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**CANADIAN DEFENCE AND THE CANADA-US  
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP**

**-Conference Report-**

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## **Executive Summary:**

- The axiom that post-Cold War era threats – particularly in the form of global terrorism - see no borders is true, in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. While Canada might not be a primary target, there are different ways in which Canada is in the crosshairs of global terrorism; highlighting the need for closer cooperation between Canada and the United States in dealing with these terrorist threats.
- While Canada and the United States have a strong partnership, more needs to be done to further strengthen this relationship in terms of enhancing the security of both countries; closer cooperation will not lead to diminishing sovereignty in the Canadian context, but it will also enhance Canada's ability to act independently.
- While the war on terrorism has brought Canada and the United States closer together than ever before because of our common borders and waterways, there is a perception that Canada is not doing enough, and needs to contribute more in terms of burden sharing, since free riding is ultimately detrimental to Canadian security. In this context, the consequences of failing to increase defence spending in Canada, for example, should be more clearly communicated to Canadian officials.

## **Introduction**

The future of Canadian defence and the Canada-US relationship has become a topic of great interest since September 11, 2001. The tragic events of September 11 fundamentally altered the post-Cold War landscape, and significantly exposed the strategic vulnerability not only of the US but the North American continent as a whole, and have engendered debate on Canada-US security issues. There have been calls for re-orienting the strategic partnership in terms of heightened levels of cooperation to defend North America from the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. A relationship, which must be premised on the fact that these threats do not respect borders. There is evidence to suggest that the long-standing and critical relationship between the two countries is still strong. Nevertheless, certain rifts have also emerged. Beyond the oft-noted disparities in defence spending, questions of infringements upon Canadian sovereignty have often been heard since the war on terrorism slowed and sweeping US reforms accelerated.

The theme of the conference revolved around an examination of the unique binational strategic partnership between these two allies and the challenges posed by a new paradigm sparked by terror but managed by mutual cooperation. This monograph represents a summary of the presentations and discussions at the conference.

## **The United States and Canada as Historic Allies: The NATO perspective**

Locating the partnership within a wider historical context, the first presenter noted that NATO is an alliance of mutual purpose and mutual returns, Canada being a founding member in 1949. The need for creation of a unified command led the North Atlantic Assembly in 1956-58 to establish the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) as the most integrated bilateral organization. With the end of the Cold War, some have argued that NATO is no longer needed. However, September 11 shattered this thinking about the US as a superpower, never being so strong yet so vulnerable (and by extension Canada). It revealed terrorists could smuggle weapons of mass destruction through the largest uncontrolled border in the world. Thus greater interdependence comes out of this event as the guiding principle in dealing with threats. The guiding principle for both governments is that: in unity of effort lies strength and division brings weakness. This principle for this presenter, “won the Cold War without fighting”. With NATO invoking for the first time the principle that an attack against one is an attack against all, he pointed to the importance of Canada coming out with a public strategy in dealing with threats in the face of dwindling defence spending. The revolution in military affairs in Canada should lead to greater investment in the military. Given the long border between the two countries he enjoined both governments to find ways of further working together in broadening the scope of NORAD by linking it to greater coordination of land and sea forces. In a nutshell, he noted that although threat perceptions differ in both countries, much more needs to be done in alerting the public to these threats.

The second presenter touched on findings of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, intimating that there are more than 250 memorandums on cooperation between the two countries. The relations between both countries are often conducted most smoothly at the pragmatic level of day-to-day cooperation rather than in the more politicized policy debates that occupy Ottawa and Washington, D.C.. Viewed in the context of 9/11, a Canadian general serving as Director of Combat Operations at NORAD gave the order to launch combat air patrols to protect American cities from further attacks. With the closure of US airspace, more than 33,000 passengers and aircrews bound for the US touched down in Canada where they were welcomed with north-of-the-border hospitality and empathy. As in past national crises – whether during the Korean War, the Gulf War, or more recently in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, US forces fought alongside Canadian forces. For better and worse, throughout their histories the fates of both countries have been closely interlinked not only by geography, but also in terms of sharing democratic values and freedom from tyranny. If past periods of dynamics change and challenge offer any lessons, it is that the basis of the relationship will emerge all the stronger through a thorough examination of those ties that bind both countries.

Even before the 9/11 attacks, the primary foreign policy challenge for many states, friends and foes alike, was how best to manage relations with the US. As successive US administrations wrestled with the issue of how to wield the unprecedented muscle of the only superpower in pursuit of national interests and as a positive influence in the world, tensions have risen between the US and even many of its closest allies, including Canada, over issues ranging from trade, global warming, arms control,

peacekeeping, international criminal court, ballistic missile defence, and the role of the United Nations. While to some degree natural, those tensions must now be managed within a context of the September 11 attacks, and the US determination to lead the fight against international terrorism and restore to the degree possible a wounded American people's sense of security. For more deliberative and cautious European and Canadian governments, the pace of US actions and demand for short-term, tangible results can seem at once dizzying and disconcerting.

It is against this backdrop that US and Canadian officials have been negotiating for much of the past year the most fundamental restructuring of the US-Canadian security relationship since the Ogdensburg Agreement and founding of NORAD in the 1940s and 1950s.

The biggest re-orientation of the US government and an intense reappraisal of the US-Canadian relationship necessary to formulate changes in the context of 9/11 has, however, not been easy or altogether free of controversy. The post-9/11 period has compelled Canadian and US officials to make difficult adjustments in the formal and informal linkages at the core of the relationship in order to meet new challenges. Officials from both countries, for instance, are in final negotiations over a proposed agreement to expand the operational scope of NORAD, the cornerstone of the US-Canadian security relationship, to include land and sea forces. On October 1, 2002, the Pentagon will set up the new homeland defence headquarters Northern Command, which is a unified command with responsibility for protecting the American homeland and coordinating the operations of US military air, land and sea elements in its area of responsibility (AOR).

The AOR will include the US, Canada and Mexico. Canadian concerns of NORAD/ Northern Command touch on the issue of sovereignty. However, a careful review of the planned Northern Command dispels most serious concerns. The commander of Northern Command will also command NORAD. The commander of Northern Command will be no different than his counterparts at the helm of US regional commands in Europe, Asia, Central and South America, and the Middle East (European Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command or Central Command respectively). Each has a geographic area of responsibility, directly commands the activities only of US forces in that region, and coordinates cooperative military-to-military engagements and exercises with friendly countries in the region. As regional US commanders, none automatically assumes command over foreign forces within his area of responsibility.

Canadian military officers have also argued that it is far from an infringement on national sovereignty, but rather improves it. It gives Canada access to senior level decision-making and access to intelligence from the US in threats affecting Canada. Canada can also act independently as well. Security cooperation/synergy is thus important for Canada, and there is no reason to view Canadian sovereignty and NORAD reforms as competing with one another. Since Canada has an independent foreign policy, the US has to understand these sensitivities and work with it.

Canadian and US officials have also signed a comprehensive and far-reaching Smart Border agreement designed to improve security and screening along the border, while not impeding the free flow of legitimate goods and people on which both economies are so dependent in an era of global trade. Also, a Great Lakes/Saint Lawrence Seaway Cross Border Task Force has been created to target the illicit traffic of people

and goods across the Great Lakes, a historical smuggling route dating back to the 1920s Prohibition Era.

Issues that came up during discussions were: how 'Canadian', the Center for the Study of the Presidency Report is, given that there is no new funding for defence in Canada in light of the appalling state of the Canadian Armed Forces; the differences in military spending as priorities for both Canada and the US; and the question of NATO and burden sharing.

It was pointed out that the impetus should come from the US in pushing Canada to increase her defence spending given a deep seated feeling that Canada is not at war. The presenters noted that when Canadian forces joined the US-led campaign against international terrorism, they solidified their position as perhaps the most interoperable of all the world's armed forces in terms of joint operations with the US military. Canadian forces were also second to the US military in terms of strike sorties flown in NATO's 1999 Kosovo war, largely because of the interoperability of Canadian fighter jets, with US command-and-control and strike elements.

As Canada attempted to deploy 2,000 troops to Afghanistan, however, they were forced to get in a long line awaiting US airlift due to lack of strategic airlift capabilities. This incident, it was pointed out, highlights the increasingly difficult plight of a Canadian military that many Canadian analysts consider overstretched, under-funded, and badly in need of modernization. There have also been reports suggesting that Canada's plans to contribute ground forces to Afghanistan were severely limited by inadequate medical infrastructure and insufficient logistical support. According to a C.D. Howe Institute report, defence spending of \$12 billion (Canadian) in 2002 has proved insufficient to



support even a force of 60,000 personnel (the actual effective strength in mid-2002 is at least 10% lower). Canada's defence spending of \$265 (US) per capita is less than half the NATO average, and its 1.1% of gross national product devoted to defence is precisely half the NATO average. Furthermore, Canadian spending on defence equipment acquisition faces an \$11 (Canadian) deficit over the next 15 years, while the annual shortfall in the Canadian Forces' operations and maintenance budget is about \$1.3 billion (Canadian).

Canadian military officials stress that they have plans to upgrade the avionics of Canada's 80 CF-18s, and there have been proposals for Canada to buy or lease a handful of C-17 airlifters and build strategic sealift ships to improve Canadian Forces mobility, and that a defence review is underway. However, they concede that the problem is chronic lack of adequate funding. The Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, General Raymond Henault, in his annual report, was blunt in pointing out that "the status quo is not sustainable".

Burden sharing tensions within the NATO alliance are not new. The US has for many years implored its NATO allies to increase their defence spending to meet the alliance goal of 3% of gross domestic product. Given the size of US economic output and the fact that it is at war, it is perhaps not surprising that the US is far outpacing all of its allies combined in defence spending.

In the aftermath of September 11, however, Canada's refusal to adequately modernize or capitalize Canadian Forces that have already declined by roughly 50% since the end of the Cold War raises particular concerns. Canada gains significant influence from its special relationship with the US, and through its ability to link arms in

a synergistic way with US forces in times of crisis. By being so interoperable with their American counterparts, Canadian Forces punch well above their weight on the world stage. Losing that ability risks forfeiting a key pillar in the special relationship Canada maintains with its superpower neighbour.

A number of experts also worry that the lack of adequate Canadian defence spending may throw Canadian Forces into a destructive spiral from which it will be difficult to recover. “There is a tipping point beyond which any effort to right yourself requires a really Herculean effort”, said a presenter, “and the Canadian military is already below it”. The presenter further pointed out that “you get into a vicious cycle where the amounts of money needed grow ever bigger until politicians throw up their hands and say we could never justify that level of spending, so let’s give up and leave defence of North America to the Americans”. That’s dangerous thinking, however, because Canada has long recognized that in order to stay in the game and maintain its special relationship with the United States, Canadians have to ante up a certain minimum amount of military capability. Canada has now fallen below that minimum.

It was suggested that it will be counterproductive to push Canada towards more defence spending through cajoling and arm-twisting, and that the best approach is lay out the consequences of the failure to do so. Also, bilateral heads of government meeting should be forthright about this issue.

## **Homeland Security:**

Another theme of the conference related to explaining developments in the US regarding homeland security and what has changed since September 11. The presenter noted that the American people are unified in their desire and perception of taking care of the problem of terrorism. There was some understanding of worldwide terrorism but this had not been internalized before September 11. September 11 was a call to provide for a common defence. For a long time, the perception was isolation within secure borders, but 9/11 changed that since it was the first time going back to 1945 that the US had been attacked, and specifically Washington since the war of 1812. He noted that Homeland Security and Homeland Defence are not interchangeable terms. The latter refers to the protection of domestic public and infrastructure against foreign aggressors. The former is best accomplished by building on State and local capabilities. He envisioned the role of the Federal Government as responsible for enhancing capabilities at lowest levels of government, and the Office of Homeland Security, as consolidating federal activity; integrating national preparedness and response system; and, encouraging the development of state and local capabilities.

He elaborated on the vision of the Department of Defence pillars of Homeland Security. Firstly, Homeland Defence encompasses the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defence infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Secondly, the civil support function relates to the Department of Defence support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Thirdly, he noted emergency preparedness as those planning activities undertaken to ensure Department of Defence processes, procedures,

and resources are in place to support the President and the Secretary of Defence in a designated National Security Emergency. With regard to functions, he noted that in the event of national need, the Department of Defence will be a front-line actor under 3 broad circumstances: 1. Extraordinary (require Department of Defence capabilities, e.g. combat air patrols); 2. Emergency (augment capabilities of civil authorities e.g. post-event management, logistics, supply, and mobility); 3. Temporary in time/Limited in scope (assist/train state/local actors, e.g. special events, training first responders, and support to law enforcement). For Homeland Defence roles and missions, he noted: Homeland Security is a national activity best accomplished by: (a) domestic agencies performing domestic security, (b) enhancing capabilities at lowest level of government, and (c) balancing the Department of Defence's ability to defend the nation while adapting to the domestic security environment.

He concluded by pointing the way ahead under three broad themes: notably, the Northern Command, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the Department of Homeland Security. The Northern Command "conducts operations to deter, prevent, preempt, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within assigned areas of responsibility; as directed by the President or Secretary of Defence, provides military assistance to civil authorities including, consequence management operations". It is responsible for defence of the United States, and Department of Defence support to civilian authorities, when directed. Its area of responsibility is U.S., Canada, Mexico, and the land, sea, and aerospace approaches. It has taken over responsibilities for operational planning. Future plans are to build staff up

to full operational capability, and the President will decide whether it will have a permanent staff, or staff drawn from other agencies.

The strategic objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security are to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and, minimize damage and recover from attacks that occur. Its critical mission areas include: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic terrorism, protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, defending against catastrophic threats, and, emergency preparedness and response. In sum, the highlights of the National Strategy for Homeland Defence are: laying out America's most urgent priorities; designating lead federal agency for each initiative; building managerial, budgetary, and structural flexibility; focusing on producing results; advocating resource allocation based on measured performance; and, establishing processes to decide future allocation disputes.

Under the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council remain. The new department would be responsible for: security of US borders, transportation, ports, and critical infrastructure; managing federal emergency response activities; analyzing intelligence from multiple sources for homeland security implications; coordinating threat and preparedness communications with state and local government, domestic population, and private industry; helping to train and equip first responders; and, coordinating national efforts to protect US against weapons of mass destruction. Several departments/agencies would be transferred to the new department, for example: FEMA, Secret Service, Coast Guard, INS, Customs Service, Border Patrol, TSA, National Information Protection Centre, CIAO, select Department of

Energy laboratories and programs, Animal and Plant Inspection Service, and the Federal Protective Service. Important issues that came up during discussions were the need to define Homeland Security as Continental Security, and the extent of the diffusion of these various institutions and structures which might serve as a model for how Canada organizes its military. A participant pointed out that both countries should work out relationships that are best for them particularly at the military level. To a question as to where is thinking in terms of regional subcommands since the military is primarily used in situations of externally based threats, the presenter noted the President's authority as commander in chief is broad. There is a long tradition in the US of what the military is used for (e.g. defending against incoming missiles), but the post 9/11 environment changed that, and requires all sorts of activity, which is precisely what Homeland Security is about. He also noted, the principle of *posse committatus* has not inhibited what the Department of Defence has to do. The real issue of whether the Department of Defence has to take a specific action hinges on who pays for that activity undertaken by the military.

### **Land Threats to North America and the Role of the Army:**

In examining this topic, the presenter gave her thoughts on Canadian sovereignty of a new Canadian/American defence relationship in the context of land threats to North America. She posed two questions in this regard: firstly, what is the nature of the land threat to North America today? And, secondly, what is the nature of cooperation and the impact such arrangements would likely have on Canadian sovereignty?

Reports by the CIA, assess that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups will continue to plan attacks on the US. Similarly, a CSIS report concludes that the threat of another terrorist attack by Islamic extremists or other like-minded groups on North America has not diminished. A senior Canadian intelligence agent is reported to have stated that when it comes to Canada “the threat is real, it’s immediate, it’s here”. The land threats to North America reveal three things: first, the threat is primarily, if not exclusively, from individual terrorists and not from states. Second, the land threat to North America can be characterized as ‘doubly asymmetric’ in that it potentially involves both unconventional parties (terrorists) and unconventional means (weapons of mass destruction). And third, although there is a notable domestic terrorism aspect – highlighted all too well in Oklahoma City in 1995 – the primary origin of land threats is to be found overseas. Understanding these, points us in the right direction in examining the role of land forces in responding to the threat.

The key elements to take into account in terms of response regarding the first point made earlier is the control of individuals as they cross the Canada – US border, or as they disembark ships on the North American coast or airplanes at any number of international airports on North American soil. There is also need for intelligence on potential terrorists that may already be in North America. The ‘border control’ and the intelligence dimensions, lend themselves not so much to a military response as to a robust and well-resourced civilian agencies. There has been increased funding in both countries in this regard and cooperative initiatives are moving forward quickly.

The second point made earlier also demands a primarily civilian response. In the event of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction, the first line of defence would

be the nation's 'first responders' – local police and fire department, ambulance drivers, doctors and nurses working with federal agencies charged with 'consequence management' – the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the US and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness in Canada. There would also be a significant role for the military. Both the Canadian and American militaries have developed units that can be called to assist civilian authorities if necessary. The question of the role of the military in homeland security is not generating the same degree of debate in Canada. With the increased continental focus one might expect calls for the militia or army reserve to play a greater role in homeland defence, much as former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker assigned civil defence and 'national survival' duties to the militia in the late 1950s. This idea, however, has not been seriously revisited. There is some discussion of using the militia in "non-traditional roles", which may include domestic NBC defence, critical infrastructure protection, and disaster reaction and relief

The unsettled question of the role of US land forces in homeland security is inevitably having an impact on our understanding of future cooperative efforts between the Canadian and American armies in territorial defence. The Canada-US Basic Security Document and its associated Combined Defence Plan provides for the coordinated use of both countries' land forces in the event of an attack on North America. A High Level Working Group of Canadian and American defence and foreign affairs officials is currently engaged in informal discussion on how Canada and the US can better cooperate to enhance continental security and defence. The discussions do not involve Canada 'joining' Northern Command per se since this, like the other unified commands, is a solely American operation. Rather, given that the Canadian and American air forces



already cooperate in the context of NORAD, the group has been focusing on how the two countries can increase North American security from a maritime and land perspective. The bottom line must be how to protect Americans and Canadians from terrorist attack. “Protection” in turn has two elements: prevention and response. Prevention falls primarily in the civilian realm in dealing with land threats. In terms of response, the Canadian Forces has a well-established role with respect to aid to civil power, as does the National Guard in the US. But since the military would likely play a substantial role in responding to a terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction, it would be beneficial for the Canadian and American militaries to set up cooperation in this area.

The third point made earlier calls for a significant role for land forces in two broad areas: warfighting and peacebuilding. The warfighting role demands land forces that are more rapidly mobile and deployable than their cold war counterparts, and yet are still lethal. In 1999 the US Army launched a major transformation effort that is to be completed by about 2010. The Canadian army’s new strategy document is also in line with the requirements of future warfare. The measures it plans to take should enable it to make a meaningful contribution to coalition – and often US-led – military operations. The second broad and increasing role for the army is peacebuilding. Failed states create an environment where terrorists can establish a base of operations to inflict harm on North America. States like Afghanistan, where terrorists have been rooted out, continue to provide a security threat to the Western world until such time as they are reconstructed and stable. This would similarly be the case if military force were to be used to remove the regime in Iraq. The warfighting aspect of addressing the land threat to North America

is therefore only the tip of a very large iceberg that is likely to reveal an extended period of post-conflict peacebuilding.

The nature of the land threat to North America, the likely role of land forces in addressing it, and any resultant cooperative efforts between Canada and the US, are such that they are unlikely to impact Canadian sovereignty. Cooperation between the Canadian and US militaries should be stepped up and would best focus on joint training exercises. As for the overseas dimension Canada will retain, as it has in the past, the power to choose how and whether to participate in a particular operation. In all military missions, whether at home in NORAD or abroad in NATO, the United Nations or as part of an ad hoc coalition, Canada has a longstanding tradition of relinquishing control – but never command – of its military forces.

Discussions revolved around how Canada compares to the US in terms of response to crises. Although in Canada, there is no national guard, response will involve using the regular forces in new roles. The debate on the use of Canadian reserves rather centres on overseas roles than using reserve forces at home. Primary response will remain aid to civil power. The overseas dimension will require more funding for the Canadian army since Canada's ability is overstretched, and not limited.

### **The Canadian Navy – Continental Maritime Security and Beyond:**

The presenter considered the maritime dimension of the Canada-US security relationship in the wake of September 11. Since the attacks, Maritime Command has been working almost seamlessly with the United States Navy, and has committed almost its entire operational capability to the war on terrorism. He noted that most Canadians are

unaware that the Canadian Navy is a modern, well-trained force that has a close working relationship with the US Navy. It is highly robust, professional, and continues to develop many core competencies, for instance, anti-submarine warfare which gives it a “blue water” capability. It is one of the few navies that is able to deploy to almost any ocean. In the context of comparison, it ranks in the top 15 navies in the world in terms of capabilities.

While the importance of Canadian naval cooperation in NATO diminished with the end of the Cold War, the close cooperation between the Canadian and American navies continues. This is best exemplified by the level of cooperation during the Gulf War, and by the subsequent attachments of Canadian frigates to American carrier battlegroups. The Canadian navy has also been involved in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan as part of a battlegroup.

While the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> are generally perceived to be a new threat against North America, the reality is that the attacks were the continuation of a trend that began with the end of the Cold War. However, September 11<sup>th</sup> changed the perception of the seriousness of the threat and of the need to respond. The North American maritime dimension of this threat can be divided into three main typologies: target, prevention, and response.

Maritime Units as a Target: As the attack on the USS Cole demonstrates, maritime forces can be targets of terrorist activity. While it is unlikely that an attempted repeat of the attack in Yemen would be successful, the symbolic nature of warships, plus the fact that both Canada and the US continue to deploy their vessels to the Middle East,

means that they will still be a potential threat. The two navies already share information and it is difficult to see what else can be done to avert attacks besides constant vigilance when visiting foreign ports.

Prevention of Terrorist Attacks: It is necessary to tighten security over the entry into North America of foreign goods as concerns have been raised that terrorist organizations could attempt to smuggle dangerous materials such as explosives and even nuclear weapons into North America. The September 11 attacks and the prior arrest of Ahmed Ressam also demonstrate that it is easier to obtain the necessary weapons within either country rather than to smuggle them in. The 1995 Tokyo Subway attack and the use of Anthrax in the fall of 2001 both demonstrate that tighter controls within the state are necessary.

It would be extremely difficult to acquire a nuclear weapon within Canada or the US. If a nuclear weapon was smuggled in, the most likely means of transport would be by sea. With globalization, both countries experience tremendous increases in the amount of maritime traffic entering their major ports and, consequently, difficulties in monitoring the traffic. Several factors complicate the task of monitoring. First, the containerization of maritime trade makes it very difficult to physically inspect all maritime cargo. In addition, there has been a trend in the US and Canada to deregulate and/or privatize Port Authorities. Thus, security measures that were in place in the 1970s and 1980s have in the 1990s been scaled back and, in some instances, eliminated from most North American ports. There is no question that the Canadian and American Navies and Coast Guards do not have the capabilities, let alone the mandate, to allow for proper

surveillance of container traffic. Increased surveillance capabilities and greater shared intelligence are required.

Response: Maritime forces will play a pivotal role in North America's responses against states that support terrorism as well as in overseas bases of operations. For example, almost the entire operational capability of the Canadian Navy has been deployed to Afghanistan. Likewise, if the US decides to attack Iraq, Canadian participation will likely be in the form of maritime assistance. The main duty of the Canadian task group is to search for Taliban or al-Qaeda members who are attempting to flee by ship. Few have been caught but it is important to convey the message to these various organizations and their members that they do not have an escape route by sea.

Having briefly examined the nature of the maritime relationship following the events of September 11, the presenter also considered some of the costs and benefits to the Canadian Navy with regard to the evolution of North American security relations. He noted that of the three branches of the forces, Maritime Command is best able to provide an independent contribution to the war on terrorism in overseas regions. Apart from proceeding to any point on the globe bordered by an ocean, it also has the ability to maintain a sustained presence on its own. However, this ability is time sensitive in that the Canadian Navy's two remaining replenishment vessels are old and will be taken out of service soon. When both vessels are withdrawn from service, the Navy will lose its ability to independently proceed overseas, and severely restrict Canadian mobility. The issue of replacing the two replenishment vessels raises the possibility of developing new force capability. Ideally, more than two vessels would be purchased, but this is unlikely given the traditional reluctance of the Canadian Government to engage in such

expenditures. Nevertheless, if new vessels are approved and built with a more robust, strategic, sea-lift capability, in the long term, Canada will have greater independence in deploying its ground troops in any future overseas operations, and also in accordance with its own agenda rather than having to wait for American assistance. This benefits Canada in two ways. First, it allows Canada the option of deploying its troops overseas even when the US is not involved. While this scenario is presently unlikely, it is not impossible. At the same time, the US would find a Canadian sealift capability to be to its own benefit. It would reduce the strain on American capabilities in a time of crisis.

The current Canadian naval deployment in the war on terrorism is a combination of direct integration into the US Navy and of independent action. The Canadian frigate that operated with the carrier battle group provided direct assistance to the American Navy. The task group allows for greater independent action with a Canadian identity. In terms of the attached frigate, such interoperability requires that its crew and communications be completely compatible. The major cost of such a deployment is the elimination of that particular ship from other duties. There is also a political cost. Canada reserves the right to pull the vessel from the battle group at any point. However, since the integration is not a token act, such a withdrawal would create significant problems for the battlegroup. Therefore, any withdrawal could not be made for frivolous reasons.

Canada will incur other costs for continued cooperation between the two navies. Given that the US Navy is the most technically advanced navy in the world, Canada will need to ensure that the technology on its vessels continues to be updated. In particular it will need to ensure that its command, control, communication, computer, and, intelligence remains compatible with the US Navy. This will not be easy or inexpensive.

But doing so will provide Canadian decision-makers with the widest range of options for future operations either with or without the United States. Canadian maritime forces will also need to stay abreast of current naval weaponry technology. This means a willingness to maintain a general capability for its maritime assets.

Close cooperation with the American Navy will create opportunity costs. The overseas deployment of Canadian warships means that those particular vessels are not available for use in Canadian waters.

In conclusion, the presenter posed the question: Does Canadian maritime cooperation with the US impact on Canadian sovereignty? He noted that as Canada develops closer maritime cooperation with the US, Canada's ability to act independently is actually enhanced. In order to cooperate with the US in a meaningful manner, Canada requires a navy that is modern and combat capable. Such a navy, by virtue of the unique nature of maritime forces, means that it can easily be used by itself or in combination with other Canadian force. The Canadian Navy is not dependent on foreign support or logistics to the degree that Canadian Land and air units are. However, such forces are expensive.

### **The Aerospace Dimension:**

The presenter noted that the existence of a strategic defence partnership between Canada and the US has been most evident and pronounced in the aerospace sector. While elements of such a partnership do exist on the land (army) and maritime (navy) sides of the equation, they have been historically centred on the NATO linkage, and since the end of the Cold War on overseas operations from the Gulf, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia,

to Afghanistan. As a result, the land and maritime sides have largely existed at the operational/theatre level down to close tactical cooperation. Only on the aerospace side is there an integrated, institutionalized command structure – the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). As a result of this command, and the missions assigned to it, only in the area of aerospace has the bilateral relationship truly possessed a strategic quality, and for Canada, it has provided its only window into US strategic level consideration. It has also provided Canada with a strategic entrée into outer space.

The strategic quality of the aerospace relationship also extends beyond NORAD and, of course, related close cooperation between the US Air Force and the Canadian Air Force. It also exists in the defence industrial and technology areas. NORAD provided Canada with access into strategic areas of US aerospace development and this access in turn created a conducive, or supportive environment for industrial/technological cooperation.

Today, this strategic partnership, he pointed out, has come to a fork in the road. As the US moves in the near future to deploy a range of missile defences, continues to develop new technologies to practice space control, and proceeds to create a real global engagement, precision strike capability beneath the rubric of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Canada faces a difficult choice. It must decide whether to continue a strategic aerospace partnership, or transform the partnership into an operational or theatre one limited to North America and operating within only a portion of the aerospace sector. In fact, it must make a decision quickly on the most pressing issue – missile defence. Failure to do so will likely result in having the decision made in Washington; one which will result in transformation to the detriment of a range of Canadian national strategic



interests. He examined the aerospace dimension relating to the past, present, and the future.

The past: North American defence co-operation, dating back to Ogdensburg (1940) has always been problematic, yet essential for Canadian self-interest. Successive Canadian governments, have always been sensitive about a public image of Canadian subservience or satellite status stemming from the relationship. As a result, NORAD as the institutional embodiment of a strategic partnership has generally been downplayed. Furthermore, NORAD has rarely been seen as a strategic partnership, not least of all because strategic connoted nuclear weapons. Instead, NORAD has been compartmentalized, with a policy emphasis instead placed upon the NATO relationship, followed by the United Nations as representative of Canada's internationalist role.

The roots of aerospace cooperation that would lead to NORAD were primarily a function of the Cold War Soviet Union's long-range bomber, and subsequently ballistic missile threat to North America. Canadian interests in pursuing the relationship, and agreeing to its institutionalization were a product of the legacy of the World War II trade-off, and the geo-strategic location of Canada sandwiched between the US and the Soviet Union on the north-south axis. This institutionalized relationship on the surface concerned only North America, as both the US and Canada sought to isolate it from NATO and wider global US activities. However, it had two strategic qualities for Canada. First, Canada gained access to US strategic level activities and a strategic entrée into space. Second, the value and importance of the aerospace defence relationship for Canada was much greater than North America. Certainly, the relationship and NORAD provided Canada with a cost-effective method to ensure the surveillance of its national territory

and airspace, and in so doing enhanced Canadian sovereignty claims especially over the North. But, it was the favourable operational and capital cost-sharing arrangements that had strategic significance for Canada- enabling it to meet its other defence commitments at home and overseas. A final consideration of the Cold War strategic relationship is found in the area of defence industrial cooperation. For the US, the relationship reflected its core strategic concerns about ensuring second-sources of supply and the dispersion of industrial assets. For Canada, by virtue of its privileged access to the US defence market, it represented vital economic interests relative to technology and production in which the Canadian market was simply too small to support a viable independent base.

The Present: The fundamental implication of the end of the Cold War for the aerospace relationship can be summed up in one phrase – territorial obsolescence. Canadian territory lost its strategic significance, at least until the attacks of September 11th, 2001. As a result, the aerospace relationship and the future of NORAD emerged quietly as an issue, and both became seen to revolve around the return of ballistic missile defence (BMD) to prominence on the US security agenda.

For Canada, the overall relationship embodied in the 1994 White Paper remained conceptually restricted to North America. With regard to BMD, policy moved forward slightly to a somewhat more active role from that established in 1985, when the Mulroney government rejected official Canadian involvement in SDI R&D, but allowed for the participation of Canadian companies. Consultation on BMD became formal policy, and the government identified a potential Canadian role in the surveillance and reconnaissance elements relative to their potential contribution to other Canadian defence interests. Thus was born in nascent form the idea of a Canadian asymmetric contribution

to BMD. It would evolve into ideas of a Canadian contribution to the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) and the possibility of deploying tracking and damage assessment radar on Canadian soil to facilitate the US National Missile Defence (NMD) effort. Most importantly, the idea of an asymmetric contribution has been a Canadian one, with the US largely leaving the door open with regard to a Canadian contribution, as well as Canadian participation. The US has proceeded through the NMD program and its successor Global Missile Defence (GMD) to plan on the basis of no Canadian territorial involvement.

The key issue for Canada today is not the future of NORAD per se relative to Canadian strategic interests. Rather, it is the loss of access to, and involvement in strategic level areas in the realm of space in particular. September 11<sup>th</sup>, not least of all because of the important role NORAD played in responding to the attacks and since then, has largely removed concerns about its future. The threat of similar attacks, alongside concerns about cruise missiles being launched clandestinely from ships off the North America coast, has provided NORAD with a vital air defence mission once again. But there still remains the key issue of BMD/space side of the equation for Canada, and it is this issue which will likely determine whether the aerospace relationship with the US continues to be a strategic partnership for Canada.

The narrowing of the aerospace relationship will not only affect Canada's strategic interests with regard to space, and access to US thinking, planning and intelligence with regard to space as it concerns North America. It will also have four other significant effects. First, it will also close the door on the global, strategic picture that derives from space and with it the key elements of space linked to larger, global

security considerations. Second, with access to Canadians closed or narrowed, Canada's current space investment strategy, military and civil may be significantly affected. Third, it will also likely affect the defence industrial/technological relationship. Finally, consideration also has to be given to the loss of Canada's privileged and unique relationship with the US as compared to other allies. It is important to remember the consternation of Canadians when Canada was not mentioned in President Bush's first address to Congress after September 11<sup>th</sup>, and when a US poll identified the United Kingdom as the US' closest ally.

The Future: Although US planners must proceed on a US only basis for the time being, this does not mean that Canada has lost the opportunity to engage in GMD, and, in so doing, protect its strategic aerospace relationship. However, the longer Canada waits, the more difficult it will likely be to engage because decisions have to be made sooner, rather than later.

Today, opposition to Canadian participation with the end of the ABM Treaty has now focused on the weaponization of Outer Space. Canadian policy since the 1960s has opposed weaponization, and many fear that beneath GMD, or as part of GMD (the SDI legacy) lies the deployment of space-based weapons. However, several factors need to be considered with regard to this argument. First, the technology to weaponize space is at least fifteen years into the future. Second, the key role of outer space assets relative to GMD is launch identification, tracking, target discrimination, and cueing. Third, the case for space based weapons goes beyond missile defence, and is being driven by reasonable concerns about the vulnerability of critical military and civilian space-based infrastructure. In other words, weaponization is an issue driven by strategic consideration

outside of missile defence per se. The linkage is that a space-based boost-phase intercept capability simultaneously provides missile and space defence as the launchers are the same.

Finally, and most importantly, the question is whether engagement in GMD traps Canada into the weaponization of Outer Space. Many of the arguments employed above suggest that Canadian strategic interests would be similar, with regard to space defence itself. However, it is difficult to predict the strategic world and Canadian political considerations fifteen or more years into the future. Engagement on GMD does not bind Canada to weaponization, and a future Canadian government can say no. Moreover, the answer to the future lies in the most useful ways to influence the US debate, as much as anyone can influence the US.

In conclusion, it is important to recognize that the weaponization issue is in the distant future. It is also vital to recognize that the key strategic issue of Canadian participation in GMD of today is not all or nothing. To decline participation by making an explicit statement in this regard, or by making no policy statement whatsoever does not mean that the Canada-US defence relationship, and much broader and deeper political, economic, and social relationship will collapse. Fears of economic punishment are simply unfounded, because of the complicated and compartmentalized nature of US politics. This is also the case for the overall defence relationship, especially given the importance of air defence, surveillance and control in the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup>.

The key issue is not cooperation itself, but the scope and nature of cooperation relative to Canadian strategic interests. Whether Canada should now consider offering its territory to GMD with the ABM Treaty gone, needs to be evaluated closely relative to the

payoffs for Canada in aerospace and elsewhere, which would likely be funded on a cost-sharing basis. Regardless, the relationship will change if Canada does not participate in GMD. The longstanding strategic aerospace relationship will likely become a limited air-breathing theatre or operational relationship, which will significantly affect Canada's strategic interests and its role on the international stage. Perhaps, at the end of the day, Missile defence is designed to protect a nation's citizens, and the fundamental role of a democratic government is to provide protection for its citizens.

### **Terrorism and Response: The Impact of the War on Terrorism on the Canadian-American Security Relationship:**

In his introductory remarks, the presenter noted that only time will tell if the terrorist attacks on the US on 9/11 was a "one-off", anomalous event, or actually represented a breakthrough in terrorist capability, heralding a potential "Revolution in Terrorism Affairs". For the US, it was a terrifying surprise attack, mass murder on an exponential scale, and a national tragedy. While Canadian expressed heartfelt sympathy for our closest neighbours, for most Canadians, it was a 'near miss'; we "dodged the bullet". Only 24 Canadians were killed in the attack on the World Trade Centre. The immediate impact on Canada was limited primarily to looking after thousands of airline passengers stranded when their flights to the US were cancelled or diverted. There was a longer-term, but temporary economic impact arising from delays at border crossings and from the grounding of air traffic. He reflected on the impact of those events and the subsequent "War on Terrorism" on Canada and Canadian-American security relations. First, he discussed the Canadian response to it, situating it both within the wider context

of Canadian-American relations, and then tried to draw some conclusions about the implications for the Canada-US security and defence relationship. He argued that short of a sustained terrorist campaign within North America, the current War on Terrorism will not alter that relationship in a major way.

The terrorist threat to Canada: On 17 September, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that: *“I am not aware at this time of a cell known to the police to be operating in Canada with the intention of carrying out terrorism in Canada or elsewhere”*. Coming in the wake of the most costly terrorist attack in history, against our closest neighbour, these remarks seemed – and still seem – extraordinary. Yet, in a very real sense his statement reflected not only Canadian perceptions of the post –9/11 situation, but also the Canadian reality, which is an anomalous position of vulnerability and invulnerability. This is not an unfamiliar position for Canada; throughout the Cold War, it was said that Canada was both undefendable and unconquerable. The presenter attempted to demonstrate that Canada’s current position with regard to terrorism is quite similar, and thus that the Prime Minister’s statement is, at one and the same time, both right and wrong.

The Prime Minister’s view, according to him, is probably correct in the sense that no terrorist group, except possibly al-Qaeda, is likely to target Canada or Canadians just for the sake of killing and terrorizing Canadians. Canada may be a staunch American ally, but it carries very little weight in the world. So, attacking Canadian targets for their own sake does not make strategic sense; it would gain al-Qaeda nothing. Why waste limited resources on a bit player, when the main enemy and a “target-rich environment” is “right next door”?

Which brings us to the part of the PM's statement, which is incorrect. Canada is at some degree of risk because we share a common border (which cannot be made wholly secure), and because our economies and infrastructures are so closely integrated. So a terrorist threat to the US could affect Canada indirectly but seriously. There are at least four terrorist threat scenarios in this regard. While not inevitable, these are not impossible; the first two have already happened. While none of the 9/11 terrorists appear to have entered the US via Canada, slipping instead through an equally porous American border bureaucracy directly from Europe and Britain, the US had every right and reason to cast a nervous eye toward its longest undefended border, because at least one previous attempted attack did originate in Canada. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested trying to smuggle explosives across the BC/Washington border, en route to bombing Los Angeles airport in a way that would have caused mass casualties. Only vigilance at the US border led to his arrest.

This is the scenario that worries Americans, and ought to concern Canadians. Even before Ressam surfaced, CSIS had acknowledged that most terrorist groups have a presence in Canada. They engage in propaganda, recruiting, and fundraising, more or less openly. The second potential threat to Canadians could arise from attacks on "enemy" targets in Canada. These could include diplomatic installations, personnel, businesses, tourists from certain countries, and targets identified as "Jewish". The third terrorism scenario that could have consequences for Canada would be an attack on shared Critical Infrastructures (CI). Canada and the US share a number of CI that are vital to the functioning of both countries and their economies. These include energy generation and distribution: power stations, electricity grids, and natural gas pipelines. The transportation



networks are largely integrated and serve both countries. This applies to railways, bridges, the St. Lawrence Seaway, airlines, and air traffic control. There is also the telecommunications network, which is vital to commerce for both countries and flows seamlessly between them. The final threat resides in the “nightmare scenarios”, such as a major chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack on an American city in close proximity to the Canadian border, for example Detroit. There is also another CBRN attack scenario, which would more directly affect Canada. This posits an attack on a Canadian nuclear power plant, such as the Pickering station just east of Toronto. All of this notwithstanding, it would be a mistake, not to mention irresponsible to suggest that these catastrophic scenarios are either imminent or inevitable. The problem, however, is that we cannot rule out any of the scenarios with a high degree of confidence, because there are gaps in our knowledge. So, what is Canada doing about it?

Canadian Counter-Terrorism Efforts: The Canadian response to 9/11 has been multi-faceted, involving military operation, anti-terrorism legislation, financial resources, border security measures, and police and intelligence activity, among others. It developed with – for Canada – remarkable speed, although not without confusion and debate about what to do and how to do it. Moreover, it exposed some glaring weaknesses in Canada’s preparedness to deal with terrorism at home and to participate in the war against it abroad. In many respects, Canada has been playing ‘catch up’ since 9/11, and is fortunate that, except for the military, its institutions, plans, and resources have not been truly tested by contact with the enemy.

Canada’s military involvement has been the most visible portion of the response, with the involvement of a naval task group; a small contingent of Joint Task Force 2; and

a battalion battle group to Afghanistan to fight the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Additionally, it also deployed three transport aircraft to support operations in the theatre. Given the size of Canada's regular forces, this was a substantial commitment. While the deployed forces appeared to have performed well, it also laid bare all of the weaknesses of the Canadian Forces, e.g. low state of readiness, insufficient personnel, inadequate equipment and logistical support, and lack of strategic mobility. Given its small size and on-going operations elsewhere, deploying a single battalion group (less than 1,000 personnel) to Afghanistan stressed the army to the limit. Though the troops had seen relatively little action, the operation could not be sustained beyond a six-month tour of duty. While this confirmed everything that parliamentary committees and external critics had said about the state of the Canadian Forces, it also said a great deal about the priorities of the Canadian government. Maintaining Canada's peacekeeping operations comes first; the War on Terrorism is clearly second-tier priority. By comparison with the army deployment, the naval contribution was disproportionately large. Yet, while it has conducted hundreds of boarding operations and searches in the Arabian Gulf, the navy has captured only two suspected terrorists in nine months on station. This raises serious questions as to whether the naval contingent was fulfilling a necessary purpose. Given the number of ships deployed i.e. six ships, the naval deployment seemed to have reflected a 'capabilities driven' rather than a threat driven strategic decision.

On the legal front, parliament passed omnibus anti-terrorism legislation (Bill C-36), which became law on 24 December 2001. Bill C-36 amended the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act (which was changed to the Security of Information Act), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the National

Defence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and a number of other extant acts of parliament in the areas of public security and human rights. With the proclamation of Bill C-36 into law, Canada also ratified two international law conventions: the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Convention, and the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Convention. In practical terms, the new legislation allows the government to designate certain groups as terrorist groups, making leadership of, participation in or assistance to the group illegal. The law also gives the police the power to conduct “preventive arrest” of persons believed to be about to commit a terrorist act, and lifts some restrictions on electronic surveillance of terrorist groups. It clarifies the powers of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) – the SIGNIT agency – to gather foreign intelligence on terrorist groups that might attack Canada or Canadian interests, and allows CSE to undertake security measures to protect government computer networks from terrorist activity. In short, Bill C-36 was a comprehensive package of anti-terrorism legal measures.

Critics questioned both the necessity and implications for civil liberties of the bill, given that the Prime Minister himself had suggested that Canada faced no direct terrorist threat. By Spring 2002, the government was forced to withdraw a companion piece of legislation, Bill C-42, and replaced it with Bill C-55, the Public Safety Act, which was seen as less repressive.

At a relatively early stage the government began to allocate additional funding for defence, internal and border security. The first step, announced in October 2001, was to add \$250 million to the 2001-2 budget for border and airport security and immigration control. The second step was a much larger spending program, contained in the 2001

Budget (for FY 2002-3). The budget promised \$7.7 billion in spending over a five-year period to support Canada's role in the war on terrorism and to enhance Canadian internal and border security. The Finance Minister claimed that the main goal of the budget was "to keep Canadians safe, keep terrorists out and keep our borders open". Looking closely at the budget, critics suggested that in their view it did not commit the government to a long-term program to refinance defence. Their fears were confirmed when the Prime Minister said later that if the military needed more money, it would have to "get in line". In fact, keeping the border open for trade was probably the government's highest priority, since the Canadian economy is so dependent on cross-border trade. Thus, it was essential to alleviate any American concerns about the supposedly "porous" border and Canada's allegedly "lax" immigration/refugee policies. In this regard, it is hardly surprising that border security was featured more prominently than defence in the budget and in the initiatives that followed. Security initiatives included: reinvigorating joint efforts, such as Project Northstar, networking, training, and planning; establishing an integrated intelligence effort; improved sharing of fingerprint data; addressing the legal and operational problems arising from joint declaration actions; and, expanding Integrated Border Enforcement Teams.

The budget will also allow CSIS to increase its strength by about 30%, but over a five-year period. Canada is also making substantial effort to improve Critical Infrastructure Protection. The government established the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OC�PEP) in February 2001, and has expanded its budget and strength considerably since.

Implications for Canada-US Relations: As the foregoing suggests, Canada has a lot at stake – and much more to lose – in its relationship, particularly in its economic dimensions. It is an unequal relationship, in economic and military terms, between a superpower and a minor power. This asymmetry means that Canada has to struggle to make its voice heard in Washington, let alone wield any influence there. It committed modest military power, legal, financial and other resources to the War on Terrorism, at home and abroad. But, what are the implications of this for the Canada-US security relationship?

The Canada-US defence and security relationship was already changing when the 9/11 attacks occurred. Increasingly, that relationship was focusing on continental security. The “Kingston Dispensation” – the idea (originally advanced by President Roosevelt and affirmed by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1938) that the two countries would not pose threats to each other and would come to each other’s defence – is still valid. Canada must cooperate militarily as fully as possible with the US. The only question is how much. It may be reasonable to conclude that Canadian-American defence and security relations will remain substantially unchanged by the War on Terrorism. The longstanding trend toward closer collaboration between the armed forces of both countries will continue. But so long as the current government stays in power – and, in light of the weakness of opposition parties, it seems destined to be that for a considerable period – there will not be a dramatic reversal of the deterioration of the Canadian Forces. The best that can be hoped for is that the erosion of its capabilities can be slowed or stopped. In the meantime, as the American military continues to evolve into a force shaped by the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, the gap between the Canadian and

American forces seems likely to widen. This will tend to counteract the trend toward interoperability and will limit the utility of the Canadian Forces in joint operations. So, while Canada may wish to have some say in defining the mission of US Northern Command, if only to ensure that it does not infringe Canadian sovereignty, it will have little to offer in return and is unlikely to gain a seat at the table.

Nor will Canada surrender control of its side of the border or ports of entry. A shared North American security perimeter might make sense from a practical standpoint, but again, short of a major ongoing terrorist threat, the sovereignty ‘optics’ are unsellable, even if they are overstated. The most the US can expect – indeed, what it has the right to expect – is that Canada will exercise ‘due diligence’ within its own territory and jurisdictions to ensure that its border controls, refugee, immigration, and other policies and procedures limit as much as is reasonably possible the ability of terrorists to infiltrate Canada and to use it as a base for attacks against the US.

The 9/11 attacks may come to be seen in retrospect either as the start of a “Revolution in Terrorism Affairs” or merely as a tragic anomaly that was never replicated on a similar scale. What is clear at this point is that they have not yet ‘revolutionized’ Canadian-American defence and security relations.

### **Terrorism, Proliferation and the Myth of American Independence: Multilateral vs. Unilateral Approaches to Security after 9/11 and the Implications for Canada**

The Conventional Wisdom: This presenter noted that the emerging consensus in the literature on 9/11 is clear – the terrorist attacks destroyed, once and for all, the myth of American independence. According to this view, the US officials can no longer remain

complacent in the belief that they are somehow isolated from global conflict, or that they have power to independently protect the US from external (and internal) attacks. American unilateralism ( a key feature of US foreign policy prior to September 11) will be replaced by a strong preference for multilateralism, because only multilateral strategies and institutions can provide the coalitions and international cooperation required to address the security threats created by the forces of globalism. These arguments and associated policy recommendations represent the conventional wisdom on globalism and the inevitable (and rational) trend towards multilateral solutions to security after 9/11.

Unfortunately for those who embrace this conventional wisdom their predictions about the inevitable (and rational) preferences for multilateralism do not match the US response to 9/11, nor are they consistent with the emerging trend in American security policy. Rather, the evidence confirms that the more insecure the US becomes as a result of the globalization of terrorism and WMD proliferation, the more effort, money, time and energy the US will invest in re-establishing independent, autonomous, self-directed, sovereign and unilateral control over American security. This is precisely why the American response to 9/11 has been so reliant on unilateral initiatives. US efforts have one overriding objective in mind – to acquire more independent control over US security. Officials in Washington are committed to becoming less dependent on other states and international organizations for the safety of American citizens, compelled to be less dependent on the United Nations, European allies, and less dependent on Russia and the multilateral arms control regime. Washington is unlikely (and apparently unwilling) to

heed the concerns expressed by multilateralists regarding the futility of American unilateralism.

Critics are correct to warn that unilateral, state-centric approaches are destined to fail, because of the uncontrollable forces of globalisation. But the futility of unilateral strategies is almost irrelevant today. What **is** relevant is that major powers will forever struggle to re-establish independent control over their security **even in the face of failure**. This fact should be the starting point for our theories, explanations and predictions of international behaviour after 9/11, and our policy recommendations as well.

The Inevitability of American Unilateralism: What appears on the surface to be an irrational response to the contemporary realities of globalization is in fact a perfectly rational strategy derived from an objective assessment of the costs, benefits and risks of available alternatives. Unilateral approaches to security are never evaluated (or selected) in isolation – they are always compared to the successes, failures and overall potential of multilateral alternatives. With respect to that comparison, it is becoming increasingly apparent that multilateral approaches to security have not succeeded, and that unilateral strategies offer a better return for one's security investment, with fewer risks. The debate between supporters of ballistic missile defence (BMD-unilateralism) and their critics who favour reliance on the nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime (NACD-multilateralism) serves well to highlight reasons why Washington prefers unilateral solutions.

The main challenge for proponents of the NACD regime is the lack of demonstrable proof that multilateral arms control actually works. Ongoing disagreements



over appropriate criteria for measuring success and failure preclude definitive statements about the real (and relevant) contributions of the NACD regime to global security. Furthermore, proponents of multilateralism are quick to offer as clear ‘evidence’ of success a long list of multilateral treaties etc. But evidence that multilateralism is rampant and spreading does not, in any way, constitute proof of successful multilateralism. Notwithstanding all of this activity, there is no demonstrable proof that we have dealt effectively with the proliferation problem, or that the planet is any safer today than it was before we engaged in all of this activity. Indeed, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate and pose a more significant global threat today than ever before.

Two final points regarding the ‘choice’ between multilateralism and unilateralism should be noted. First, policy choices are not always a matter of ‘preferences’ but rather are products of systemic pressures that push leaders in one or another direction – imperatives, not choices, explain behaviour. A singularly unipolar structure will produce, absolutely inevitably, a unilateralist outcome. The sole viable alternative to unilateralism is not multilateralism, but isolationism. In order to protect their own security and economic imperatives after 9/11, European, Canadian and Russian leaders simply cannot afford American isolationism and will reluctantly come to support almost any US foreign policy initiative (unilateral or multilateral), even while criticizing that approach in public.

Second, the unilateralism-multilateralism debate often creates a false dichotomy – there are no pure unilateralists or multilateralists, and ones preferences are likely to vary from issue to issue, region to region, threat to threat. When it comes to American ‘security’ after 9/11 unilateral priorities are likely to prevail for many reasons outlined

earlier. In essence, multilateralism has become a liability and a security threat. It is perceived by Washington today as “a strategy by smaller states to tie the US down like Gulliver among the Lilliputians. It is no wonder that France prefers a multi-polar and multilateral world, and less developed countries see multilateralism as in their interests, because it gives them some leverage on the US. These states are not driven by some higher moral imperative to create a truly global order based on justice and international law; they are motivated by the same fundamental imperatives that drive American foreign policy: power, security, self interest and survival.

Implications for Canada: There are two obvious predictions that follow from the preceding analysis. First, terrorism has become a fact of life for the United States. The US will continue to be threatened by terrorism and will inevitably experience additional (and devastating) terrorist attacks. Second, current and future US administration will respond to terrorism with unilateral initiatives. These unilateral responses, in turn, will have a direct impact on Canadian foreign, economic, security and defence interests, especially if the security threat in question is alleged to have originated from Canada. Several recommendations follow from these two inevitabilities.

1. Canadian officials should develop planning scenarios to help prepare for a variety of US responses to terrorist attacks. The objective is to go beyond emergency preparedness and to begin thinking about how Canada could respond to a range of potential US reactions. These responses should be coordinated in ways that avoid the negative consequences of being caught off guard, and that ensure Canadian interests are not jeopardized in the wake of US unilateralism.

2. A coordinated legal and diplomatic action plan would also help to avoid the strong tendency in Ottawa to be reflexive when dealing with the US, or when facing any major international crisis. Waiting for the US to act/respond may be appropriate when the policy in question affects some other region or state, but reflexive responses are entirely inappropriate when US actions have a direct (and sometimes instantaneous) impact on Canadian economic and security interests. In a post-9/11 environment, the imperative to be confident and proactive when crafting Canadian foreign and security policy has never been greater.

3. With limited resources, however, Canadian officials should avoid the tendency to implement (and pay for) quick fixes. This will become increasingly difficult as Canada gets swept along by US unilateralist pressures, but officials in Ottawa should be prepared to handle these pressures in ways that steer US unilateralism in more productive, cost effective, security maximizing directions.

4. Although the gap between Canadian and American objectives and priorities in the war on terror is arguably quite narrow, there are specific priorities on which Canadian officials should focus. For example, port security is a high risk area for future terrorist activity that demands proactive Canadian planning.

5. Officials in Ottawa must be prepared to defend the security policies they put forward as alternatives to US unilateralism, and should bring to the table more than the hope that

multilateralism, if given enough time, will solve everything. Canadians must engage Americans on the right debates, with the right arguments derived from the right evidence. Take for example Prime Minister Jean Chretien's reaction to current American plans to invade Iraq – "The question of the production of unacceptable armaments in Iraq," the Prime Minister argued, "is a problem that is under the authority of the United Nations, and it is completely different than the problem of terrorism. If we try to do it unilaterally it will go absolutely nowhere." The Prime Minister continues to urge the US to work with allies and through the UN. In other words, avoid unilateralism at all costs. Rejecting unilateralism without explaining precisely how Prime Minister Chretien's multilateral solutions will address these very real security threats is not particularly helpful. The UN's inspection regime (UNSCOM) was the most intrusive multilateral arms control regime in history, yet it failed to prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction.

6. US dependence on (and preference for) unilateral approaches to security (such as BMD) will have a direct impact on Canada's ongoing commitments to multilateral arms control (NACD). If globalism diminishes the capacity of multilateral institutions and regimes to provide core security guarantees, and if these multilateral regimes become less credible and reliable as a result, Canadian officials will be forced to reassess Canadian priorities. Ironically, one way for Canada to increase respect from multilateral alternatives is to accept the fact that, occasionally, unilateralism may be the only option available for meaningful security. If we fail to establish that balance in our policies (and official statements) then Canada will face increasing marginalization on arms control and disarmament issues. Indeed, the unintended consequence of maintaining an almost

religious commitment to multilateralism is that weapons of mass destruction will continue to proliferate, especially in places such as Iraq. Something more must be done today. If US unilateralism is not the answer, then what is?

A question raised during discussions was: what options are there for Canadian foreign policy other than multilateralism? The presenter pointed out that Canadian officials should stop criticizing alternatives to multilateralism. To assume multilateralism is the only option is a mistake. The world needs multilateralism but also needs more than multilateralism. There is no intellectual or moral authority to say multilateralism is the only way of dealing with problems. Other participants also pointed out that alternatives to multilateralism might be, among others, grand strategy; bilateral option (with the US); trilateral option (Canada, US, UK); alliance strategy among English speaking peoples; or a quadrilateral option. In conclusion, the presenter emphatically noted that not all unilateralism is bad and not all multilateralism is good. The relationship between multilateralism and unilateralism and whether it is descriptive or prescriptive as a guide for Canadian foreign policy will have to be further explored.

## **Summary**

The last panel highlighted several issues emerging from the conference. A synthesis of the themes and avenues for future thought are:

- 1. Whether Canada and the US exist in an interdependent relationship as regards threats.** The underlying question of mutual vulnerability and the assumption that we face

the same threats should be spelled out more fully. The post-cold war environment, it was noted, has revealed that threats see no borders, and this is particularly true after the September 11 attacks, which tended to show perhaps, that we are not as interdependent as it seems. Perhaps a better description of the relationship is asymmetric interdependence. The issue is whether the US can live without Canada? It was noted that Canada and the US have a strong partnership. In sum, future thought would have to determine what are Canadian interests and how those interests are fulfilled

2. **The problem of burden sharing and free riding.** It was noted that increasing border cooperation requires a monetary outlay, which entail costs. The cost of not cooperating will lead to potential reduction of Canadian security. It is important to point out in this regard that free riding is ultimately detrimental to Canadian security.

3. **The question of Canadian sovereignty and how it plays out with regard to cooperation.** It was noted that closer cooperation and community between Canada and the US is necessary for Canadian security, and would not be detrimental to, or diminish Canadian sovereignty, since both countries are hard practitioners of the national interest. It is necessary, however, that the logic of this argument be further spelled out. The issues need to be framed and marketed in a better way.

In sum, as with many such discussions, the conference on which this report is based raised more questions than it answered. In any case, it was clear that given the nature of threats after September 11, Canada can actually contribute more to the war on

terrorism than it is doing now. We do not have to wait till an immense crisis strikes before increasing defence spending. The time to do it is now. Ultimately, difficult choices will have to be made regarding Canadian defence, and, if the Canada-US strategic partnership is to continue in a robust manner.

## APPENDIX A: Conference Agenda



Centre for the Study of the Presidency



## AGENDA

### Canadian Defence and the Canada-US Strategic Partnership

The Pearson Room, Lord Elgin Hotel  
Ottawa, Ontario  
5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> September 2002

**Welcome and Introduction 8.30 - 9.00 a.m.**

**Fen Hampson**, Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs  
**Robert Millar**, President, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute  
**David Abshire**, President, Center for the Study of the Presidency

**Thursday, 5 September**

**9.00-10.15 a.m.**

**The Honorable David Abshire**, President, Center for the Study of the Presidency  
“The United States and Canada as Historic Allies: The NATO Perspective”

**James Kitfield**, National Security Affairs Correspondent, *National Journal*, and Advisor to the CSP Project: “Findings of the CSP Report”

**10.15- 10.30 a.m.**

**Coffee Break**

**10.30 – 11.45 a.m.**

“Politics and Diplomacy of the Canada-U.S. Strategic Partnership: Looking Backward, Moving Forward”



**Dwight Mason**, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies,  
Washington

**Christopher Sands**, Fellow and Director, Canada Project, Center for Strategic and  
International Studies

**11.45 – 1.00 p.m.**

**Lunch**

**1.00 – 2.15 p.m.**

**Peter Verga**, Director, Homeland Security Task Force, Office of the Secretary of  
Defense

“The New Unified Command Plan: Whither NORAD

**2.15 – 3.00 p.m.**

**Press Briefings/Conference**

**3.00 – 4.15 p.m.**

**Frank Cilluffo, (invited) Special Assistant to the President, Office of Homeland  
Security Affairs, and Executive Director, President’s Homeland Security Advisory  
Council**

“North America as Homeland: Protecting the Continent as a Whole”

**4.30 – 5.30 p.m.**

Reception: Laurier Room, 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor

**Friday, 6 September**

**8.00 a.m.**

**Coffee Service**

**9.00 – 10.00 a.m.**

**Elinor Sloan**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University

“Land Threats to North America and the Role of the Army”

**10.00 – 10.15 a.m.**

**Coffee Break**

**10.15 – 11.15 a.m.**

**Rob Huebert**, Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies,  
University of Calgary

“The Canadian Navy – Continental Maritime Security and Beyond”

**11.15 a.m. – 12.15 p.m.**

**Jim Fergusson**, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of  
Manitoba

“The Aerospace Dimension”

**12.15 - 1.15 p.m.**

**Lunch**

**1.15 – 2.15 p.m.**

**David Charters**, Director, Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick

“Terrorism and Response: The Impact of the War on Terrorism on the Canadian-  
American Security Relationship”

**2.15 – 3.15 p.m.**

**Frank Harvey**, Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University

“Terrorism, Proliferation and the Myth of American Independence: Multilateral vs.  
Unilateral Approaches to Security after 9/11 and the Implications for Canada”

**3.15 – 3.30 p.m.**

**Coffee Break**

**3.30 – 4.50 p.m.**

**NPSIA/CSDS Panel: Commentaries on Canada-US Defence Relations**

**Norman Hillmer**, Professor, Department of History, Carleton University

**Mira Sucharov**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University

**David Mendeloff**, Assistant Professor, NPSIA Carleton University

**4.50 – 5.00 p.m.**

**Closings**

**David Bercuson**, Vice President (Research), Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute

**David Carment**, Director, Centre for Security and Defence Studies, NPSIA

**Jonah Czerwinski**, Senior Research Associate, The Center for the Study of the Presidency

### **The Centre for Security and Defence Studies (CSDS)**

The Centre for Security and Defence Studies (CSDS) in The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University is internationally recognized for its advanced research, conference, workshop and guest lecture programs, graduate and undergraduate education; and public outreach programs on security and defence issues. CSDS programs and activities embrace faculty from several disciplinary and interdisciplinary departments and schools at Carleton University, most notably NPSIA, the Department of Political Science, and Department of History. The CSDS is a member of the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) program of the Department of National Defence. The SDF program is designed to assist and support teaching and research in the fields of international security, conflict and defence at selected Canadian universities.

### **Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI)**

The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) is an independent, privately funded, federally registered, non-profit, non-partisan research institute which focuses on Canadian defence and foreign policy as well as national security. CDFAI is based in Calgary. One of the Institute's core beliefs is that an informed public will, in turn, produce an informed group that will draft, implement and support innovative and comprehensive Canadian policy. CDFAI is dedicated to improving Canada's participation in international peace and security by providing analysis and education that informs Canadians about defence and foreign policies and the instruments which serve them. To that end, the aim of the Institute is to provide Canadians with factual and comprehensive policy analysis and research in order to promote their understanding of Canada's foreign and defence policies.

### **The Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP)**

The Center for the Study of the Presidency, founded in 1969, is a non-partisan and non-profit organization which studies, informs, and advises the American federal government and brings together experts from government, academia, and the corporate world on a wide range of key issues facing the Presidency. The Center also publishes the award winning Presidential Studies Quarterly. In 1999, the Center began a series of projects and initiatives focusing on a variety of issues that led to a report to the President-elect in early, 2001. Working with scholars, practitioners, and seasoned government experts, the Center completed the report by publishing a book of case studies and an in-depth review of Presidential decision-making in Cold War and post-Cold War military interventions. Efforts that contributed to this work eventually identified new challenges to and new solutions for Presidential leadership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, specifically in the area of national security reform.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Francis Kofi Abiew** is Postdoctoral Fellow and Coordinator of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.