TWISTING ARMS AND FLEXING MUSCLES: PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARY FORCE, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

Report on a Workshop

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ABSTRACT

Based on the presentations and discussions from the workshop, *Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Perspectives on Military Force, Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding*, this monograph probes many of the issues and complexities at the centre of this dynamic interplay. In addition to trying to answer the questions raised above, its purpose is to reflect on past applications and future directions of intervention, whether it occurs in pre-conflict situations, through the use of force, for the purpose of humanitarian concerns, or for more blatant strategic interests. The examination draws from case studies of the Balkans and Africa as well as the post-Soviet region. It will also consider some fresh insights on civil-military co-operation, the use of force for humanitarian protection and third party neutral models of post-conflict reconstruction.
TWISTING ARMS AND FLEXING MUSCLES:
PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARY FORCE,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

Natalie Mychajlyszyn

Introduction

For some time, the academic and policy communities have devoted increasing attention to issues relating to the intersect of military force, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding. As evident in the events surrounding the international community’s active involvement in the Balkans and Africa, as well as Russia’s unilateral actions in the ‘near abroad,’ there has been much to hold this attention. In the process, several important questions are raised: Under what conditions and forms is intervention acceptable? What priorities and concerns inform decisions to intervene? How well has the international community overcome obstacles in its efforts to build peace in post-conflict situations? Finally, what are the consequences of a premature or delayed disengagement for the disputants and for the international community?

Ultimately, these questions can only ever be answered partially and never to the complete satisfaction of any particular point of view. Perhaps more than any other topic in international politics, the subject of this monograph is fraught with dilemmas and controversies. It touches on inter alia international ethics and morality, strategic interests, leadership, human rights, good governance, and sovereignty among others. Moreover, the overlap of the security and development fields has become entrenched, resulting in confusing, undefined non-combatant roles for militaries, unprecedented partnerships between militaries and aid groups in the field as well as having considerable policy implications. The wide array of interests ranging from those of
the international community, individual states, international and regional organisations, non-governmental aid groups to the disputants on the ground further complicate efforts to examine, understand and reflect in a systematic way on the issues relating to military force, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding.

Nevertheless, the issues are important enough to warrant an attempt. Based on the presentations and discussions from the workshop, *Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Perspectives on Military Force, Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding*, this monograph probes many of the issues and complexities at the centre of this dynamic interplay (see Appendix A for Workshop Programme and Appendix B for the List of Participants). In addition to trying to answer the questions raised above, its purpose is to reflect on past applications and future directions of intervention, whether it occurs in pre-conflict situations, through the use of force, for the purpose of humanitarian concerns, or for more blatant strategic interests. The examination draws from case studies of the Balkans and Africa as well as the post-Soviet region. It will also consider some fresh insights on civil-military co-operation, the use of force for humanitarian protection and third party neutral models of post-conflict reconstruction.

**The Balkans**

Regrettably, events of the last decade in the Balkans have made the region an interesting case study of issues relating to military force, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding. In particular, it has provided insight into coercive diplomacy, the impact of bias on the effectiveness of third party intervention, and different levels of tension that arise in peace support operations. Papers on these themes were presented at the workshop by Frank Harvey, David Carment and Dane Rowlands, and Donna Winslow.

According to Harvey, a broader perspective on the use of coercive diplomacy, defined as the application of threats of military force to diplomatic negotiations, finds instances of both successes and failures
in this region of study. For instance, the negotiations that took place in
the fall of 1998 can be considered as an example of successful coercive
diplomacy based on the presence of the four requirements for success:
clear communication of threat, clear commitment to carry out the
threat, capability and capacity, and, finally, resolve to follow through.
In contrast, NATO’s military action against Serbia in March 1999 was
an example of the West’s failure to apply coercive diplomacy and deter
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic from taking action against the
Kosovo Albanians. In particular, the Balkans case provides a wealth
of data and information to demonstrate the critical role played by
rationalism and the credible threat of military force in effective
preventive diplomacy. For instance, rationalism can be used to explain
why coercive diplomacy failed in the March 1999 negotiations
whereby Milosevic failed to perceive the threats as intended.
Rationally, therefore, the Serbian leader was not deterred from taking
action against the Kosovo Albanians and preventive diplomacy failed.

However, coercive diplomacy explanations are not without their critics
and limitations. According to one criticism, the effectiveness of
coercive diplomacy can be measured in ways other than by the
presence or absence of the four criteria for success, thereby leading to
other conflicting conclusions. For instance, Milosevic’s stay in power
following NATO’s March 1999 intervention could be seen as a failure
of Western policy toward Serbia despite Serbia’s withdrawal from
Kosovo. Thus, it may be more valuable to measure the effectiveness of
coercive diplomacy against its identified objectives, whether they may
be limited, short-term (the return of Kosovo Albanian refugees in the
NATO case) or more geo-political and long-term. Likewise, in
considering the success or failure of Western policy toward Serbia,
factors in addition to military action to stop the fighting need to be
taken into account, such as the role played by NGOs and aid agencies
to create the proper socio-economic conditions. The appeal of
considering alternative measurements is amplified whereby the
presence of all four criteria of effective coercive diplomacy is a rare
occurrence.
According to another criticism, the coercive diplomacy approach suggests that it is based on catastrophes. More specifically, events are allowed to escalate until conditions are ripe for effective threats and preventive diplomacy. In this respect, the approach fails to fully appreciate the need for immediate action given the catastrophic and even deteriorating conditions on the ground while policymakers and negotiators engage each other. Likewise, it raises questions about how to react to such situations when the four criteria for effective preventive diplomacy are not all present.

In an effort to explain another dimension of the events in March 1999, particularly the level of force used by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian military, the presentation by Carment and Rowlands focused on the impact of an intervenor’s bias on the management of intrastate conflict. More specifically, they were concerned with the ways in and extent to which combatants react to this biased intervention, especially with respect to escalating or de-escalating the conflict in question, thereby feeding the overall atmosphere of the conflict and affecting the scale and scope of the intervention. For example, in situations consisting of two combatant groups, a biased intervenor is expected to skew the distribution of resources between them. As a result, one combatant group is more harmed by the intervention than the other, leading it to react to the intervention in a way that could either accelerate or decelerate the escalation of the conflict. It follows that the conditions on the ground which led to the intervention in the first place will be either positively or negatively affected by this group’s reaction to the intervention, leading to a comparable change in the force levels of the said intervention and perhaps ultimately to a new equilibrium. According to the preliminary findings of Carment and Rowlands, such an explanation obtained with respect to the situation in Kosovo in March 1999. In other words, there was clear evidence of US and NATO support for the KLA in its struggle with Serbian authorities and that the escalating and more forceful behaviour of the KLA against Serbia was in response to encouraging actions on the part of the US and NATO.
The policy implications of these findings are profound in the sense that escalation of a conflict can be anticipated as a consequence of biased intervention. Indeed, they suggest that biased interventions are ultimately unavoidable and need to be managed in order to avoid their negative consequences. At the same time, the findings are significant in showing how weaker combatants can prevail over a stronger adversary if they are favoured by the biased intervenor.

However, such a framework raises several questions about its applicability. In particular, given that interventions are increasingly more complex and are more than just the application of military force, but rather also include a long-term humanitarian assistance dimension involving NGOs and the development community, the framework may be limited in its scope and subject area. At the same time, the source of the bias needs to be further explored and understood, especially in the context of the role played by popular and visual media coverage of such events which can influence the direction of the bias. This reinforces the limitations of the framework and its inapplicability to situations of humanitarian intervention that receive no media coverage.

The Balkans has also provided valuable data in examining other aspects of peace support operations, most notably the different levels of tension which develop between and among the different actors that find themselves in these complex situations. In her presentation, Winslow presented findings of her research which examined the different relationships involving the Canadian military as it participated in the peace support operations in the Balkans. In particular, she was interested in the role played by cultural challenges in forming the basis for tensions between different actors in peace support operations. By understanding and becoming more aware of the reasons for such tensions, more cooperative relationships could be developed.

Thus, where the Canadian military and peacekeeping is concerned, tensions are evident in the military – political relationship as a result of the inconsistency between the decreasing size of Canada’s defence budget and the increase in its demands and expectations. Moreover, tensions are found within the military whereby military personnel are
increasingly expected to carry out civilian-type activities in peacekeeping situations for which they are not trained. At the same time, the high tempo of Canada’s peacekeeping commitments affects especially those military personnel with a specific trade or belonging to occupational groups that are in high demand and ultimately irreplaceable. The effect on such personnel is evident in their performance and also in their morale since the fast pace affects time spent with their families.

Peace support operations are also affected by tensions among different national militaries. Such tensions emerge due to the lack of or insufficient amount of communication between these groups, as well as because of weak and incompatible understandings of civil-military relations. In this respect, some national militaries are motivated by financial incentives and have shown poor compliance with military norms of behaviour. Ultimately, multinational training and inter-operability are negatively affected as is the overall peacekeeping operation. Moreover, tensions between militaries involved in peacekeeping missions and the local population emerge primarily because of the different cultures and misunderstandings of each other. Similarly, the different culture of operation of NGOs and relief agencies has led to strained relationships between these groups.

Indeed, the complexity of managing relations in such multi-agent operations is especially apparent in the relationship between the military and NGOs. For instance, civilian-led operations in the field are not co-ordinated and the military is frequently forced into situations in which it must contend with them. Likewise, NGOs try to distance themselves from the military because they are seen as a liability at the same time that they rely on it for assistance in the delivery of their programs. The differences in the two groups are especially apparent in their mandates and methods of operation. Moreover, these differences are frequently manifested as gender issues, with NGOs deploying more women than the military. Civilian groups also have a better local knowledge of the area but are perceived to be unwilling to share it with the military.
The implications of such research reach beyond peace support operations. More specifically, its results can also be useful in efforts at improving multi-national combat operations. From another perspective, they can also help to emphasise the need to differentiate between low and high objectives in such operations and to better understand the point at which NGOs should be deployed instead of the military.

At the same time, the research raises several concerns, particularly the limited extent to which the results can be operationalised given the strong resistance to change in the military culture as evident in past efforts at reform. Moreover, recommendations on how to improve such relations that would stem from this research may fall on deaf ears as policymakers are known to disregard the advice of practitioners.

Other questions pertain to the uniqueness of the strain felt by military personnel in such operations. For instance, humanitarian aid works also find themselves in difficult and traumatic situations and endure stress not unlike that faced by military personnel. However, it becomes clear that such costs are different for military personnel. More specifically, military personnel joined the military in order to defend their country, not to be sent overseas in order to protect another nation. In contrast, the motivation of humanitarian workers cannot be separated from humanitarian assistance operations, i.e. to help others in humanitarian catastrophes. Moreover, military personnel do not control their lives unlike humanitarian workers. Thus, the stress levels are different for military personnel.

Finally, such research must guard against caricaturising NGOs and misrepresenting tense relations between the military and NGOs as the norm when instead cooperation between the military and NGOs takes place more often than is appreciated. Moreover, as much as there may be some militaries that are easier to work with than others, so are there NGOs that are more cooperative and professional. In this respect, the research should instead present NGOs more accurately as professional and altruistically motivated. While the point of the research may be to study misperceptions of NGOs held by the military and which underlie
the tensions between these groups, from another perspective the research can be valuable in reinforcing the need to correct these misperceptions and in taking the first step toward removing these tensions.

**Africa**

The growing attention to issues of military force, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding are not confined to the Balkans. Indeed, the scope of research on these inter-connected themes has also encompassed conflicts in Africa. The papers presented at the workshop by David Meren and Robert Astroff and Timothy Shaw on conflicts in Africa were challenged by many of the same issues and questions as those in the Balkans. However, the outcomes and conclusions were not always complementary, nor should they have been expected to be, in order that the larger field of inquiry may be enriched and benefit from the research.

The research presented by Astroff and Meren concentrated on identifying a reliable measurement of the effectiveness of third party interventions. More specifically, they applied a Conflict Intensity Abatement (CIA) Index by which to measure changes in conflict intensity and to determine the effect on the intensity of the conflict of third party intervention. Most importantly, they sought to identify conditions which sustain the abatement of the conflict following an intervention. Limiting the scope of their inquiry to the deliberative, implementing and termination phases of United Nations Chapter VII operations in Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (1996), Astroff and Meren found that intervention had no or a partial effect on the intensity of the conflict. Moreover, they concluded that political will is a critical component to sustaining the effectiveness of third party interventions, but a component that itself too frequently proves difficult to sustain. As a result, the conflict that originally motivated the intervention is perpetuated and, in some cases, can even be aggravated. Thus, what is most needed in such interventions is a long-term perspective in order to avoid a premature and damaging termination of the intervention.
However, attempts such as this one at constructing a measurement for the effectiveness of interventions are dangerous for policy-making because they often oversimplify relationships and require adjustments in order to be more accurate and useful. For instance, the process-based nature of interventions needs to be better appreciated in this framework beyond their simple deconstruction into three phases as Astroff and Meren did. More specifically, the phases of the interventions themselves and the activities on the ground need to be sub-divided in order to develop a more accurate application of the CIA and achieve more credible conclusions. In this respect, attention must be paid to when one part of the intervention ends and another begins. At the same time, for such a model to be useful, it must take into account the possibility of regression. Likewise, models that attempt to measure effectiveness of interventions must demonstrate a predictive capability in order to help policymakers choose the correct strategy when considering intervention. Indeed, anytime that effectiveness is being measured, questions will be raised about how that measurement should be best achieved. In other words, should success or failure be determined based on the outcomes of the strategies, or is it more accurate to measure success or failure according to the objectives of the interventions?

The tendency to localise conflicts that have a regional impact is a particular weakness of analysts and policymakers who think about military force, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding. It is a weakness that Shaw sought to overcome in his presentation from the perspective of sustainable security communities. Indeed, while most contemporary African conflicts originate domestically, they almost all rapidly acquire regional dimensions. It follows that reconciliation and reconstruction cannot be realised without taking into account the multiple transnational relations which are concentrated at this intermediate level. These relations include informal economic and civil society links as well as formal state and economic interactions.

However, reconstruction is not sustainable without the establishment of new patterns of governance among all local and regional stakeholders;
i.e. the trio of states, economies and societies set within these communities. To activate such processes requires shifts in analytic and theoretical as well as policy and institutional projections, both within and around any region. More specifically, these shifts need to be made from a focus on states, interstate organizations and formal economies towards civil societies.

In this context, important insights are gained from both the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region in Africa which inform possibilities for new approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. In the final analysis, such an approach reinforces the need to appreciate more the developmental and economic dimensions of peacebuilding and to consider non-state actors other than NGOs, such as multi-national corporations, as well as the impact of informal trading investment. Indeed, the more these other dimensions are appreciated, the more comprehensive our analyses of complex interventions and peacebuilding operations, and the better understood the need to incorporate a multi-disciplinary perspective to this scope of inquiry.

**Regional Considerations**

As demonstrated by Shaw, the regional implications of military force, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding has increasingly captured the attention of much research. Indeed, the growing appreciation for the regional dimension of these phenomena may be reflective of the better understanding of their complexities. The papers presented by Sandra MacLean and Neil MacFarlane reinforced the utility and benefit of a more comprehensive perspective on the topic.

In her paper, MacLean linked this regional approach to thinking on human security. More specifically, she argued that new, non-traditional regional solutions are necessary if peacebuilding is to fulfill its potential for the advancement of ‘human’ security in Southern Africa. Echoing Shaw, she noted that for there to be any progress, however, the challenges of regionalism, such as its multi-dimensional character and the incompatibility among various regionalist forces,
need to be overcome. Moreover, official policies need to move away from statist principles of *realpolitik* and the mixed and contradictory movements of civil society need to be better coordinated and integrated. In this context, there is opportunity to better understand regional cooperation at both state and non-state levels and the related implications for human security in Southern Africa of the complex and evolving relations between state, markets and civil society within a regional context.

In this respect, Africa holds great promise in revealing crucial insights into these issues given the overlap between traditional and new, or human-based, security issues on the continent. For instance, whereas peacebuilding traditionally comprises short-term, precise in and out measures and is carried out by outside actors, the settlement of African issues when viewed from a non-traditional perspective may be considered to benefit from long-term peacebuilding and from only a partial involvement of third parties.

Moreover, the continent provides ample evidence of the proliferation of non-traditional security concerns affecting the individual rather than the state. These concerns include crime, cases of environmental degradation, particularly affecting the supply of fresh, clean water, civil unrest in the form of state-society relations such as in Zimbabwe, the escalation of social problems such as in disease, the breakdown of family structures and deteriorating gender relations. What complicates any effort to problematise and address these problems is that they are seldom easily separated from the conflicts either on-going or recently experienced in the area. As a result, societies have become militarised and populations have migrated, in many cases towards urban centres, thereby adding to the complexity of the situation.

Indeed, the uniqueness of the conflicts in Africa is their regionalism. More specifically, the national level conflicts and conflict over access to trade in minerals and other resources are in effect part of the broader regional conflicts. Thus, the consequences of these conflicts also become regional: transnational economic interests become linked with the rise of private armies, local groups become both exploiters and
victims of the new situation, and African states themselves become criminalised. Indeed, under circumstances where sovereignty in fact promotes criminalisation, doubts are raised about the effectiveness of external interventions which are not only a function of sovereignty but also apply nationally-based solutions to regional problems.

What a closer examination of the problems facing Africa reveals is the need for new analysis which focuses on regionalism, and not just in the sense of economic integration and state security complex, but more importantly to include non-statist regional identities. In other words, regional analyses need to incorporate a transnational, human tier which is manifested in part in the increasing migration of people. While there has been some cooperation regarding the environment, such as in setting aside parklands, and a proposal has been made regarding the free movement of people, questions remain about how meaningful the cooperation has been. In this respect, attempts at cooperation on migration have not met expectations and xenophobia persists, if not increasing.

The lessons for intervention of a new analysis of regionalism which focuses on human security are many. In the first instance, caution is recommended about the assumptions of causes and the nature of conflict. In addition, greater appreciation is warranted about the limitations of the international community’s role to post-conflict activities. In the second instance, such an analysis suggests that, as civil societies develop across state boundaries, concomitant institutions are also developing. At the same time, not all such developments are necessarily positive as the contrast between constructive civil societies and destructive criminal groups reveals.

Shifting the emphasis of discussion from Africa, MacFarlane presented his paper on regionalism, peacekeeping and the former Soviet Union. More specifically, he analysed the Russian experience of “forceful” peacekeeping in the newly independent states, with particular attention to the Georgian and Tajik cases, with a view to illuminating our understanding of peacekeeping by regional powers. In this respect, two themes emerged: the use of force in response to local conflict and
humanitarian emergencies; and the balance and tensions between responses of the UN and regional organisations and of state powers

Thus, in considering Russian experience in peacekeeping, it became clear that self-interest plays a strong role in motivating a country to undertake regional peacekeeping operations. In Russia’s case, such motivations in becoming involved in the conflicts in Trans-Dniester in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and in Tajikistan took the form of trying to prevent 25 million Russians from returning to Russia, concerns regarding narco-trafficking, preventing conflicts from spilling over, preventing Iran and Turkey from intervening in addition to the direct impact of such conflicts on Russia’s own national security. Other factors motivating Russia’s involvement in regional peacekeeping include access to and control of natural resources and control over former Soviet military bases.

Thus, peacekeeping operations have come to be viewed by Moscow as the means for pursuing national interests. However, such a view has not always informed Russia’s policy on peacekeeping which can be seen to have evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union. For instance, in the early years of 1991-92, Russia’s policy was incoherent and reflected the gradual weakening of a Western orientation in its overall foreign policy and its replacement with a stronger emphasis on the ‘near abroad.’ From 1992-94, Russia’s peacekeeping policy appeared to have become more influenced by military considerations, specifically constraints on its activities given deteriorating conditions in its equipment and personnel. Following this period, from 1994-97 Moscow began to emphasise political solutions in its regional operations. Since then, however, Russia’s peacekeeping policy has been adrift as evident in its inability to impose political settlements. Having failed at its attempts to resolve these conflicts by force or by mediation, Russia now finds it impossible to retract itself from the region.

Another important dimension of regional peacekeeping that emerges from an analysis of Russia’s experience in this activity is the role played by the impartiality, or the absence of it, of the peacekeepers
concerned. In this respect, Russia is anything but impartial and has shown itself to consistently side with one party in the dispute. Indeed, its bias has manifested itself so strongly that Russia has frequently manipulated local conditions to serve its own self-interests. In other respects, its peacekeeping operations have served to ratify the gains of one side and preventing future gains of the other.

Russia’s experience with regional peacekeeping, particularly its bias and partiality, sheds light on the role played by local commanders in directing policy, particularly when the central authorities are incapable of formulating such policy as was the case in Moscow in the early years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, Russia’s early and partial engagements in regional peacekeeping operations were a product of the interests of local military commands, rather than part of a coherent policy coordinated in Moscow. Indeed, that local commanders have behaved in this way is not surprising given that Russian troops have been in the regions over a long period of time, in the meantime developing close ties (or animosities) with the local communities.

On the one hand, a debate about the impartiality or not of Russian peacekeeping serves little purpose given that the actions of the Russian troops in effect have destroyed any perception of impartiality. On the other hand, partiality may in and of itself be a desirable feature of peacekeeping, but its desirability is a function of its accomplishments. In other words, partiality may be acceptable but only under such circumstances as when it helps to reach a political agreement among the disputing parties and when it is complemented by the credibility and the coherent strategy of the intervenor, circumstances which have been lacking in Russia’s case.

Indeed, Russia’s approach to peacekeeping has shown little concern for the legitimacy and mandates of its interventions, as evident in Trans-Dniester and South Ossetia where they are operating without an international mandate. With respect to its involvement in Abkhazia, Russian intervention preceded a peace agreement, which when it was reached was coordinated by the Commonwealth of Independent States.
(CIS) and simply authorised by the United Nations. While Moscow maintains that the basis of Russia’s interventions has been by invitation, the consent for the intervention by the local authorities has not been freely given, raising doubts about the validity of such ‘invitations.’

Regarding the extent to which Russian peacekeeping subscribes to peacekeeping norms of behaviour, while they generally observe the norm of no return force, in practice Russian peacekeeping operates under loose rules of engagement and with an indiscriminate use of force. In this respect, the Russian commander of the Moldovan peacekeeping operation could not even understand the term ‘rules of engagement,’ when questioned about it. Even so, such poor appreciation of peacekeeping norms is slowly changing as Russian peacekeepers gain more experience and training in multi-national contexts.

Thus, problems which arise from having regional powers serve as peacekeepers stem largely from the extent to which such powers are impartial and less normatively constrained than traditional peacekeeping operations. To address these problems, international observers can be useful in increasing the transparency of such peacekeeping operations and in being involved in the transference of peacekeeping norms of behaviour. Nonetheless, as much as Russia’s experience in regional peacekeeping may raise serious concerns, the end result has been that its peacekeeping operations have contributed to the reduction of violence in the region. Moreover, if Russia had not undertaken to intervene in these conflicts, it is highly unlikely that another country would have given the low level of international and media interest in the region.

**Perspectives on Military Force, Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding**

This last section served as the opening session at the workshop. While its placement has changed, its purpose has not, that is to illuminate and
raise questions about underexplored areas of the subject matter and to guide future research. In this respect, several themes emerged, such as the changing role (if any) of military force, the growing importance of the community level in effective operations, differing priorities of the different phases of the conflict spectrum, and the greater appreciation for the overlap between security and development sectors. Three papers were presented by Major David Last, Don Hubert and a joint paper by Necla Tschergi and Fen Hampson.

In his paper, Last focused on the gaps in our abilities to control violence and build constructive relationships for a lasting peace. Emphasising the need to approach security beyond a soldier-provided perspective by including matters of governance, he argued that third-party efforts to control violence can be more effective by organising the appropriate agents, including military, paramilitary and police assets as well as NGOs, in such a way that corresponds to the challenge at hand. A particularly challenging case is the violence perpetrated by local, community-based spoilers, which perpetuates the sort of toxic atmosphere that obstructs and delays progress in the peace process. The problem in the past has been the lack of correspondence between such circumstances and the response to deal with it, thereby undermining the entire effort. Thus, for example, peacekeeping operations such as IFOR, SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans have been weak in their ability to increase expectations of cooperation between hostile parties. Moreover, there is a gap in the range of skills needed to support peacebuilding and the skills embodied in typical international missions. As a result, violence and distrust continues among the parties.

One solution to this problem is to apply a model for third-party intervention that controls the defectors (the perpetrators of continued violence) and increases the chances for long-term cooperation between hostile parties. This model is informed by game theory and simulation work on the evolution of cooperation, particularly the success of the tit-for-tat strategy for eliciting cooperative behaviour. Ultimately, as a first step towards organising for effective peacebuilding, a manageable area should be identified within which there is a third-party responsible
for controlling violence and building relationships. In particular, the third party has the capacity to act with respect to security, development, governance and reconciliation. This capacity includes deploying police and paramilitary forces at the same time as peacekeeping forces, rather than at consecutive stages; in this way, the full range of sources of violence (from organised military to local, individual criminals) can be confronted comprehensively when it is needed the most and in a manner that exploits the comparative advantage of the different types of security forces. This capacity also includes creating links between the third-party intervenors and the local community in that particular ‘manageable area.’ For example, a community centre composing of local and international facilitators, reflecting the range of skills needed for such activity, could serve as the glue for all the other services and organisations that come to the area to promote peacebuilding. Such a community centre operating at the grass-roots could then use access to international resources to reward cooperative behaviour and facilitate relationship rebuilding in an environment where violence is controlled by the multi-asseted security presence.

Hubert argued that new strategies are needed to provide humanitarian protection and questioned the extent to which military force, specifically the use of deadly force, is a skill that can be applied to provide protection for civilians in war zones. In contrast to the assistance dimension of humanitarian action (meanings the provision of material needs for survival) which is carried out quite well, the provision of physical safety and the protection of non-derogable human rights is a much more underdeveloped dimension of humanitarian action. In other words, international agencies, including military forces, are doing a poor job in protecting the very civilians to whom they are providing food, water, medicine and shelter. Indeed, the search for new forms of protection for civilians in war zones is necessary for three reasons: civilians are now a component of contemporary military objectives (ethnic cleansing); international refugee protection and the option of flight are weak or less viable; and identifying safe-areas or protection for narrowly defined groups fails to
protect those civilians that are most likely to be targeted - men of military age.

While there are indirect means of protection by way of prosecution, punishment and presence are available, the use of force to protect civilians in war zones needs to be re-considered. First, protection of civilians by way of force can occur at the most vigorous level, i.e. war-fighting strategy which also requires a military victory over the target. Second, protection of civilians through the use of deadly force can occur in the midst of a peacekeeping operation where the rules of engagement, not the mandate, specifically reflect the use of force to protect civilians. Third, the use of force can be applied towards a doctrine of protection whereby the military’s principal objective is to protect civilians and the tactic is to interpose itself between the combatants and civilians, rather than between the opposing forces. This third level of protection can be (and has been) manifested in several ways, including refugee camps, safe zones, safe areas, safe sites, and safe passage; however, their weak or ineffective application shows that this level raises more questions than it answers.

Indeed, discussions about the use of robust military force on humanitarian grounds have tended to focus on “when” to intervene and “who” decides. The question of “how” deadly force can be effectively employed to protect civilians has been neglected. Does robust protection compromise impartiality? If not, then protection could become a military objective distinct from either traditional peacekeeping or war fighting. Does protection through the use of deadly force require occupation? If not, then interventions might require troops in the thousands rather than the tens of thousands. Other questions that extend from such a re-consideration include: What practical measures can be taken to keep safe-areas safe, to maintain the civilian character of refugee camps, to deter attacks on civilians? What changes in doctrine, training and equipment are necessary to provide physical safety to civilians in war zones?

The greatest restriction on the use of deadly force to protect civilians is the understandable unwillingness of political leaders to place troops in
harms way where national interests are only indirectly at stake. Ultimately, much more serious thought and analysis is required of this topic to make it policy relevant and operational. Further development of the doctrine and capacity to undertake such action effectively will serve to increase the likelihood of generating the necessary political will.

Tschirgi and Hampson’s joint presentation on *The War-Torn Societies Project (WSP) and Third Party Neutral Models of Conflict Management*, assessed the WSP as an alternative, if not complementary, technique for post-conflict mediation and management. Initiated in June 1994 by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, the WSP is an innovative experiment of third-party facilitation and mediation that employs participatory action-research methodology in post-conflict reconstruction. Primarily a multi-disciplinary venture that brings together local, national and international actors in a joint exercise of collective analysis on rebuilding issues and priorities, the WSP is a research-based and driven process engaging local policy elites and authorities in a process of dialogue and discussion through the vehicles of research, policy advice, networking and evaluation and dissemination. Applied to Eritrea, Mozambique, Guatemala and Somalia, the WSP was primarily concerned with the weak coordination (and the consequential poor results) of different initiatives and actors at different levels, including local authorities and international donor agencies, post-conflict activities. Its objective was to bridge the gap between ideas generated for post-conflict reconstruction and their implementation. In this respect, it sought to understand the most beneficial and productive combination of policies and actors in order to identify common problems as well as define and develop a strategy for dealing with these problems. The WSP’s technical-functional orientation was emphasised in the way it encouraged mechanisms that sustained communication and permitted a wide range of actors to engage in an ongoing process of research, dialogue and exchange of views. Ultimately, it served well to promote a better understanding
among the participating actors about their goals, interests and motivations, leading to consensus- and relationship-building as well as establishing confidence and trust among domestic and external actors.

The WSP raised important operational considerations, such as timing and engagement, local ownership and control, managing relations with local authorities, and developing skills in mediation and dialogue facilitation by researchers. As well, it was noted to be distinct from, yet complementary to conflict resolution techniques. For instance, like conflict resolution, the WSP emphasised transparency, accessibility and inclusiveness, sustained communications, and new information and knowledge. But, whereas conflict resolution is a primary objective of conflict resolution, it is secondary to the WSP. As well, the methodologies of conflict resolution vary considerably in terms of their influence strategies, target audiences and modalities of implementation. The WSP was also deliberately concerned with post-conflict situations and engaged a wide range of actors, unlike conflict resolution which is carried out at all of the different phases of the conflict cycle and is limited to a small group of actors. Most importantly, conflict resolution is concerned with identifying the sources of conflict, whereas the WSP was future-oriented, aimed at identifying modalities and means for cooperation on post-conflict reconstruction.

There are several reasons behind the success of the WSP. First, unlike international donor agencies, the WSP took the matter of local ownership seriously and, applying it directly, encouraged local nationals to run the dialogues. Second, and related to the first, the flexibility of the methodology also contributed to development of local ownership whereby the local participants made decisions in the evolution of the project rather than the project initiators in Geneva. Third, the importance of resources could not be understated; this speaks to the UN’s support for the project. Fourth, the WSP was forward-oriented, focusing on development problems affecting the future of the particular country and avoiding a revisitation of past grievances. Finally, the WSP was inclusive and was carried out on an unofficial, informal level out of government control.
Indeed, the WSP highlighted the importance of creating neutral spaces in post-conflict processes. In particular, neutral spaces are necessary and desirable to overcome competition among actors over control of political agendas, resource allocation and priorities. They are also important for developing commitments between national and local authorities who have few opportunities to understand the other party. Ultimately, neutral spaces are critical for building trust and legitimacy among the parties.

**Conclusion**

In recent years, the terms “military force,” “humanitarian intervention” and “peacebuilding” have become pervasive in the vocabulary of international relations. This pervasiveness in large part is a function of their capture by multiple disciplines, such as political science and international political economy, and issue-areas, such as security and development. Most importantly, it is also a function of the disturbing realities of the post-Cold War era, marked by civil and ethnic strife, the use of military force, and human suffering on a large scale. As a result, the linkages between these terms have become more greatly appreciated by analysts and practitioners alike.

At the same time, however, their significance and content has fluctuated in keeping with the changing circumstances on the ground and their consequences. In this respect, the terms have become pregnant with new concerns and issues for analysts and policy-makers. Some of these issues consider the methods for assessing impact, evaluating success, and risk-assessment. Other issues pertain to levels-of-analysis, the distinction between state and regional interventions, and the multiple definitions of security for different referents. Yet others concentrate on the agents of intervention, the role of states, international organisations and the challenges to traditional, sovereignty-based approaches by non-traditional ways of thinking that emphasise transnational, human-based processes.
As is readily apparent, the topics are complicated and exceedingly complex. Whether or not the issues they raise can ever be satisfactorily addressed remains to be seen. Meanwhile, perspectives on military force, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding will continue to be nurtured, in the process promising vital and useful information for scholarship and policy. Ultimately, such perspectives will continue to strive to provide more enriching explanations of the most perplexing phenomena of the post-Cold War era.
APPENDIX A – Workshop Programme

Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Perspectives on Military Force, Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding

14-15 October 1999 Ottawa, Ontario

Thursday, 14 October:

1:15-3:15  I. Opening session

Chair: Tim Shaw, Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University

Organizing for Effective Peacebuilding
Major David Last, Royal Military College of Canada

Third Party Neutral Models of Conflict Management
Fen Hampson, NPSIA and Necla Tschirgi, IDRC

Use of Deadly Force to Protect Civilians in Conflict Situations
Don Hubert, Dalhousie University

3:30-5:30  II. Case Studies - The Balkans

Chair: Fen Hampson, NPSIA

The Role of Bias in Third Party Intervention: Kosovo and Beyond
David Carment and Dane Rowlands, NPSIA

Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo: A Response to Critics of NATO's Intervention
Frank Harvey, Dalhousie University

Canadian Warriors in Peacekeeping - The Case of the Former Yugoslavia
Donna Winslow, University of Ottawa

7:00 dinner McDonald Room, Courtyard by Marriott Hotel, 350 Dalhousie Street
Keynote Speaker: Paul Heinbecker, ADM (Global and Security Policy), DFIAT
Friday, 15 October:

9:30-12:00  III. Case Studies - Africa

Chair: Sandra MacLean, Dalhousie University

Regionalisms for Reconstruction? Prospects for Sustainable Security
Communities in Africa’s Horn & Great Lakes in a New Century
   Tim Shaw, Dalhousie University

Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain: An Assessment of United Nations Chapter VII Activities in Central Africa
   Robert Astroff, University of Toronto and David Meren, NPSIA

12:00-1:00  Lunch

1:00-3:30  IV. Peacebuilding and Regional Implications

Chair: Harald von Riekhoff, Carleton University

Seeking Human Security in Africa: Regional Dimensions of Approaches to Peacebuilding
   Sandra MacLean, Dalhousie University

Peacekeeping and Power Politics in the Former Soviet Union
   Neil MacFarlane, Dalhousie University/Oxford

3:30 - 4:00  Coffee

4:00-5:00  V. Roundtable on Future Directions: Policy, Analysis, Pedagogy
## APPENDIX B – Workshop Participants

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS)</td>
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<td>Fraser, John</td>
<td>EURUS, Carleton University and former Ambassador to Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>Frewer, Barry</td>
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<td>Hubert, Don</td>
<td>Dalhousie University</td>
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<td>Last, Major David</td>
<td>RMC</td>
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<td>Lee, James</td>
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<td>MacDonald, Corinne</td>
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<td>MacFarlane, Neil</td>
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Natalie Mychajlyszyn is Post-Doctoral Fellow and Coordinator of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.
LIST OF OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. Aliya and the Demographic Balance in Israel and the Occupied Territories (1992)
   *James W. Moore*

2. A New Germany in a New Europe (1992)
   *John Halstead*

   *Ian Malcolm*

   *John M. Fraser*

   *Charles K. Armstrong*

   *Simon Dalby*

7. Ethnic Conflict and Third Party Intervention: Riskiness, Rationality and Commitment
   *David Carment, Dane Rowlands and Patrick James*


   *Lucian Ashworth and David Long*

    *Athanasios Hristoulas*

    *David Carment and Dane Rowlands*
   David Carment

   Craig N. Murphy

   Roger Hill

   Evan H. Potter and David Carment

   Jean-François Rioux and Robin Hay.

   Jianxiang Bi

   Ozay Mehmet.

   John B. Hay

   Michael Croft, Sharon Hobson, and Dean Oliver

   Natalie Mychajlyszyn

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