The Influence of Class, Status, and Social Capital on the Probability of Volunteering

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Introduction

Across virtually the whole literature that investigates why people participate in voluntary organizations two conclusions dominate: those with higher social status participate more than those with lower status, and those with more social capital, in particular more extensive social networks, participate more than those with less social capital. These can be broadly described as the dominant status and social capital models of volunteer participation. Basic to these approaches is the idea that differences in participation are related to differences in the amount of status and social capital individuals possess.

With very few exceptions voluntary participation has not been analyzed from a social class perspective (but see Daniels, 1988; Van Til, 1988; Wilenski, 1962). This is surprising since as Wuthnow (1991: 307) says, "Voluntarism is, and has been from its inception, largely a feature of the middle-class." It is even more surprising since voluntarism is a distinctive characteristic of advanced capitalist democracies and is firmly embedded in prevailing social and economic structures (e.g., Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 227). Early research on voluntary participation was not mute on the relevance of class (e.g., Gordon and Babchuk, 1959; Kahl, 1957: 147-150). But more recent research has largely replaced the notion of discrete social categories (classes) with notions of gradational difference (social status and social capital) that lack identifiable group boundaries. This raises the central question of this research paper: what are the relative impacts of social class, social status and social capital on the patterns of voluntary participation,. This paper examines all three models and empirically tests their efficacy for understanding volunteer participation. The first section of the paper outlines the central points of each model as they bear on the

question of participation. The second section presents an operationalization of the key concepts and an analysis of data from the 1998 General Social survey. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relative merits of the models.

Dominant Status Model

The dominant status model arose less as a formally specified sociological theory of volunteer participation than as a post hoc attempt to bring order to the accumulation of evidence from diverse empirical investigations of who volunteers. This early research consistently found that traits such as high education, high income, high occupational prestige, being married, male gender, and middle age, among others, were positively correlated with participation (Payne et. al., 1972:231-232). Although this approach has yet to find formal enunciation as a theory, it does constitute an "underlying principle" that has repeatedly appeared in the literature and thus has achieved the de facto status of a model of volunteer participation (Smith, 1994:247).

At the core of the dominant status model is the assertion that volunteer participation is greater for individuals who occupy social roles or positions that are more highly socially valued or preferred (Smith, 1994:246). Dominant status encourages participation because such roles are the basis of important social resources, dispositions, and signals.

In the first case, dominant status reflects higher levels of the social and economic resources that facilitate participation. In the most basic sense, higher status people have the economic resources that in themselves reduce barriers to participation. In contrast, lower status individuals may face real economic constraints to participation. For those with

limited resources, things such as transportation, babysitting, time off work, or other direct costs to volunteering may be barriers to involvement (Sundeen and Raskoff, 1994:384; Wilson and Musick, 1998:800). It has also been suggested that those with higher economic resources will have more time to devote to voluntary participation (Sundeen, 1988:548). This may be true if wealth is used to "buy-off" other uses of one's time in order to volunteer – such as hiring a gardener rather than doing yard work oneself. However, the evidence that wealth and discretionary time are positively related is ambivalent. Verba et. al., (1995:291-295), for example, find no connection between amount of free time and social status. This is supported by Freeman's finding that those with higher opportunity costs (whose time is more valuable) actually participate to a higher degree (1994:S146). So it is unclear whether dominant status is associated with more available time.

Other resources linked to dominant status can generally be seen as components of an individual's human capital. In its most transparent form, education itself is a dominant status (Wilson and Musick, 1998:800: 1997a: 698). But it may also be the case that occupying a dominant status imparts practical social skills such as cognitive abilities (Goss, 1999: 381; McPherson and Rotolo, 1996:183) or civic skills and leadership abilities (Verba et. al., 1995:284; Wilson and Musick, 1997b:254-255). The consequence of possessing these aspects of human capital is that individuals are more "qualified" and therefore better prepared to participate in voluntary organizations. Dominant status is also associated with a greater awareness of the needs of one's community and the opportunities to actively participate (Sundeen, 1988:557: Wilson and Musick, 1997b:256).

Thus persons in roles that reflect dominant status are associated with levels of economic and human capital that facilitate involvement in volunteer activities. Or as Verba et. al. (1995: 304), put it, time, money and civic skills are the resources that enable participation.

Dominant status is also seen as generating a set of attitudes, values and norms that dispose the individual towards participation. In one sense, the main disposition associated with dominant status is the development of a sense of civic responsibility (Wilson and Musick, 1997b: 256). Other dispositions are also suggested as relevant for participation -- high status roles tend to reduce psychological barriers by increasing confidence or competence in social interaction (Goss, 1999: 381; Wilson and Musick 1998: 800; Sundeen, 1988;551), and higher status individuals tend to receive greater rewards from participation (McPherson and Rotollo, 1996:183; Janoski and Wilson, 1995:273). For example, volunteering can be viewed as consumption of a symbolic good (status reinforcement) so that the prestige returns to participation are greater for dominant status individuals (Wilson and Musick, 1997a: 696). In addition, participation by high status individuals has greater implications for career enhancement than it has for lower status individuals (Sundeen and Raskoff, 1995:341; Wilson and Musick, 1997b; 253). In particular, many high status occupations may carry with them a strong and at times explicit obligation to become involved (Goss, 1999:381; Wilson and Musick, 1997b: 253). Another disposition derives from the fact that dominant status individuals typically have a greater stake in the public goods that are the outcome of participation and thus are more likely to become involved (Wilson and Musick, 1998:800; Sundeen, 1988:548; Verba et. al., 1995:281).

Finally, the dominant status model includes an explanation for the increased participation of higher status individuals based upon the role of dominant status as a signal. While resources and dispositions relate directly to the factors that encourage and facilitate the participation of high status individuals, signalling involves how organizations and their members actively recruit specific kinds of volunteers. A dominant status indicates to organizations that individuals have the appropriate qualifications for participation. This is important because these qualifications (resources and dispositions) are valuable to the organization and presumably are in short supply in the population (McPherson and Rotolo, 1996: 183; McPherson, 1981: 718; Wilson and Musick, 1997a: 698). This being the case, organizations can be expected to more actively recruit individuals with these resources, and dominant status signals that a person has the needed resources. Signals reflecting high status are also important because the organizations themselves tend to be socially stratified and have a strong tendency to status homogeneity (Tomeh, 1973:97; Gordon and Babchuk, 1959:27). Both of these find expression in the fact that the main road to participation is often through being asked (Wilson and Musick,1998: 800; Freeman, 1997: S141).

Problems with the dominant status model largely stem from the fact that there is no clear demonstration that these roles actually have the purported "preferred qualities". As Smith notes, for many of the proposed dominant roles the association with prestige and respect is suspect (1994:247). In addition, some empirical research either contradicts the model or at least shows ambivalent results (Auslander and Litwin, 1988; Berger, 1991; Smith, 1994;

Tiehen, 2000). Furthermore, it has been suggested that one type of resource associated with dominant status, human capital, may be important in volunteering for self-interest types of organizations, but is not relevant for community-oriented organizations (Janoski and Wilson, 1995:289).

The lack of specificity about what constitutes a dominant status presents a problem for our analysis of the relevance of the model. To compare this model with the class and social capital models requires being able to operationalize the concept of dominant status. To this end the rather vague idea of dominant status is replaced by the more specific idea of socio-economic standing or SES. It is suggested that the clearest example of dominant status is the concept of socio-economic status -- that in fact the most important base for differential resources, dispositions and signals is SES. This is certainly supported by the fact that education and occupation are consistently found to be strongly associated with volunteer participation.

The Social Capital model

A second model of participation focuses on the relevance of social capital for patterns of volunteering. This model holds that the more social capital an individual possesses, the more likely they are to participate in volunteer activities. As with the dominant status model, the social capital approach sees the connection between social capital and volunteering in terms of three types of factors: resources, dispositions, and exposure. In this case however the origin of these lies in the character of social networks and not in the individual's social status.

Originally proposed by Bourdieu (1986) and later Coleman (1988), the notion of social capital has found a place in explanations of participation in voluntary organizations and for volunteering itself. This section outlines the essentials of the social capital model and its main consequences -- both for individuals and for groups. It is in its consequences that analysts of volunteering see social capital as instrumental in explaining who participates as volunteers and why they do so.

For Coleman, social capital is a characteristic of existing social structures that facilitates the productive actions of individuals or groups -- social capital makes possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible" (1988:S98). Thus social capital is a resource individuals or groups may call upon in order to secure certain desired ends. Bourdieu argues that social capital reflects the resources derived from "… possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition -- or in other words, to membership in a group…." (1986:248).

In Coleman's formulation, social capital exists in three forms. In each case, the more that social relations among individuals exhibit these characteristics, the greater the pool of social capital that is available to them -- either as individuals or as groups (Coleman, 1988: S101). The first form social capital takes involves the extent of obligations, expectations and trustworthiness that exists in the reciprocal relations among individuals in a group. The greater the density of obligations, and the greater the trustworthiness of the social

environment, the greater the social capital available to the group as a whole, and to any member in particular (1988:S102-S103).

The second form of social capital exists simply in its information function. Relations among individuals are important sources of useful information that can be acquired at lower cost to the individual than would be true otherwise (1988:S104). And finally, social capital derives from strong norms and effective sanctions within social networks. These not only facilitate certain types of action but importantly they constrain other, undesirable actions (1988:S105).

Two aspects of social structure are important for the accumulation and effective use of social capital. As forms of social capital, norms and sanctions are enhanced the extent that there is closure in social networks. That is, the more that individuals in the network are known to each other on a face-to-face basis, the greater the effectiveness of norms and sanctions, and thus the greater the level of trust. In other words, the greater the density of personal ties among members of a community or group, the greater the level of closure and the stronger the social capital available within the group. A second aspect of social structure that is of particular importance for realizing social capital is what Coleman calls "appropriable social organizations". Formal organizations provide a context in which the three forms of capital can be developed and thus are a particularly effective basis for developing social resources. Significant in this respect is Coleman's point that individuals involved in diverse (multiplex) sets of personal ties will have access to a greater pool of resources than those involved in less diverse (simplex) sets of relations (1988:S108-S109).

Coleman's analysis of social capital is generally the takeoff point for applications of the notion of social capital to volunteering. Early research on why people participate in voluntary associations did not underestimate the importance of social networks (cf., Tomeh, 1973:104-105; Kahl, 1967:147-150). And certainly more recent studies of participation in both formal and informal organizations highlights the relevance of social networks (Snow et. al., 1980; Auslander and Litwin, 1988; Marwell et. al., 1988; Guterbock and London, 1983). But when the transformation of social networks into social capital occurred in the history of this model is not clear, although most current analysts point to Putnam's article on the decline of social capital in the USA (Janoski et. al. 1998:496; Wilson and Musick, 1998:799). In any event, the analysis of social capital and volunteer participation is now firmly entrenched in research in this area.

Applications of the social capital model typically begin with Coleman's assertion that social capital inheres in social networks, and generates the norms, obligations and trust that facilitate collective action (1998:799). The resources social capital makes available to members of networks include amplification of personal resources, information, pooled labour (Wilson and Musick, 1998:800), contacts, and obligations (Wilson and Musick, 1997a: 695; Paxton, 1999:92). Along with resources, social capital generates dispositions that foster participation. These include trust, norms of group reciprocity, and an awareness of community, or what Portes calls bounded solidarity (Wilson and Musick, 1997a; Janoski et. al., 1998:497; Portes, 1998: 8). Finally, social capital in the form of social networks increases the individual's exposure to the community which in turn increases the

likelihood of participation. The more extensive are one's personal networks, the greater will be both one's awareness of opportunities to participate, and the likelihood of recruitment.

A number of problems exist with this approach to understanding voluntary participation. One very specific problem in analyzing participation is the question of whether participation in social networks increases the tendency to volunteer or whether being a volunteer increases the size of an individual's social networks. Second, central to the social capital model is the idea that extensive networks encourage prosocial values and attitudes. Research in this area, however, has produced conflicting results. Janoski et. al., (1998) find that prosocial attitudes are more important than social participation in explaining volunteer participation. In contrast, Amato (1990) finds participation more important in helping behaviour than are personality traits. Third, the notion of social capital as it is typically used in the studies is far removed from either Bourdieu (1986) or Coleman's (1988) definitions. In fact, it is in danger becoming tautological: social capital becomes equated with the resources it supposedly generates (Portes, 1998:5). But perhaps the most significant problem is that nowhere in this literature is there any indication of why social capital should vary across individuals. In this model there is no explanation of why some people have more social capital than others.

The Class Model of Volunteer Participation.

The class approach does not dispute that resources, dispositions, and signals or exposure are important proximate factors affecting participation. Instead it differs in the assertion that each of these is fundamentally related to an individual's social class rather than to their socials status, and that social capital is itself a product of class position. This approach begins with Bourdieu's discussion of social capital as part of a larger analysis of all the forms of capital in capitalists societies. Central to his argument is the claim that both cultural and social capital are fundamental characteristics of the structure and reproduction of inequality in capitalism. As a consequence, the basic nature of economic, cultural and social capital is to be understood in the nature of the capitalist class structure itself. This is the essential difference between a class analysis of volunteer participation and an analysis based upon the dominant status or social capital models. Where the status and social capital models lack a clear theory that explains why social roles are accorded the status they have, or why social capital varies across individuals, the class model explains these characteristics of individuals as aspects of their class position. As such, variations in resources and dispositions can be explained by understanding the differences between classes as "empty places" in the structure of capitalist production (Poulantzas, 1975:14).

Central to an understanding of capitalism is the idea that capital can present itself in three basic forms -- as economic capital, as cultural capital, and as social capital (Bourdieu, 1986:243). Economic capital derives from ownership in the means of production. In general terms, the resources attached to economic capital are wealth and power. Cultural

capital exists in three forms, as lasting dispositions of the mind (values and attitudes), as cultural goods, and as knowledge, particularly in the form of educational credentials (1986:243). The resources that are attached to cultural capital are those typically described as human capital. Social capital, as noted earlier, is the aggregate of resources that derive from social networks characterized by "durable obligations subjectively felt" (Bourdieu, 1986:248-249).

As applied to volunteer participation these three forms of capital underlie the basic resources and dispositions that promote participation. It is important to note, as Coleman does in relation to social capital, that in practice all individuals in the society will possess some amount of all three types of capital (Coleman, 1988:S105). However, the amount and efficacy of any form of capital as a social resource is determined largely by the individual's position in the class structure (Wright, 1985: 148-153). In the application of the class model to volunteering, the concordance between the class structure and the distribution of economic resources, such as wealth, and cultural resources, such as dispositions and knowledge, is not problematic. Analysts of capitalism routinely acknowledge that class position involves fundamental differences in the nature and quality of these resources (Goldthorpe, 1980:38-42; Giddens, 1973:100-107). Social capital however is more problematic -- the inherent relationship between social capital and the class structure is not typically developed in class analyses. However it is apparent in Bourdieu's discussion of social capital that, as with cultural capital, it is ultimately based on economic capital and thus is itself class-based (1986:252). Nonetheless, a re-reading of

Coleman's discussion of social capital supports the contention that social capital is inherently class based.

In the literature on volunteer participation, social capital is usually equated with the extent of the individual's personal ties. But these ties must be of a particular kind – reciprocal, trusting and emotionally positive (Paxton, 1999: 93). But as Coleman himself argues, extensive personal ties, regardless of their character, are in themselves not enough to generate effective social resources. Social networks only become effective resources when there is social closure. Coleman explicitly argues that the necessary condition for the emergence of effective norms and sanctions, and the development of trust, is some degree of social closure in the individual's social networks (1988:S105-S108). Portes suggests that "closure means the existence of sufficient ties between a certain number of people to guarantee the observance of norms"(1998:6). It is only on the basis of closure that groups can apply the sanctions that enforce norms and enable the growth of trust. But the notion of closure also implies that groups must also have the ability to exclude outsiders (Portes, 1998:15). This last is what Bourdieu means when he argues that developing social capital requires "… an endless effort at institution" (1986:249-250). Strategies of closure in the class structure are intrinsic to class categories. Classes in dominant positions generally practice strategies of exclusion, while classes in subordinate positions practice strategies based upon bounded solidarity (Parkin, 1974: 1-18; Portes, 1998:8). Combining Coleman's arguments about closure, and notions of exclusion and bounded solidarity suggests that social networks will tend to be intra-class phenomenon. Personal networks will tend to extend within a class category rather than across class

boundaries. As a result, the social capital associated with networks will be class-specific. Once class is accounted for, social capital will have little effect on volunteering.

To summarize, the class model of volunteer participation thus rests on the argument that the resources and dispositions, the signals and exposure that constitute the central aspects of the dominant status and the social capital models are all subsumed under the structure of class positions in capitalists societies. As a result, patterns of volunteer participation might better be described by the class model than by the dominant status or social capital models. Moreover, because the class model lies within the general model of inequality in capitalist societies, it provides a coherent account of why economic, cultural and social capital vary across individuals in society and thus may provide a more informative account of volunteer participation.

The Data

The data for this analysis are taken from the 1998 General Social Survey (Statistics Canada, 1999). The sub-sample in the analysis is restricted to those who report being employed at some time during the 12 months prior to the survey. To create both class and status classifications requires that the respondents report information about their occupation. This restricts the sample to a total of 5,750 individuals.

Table 1 Coding and Distributions for Class, Status and Social Capital Variables*

	Count	%
Status		
SES 7, High, scores 70+	313	5.4
SES 6, scores 60-69	528	9.2
SES 5, scores 50-59	1254	21.8
SES 4, scores 40-49	1209	21.0
SES 3, scores 30-39	1487	25.9
SES 2, Low, scores 17-29	957	16.6
Total	5747	100.0
Hours of Contact		
13-24	389	6.8
9-12	1357	23.6
5-8	1580	27.4
1-4	1480	25.7
none	954	16.6
Total	5761	100.0
Church Attendance		
52 times/year	915	15.9
12 times/year	645	11.2
4 times/year	1303	22.7
1/year	513	8.9
never	2374	41.3
Total	5750	100.0
Social Class		
Large Capitalist	89	1.6
Small Capitalist	286	5.0
Petty Bourg	691	12.0
High Manager	377	6.5
supervisor	222	3.9
Autonomous worker	546	9.5
White worker	2600	45.1
Blue Worker	949	16.5
Total	5761	100.0

* The excluded or reference group is shown in italics

Operationalizing the Central Concepts

Socio-Economic Status

As indicated above, the lack of a clear statement about what constitutes a 'dominant status' leaves this concept in limbo – many social roles can be seen as dominant in some way, but why they should be so is not spelled out in the model. As a result, the analysis here uses a very specific measure of dominant status – socio-economic status. Two factors that are repeatedly identified as important dominant statuses are education and income (Smith, 1994). Since SES is a linear function of these two it should also have a significant impact on the likelihood of being a volunteer.

Socio-economic status is operationalized as a set of dummy variables representing the grouped scores of the Blishen 1981 SES index available in the GSS data (Blishen et. al., 1987). The dummy variables, along with the range of Blishen scores they represent and the distribution of the sample across these categories are shown in Table 1.

Social Capital

Operationalizing social capital in the GSS data is difficult. No questions were asked that were specifically meant to measure this characteristic. However, two variables are available that are often used in the literature as indicators of social capital – church attendance and level of contact with non-household individuals. The first is simply a measure of the number of times the respondent attends church each year, ranging from never attending to attending weekly. The second measure, hours of contacts, is a variable constructed by the General Social Survey from the time diaries in the 1998 survey. It

measures the number of hours in a typical day the respondent spends interacting with non-household members. Both measures are operationalized as a set of dummy variables, in part to facilitate comparisons with the status and class variables, but also because initial examination of the data suggests that the relationship between these and the probability of volunteering may not be linear. Treating each as a set of dummy variables avoids the possibility of lack of fit due to any non-linearity. The dummy variables, the ranges they represent, and the sample distribution are presented in Table 1.

Class

Several variants of a class schema have been proposed by various authors seeking to reformulate the central tenets of Marx's class theory. While these rest on different re-conceptualizations of class as proposed by Marx, and at times, Weber, the schemas which result are generally quite similar (Clement and Myles, 1994: 6-7). The most explicit re-formulation is perhaps that of E. O. Wright. For Wright, class categories are defined by three principle dimensions of exploitation relations in capitalism – exploitation based on the ownership of capital, on control of organizational assets, and on the possession of credential or scarce skills (Wright, 1985: 148). Ownership (and non-ownership) of the means of production delineates the two great classes under capitalism, capitalists and workers. Within the category of 'capitalist' are three distinctive class positions, large capitalists, small capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie. The distinction between these rests on the amount of labour they employ and the amount of capital they own (the two being closely related in practical terms).

Control over organizational assets reflects the “effective control over the coordination and integration of the division of labour’ within economic organizations (Wright, 1985: 151). Those who possess control over these assets are themselves divided into two class locations on the basis of the authority they have over both capital and labour. Managers are those positions that involve both policy-making and resource allocation, including the allocation of both capital and labour resources. In contrast, supervisors are those positions that are only involved in the disciplining of labour -- in the control and surveillance of other employees (Clement and Myles, 1994:17).

The last dimension of the class structure is based upon assets in credentials or scarce skills. . This dimension divides wage workers into two class categories, the working class proper, and autonomous workers (Wright, 1985: 153). It is important to note that autonomous worker refers to the positions in the structure of production and not the necessarily the individuals that occupy those positions. Because these positions require specific credentials or scarce skills, they exist in a different relationship to the means of production than do positions that do not require these assets. The consequence of this is that these positions endow their occupants with an extraordinary degree of control over their own labour process, one not enjoyed by typical wage workers.

The working class is defined as a residual category, those who possess none of the assets discussed above. Wright also makes a distinction, adopted here, between two parts of the working class, the traditional white-collar and blue-collar fractions (1985: 153-154).

Class is operationalized by combining information on (a) employee versus self-employed status, (b) if self-employed, number of employees, (c) the 1991 Standard Occupational classification (Statistics Canada, 1991) and (d) the Pineo-Porter-McRoberts occupational classification. Those who are self-employed are divided into large capitalists -- those with 11 or more employees, small capitalists -- those with between 1 and 10 employees, and petty bourgeoisie -- those with no employees. Managers, supervisors and autonomous workers are identified from the cross-classification of the Standard Occupational and Pineo-Porter-McRoberts classifications, and their status as employees.

The working class as a whole is the residual group, those wage workers not assigned to any of the other categories. The distinction between the white-collar and blue-collar fractions of the working class is based upon a combination of the Standard Occupational and Pineo-Porter-McRoberts occupational categories and mainly reflects the difference between clerical, sales and service positions and those in trades, transport, processing and manufacture. The class categories are operationalized as a set of dummy variables and the distribution of the sample across the class categories is presented in Table 1.

Socio-Demographics

Finally, a set of socio-demographic traits form a baseline model with which we can evaluate the effects of class, status and social capital on the probability of being a volunteer. With the exception of the number of children in specific age groups, these are also operationalized as sets of dummy variables. These variables are:

Region: Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario (reference group), Prairies, B.C.

Gender: males are the reference group.

Marital status: Married/common law (reference group).

Number of children ages 0-4.

Number of children ages 5-12.

Number of children ages 13-14.

Number of children ages 15-18.

Religion: No religion (reference group), Catholic, United church, Other Protestant, Other religion.

Ethnicity: Canada (reference group), USA, South America, United Kingdom, Europe, Africa, Asia/Oceania.

Immigrant: Canadian-born is reference group.

Employed: Currently employed (reference group), Employed in last 12 months.

Analysis

The analysis begins by examining the bivariate relationship between the proportion of people who volunteer and the indicators of class, status and social capital. Each factor is examined separately in bivariate tables of the volunteer participation rates. At issue in this section is whether or not each factor is associated with the probability of volunteering, and how strong that association might be.

Social status and participation

The dominant status model suggests that socio-economic status is one basis of the resources, dispositions and signals that facilitate participation. Assuming that these should increase as status increases, the pattern of participation rates in Table 2 supports the model. Volunteering increases as SES rises, from 29% among the lowest status category to 50% among the highest. However, the increase is not regular across status groups. The largest changes in participation rates occur between groups 3 and 4 and groups 5 and 6. In

Table 2 Proportion Who Volunteer by Status Group

	Volunteer		
	No	Yes	Total
Status Group		%	
SES 6 (Hign)	49.8	50.2	100.0
SES 5	58.0	42.0	100.0
SES 4	57.6	42.4	100.0
SES 3	67.3	32.7	100.0
SES 2	70.4	29.6	100.0
SES 1 (Low)	70.8	29.2	100.0
Total	64.8	35.2	100.0

the way it facilitates volunteering, dominant status may not simply be a question of higher socio-economic status. That is, dominant status may not equate with higher status at any given level of the status hierarchy. Instead, it may mean positions at particular levels of the hierarchy are those that are perceived as dominant status position.

Social capital and participation

The variables, hours of contact and church attendance, measure the tendency for respondents to interact with non-household individuals. As indicators of social capital we would expect those with higher levels of contact and church attendance to be more active in their community and thus to be more likely to be volunteers. The participation rates in Tables 3 and 4 provide contradictory evidence for the social capital model. Rates of participation broken down by hours of contact in Table 3 show an irregular pattern. While those with the lowest hours do show low participation rates, the trend flattens out for those at higher levels. And at 10%, the variation in rates from low to high is not large. This suggests that participation rates are not highly associated with the tendency to interact with non-household individuals.

Table 3 Proportion Who Volunteer by Hours of Contact

Hours of Contact	Volunteer		
	No	Yes	Total
		%	
13+	62.2	37.8	100.0
9-12	64.6	35.4	100.0
5-8	65.0	35.0	100.0
1-4	60.3	39.7	100.0
0	72.6	27.4	100.0
Total	64.8	35.2	100.0

In contrast, rates of volunteering are clearly associated with levels of church attendance. The rates in Table 4 rise from 29% for non-attendees to 51% for those who attend weekly or more. The trend, however, does not appear to be a simple linear effect. Among those

who do attend church the rates go from 34% to 37% for low level attendees and then jump quite sharply to 51% for those who attend weekly. There may be a threshold effect associated with social capital -- only high levels of social capital actually increase participation.

Table 4 Proportion Who Volunteer by Church Attendance

	Volunteer		
	No	Yes	Total
Weeks/Year		%	
52	49.1	50.9	100.0
12	63.1	36.9	100.0
4	64.9	35.1	100.0
1	66.0	34.0	100.0
0	70.9	29.1	100.0
Total	64.8	35.2	100.0

Class and participation

Table 5 shows the participation rates for the eight class categories. What is immediately evident is the wide variation in rates across the class structure -- from a low of 21% in the blue-collar working-class to a high of 50% among autonomous workers. Within this variation are three suggestive patterns. First, among the three class categories defined by ownership of the means of production, the level of participation increases with the amount of capital owned (as measured by the number of employees) -- from 38% for the petty bourgeoisie to 46% for large capitalists.

Table 5 Proportion Who Volunteer by Social Class

Class	Volunteer No	Yes	Total
		%	
Large Capitalist	53.9	46.1	100.0
Small Capitalist	55.8	44.2	100.0
Petty Bourgoisie	62.2	37.8	100.0
Upper Managers	58.7	41.3	100.0
Supervisors	68.9	31.1	100.0
Autonomous Workers	49.3	50.7	100.0
White Collar workers	65.3	34.7	100.0
Blue Collar Workers	79.2	20.8	100.0
Total	64.8	35.2	100.0

Second, among individuals who have varying levels of control over the labour process (either in terms of their own work or that of others), those with only nominal control, supervisors, show low levels of participation at 31%, while those with extensive control, high-level managers, are at 41%. Those with marked control over their own labour, the autonomous workers, show the highest absolute level of participation at 51%. One argument related to occupational characteristics suggests that the experience of managing people and resources provides skills that facilitate volunteer participation (Wilson and Musick, 1997b). The pattern for high-level managers and supervisors supports this contention. However, the high rate for autonomous workers does not quite fit the pattern and may reflect a different effect. In class terms these positions that are less distinctive for their control over people and resources than for control over their own labour, and skill scarcity in the labour market. Why this could facilitate participation is unclear unless that same skill scarcity makes them more often the target of active recruitment by voluntary organizations. But in this case it may be more directly related to the production of a

specific disposition toward volunteering that has been linked to possession of university credentials. Most of the individuals (70%) in these positions have a bachelor's degree or higher and may show the increased sense of social responsibility presumed to go along with a university education. However, there is evidence that this effect is not simply due to exposure to a university education. If this were the case, then class would be irrelevant to this effect. In other words, the association between university exposure and volunteering should hold regardless of an individual's class. Table 6 shows that this is not the case -- the link between university education and volunteering does not hold for large

Table 6 Proportion Who Volunteer by Class and Education

Class	% With Degree	% Volunteers Non-Univ	% Volunteers Univ Degree
Large Capitalist	32.2	41.0	57.1
Small Capitalist	24.9	42.7	47.9
Petty Bourgoisie	24.9	33.6	49.7 **
Upper Managerial	40.2	36.0	49.0 **
Supervisors	20.6	29.9	35.6
Autonomous Workers	69.8	41.6	54.9 **
White Collar workers	20.2	32.6	42.4 **
Blue Collar Workers	2.9	20.4	33.3
Total	24.4	31.2	47.6

** Difference between participation rates for University and Non-University is significant at 0.05 level of confidence

and small capitalists, for supervisors, nor among blue-collar workers. In these four categories there is no association between having a university degree and the rates of participation. The relationship does hold, however, for the petty bourgeoisie, high-level managers, autonomous and white-collar workers. So would appear that it is not simply

exposure to university, as measured by a degree, that is at work among autonomous workers.

The third pattern in Table 5 occurs between the two working-class fractions. Those whose work situation is differentiated mainly by the traditional manual-nonmanual split show distinct differences in participation rates. Volunteering has been described as a middle-class phenomenon, and the white-collar fraction of the working class has long aspired to middle class status. Thus we see here the tendency for those in nonmanual positions to behave like middle-class individuals. The traditional proletariat, the manual workers show a distinctly lower tendency to participate as volunteers.

Models of volunteer participation

Each of the three factors appear to be associated with the rates of participation, but these are only the bivariate relationships. Each factors is known to be associated with other attributes of individuals that are not specifically attributes of their class, status or social capital, but that do affect volunteering. As a result, the effect of other attributes on volunteering may be confounded with the effects of class, status and social capital. To identify the unique contribution of each factor requires a multivariate approach. To this end we estimate a number of logistic regression models that predict the probability of being a volunteer. The analysis begins with a baseline model of socio-demographic factors that are known to be significant factors in predicting volunteering. Once a suitable socio-demographic model is established, we can analyse the contribution of class, status and social capital to an understanding a volunteer participation rates by examining how

they improve the predictive power of the logistic model. In addition, the impact of these factors on participation can also be assessed by examining their effect on the estimated probabilities of being a volunteer.

There's a second reason for including socio-demographic traits in the models. Class and status both represent structures of inequality in society at large. But other dimensions of inequality exist that may reinforce or offset the effect of these hierarchies -- in particular are distinctions based on gender and ethnicity at (e.g., Clement and Myles, 1994: 33-39). To the extent that these structures of inequality correlate with those of class or status, they need to be explicitly included in the model of volunteering.

In addition, the development and testing of the three factors has an intrinsic logic that is important for assessing the impact of each factor. In particular, theoretical conceptualizations of social capital suggest it should be seen as an endogenous variable in models of volunteering that include class and status. Social capital should be treated as being a (possible) consequence of class or status position. Certainly in Bourdieu's discussion of social capital, it is a consequence of class position (1986: 252-253). Dominant class categories can amass greater levels of social capital and receive greater returns on its investment. It is less clear in the dominant status model that social capital is a consequence of social status, but some research suggests that this is the case. In Lin's (1999) work on status attainment, social capital is explicitly treated as a consequence of social status. With reference to volunteering, Wilson and Musick (1998) suggest that not only do those with higher status tend to have more social capital, but also that there is an

amplification effect such that their use of capital produces greater returns than would be the case for lower status individuals with the same level of social capital. These considerations shape the way we will evaluate the impact of the three factors on the probability of volunteering. Because social capital is partly a consequence of class and status, its will only enter the equations once class and/or status are already in the model.

The overall impact of class, status and social capital

The results of the modelling process are shown in Table 7. The first model represents the basic socio-demographic traits that have statistically significant effects on the probability of being a volunteer. These include region, gender, marital status, children under 18, religion, ethnicity, immigrant status, and currently employed. Age was tested and found not to be a significant predictor. These factors together account for a significant reduction in the deviance (X^2= 338.0, df=23, $p < .00$). However, they account for only about 9% of the total deviance (R^2 for the full model) and thus are not very good predictors of the probability of volunteering. This implies that there are other important variables, not available in the GSS data, that also predict volunteering. Although the models we test all have low overall predictive power, the effects we examine all significantly add to the fit of the models and substantially increase their explanatory power.

The first question concerning the models is how much improvement in prediction occurs when class and status are separately added to the baseline model. Models 2 and 3 show that adding class (model 2) adds about 3.6% to the explained deviance (R^2 due to the added effect), while status adds about 2.9% (model 3). The effects of the two factors are

not very different, although adding social class accounts for more explained deviance than does status.

Table 7 Logistic Regressions of Class, Status, and Social Capital on the Probability of being a Volunteer

Model	Baseline Model	Added Effect	Full Model				Due to Added Effect			
			X^2	df	R^2	Correctly Predicted %	X^2	df	p-value	R^2
1	Socio-Demographics (SD)		388.0	23	0.091	62.2			0.00	0.091
2	SD	Class	549.5	30	0.127	63.5	161.5	7	0.00	0.036
3	SD	Status	514.9	28	0.120	63.1	129.0	5	0.00	0.029
4	SD	Capital	569.1	31	0.131	63.7	182.8	8	0.00	0.040
5	SD + Class	Status	581.0	35	0.134	63.8	33.2	5	0.00	0.007
6	SD + Status	Class	581.0	35	0.134	63.8	66.1	7	0.00	0.014
7	SD + Class	Capital	722.3	38	0.165	65.1	174.4	8	0.00	0.038
8	SD + Status	Capital	694.0	36	0.159	65.1	181.6	8	0.00	0.390
9	SD + Status + Class	Capital	756.4	43	0.172	65.5	177.3	8	0.00	0.038

More interesting are the models that add class or status once the other factor is already in the model. These two factors are correlated -- in theory and in the population. By construction socio-economic status is a linear function of education and income, while class is partially dependent on education, and is a causal factor in income determination (Wright and Perrone, 1979). Adding each one, once the other is in the model, identifies the unique contribution of each to the probability of volunteering. The change in R^2 due to status, once class is in the model, is about 0.7% (model 5), while the contribution of

class, once status is in the model, is about 1.4% (model 6) -- about twice that of status. Net of their joint effect on volunteering, class has a larger impact than status.

The final model in Table 7 (model 9) shows the impact of adding social capital to the model which already contains class and status, along with the baseline socio-demographic traits. Overall, this model accounts for a respectable 17% of the deviance, and social capital itself accounts for 3.8%. Clearly, social capital is the most important of the three factors in predicting volunteering. This is also evident in models 4, 7 and 8. When social capital is added to the baseline socio-demographic model it increases R^2 by about 4% (model 4). When social capital is added to the models containing either class or status (models 7 and 8), it increase R^2 by about 3.8%. Regardless of whether class or status is in the model, the improvement in fit due to social capital doesn't change. Not only is this evidence for the importance of social capital in predicting volunteering, it also suggests that class and status are not important determinants of social capital.

Examining the contribution to explained deviance is not the only way to assess the effects of the three factors. As important is the question of how each affects the substantive probability of being a volunteer. This can be addressed by comparing the three factors in terms of the differences in the estimated probability of volunteering and is accomplished by converting the logistic regression coefficients into the estimated probabilities associated with each effect. In doing so, the model 9 in Table 7 is modified slightly by removing non-significant categories among the socio-demographic variables. The full model with coefficients and significance levels is presented in Table 8.

Table 8 Final Model of the Impact of Class, Status and Social Capital on the Probability of Volunteering

Variables*	b	Standard Error	p-value	Exp(b)
Constant	-1.693	0.174	0.000	
Prairies	0.208	0.080	0.010	1.23
BC	0.514	0.093	0.000	1.67
(Atlantic,Quebec, Ontario)				
Children 0-4	-0.234	0.067	0.001	0.79
Children 5-12	0.334	0.042	0.000	1.40
Children 13-15	0.468	0.099	0.000	1.60
Children 15-18	0.248	0.072	0.001	1.28
Catholic	-0.465	0.066	0.000	0.63
(all others)				
South American	-0.506	0.225	0.025	0.60
European	-0.297	0.096	0.002	0.74
Asian	-0.807	0.156	0.000	0.45
(Canadians, UK,USA, Africa)				
Immigrant (Canadian-born=0)	-0.438	0.097	0.000	0.65
Employed (Working=0)	-0.489	0.107	0.000	0.61
Large Capitalist	1.127	0.253	0.000	3.09
Small Capitalist	0.984	0.158	0.000	2.68
Petty Bourgoisie	0.691	0.125	0.000	2.00
Upper Manages	0.588	0.156	0.000	1.80
Supervisors	0.513	0.178	0.004	1.67
Autonomous Workers	0.983	0.155	0.000	2.67
White Collar workers	0.553	0.100	0.000	1.74
(Blue Collar Workers)				
SES 6	0.638	0.168	0.000	1.89
SES 5	0.473	0.139	0.001	1.60
SES 4	0.569	0.104	0.000	1.77
SES 3	0.203	0.104	0.051	1.23
SES 2	0.144	0.099	0.146	1.16
(SES 1)				
Hours 13+	0.600	0.138	0.000	1.82
Hours 9-12	0.465	0.100	0.000	1.59
Hours 5-8	0.326	0.097	0.001	1.39
Hours 1-4	0.463	0.097	0.000	1.59
(Hours 0)				
Church 52/yr	1.200	0.090	0.000	3.32
Church 12/yr	0.533	0.103	0.000	1.70
Church 4/yr	0.465	0.081	0.000	1.59
Church 1/yr	0.477	0.112	0.000	1.61
(church 0/yr)				

* Excluded category (reference group) is indicated in brackets

Converting the logistic coefficients to estimated probabilities requires that we solve the equation for specified values of the independent variables. With the exception of the number of children at various ages, all variables in the full model are represented by sets of dummy variables. Coefficients for categories represented by the dummy variables reflect the difference between each category and the excluded reference group in the probability of volunteering. This makes it relatively easy to calculate the actual probabilities. If we examine a hypothetical individual who represents the reference group on all the socio-demographic traits, and who has no children, their probability of volunteering simply the exponent of the constant in the equation (the natural antilog of the constant). For any of the dummy effects, the estimated probability is simply the constant plus the coefficient for that effect. To determine the effect of being in a particular category, we compare their probability to that of the reference group. Since the reference group represents those individuals with the lowest probability of being volunteers for the class, status and social capital factors, this comparison shows the size of the effect for the relevant category. These calculations are presented in Table 9. The first column shows the estimated probability of volunteering, while the second column shows the difference between each category and the reference group.

Several patterns that help explain the results in the model evaluation section earlier are evident in Table 9. The strongest effect is found in one of the social capital factors – church attendance. The maximum difference in the probability of volunteering for the

social capital factor occurs for the highest level of church attendance (prob=.38), this group is more than twice as likely to volunteer as those who never attend church (the

Table 9 Estimated Probabilities of Volunteering by Class, Status and Social Capital

	Estimated Probability of Volunteering	Difference between Category and Reference Group
Reference Group	0.155	
Social Class		
Large Capitalist	0.362	0.207
Small Capitalist	0.330	0.175
Petty Bourgoisie	0.269	0.113
Upper Managers	0.249	0.093
Supervisors	0.235	0.080
Autonomous Workers	0.330	0.174
White Collar workers	0.242	0.087
(Blue Collar Workers)		
Socio-Economic Status		
SES6	0.258	0.103
SES5	0.228	0.073
SES4	0.245	0.090
SES3*	0.184	0.029
SES2*	0.175	0.020
(SES1 Low)		
Social Capital		
HRS4	0.251	0.096
HRS3	0.227	0.071
HRS2	0.203	0.048
HRS1	0.226	0.071
(Hours0 low)		
CHUR4	0.379	0.224
CHUR3	0.239	0.083
CHUR2	0.227	0.071
CHUR1	0.229	0.073
(Church0 low)		

* Coefficient is not significant at 0.05 confidence level

reference group at prob=.16). The other measure of social capital, hours of contact, has

weaker effects on volunteering -- those in the highest category of this variable are only 10 points higher than the reference group. This suggests that the degree of connectedness represented by interaction with non-household individuals is not a major influence on volunteering. In contrast, church attendance does have a major effect. The fact that it is mainly among those who are active where attendance has a large effect indicates that a high level of involvement and commitment is crucial to this aspect of social capital. The impact on volunteering for those who attend less is distinctly lower -- the probabilities range from 7 to 8 points higher than the reference group. The same is true for contact hours-- there is a distinct jump in the probabilities for those in the most active category.

The pattern across status groups suggest two distinct levels of volunteering -- those in the three lowest groups have about the same probability of volunteering (note that groups 2 and 3 are not statistically different from the reference group in this model), and further tests of the coefficients for groups 4, 5 and 6 show that they are not statistically different. Thus there are effectively two status effects -- one for the three lowest groups and one for the three highest groups.. This does not contradict the basic tenets of the dominant status model, but is problematic for the idea that socio-economic status is equivalent to dominant status. As noted earlier, the notion that SES reflects dominant status implies that the resources, dispositions toward volunteering, and signals based on status will increase monotonically as status rises. Given two individuals with different status, regardless of the level of that status, the higher will be more likely to be a volunteer than the lower. The evidence here does not support that proposition. The likelihood of volunteering does not

steadily increase as status increases. If, on the other hand, dominant status is taken to mean particular "socially approved" roles, the bifurcation of the status distribution may reflect a split between the approved roles and those that are less approved. But if dominant status is interpreted in these terms, then non-dominant statuses, such as being female or black (African ethnicity) should reduce the probability of volunteering. Since these effects are not significant in the full model, this is not universally the case. Thus whether dominant status is taken as a question of degree (the SES effect) or of categories (the role effect), the full model supports neither position.

The pattern of effects for the class variables is the most complex of all the factors. The strongest class effect, that of the large capitalists, is on a par with the strongest effect in the table, that of the most active church-goers. The probability of volunteering for large capitalists is 0.36 (21 points higher than the reference group) while for active attendees it is 0.38 (22 points higher than the reference group). This accords with the earlier finding that class and social capital have the largest impact on the fit of the models.

Figure 1 shows how the class categories would be arranged if ranked on the basis of their probability of volunteering, and the boxes enclose categories that, statistically, have the same probability of volunteering. The class categories fall into three broad groups -- at the highest level are the large and small capitalist, autonomous workers, and the petty bourgeoisie. In the second group are the petty bourgeoisie, high managers, white-collar workers and supervisors. Alone in the lowest group are blue-collar workers. Note that the

petty bourgeoisie are in both the top and the middle groups -- they occupy a position that is clearly between these two groups in terms of their probability of being a volunteer.

Figure 1 Grouping Class Categories on the Basis of Significantly Different Estimated Probabilities of Volunteering



The overall impression from Figure 1 is that the clusters follow the distribution of the three basic attributes that define class position: assets in production (ownership of capital), organizational control (managerial control) and scarce skills. Figure 2 is the relational diagram Wright uses to describe his re-conceptualization of the class structure (1978: 63). If we map the probabilities from the full model onto this structure the pattern is strongly suggestive. With one exception, they mirror the distinction between the classes. Along two of the three axes, the probabilities increase as one moves “up” the axis. The exception,

Figure 2 Mapping the Estimated Probabilities of Volunteering onto the Class Structure



autonomous workers, do not appear to fit between the petty bourgeoisie and the working-class. Since advanced educational credentials are typical of this category, this may simply be the education effect as discussed earlier. However, when we include a variable representing having a university degree in the final model, the probability for autonomous workers only declines from 0.33 to 0.29 -- still higher than the petty bourgeoisie. So it is not simply having a high level education that distinguishes these positions in terms of volunteering. Nor is it simply a reflection of the economic resources they possess. As Table 10 shows, although autonomous workers do tend to have higher income than the petty bourgeoisie, they have lower income than high-level managers and yet they are distinctly more likely to volunteer than are managers. Clearly income cannot entirely

account for their exceptional rate of volunteering. For this particular class category, the answer may lie more with the consequences of the position in terms of the disposition toward volunteering, and perhaps also the signalling function, than in the economic resources they possessed. The distribution of income across class categories

Table 10 Average Household and Income by Class

Class	HHld Income 000s	Personal Income 000s
Large Capitalist	77.8	61.7
Small Capitalist	67.8	54.3
Petty Bourgoisie	55.3	36.2
Upper Managers	75.8	55.3
Supervisors	56.8	40.0
Autonomous Workers	73.6	49.6
White Collar workers	53.3	31.7
Blue Collar Workers	51.1	36.9

also contradicts any suggestion that the class categories themselves simply reflect differences in economic resources (i.e. income) -- the petty bourgeoisie have lower household and personal income than managers and supervisors yet their probability of volunteering is distinctly higher.

Overall, the pattern of probabilities across the class structure strongly suggests that this factor is important in determining who will volunteer. But more research is clearly needed that directly connects the attributes of class position with the tendency to volunteer.

Conclusions

In evaluating the relative impact of class, status, and social capital on the likelihood of volunteering, several conclusions may be drawn. First, the analysis shows that socio-economic status is not an important factor in determining the probability of volunteering. To the extent that SES reflects a valid test of the dominant status model, the latter finds little support. The absence of dominant status effects, such as gender and ethnicity, in the socio-demographic component of the model supports this conclusion.

In contrast, both class and social capital have significant impact on the probability of volunteering, with the strongest being the church attendance measure of social capital. Surprisingly, level of interaction with individuals outside the household is only a weak predictor of volunteering. This may be due to the fact that this measure does not distinguish between activities that would directly qualify as network building or maintenance, and those that are simply casual interactions with others. A more direct measure of networking would be desirable. In addition, as a measure of social capital, church attendance seems to have a threshold effect -- is only those are very active in the church (weekly attendance or more) who show the elevated tendency to volunteer. Whether this is due to the greater resources available through greater connectedness or is simply a function of greater exposure is unclear. In any event, the suggestion made earlier that social capital is mainly an intra-class phenomenon is not borne out. Even when class differences are accounted for, social capital has a strong and independent effect on the likelihood of volunteering. In other words, even within a given class, differences in social capital are associated with differences in volunteering.

Class does not make quite as strong a contribution to explaining the probability volunteering as does social capital, but the pattern of volunteering does closely follow the distribution of the assets that define the classes. Importantly, this co-incidence does not appear to be simply due to income or education effects. In this sense it is not simply economic resources that seem to matter in the different levels of volunteering. In a similar manner, the level of volunteering among the autonomous workers appears to be related to their condition of employment and not simply to their (unusually) high level of education.

In sum, the evidence suggests that class and social capital -- factors Bourdieu says are intimately related in capitalist societies -- are important determinants of the likelihood of being a volunteer. Social status has an impact, but it is clearly less important and less consistent than the other two factors.

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