative, military-to-military engagement will likewise honor the cardinal principle of selective participation that has long governed U.S.-Canadian bilateral defense relations. A Canadian frigate does not accompany virtually every U.S. carrier battle group deployed from the west coast because a U.S. military officer “ordered” it to. Rather, the arrangement persists because both the United States and Canada selectively judge that routinely exercising and demonstrating such interoperability between their naval forces serves each nation’s interest.

**NORAD: Strategic Keystone**

There is no question that establishment of Northern Command raises important questions about its relationship and impact on NORAD, the keystone of the U.S.-Canadian security relationship. To answer those questions, a High Level Working Group of senior Canadian and U.S. defense and foreign affairs officials has worked for much of the past year to discuss ways NORAD might be adapted to better interface with the new Northern Command and improve both countries’ defenses against future terrorist attack.

The bilateral talks have been careful and deliberative, reflecting an understanding that the High Level Working Group is entrusted with the future of one of the most successful binational security organizations in history.

From its present headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base and command center at the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, NORAD fuses intelligence and early-warning information from a worldwide and space-based network of sensors and radars.

Data from sensors in Canada is collected and analyzed at the underground complex at Canadian Forces Base North Bay, Ontario, then forwarded to Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters at Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg. From there, potential threat and tracking information is relayed to the NORAD com-
mand-and-control center in Cheyenne Mountain. If an airborne threat such as an unidentified aircraft is tracked and verified, NORAD can also coordinate a defensive response that is virtually seamless across national boundaries.

The first important decision has already been made: the commander of Northern Command will also command NORAD. At present, U.S. and Canadian plans for continental defense are divided between two commands, NORAD for air forces and U.S. Joint Forces Command, with Canadian liaison participation, for land and sea. In the aftermath of September 11, it is clear that a more streamlined and efficient command arrangement is required. Because the U.S. side of the equation will now be consolidated under NORTHCOM, it seems logical to consider extending NORAD's planning and deployment capabilities to include land and sea forces.

U.S. officials would thus like to see NORAD's operational scope — which is now limited to warning against missile attack and detection and defense against air threats such as bombers — expanded to include the maritime, land and civil support domains. That would make NORAD's organizational structure roughly parallel with the new Northern Command, which will likewise include air, land and sea elements, as well as civil support functions. That parallel structure is reflected in the fact that a four-star commander will wear two hats as the commander both of NORTHCOM and of NORAD, where he will operate with a Canadian deputy commander. This "dual-hatted" arrangement reflects long experience in NATO where, for instance, the U.S. four-star Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (who commands multinational NATO forces) also commands the U.S. European Command.

Significantly, as part of the Unified Command Plan changes, the U.S. commander of NORAD will no longer also head U.S. Space Command. That linkage was broken when Space Command recently migrated to U.S. Strategic Command. The move potentially averts a controversy brewing over Space Command's likely integral role in the Pentagon's proposed Ballistic Missile Defense system, which numerous Canadian officials and politicians have openly opposed.

U.S. officials have been quick to stress that the proposed NORAD reforms focus mostly on command streamlining, organizational efficiency, and force designation. The U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense has issued guidance, for instance, that the stand-up of Northern Command and changes to NORAD are not to require major increases in staff or new military construction. Costs and resource commitments should be kept to a minimum.

Meanwhile, U.S. and Canadian naval forces already routinely interact at numerous operational and planning levels, up to and including frequent exercises and joint deployments. With the proposed changes, U.S. officials hope to capture and formalize existing maritime cooperation — already spelled out in numerous military-to-military "memorandums of understanding" — under the umbrella of an expanded NORAD.

In terms of land forces, even military planners trained to imagine virtually every possible contingency cannot conceive of the need for joint Canadian-U.S. operations to repel an invasion of North America. U.S. officials can far too easily conceive, however, of the need for NORAD to coordinate military support for civil authorities involved in responding to the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction. In the case of a massive terrorist attack, NORAD might also need to rapidly respond to an order from national command authorities in Ottawa and Washington to coordinate the deployment of military forces to protect oil pipelines, power stations and other critical infrastructure on both sides of the border.

For their part, Canadian officials have made clear that they will not agree to any changes or reforms that diminish NORAD's stature, or subjugates it to another command such as NORTHCOM. Beyond that, they have adopted a "go slow" approach of weighing each proposed expansion of NORAD's mission against the cardinal imperative of preserving Canadian sovereignty and foreign policy independence.
Recently, Lieutenant General Macdonald, vice chief of the Canadian Defense Staff, has indicated that Canada would prefer not to formalize command channels and assigned forces for the land and sea missions into NORAD, preferring instead to leave such arrangements to be settled on an informal basis. Whatever the outcome of the NORAD reform talks, however, there is no reason, however, to view Canadian sovereignty and NORAD reforms as competing with one another.

As Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley has rightfully noted, NORAD has long served Canadian sovereignty by providing a mechanism for joint consultation on security matters of interest to both nations. Its regional structure — with the three NORAD subcommands each reflecting the principle of shared command between U.S. and Canadian senior officers — is likewise respectful of sovereign boundaries.

Perhaps most importantly, each nation retains the right to act independently of NORAD, and its actions are approved on a case-by-case basis. "The Canada-U.S. bilateral defense relationship has always been based on the principle of selective participation," Lt. Gen. George Macdonald testified earlier this year. "Our collaboration within NORAD has not undermined our sovereignty. If anything, NORAD has helped protect and enhance our sovereignty by establishing a bi-national structure that ensures Canadian participation in the defense of North America."

With the October 1, 2002 deadline for stand-up of Northern Command fast approaching, pressure is mounting for the High Level Working Group to reach agreement on proposed NORAD reforms. The results of their negotiations are not expected to be a treaty that requires Senate ratification, but rather an addendum to the original bilateral NORAD Agreement, or else a new NORAD Agreement altogether. This will build on the success of the NORAD model over nearly a half-century, and capitalize on the familiarity of both nations with the underlying principals and purposes of the NORAD Agreement.

As they attempt to reach consensus, both Canada and the United States might also take a page from the original drafting and focus on a broad blueprint and general principles that can be filled in later with operational detail.

In focusing on those general principles, U.S. officials would do well to remember that while the strategic importance of Canadian territory may have seemed to dwindle in an age of globe-spanning weapons such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the beginning of an asymmetrical war have made it newly relevant. As the capture of an Al Qaeda terrorist armed with explosives on the U.S.-Canadian border in December 1999 drove home, in the war on international terror geography and proximity matter once again.

For the Canadians, a long-standing principle of Canadian defense policy holds that defending the homeland is most effectively accomplished in close cooperation with the United States. That security cooperation, most obviously reflected in NORAD, gives Canada access to senior U.S. national security officials, significant influence in a joint decision-making mechanism, and access to the largest and most sophisticated intelligence-gathering system in the world.

**NATO and Burden Sharing**

When Canadian forces joined the U.S.-led campaign against international terrorism — naming their deployment Operation Apollo — they solidified their position as perhaps the most interoperable of all the world’s armed forces in terms of joint operations with the U.S. military. As mentioned, Canadian frigates even routinely integrate with U.S. carrier battle groups. Canadian forces were also second only to the U.S. military in terms of strike sorties flown in NATO’s 1999 war in Kosovo, largely because of the interoperability of Canadian CF-18 aircraft (a version of the U.S. Navy’s F-18), with U.S. command-and-control and strike elements. U.S. and Canadian air forces routinely train together during annual
“Maple Leaf” exercises in Canada, and, so far this year, 1,300 Canadian army reservists took part in Exercise Bold Venture at Fort Knox, Kentucky, which incorporates live-fire urban combat training.

As Canada attempted to deploy 2,000 men and women of the Canadian forces to Afghanistan, however, they were forced to get in a long line awaiting U.S. airlift due to a lack of strategic airlift in the Canadian arsenal. The incident highlights the increasingly difficult plight of a Canadian military that many Canadian analysts consider overstretched, underfunded, and badly in need of modernization. There have also been reports, for instance, that Canada's plans to contribute ground forces to Afghanistan were severely limited by inadequate medical infrastructure and insufficient logistical support.

“The condition of the Canadian Forces was in crisis before September 11,” according to a June 2002 report by the C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, based in Toronto. “Defense spending of $12 billion (Canadian dollars) in 2002 has proved insufficient to support even a force of 60,000 personnel (the actual effective strength in mid-2002 is at least 10 percent lower). Canada's defense spending of $265 (U.S. dollars) per capita is less than half the NATO average, and its 1.1 percent of gross national product devoted to defense is precisely half the NATO average.

According to the C.D. Howe report, authored by noted Canadian defense expert J.L. Granatstein, Canadian spending on defense equipment acquisition faces an $11 billion (Canadian dollars) deficit over the next 15 years, while the annual shortfall in the Canadian Forces' operations and maintenance budget is about $1.3 billion (Canadian).

“Army units operate at something approximating 50 percent of strength and, for lack of money, army battle groups train together only every three years,” according to the report. “Three navy vessels were tied up for want of sailors to crew them; and the air force is short of pilots and still years away from replacing its 1960s vintage Sea King helicopters. Very simply, the Canadian forces have all but lost the capacity to undertake operations for a sustained period.”

Canadian military officials stress that they have plans to upgrade the avionics of Canada's 80 CF-18s, and there have been proposals for Canada to buy or lease a handful of C-17 airlifters and build strategic sealift ships to improve Canadian Forces mobility. A defense review is also underway.

However, Canadian military officials concede that the problem is a chronic lack of adequate funding. The Canadian Forces had expected a major infusion of new funding in the December 2001 federal budget, for instance, with Canadian opinion polls suggesting support for increased defense spending in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Except for increased funds for some CF-18 upgrades and strengthening Joint Task Force-2, the Canadian military's small anti-terrorism force, the budget included few bright spots for military forces.

In assessing the confluence of stagnant defense budgets, a looming modernization crisis and an increase in the tempo of operations after the September 11 attacks, Gen. Raymond Henault, the Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff, was unusually blunt in an annual report released earlier this year. “The status quo,” Henault wrote, “is not sustainable.”

Burden-sharing tensions are nothing new within the NATO alliance, of course, and the United States has for many years implored its NATO allies to increase their defense spending to meet the alliance goal of three percent of gross domestic product. Given the size of U.S. economic output and the fact that the nation is embarked on a war against international terrorism, it is perhaps not surprising that the United States is far outpacing all of its allies combined in defense spending.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, however, Canada's refusal to adequately modernize or capitalize Canadian Forces that have already declined by roughly 50 percent since the end of the Cold War
raises particular concerns. Canada gains significant influence from its special relationship with the United States, and through its ability to link arms in a synergistic way with U.S. forces in times of crisis. By being so interoperable with their American counterparts, Canadian Forces punch well above their weight on the world stage. Losing that ability risks forfeiting a key pillar in the special relationship Canada maintains with its superpower neighbor.

A number of experts also worry that the lack of adequate Canadian defense spending may throw Canadian Forces into a destructive spiral from which it will be difficult to recover.

“There is a tipping point beyond which any effort to right yourself requires a really Herculean effort, and I think the Canadian military is already below it,” Dwight Mason, former co-chairman of the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense, told the Center for the Study of the Presidency. “You get into a vicious cycle where the amounts of money needed grow ever bigger until politicians throw up their hands and say we could never justify that level of spending, so let’s give up and leave defense of North America to the Americans. That’s dangerous thinking, however, because Canada has long recognized that in order to stay in the game and maintain its special relationship with the United States, they had to ante up a certain minimum amount of military capability. Canada has now fallen below that minimum.”

**Smart Border Initiative**

When U.S. Customs agents arrested Al Qaeda terrorist Ahmed Ressam on December 14, 1999, as he attempted to cross into the United States from Canada with a car full of explosives, they helped thwart a terrorist “spectacular” planned to coincide with Millennium celebrations. The result of intuitive police work and plain good luck, the arrest set off an alarm that became a clarion call for action following the September 11 attacks.

While initial concerns that Canada had become a hotbed for Al Qaeda activity were misleading — the September 11 hijackers, for instance, had received visas and were living in the United States — the Ressam incident did suggest that Al Qaeda had identified the more than 5,500-mile U.S.-Canadian border, the longest continuous, non-militarized border in the world, as a potential weakness. The cross-border trade thus put at risk accounts for 25 percent of the United States foreign trade, and fully 90 percent of Canada's foreign trade.

On December 12, 2001, both nations stepped forward to aggressively counter that vulnerability with the signing of the Smart Border Declaration, a 30-point action plan designed to insure the secure flow of people and goods across their common border, protect critical infrastructure in the border region, and improve intelligence-sharing and cooperation between U.S. and Canadian law enforcement and border control agencies.

The comprehensive Smart Border initiative may well become a model for other nations hoping to secure common borders and enhance the security of the global trading and transport system, as well as serve as a possible prototype for improvements along the U.S.-Mexican border.

“In addressing the global threat of terrorism we quickly concluded that national and economic security were mutually reinforcing objectives,” Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and U.S. Homeland Security Adviser Tom Ridge declared in a joint statement issued at Niagara Falls, Ontario on June 28, 2002. “We recognized that we could and must enhance the security of our border while facilitating the legitimate flow of people and goods upon which both of our economies depend. In short, we decided to develop a smart border — one where we could identify and expedite low risk people and goods, and focus our resources on higher risk traffic.”
In terms of better securing the flow of 200 million people who cross the border each year, the Smart Border initiative calls for the implementation by the end of 2003 of a border-wide NEXUS program to essentially create a “fast lane” for pre-screened, low-risk travelers. As part of the program, officials in both nations are working to develop common standards for international travel documents such as passports, and to harness new technology in the realm of “biometric identifiers” — such as fingerprints, facial recognition, and iris scanning — for reliable identification of travelers.

By next month new Joint Passenger Analysis Units manned by both U.S. and Canadian officials are expected to be up and running at airports in Vancouver and Miami in order to better identify and intercept travelers identified as “high risk” by a classified threat matrix system. For the first time, both nations are also now sharing Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data for air travelers.

To secure the flow of goods, U.S. and Canadian officials have also launched the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program to better align their procedures for processing commercial shipments. Drawing on lessons from existing supply chain security programs — including Canada’s Customs Self Assessment and Partners Protection program and the U.S. Custom Service’s Trade Partnership Against Terrorism — the program is a holistic attempt to establish a reliable “chain of custody” for all cargo. Such a chain would include certification that a cargo container, for instance, was packed in a secure environment; sealed so that its contents cannot be tampered with while underway; and transported under the control of a certified and responsible shipper.

To create incentives for companies willing to commit to the improved security measures, the program would also establish a “fast lane” for pre-authorized importers and commercial truck companies. Both countries are also trading Customs inspectors to better target “high risk” cargo, with U.S. agents deploying to Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver, and Canadian agents to Seattle and Newark.

A Binational Steering Group has been formed to assess infrastructure vulnerabilities, with some security improvements already implemented on bridges and tunnels in the border region. New transportation security agencies, meanwhile, have deployed cross-border Air Marshals and Aircraft Protection Officers, and fielded additional bomb detection systems, high-energy X-ray and Gamma-ray screening machines, and advanced information systems better able to weed out high risk people and cargo.

Intelligence sharing and coordination between Canadian and U.S. law enforcement agencies has likewise increased markedly under the Smart Border initiative. For the first time, for instance, Canada is now participating in a U.S. Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, and the two nations have scheduled a major Joint Counter-Terrorism Training Exercise for next spring. Under Project Northstar, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border will meet regularly to better coordinate operations and facilitate intelligence sharing.

Perhaps most significantly, U.S. and Canada have created six new Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS) composed of police, immigration and customs officials from the two countries. IBETS were first developed in 1996 as a way to combat cross-border crime, but are being expanded to address the counter-terrorism threat. The new teams bring to 10 the number of IBETS created to date, with a total of 14 planned in the next 18 months.

“September 11 demonstrated the depths of destruction that terrorists seek to impart to our peaceful continent. However, that tragic day also highlighted the strong friendship and cooperation that exists between the United States and Canada,” U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft said in announcing the new IBETS on July 22 at the sixth annual Canada-U.S. Cross Border Crime Forum in Banff, Canada.

The increased cooperation also spilled over into the legislative realm. Similar to the U.S. Patriot Act passed by Congress on October 25, 2001, the Canadian government introduced an Anti-Terrorism Act
that will make it easier to identify, investigate, prosecute and convict terrorists. The legislation defines and designates various terror groups, introduces tougher sentences for terrorism, and relaxes some restrictions on electronic surveillance aimed at terrorist groups.

In terms of immigration reforms, Canada has also increased the number of its Immigration control officers deployed overseas. In the past six years, Canadian immigration control officers abroad have stopped more than 33,000 people with false documents from boarding planes bound for North America. Amendments to its Immigration Act after September 11 also stiffened the penalties for people smuggling; gave Canadian immigration officers the authority to arrest foreign nationals in Canada unable to credibly identify themselves; and allowed for the termination of asylum proceedings if there are reasonable grounds to believe the claimant belongs to a terrorist organization.

**Conclusion**

The audacity that both U.S. and Canadian officials revealed in rapidly developing and moving to implement the Smart Border Initiative serves as a cogent reminder of how closely our nations remain bound by geography. Even in an age of global trade, instant communication and jet-age travel, the common space we inhabit in North America continues to shape and cement the unique U.S.-Canadian relationship.

Canada’s actions immediately following the September 11 tragedy also showed that deeper even than soil is the common cause of free and democratic peoples united in a time of crisis. It is that spirit of cooperation that both nations must now take advantage of in reshaping the U.S.-Canadian relationship to meet the emerging threats of asymmetrical warfare and catastrophic terrorism. Prime Minister Jean Chretien evoked that challenge on September 14, 2001, when he addressed the American ambassador before a crowd of 100,000 Canadians gathered in a day of National Mourning:

“Generation after generation, we have traveled many difficult miles together,” said Chretien. “Side by side, we have lived through many dark times, always firm in our shared resolve to vanquish any threat to freedom and justice. And together, with our allies, we will defy the threat that terrorism poses to all civilized nations. Mr. Ambassador, we will be with the United States every step of the way. As friends. As neighbors. As family.”

**Participants**

**Commander Stephen Cundari, US Navy (ret)**

Commander Cundari is a Special Advisor for Political-Military Affairs for the Center for the Study of the Presidency. In this capacity, he has contributed to the Center’s projects on US-Canadian affairs and NATO. Commander Cundari is a Senior Analyst for Science Applications International Corporation and works with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I. Previously, he served in the Pentagon for the Joint Staff as the Executive Assistant for the Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs Europe, as a Strategic Plans and Policy Analyst for the NATO and European Policy Division and as a National Military Command Center (NMCC) Briefer. As a naval aviator, CDR Cundari performed various operational assignments for the Navy within the United States and overseas in Europe and Asia, and he holds an M.A. in National Security Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He resides in Alexandria, Virginia, with his wife, Patricia, and three sons, Matthew, Bradley and Kyle.

**Jonah J. Czerwinski**

Mr. Czerwinski is Senior Research Associate at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and project director for the “U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism.” Prior to joining the Center
in June 1999, he was an analyst with the program in International Finance and Economic Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) then research assistant to founder and long-time CEO of CSIS, Ambassador David M. Abshire. While at the Center, he has focused on national security and foreign policy and was contributing writer on and research coordinator for the Center’s primary national security reform report entitled *Comprehensive Strategic Reform* (September 2001). He also was project coordinator and principal writer of *Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies* (October 2001), assistant editor and contributor to *In Harm’s Way: Intervention and Prevention* (December 2000), and assistant editor of *Triumphs & Tragedies of the Modern Presidency* (Praeger Publishers 2001). Mr. Czerwinski served as a participant in the George Washington University Center for International Health and its work on the intersection between health and international security, as a consultant to CSIS, and as a coordinator for the Trinity National Leadership Roundtable. Mr. Czerwinski holds a Bachelor of Arts in philosophy from Salve Regina University.

**James Kitfield**

Mr. Kitfield is National Security and Foreign Affairs Correspondent for National Journal magazine, a newsweekly on politics and government. He has written on defense, national security and foreign policy issues from Washington, D.C. for more than fifteen years, previously as a defense correspondent and senior editor of Government Executive and Military Forum magazines. Mr. Kitfield is also the author of *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War*, published by Simon & Schuster in 1995. Mr. Kitfield is recipient of the second annual Peter R. Weitz Prize for excellence in reporting on European affairs from the German Marshall Fund, the 2000 Edwin Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence given annually by the National Press Club, and is the first two-time winner received the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense (1990, 1995). He has twice won the Washington Monthly Journalism Award for Investigative Reporting, most recently in April of 2000 for an article he wrote about the overworked status of the U.S. Coast Guard. In 1999 he won the award for an article on the conflict between the media and the military during the Kosovo conflict. In 1987, Kitfield won the Jesse H. Neal Award for Excellence in Reporting from the Association of Business Publishers for an article on the vulnerability of the Navy's surface warships that preceded the tragic attack on the USS Stark by an Iraqi aircraft. Before moving to Washington, D.C. Kitfield observed the U.S. military in Europe as managing editor of *Overseas!* magazine, a publication for U.S. service members stationed overseas. His articles have appeared in *Omni*, *Newsday*, *National Journal*, *Penthouse*, *Los Angeles Magazine*, *Army Times*, *Air Force Magazine*, *The Stars & Stripes*, *Off Duty*, *The National Interest*, and other publications. Kitfield is a 1978 magna cum laude graduate of the University of Georgia’s Henry Grady School of Journalism.

**Dwight N. Mason**

Mr. Mason is Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He was, until recently, the Chairman of the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), a strategic-level advisory body consisting of military and diplomatic representatives from both Canada and the United States. In this capacity, he was responsible for advising American policy-makers, including the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on American-Canadian political military affairs. Prior to his appointment to this position by former President Bill Clinton in 1994, Mr. Mason was a Foreign Service Officer and served in a number of management and diplomatic positions. He has been the Director for the Office of Environmental Protection at the Department of State, the Executive Director of the Bureau of Management also at the Department of State, Staff Assistant to Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a Political Officer in Ecuador, Colombia and Morocco. In addition to Mr. Mason’s work with the PJBD, he has gained extensive experience in Canada serving twice at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa first as Counselor for Political Affairs and subsequently as Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister. Currently he is a consultant to the law firm of Dilworth, Paxson. Mr. Mason holds
Christopher Sands

Mr. Sands directs the Canada Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center’s ongoing research effort on Canadian affairs. In this capacity, he has written on Canadian politics, Canada-U.S. relations, Quebec separatism, NAFTA, the North American auto industry, Canadian culture and trade, and the role of the U.S. Congress in North America. He is the author of two regular CSIS publications that appear on its Web site: *Canada Focus* and the *North American Integration Monitor*. Notable publications include *The North American Auto Industry Under NAFTA* (CSIS, 1998), edited with Sidney Weintraub, and “Fading Power or Rising Power: 11 September and Lessons from the Section 110 Experience,” a chapter in *Canada Among Nations* 2002 (Oxford, 2002). Prior to joining CSIS, he was the Canadian affairs specialist for the Michigan World Trade Center, led a state of Michigan office charged with the promotion of trade and investment with Canada, and in 1990 served on Michigan governor James J. Blanchard’s Task Force on International Trade. In 1999, he was a Fulbright Scholar and visiting fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa. Mr. Sands holds a B.A. in political science from Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, and an M.A. in Canadian studies and international economics from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, where he is currently pursuing a doctorate in international relations and economics.

About the Center for the Study of the Presidency

The Center for the Study of the Presidency, founded in 1969, is a non-profit, non-partisan 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to serving as a central resource addressing issues affecting the modern Presidency. As the foremost organization in the United States dedicated to this effort, the Center endeavors to examine all aspects of the American Presidency. The Center also publishes the award winning Presidential Studies Quarterly (ISSN 0360-4918).

In late 1999, the Center for the Study of the Presidency began a series of projects and initiatives focusing on a variety of related issues that lead to a report to the President-elect in early 2001. Working with scholars, practitioners, and seasoned government experts, the Center completed the aforementioned by publishing a book of case studies and an in-depth review of Presidential decision-making in Cold War and post-Cold War military interventions. Efforts contributing to this work eventually identified new challenges to, as well as new solutions for, Presidential leadership in the 21st Century, and this project is a part of that ongoing dialogue.

Other CSP Publications Include:


*Marshalling Science, Bridging the Gap: How to Win the War on Terrorism and Build a Better Peace* (Washington, DC, 2002)

*A Panel Report to the President and Congress on Comprehensive Strategic Reform* (Washington, DC, 2001)

*A Call for Transformational Leadership: U.S. and Japan* (Tokyo, 2001)

Dialogue on Presidential Leadership: The President, Congress, and the Media (Washington, DC, 2000)

In Harm’s Way: Intervention and Prevention (Washington, DC, 2000)
